Lesson 28: Vayikra

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• A substantive act of worship.
• Invalidating and non-invalidating rules.
• The connection between the content of a mitzvah (commandment) and its halakhic (Jewish legal) character.

Summary

In this week’s essay we deal with a very fundamental concept in the laws of consecrated offerings: the intention of lishmah (“for its own sake”) and shelo lishmah (“not for its own sake”). The Mishnah in Zevahim presents six intentions required at the time a sacrifice is offered; in certain circumstances their absence even impairs the sacrifice’s ability to be accepted and effect atonement, and in rarer cases it can even disqualify it entirely. These intentions define the rule of lishmah, but the two primary ones are changing the sacrificial designation (offering a burnt offering as a burnt offering, and not as another sacrifice) and changing the owner (offering it for the one who is to receive atonement, and not for someone else).

We distinguish between the rule of lishmah and the general question of intention in mitzvot. We then address the question whether lishmah is directed only to the officiating priest or also to the owners of the sacrifice; on this there is a dispute among the tannaim (Mishnaic sages) and the rishonim (medieval authorities). We then briefly discuss what happens when the officiating priest did not intend lishmah: did he disqualify the sacrifice or not? We also ask whether there is a prohibition against thinking shelo lishmah.

We present disputes among the rishonim regarding the very existence of such a prohibition and regarding its scope: does it apply only to acts that actually disqualify the sacrifice, or to any improper intention?

Later we address the question why an improper intention in fact does not disqualify the sacrifice. The Gemara itself asks this, and Tosafot raises in this context the principle that “Scripture must repeat a rule in order for noncompliance to be invalidating” — that is, for a rule in the sacrificial realm to be indispensable, it must appear twice in the Bible. This principle is unique to consecrated offerings and does not exist elsewhere in the Torah. We present the view of Ritva — and perhaps opposing views as well — according to which this principle applies only to positive commandments and not to prohibitions. We then qualify this by distinguishing between abstentions and actions, a distinction that pertains to the content of the commandment and not necessarily to the formal halakhic categories of negative and positive commandments.

In the third chapter we propose an explanation for the principle that “Scripture must repeat a rule in order for noncompliance to be invalidating” in light of a distinction drawn in the laws of prayer. Our main claim is that worship is a concept prior to halakha, and halakha usually does not uproot our intuitions about it, but rather adds to them. Therefore, when someone does something not in accordance with halakhic instructions, there is still here a substantive act of worship, and it retains value as service of God. Only in cases where the Torah explicitly tells us that it intends to uproot the intuitive concept — when it repeats a positive commandment twice, or when it imposes a prohibition — does it actually do so. This is the uniqueness of the sacrificial realm in this respect.

In light of this idea we propose an explanation for the distinction between abstentions and actions, and also for what seems to emerge from the Gemara: that the rule of lishmah ought to be invalidating even when there is only one command concerning it. Here the principle that “Scripture must repeat a rule in order for noncompliance to be invalidating” is not applicable.

We then propose an explanation for another unique feature of halakhic interpretation in the sacrificial passages: “one does not derive from what is itself derived.” Our claim is that this too is another facet of the limited force of commandments in the sacrificial realm. If one command is not itself invalidating, then a derivation, which is a lower-level command, is even less binding. And a derivation from a derivation is simply not acceptable in the sacrificial realm. It is insufficient to uproot the substantive act of worship that exists even without it.

The Rules and Principles Emerging from the Article

On Lishmah

A View of the Realm of Consecrated Offerings

A. The Rule of Lishmah in Sacrifices

Introduction: Intention and Lishmah

As is well known, sacrifices are subject to a rule that they must be offered lishmah. Tractate Zevahim, which opens the Mishnah’s order devoted to consecrated offerings, begins with a discussion of this rule, and so do many commentators on the Talmud.

The rule of lishmah also appears in several other halakhic contexts, such as spinning threads for ritual fringes, preparing hides for phylacteries, mezuzot, and Torah scrolls, writing a bill of divorce, writing sacred scrolls, circumcision, and more. There is a tendency to connect the rule of lishmah with the rule of intention in mitzvot,¹ but it is quite clear that these are two entirely different rules. It is commonly accepted that the rule of lishmah is independent of the dispute among the Sages and the halakhic decisors over whether mitzvot require intention; see Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 95b and parallels.

The difference between these two rules can be seen from two main perspectives:

1. From the standpoint of legal context. The rule of intention accompanies the act of performing the mitzvah. The rule of lishmah, by contrast, accompanies the preparation of the object for its mitzvah, before the mitzvah itself is performed. Hence it is generally understood that lishmah is a rule governing the object itself: it forms part of the character of the object designated for the mitzvah. Intention, by contrast, accompanies only the act of the person performing it and does not pertain to ritual objects; intention is required even in mitzvot that are not performed upon, or by means of, objects.
2. From the standpoint of content. The rule of intention requires that we intend to perform the mitzvah because we were commanded by God to do so, in order to fulfill our obligation. The focus, then, is on our reason and motivation in performing the act. The rule of lishmah, by contrast, is future-oriented: I process the hide for the sake of phylacteries. Here the focus is the intended purpose of the object in question.

Thus, lishmah is a special rule that exists with respect to some ritual objects, where the process of preparation includes dedicating them to the mitzvah. Not all rules of lishmah are identical. For example, the rule of lishmah in the writing of a bill of divorce is somewhat exceptional, because there it means writing for the sake of the specific woman being divorced, and not merely for the sake of divorce in general. The concept of lishmah also appears with respect to Torah study — “Torah for its own sake” — and there too it seems to be an exceptional case. The rule of lishmah in sacrifices is also unusual in several respects, and this week we will focus mainly on it.

The Source of the Rule

The prophets state in several places that there is no point in bringing sacrifices as a merely technical act without intention — “What need have I of your many sacrifices?” and the like. Thus thought and orientation are central elements in the sacrificial service. What exactly is that “intention”? At first glance, it would seem to be the rule of lishmah described above. But below we shall see that this is not clear, and probably that is not what they meant.

The Mishnah at the end of chapter 4 of Zevahim states:

Mishnah: A sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things: for the sake of the sacrifice, for the sake of the offerer, for the sake of God, for the sake of the fire-offerings, for the sake of aroma, for the sake of pleasing acceptance; and the sin offering and guilt offering are for the sake of sin.

The source for most of these rules is brought from the verse in our parashah dealing with the burnt offering, Leviticus 1:9:

Its entrails and its legs he shall wash with water; and the priest shall turn the whole into smoke on the altar: a burnt offering, a fire-offering, an aroma of pleasing acceptance to the Lord.

The Gemara, Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim 46b, derives from here five intentions — one rule of lishmah from each of the five words at the end of the verse. The rule “for the sake of the offerer” is derived from a different source:

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: “Burnt offering” — for the sake of a burnt offering, excluding for the sake of a peace offering, which does not count. “Fire-offering” — for the sake of a fire-offering, excluding as a mere roast, which does not count. “Aroma” — for the sake of aroma, excluding limbs that were roasted and then brought up, which does not count. For Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: if limbs were roasted and then brought up, they do not involve the category of pleasing aroma. “Pleasing acceptance” — for the sake of giving pleasure to the Lord. “To the Lord” — for the sake of Him who spoke and the world came into being.

We learn from here that the rule of lishmah in sacrifices includes six elements: for the sake of the sacrifice — to slaughter a burnt offering as a burnt offering, and not as another sacrifice. For the sake of the offerer — to slaughter it on behalf of its owners and not of another person; this is derived from other verses in the Zevahim discussion on 4a-4b. For the sake of God — and not for someone else. For the sake of the fire-offerings — for burning on the altar, and not for roasting on coals. For the sake of aroma — for roasting on the altar, and not for being brought up after roasting, when there is no longer aroma on the altar. For the sake of pleasing acceptance — to give God satisfaction by fulfilling His will. And with the sin offering and guilt offering, which are sacrifices brought because of sin, one must intend atonement for the sin for which the sacrifice was brought.

The Owners and the Priest in the Rule of Lishmah

Later in the Mishnah in Zevahim we find an opinion that this rule is not indispensable:

Rabbi Yose said: Even if one did not have in mind any one of these, it is valid, for it is a stipulation of the court that intention follows only the officiant.

The rishonim explain this Mishnah in two ways. According to Rashi, the dispute concerns the rule of lishmah with respect to the officiating priest. According to the first tanna, there is an initial requirement that the sacrifice be offered lishmah, whereas according to Rabbi Yose the Sages enacted that one should not say “for its own sake” explicitly, but rather slaughter without specification, lest he become confused and say “not for its own sake.” According to this reading, the latter clause of the Mishnah — “for intention follows only the officiant” — is an independent rule. Indeed, some manuscripts read here “and intention follows only the officiant,” with a conjunctive “and,” rather than “for.”²

Maimonides, by contrast, explains the passage in his Commentary on the Mishnah as follows:

This tanna requires that the owner of the sacrifice intend these six things in addition to the slaughterer. Rabbi Yose says that it is a stipulation of the court that we are concerned only with the intention of the officiant alone — that is, the slaughterer, or the one who receives the blood, or the one who carries it, or the one who sprinkles it — but not the owner of the sacrifice. And the law follows Rabbi Yose. Accordingly, the view of one who says that the owners can render an offering piggul is rejected, and the matter of intention depends only on one engaged in one of the four services, as explained earlier.

Maimonides explains that the dispute is over to whom the requirement of lishmah is directed. The first tanna maintains that the requirement applies both to the owners and to the officiating priest, whereas Rabbi Yose maintains that it applies only to the officiating priest. According to Maimonides, the latter clause of the Mishnah explains Rabbi Yose’s opinion: the intention is required only of the officiating priest.

The law follows Rabbi Yose, and therefore, according to all the ways of reading the Mishnah, these intentions are not required of the owners. The requirement of lishmah is directed only to the officiating priests, and according to most opinions only in the four blood rites: slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying it, and sprinkling it. If we return for a moment to the prophetic rebukes, the conclusion is that they most likely were not speaking about the rule of lishmah.³

The Zevahim 4 Discussion

The Gemara in Zevahim 4a-4b discusses the rule of lishmah at length. The intentions discussed there are only “for the sake of the sacrifice” and “for the sake of the offerer”; the other intentions do not appear there at all. In the discussion on 46b, however, no source at all is given for the requirement “for the sake of the offerer.” Slaughtering for the sake of a different owner is called by the Sages “change of owner.” The intention “for the sake of the sacrifice,” whose violation is called “change of designation,” is derived there from the word “burnt offering.” By contrast, in Zevahim 4 a different source is brought for the rule of changing the designation.

In fact, several early and later authorities saw contradictions between these two discussions and proposed various distinctions to reconcile them. We should note here that from the wording of Maimonides in Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Sacrificial Rite 4:11, it appears that these six requirements were stated only regarding a burnt offering and not regarding the other sacrifices.⁴ His language suggests that only the two intentions of changing the designation and changing the owner exist in all sacrifices. Tosafot at the beginning of Zevahim raises the possibility that the discussion on 46b concerns the burning of the sacrificial portions, whereas the discussion on 4 concerns the other blood rites.

The Intention of Shelo Lishmah

So far we have seen that there is a requirement of lishmah during the sacrificial service, at least in the four blood rites. What happens if the priest did not think lishmah? Is that a prohibition? Does the sacrifice become disqualified as a result? This is a broad discussion, and here we will present only the main points.

The first Mishnah in Zevahim states:

All sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their own sake are valid, except that they do not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation — except for the Passover offering and the sin offering.

The Mishnah says that an intention of shelo lishmah does not disqualify the sacrifice; it is offered in the normal way. The Gemara explains that one may not continue changing it either — that is, if a burnt offering was slaughtered not for its own sake, it is forbidden to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake. Still, it does not count for the owners toward fulfilling their obligation. The two exceptions are the Passover offering and the sin offering; if they were offered not for their own sake, they are disqualified as sacrifices. Later in the Mishnah it is brought that according to Rabbi Eliezer, the guilt offering too is disqualified like the Passover offering and the sin offering.

Thus, there are sacrifices that become disqualified in the absence of lishmah, and there are sacrifices that, in the absence of lishmah, simply do not count for the owners toward their obligation — that is, they are not accepted and do not atone. The problem of an intention of shelo lishmah can be understood in two ways:

1. The sacrifices are disqualified, or fail to gain acceptance, because the intention of lishmah is missing from the offering. This is the state of affairs in other halakhic contexts where lishmah is required; when it is absent, the matzah or the phylacteries are invalid.
2. The sacrifices are disqualified because an intention of shelo lishmah actively disqualifies them. That is, not only is lishmah absent, but there is also a shelo lishmah intention that actively disqualifies the sacrifice, or actively prevents its acceptance.

Rabbi Yitzhak Zev Soloveitchik proves that both of these aspects exist together; see Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, Shiurei HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein, Zevahim, p. 53 and onward.

Beyond an intention of shelo lishmah, there is also an intention of piggul, which certainly disqualifies the sacrifice. Here we are speaking of an intention connected in one way or another to the sprinkling of the blood, indicating an intention to sprinkle the blood after its proper time or outside its proper place. This is a different and very intricate discussion, and it does not directly concern the laws of lishmah, so we will not enter into it here.

A Note on the Types of Disqualifying Shelo Lishmah Intentions

It should be noted that Maimonides rules that the shelo lishmah intention that disqualifies sacrifices is only a change of designation or a change of owner — the two that appear in the discussion in Zevahim 4. The other intentions are only initial requirements, perhaps only in burnt offerings, and their absence has no effect at all on the sacrifice. Thus he writes in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Disqualified Consecrated Offerings 13:1:

There are three intentions that disqualify sacrifices, and these are they: the intention of changing the designation, the intention of place, and the intention of time. What is the intention of changing the designation? One who slaughters a sacrifice not for its proper designation — for example, it was a burnt offering and he thinks that it is a peace offering; or he slaughters it for the sake of both a burnt offering and a peace offering; or for the sake of a peace offering and a burnt offering; or he slaughters the sacrifice not for the sake of its owners — this is the intention of changing the designation.

B. “Scripture Must Repeat It” to Make It Invalidating: Is There a Prohibition in an Intention of Shelo Lishmah?

Introduction

In this chapter we will consider a unique exegetical phenomenon in the realm of consecrated offerings. In sacrificial law there is a rule that if the verse commands us to do something, that alone does not make it indispensable to the validity of the sacrifice. Only if Scripture repeats the command a second time does the rule become invalidating. We will see an application of this principle with respect to the rule of lishmah, and we will propose an explanation for it based on the distinctive character of the sacrificial realm.

“We Require That Scripture Repeat It in Order for Noncompliance to Be Invalidating”⁵

In Zevahim 4b, after the rule of changing the designation is derived, the Gemara asks: “But perhaps, where one slaughtered not for their own sake, they should be disqualified?” That is, why should the absence of lishmah not disqualify the sacrifice, whereas, as we saw in the previous chapter, in most cases an intention of shelo lishmah does not disqualify it?

Tosafot, in the gloss beginning “But perhaps,” asks: how could the Gemara have wanted to disqualify the sacrifice because of the absence of lishmah? In consecrated offerings there is a rule that “Scripture must repeat it in order for noncompliance to be invalidating.” If so, in the case of a changed designation the sacrifice should not need to be disqualified, since there is only one source that requires it.⁶

Tosafot resolves this through a discussion of the details of the passage, and that is not our concern here. We will instead consider another resolution, found in Responsa Hatam Sofer, Hoshen Mishpat, addenda, sec. 204, in the name of Rabbi David Deutsch — hereafter: Rabbi David Deutsch — which is based on Ritva’s remarks in tractate Yoma.

The Distinction Between Positive and Negative Commandments

Ritva on Yoma 53 explains that Rava in that discussion holds that there is a warning not to bring the incense without the ingredient that causes its smoke to rise, and therefore an additional verse is not needed to teach that the requirement is indispensable. His point is that with prohibitions — that is, negative commandments — the rule that “Scripture must repeat it in order for noncompliance to be invalidating” does not apply. That rule exists only with positive commandments, not with prohibitions.⁷

According to this, Rabbi David Deutsch explains that since there is a prohibition against entertaining an intention of shelo lishmah — that is, against changing the designation — we are dealing here with a negative commandment, and therefore no additional source is needed to teach that the requirement is invalidating. But the prohibition against thinking a changed designation is not universally accepted, and Hatam Sofer already notes this there.⁸

Is There a Prohibition in an Intention of Shelo Lishmah?

Rabbi David Deutsch claims that there is a negative prohibition against entertaining an intention of shelo lishmah. He cites as a source Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Disqualified Consecrated Offerings 18:1, where he writes:

Anyone who entertains an improper intention regarding consecrated offerings violates a negative commandment, for it says: “It shall not be reckoned.”

Maimonides understands the verse “It shall not be reckoned” as a negative prohibition against entertaining an improper intention.⁹ Maimonides’ source is the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim 29b:

Rabbi Yannai said: From where do we know that one who forms an intention regarding consecrated offerings receives lashes? Scripture says: “It shall not be reckoned”…

The Gemara concludes there that one is not flogged for this prohibition because it involves no act. In that discussion it is not clear exactly which intention is meant, but from the context it appears somewhat more likely that it is an intention of piggul. Rabbi David Deutsch assumes that the intention in question also includes shelo lishmah — that is, that the prohibition also applies to an intention of shelo lishmah, and not only to piggul. This indeed seems to follow from Maimonides’ wording, which speaks of any “improper intention,” not specifically of piggul. The same can also be seen in Rashi to Zevahim 2b, in the comment beginning “and voluntary,” where he applies the prohibition of “It shall not be reckoned” to an intention of shelo lishmah.¹⁰

However, Rabbi David Deutsch himself already notes that from the continuation of Maimonides’ words it appears that the “improper intention” is not every instance of shelo lishmah, for in halakhah 2 there he writes:

By oral tradition they learned that included within this rule is that one must not damage consecrated offerings through thought, for this resembles inflicting a blemish on consecrated property; nevertheless he is not flogged, because thought is not an act.

It appears from his words here that the intention prohibited by the negative command “It shall not be reckoned” is only an intention that actually disqualifies the sacrifice, and not every improper intention. Such an intention would be only piggul, or an intention of shelo lishmah in the case of the Passover offering and the sin offering.

This also emerges from the words of Nahmanides in his Addenda to the Negative Commandments — the commandments he adds to Maimonides’ count — commandment 4. Maimonides himself does not count “It shall not be reckoned” among the negative commandments in his enumeration, apparently because he sees it as one detail among the details of the sacrificial rite.¹¹ Nahmanides, by contrast, does count this commandment, and writes:

The fourth commandment is that we were forbidden to slaughter consecrated offerings with the intention of eating their flesh, or sprinkling their blood, or burning their fat, outside their proper place or outside their proper time. Likewise, one who slaughters a sin offering in the south violates a negative commandment. This is what He, exalted and blessed be He, said at the beginning of Parashat Shoftim: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox or a sheep in which there is a blemish, any evil thing, for that is an abomination to the Lord your God.” Its meaning is: do not sacrifice to the Lord your God a sacrifice in which there is a blemish or any evil thing — namely, one who slaughters and says: on condition that I eat or sprinkle outside its place or its time, for such speech is an evil thing in the eyes of the Torah, since by it the sacrifice has already been disqualified… Included in this prohibition are all disqualifications in sacrifices, such as an animal that had illicit sexual relations, or one used for such relations, mixed species, a trefah, and the like. The language of Sifrei is: From where do we know that with consecrated offerings slaughtered for consumption outside their time or outside their place, one violates a negative commandment? Scripture says: “a matter dependent on speech.” From where do we know about an animal that mounted, was mounted, was designated for idolatry, or was worshipped? Scripture says: “abomination.” From where do we know about a prostitute’s fee, the exchange for a dog, mixed species, a trefah, and a caesarean birth? Scripture says: “for that is an abomination.” There the Sages also said: even one who slaughters a sin offering in the south violates a negative commandment.

Within this commandment Nahmanides also includes a prohibition of evil speech that disqualifies the sacrifice. That is why he also includes animals designated for idolatry, a prostitute’s fee, and the like — all of which are disqualified sacrifices. The focus for him is a prohibition against disqualifying the sacrifice, not a prohibition on thought as such. In any event, it is clear that he sees a prohibition only in that which disqualifies the sacrifice, not in every improper intention.

Maimonides’ View of the Prohibition “It Shall Not Be Reckoned”

Hatam Sofer there rejects Rabbi David Deutsch’s words precisely on the basis of this inference from Maimonides’ halakhah 2. In his view, what emerges there is that the basis of the prohibition is to disqualify the sacrifice and cause loss to consecrated property, and that does not happen in an intention of shelo lishmah, except with the Passover offering and the sin offering.

Yet the intention of Maimonides himself remains open to doubt, for his formulation in halakhah 1 clearly indicates that every improper intention constitutes a violation of a negative commandment. In halakhah 2 he merely adds another law learned by oral tradition. Therefore it seems that Rabbi David Deutsch’s initial understanding is more plausible: there is a negative prohibition even with respect to an intention of shelo lishmah, and by oral tradition we learned that every intention that disqualifies the sacrifice is also prohibited by virtue of that same prohibition.

Indeed, we find that Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Disqualified Consecrated Offerings 15:3:

It is forbidden to entertain an improper intention with respect to consecrated offerings, as will be explained. Therefore, if one slaughtered a sacrifice not for its own sake, or removed the handful from a meal offering not for its own sake, whether deliberately or inadvertently, he must complete the remaining services for their proper sake. Even if he slaughtered, received, and carried with an intention of changing the designation, he is obligated to sprinkle with proper intention…

Maimonides writes that it is forbidden to entertain an improper intention. The entire context there is an intention of shelo lishmah, as can be seen from this very halakhah and from the entire chapter. By the phrase “as will be explained” he is apparently referring to the halakhah we saw above in chapter 18, which gives the source of the prohibition from the verse “It shall not be reckoned.” It therefore follows clearly that Maimonides sees a prohibition also in an intention of shelo lishmah. The same emerges from the comments of Kesef Mishneh there. If so, Rabbi David Deutsch appears to be correct: at least according to Maimonides, there is no need for the rule of shelo lishmah to be repeated in Scripture in order for it to be invalidating.¹²

We should note that Kehillot Yaakov there explains that the very fact that with an intention of shelo lishmah the sacrifice does not count for the owners toward their obligation is itself considered a loss to the sacrifice, and for that reason it enters the framework of the prohibition “It shall not be reckoned.” According to what we said above, this is unnecessary, for the scope of the prohibition is not specifically loss to the sacrifice; that is only the scope of the addition learned by oral tradition to the prohibition.¹³

Is Ritva’s Distinction Really Between Positive and Negative Commandments?

Kehillot Yaakov there discusses several difficulties with Ritva’s words and, on their basis, arrives at two qualifications:

1. If the essence of a negative commandment is simply to warn us to fulfill a positive commandment — see our discussion of Nahmanides’ view regarding a parapet in our essay on Parashat Yitro, 5767, chapter 3 — then even the negative commandment will require repetition in order to be invalidating.
2. A negative commandment inferred from a positive commandment, although halakhically it is treated as a positive commandment, will still be considered a negative commandment for our purposes, so that repetition is not required in order for it to invalidate.

If so, Ritva’s distinction is not really between positive commandments and negative commandments. A negative commandment inferred from a positive commandment is legally a positive commandment, and yet for our purpose it is treated as a prohibition. By contrast, a negative commandment that supports a positive commandment is legally a prohibition, and yet for our purpose it is treated as a positive commandment. How are we to explain these two deviations?

The author of Kehillot Yaakov argues that the basis of Ritva’s distinction lies in the content of the commandment. If its content is restraint or abstention, repetition is not required in order for it to invalidate. But if its content is action, then repetition is required for invalidation. The distinction is thus not between positive and negative commandments, but between abstention and action. The two deviations are now easily understood. A negative commandment inferred from a positive commandment is, in essence, a restraint. It is indeed weaker, and therefore counted halakhically as a positive commandment, but its normative content is restraint. By contrast, a negative commandment that supports a positive commandment has the normative content of action and not restraint; it is a restraint against refraining. In the next chapter we will attempt to explain this distinction.

C. The Unique Nature of the Realm of Consecrated Offerings

Introduction

In this chapter we will begin from a distinction made by the Gemara in the laws of prayer, and from it we will identify a fundamental feature of the realm of consecrated offerings, which resembles prayer. Through that we will try to understand why the rule that “Scripture must repeat it in order for noncompliance to be invalidating” exists only in the sacrificial realm, and from there we will also suggest a way to understand Ritva’s distinction just mentioned. Finally, we will turn to a proposal for understanding the uniqueness of the rule of lishmah in sacrifices. We will conclude by noting another interpretive distinction between the sacrificial realm and the rest of halakha, namely that in consecrated offerings “one does not derive from what is itself derived.”

The Discussion at the Beginning of Chapter 4 of Berakhot: Prayer Outside Its Proper Time

The Mishnah and Gemara at the beginning of chapter 4 of Berakhot deal with the times of prayer. In our essay on Parashat Toledot, 5767, we examined the dispute between Maimonides and Nahmanides regarding the commandment of prayer. Maimonides counts a biblical commandment to pray, and all the details of the law — such as the times, the wording, the number of daily prayers, and the like — are rabbinic additions. Nahmanides, by contrast, sees prayer with all its details as a rabbinic commandment with no root in biblical law.

The Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 4 of Berakhot states:

The morning prayer may be recited until noon. Rabbi Yehudah says: until four hours. The afternoon prayer may be recited until evening; Rabbi Yehudah says: until half of the afternoon period. The evening prayer has no fixed endpoint. The additional prayer may be recited all day. Rabbi Yehudah says: until seven hours.

And the Gemara there asks:

Does everyone agree that only until noon, and no later? But Rav Mari son of Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yirmiyah son of Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: If one erred and did not recite the evening prayer, he recites two morning prayers; if he omitted the morning prayer, he recites two afternoon prayers! — He may pray all day long.

The Gemara wonders why one should be allowed to pray only until noon and no later, when it has already been ruled that there is a possibility of compensation even at the next prayer time.¹⁴ The Gemara answers:

Until noon they give him the reward of prayer in its proper time; after that they give him the reward of prayer, but not the reward of prayer in its proper time.

That is, until noon one receives the reward of prayer at its proper time, and after that one receives the reward of prayer, but not the reward of prayer in its proper time. In other words, one can pray even after the proper time, but such a prayer is not complete, and therefore the reward given for it is also not complete.

At first glance, this seems to prove Maimonides’ view that there is a biblical obligation of prayer. One who prays after the proper time has fulfilled the biblical commandment of prayer, but he has not fulfilled the rabbinic rules that fix the times. Therefore he receives reward for the biblical commandment of prayer, but not for the complete rabbinic prayer.¹⁵

But what would Nahmanides say to this? If the entire concept of prayer is rabbinic — both the obligation itself and all its details — then why see one who prays outside the proper time as having accomplished anything at all? Why think that the times established by the Sages are not indispensable? Would Nahmanides interpret this to mean that within the rabbinic plane there are two levels of enactment: first, an obligation to pray; and second, an obligation to do so in accordance with the details established by the Sages? Why would the Sages establish the enactment in such a way? That does not seem plausible.

It therefore seems clear from here that Nahmanides too recognizes the existence of prayer on the biblical plane. In our essay on Parashat Toledot, and also in our essay on Parashat Vayeshev, 5767, we cited several later authorities who wrote that Nahmanides too agrees that there is a biblical concept of prayer — a substantive act of prayer — and that his dispute with Maimonides concerns only the question whether we are biblically commanded to pray. Nahmanides too would agree that one who prayed before the revelation at Sinai performed an act of prayer. More than that: clearly this too is service of God. It is therefore not plausible that after the Torah was given, and certainly not after the Sages enacted prayer, that original natural prayer was uprooted. One who prays, in whatever form, is still engaged in the act of prayer. In fixing the times of prayer, the Sages did not intend to uproot our natural and ordinary prayer, but to establish a new obligation, so that even one who does not want to pray — and according to Nahmanides is not biblically obligated to do so — will nevertheless be required to fulfill it.

If so, the situation according to Nahmanides is very similar to that according to Maimonides. He too agrees that there is a reality of prayer even without the rabbinic enactment. This concept of prayer exists on the biblical plane. There is no biblical obligation to pray, but one who prays has indeed prayed. Beyond that, on a second level, there is a rabbinic enactment to pray according to the pattern the Sages established.

Now, when we ask what the law is regarding one who recited the morning prayer after its proper time, the answer is clear: his prayer is a meaningful act, and certainly an instance of service of God. The rabbinic enactment did not uproot that. He has not fulfilled the rabbinic command of prayer, because he did not do what the Sages prescribed, but it is obvious that he did pray.

We note that this principle can be seen very clearly from a detailed analysis of the course of the discussion in Berakhot, though this is not the place. We may now return to the question of why “Scripture must repeat it in order for noncompliance to be invalidating.”

“Scripture Must Repeat It in Order for Noncompliance to Be Invalidating”

Our fundamental question is why it is specifically in the realm of consecrated offerings that Scripture is interpreted in such an unusual way. Why is it that in the rest of halakha the rule is that, absent special circumstances, every law that appears in a verse is indispensable, whereas specifically in consecrated offerings it is not? More broadly, what distinguishes the sacrificial passages? Is this a property of the biblical text itself, as though Scripture were divided into ordinary and sacrificial sections that must be interpreted differently? It would seem not. The Torah is written in the same way throughout, and therefore it should be interpreted in the same way. To understand this, we must first say a few words about the relation between prayer and sacrifices, and between both of these and the concept of worship.

According to Maimonides, the commandment of prayer is a concretization of the concept of worship. Thus he writes in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 5:

The fifth commandment is that He commanded us to serve Him, may He be exalted. This command has been repeated several times, as it says: “You shall serve the Lord your God” (Exodus 23:25), and “Him shall you serve” (Deuteronomy 13:5), and “Him shall you serve” (Deuteronomy 6:13), and “to serve Him” at the end of Parashat Ekev. Even though this command too is among the general commandments, as we explained in the fourth principle, it nevertheless has a specific aspect, for it commanded prayer. And the language of Sifrei is: “To serve Him” — this is prayer. They also said: “To serve Him” — this is Torah study. And in the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean, parashah 12, p. 228, they said: From where do we know that the essence of prayer is included among the commandments? From here: “The Lord your God shall you fear, and Him shall you serve.” And they also said, in Midrash Tannaim from Midrash HaGadol on Parashat Re’eh: “Serve Him through His Torah; serve Him in His sanctuary” — that is, go there to pray in it and toward it, as Solomon explained, peace be upon him, in I Kings 8 and II Chronicles 6.

Maimonides repeats here several times — and his sources are deeply rooted in the words of the Sages — that service of the heart is prayer. Prayer, by its very essence, is worship. It seems likely that Nahmanides does not dispute this. Later in the discussion at the beginning of chapter 4 of Berakhot, the Gemara assumes that the prayers were instituted corresponding to the sacrifices.

The fact we saw above — that prayer not recited according to the Sages’ instructions is still prayer, though incomplete — rests on the assumption that service of God is a factual reality and not merely the product of command. If a person serves God, then he serves God. The detailed instructions did not come to uproot natural worship, but to channel and direct it. From this we can also learn something about sacrificial worship: when a person offers a sacrifice out of natural religious feeling, there is divine service here. Even if he did so not in accordance with halakha, a sacrifice was nevertheless offered and worship was nevertheless performed. We may call this a substantive act of worship, just as Nahmanides speaks of a substantive act of prayer.

The conclusion is that when the Torah lays down detailed laws regarding sacrifices, it does not come to uproot the natural service of God. Therefore, even if a person acted contrary to the details of halakha, there is still, in reality, worship here. Consequently, these halakhic details do not invalidate after the fact. This is exactly what we saw with prayer: it is indeed incomplete worship, but it is still a substantive act of worship.

From this is born the rule that in consecrated offerings “Scripture must repeat it in order for noncompliance to be invalidating.” As long as nothing explicit has been written, there is no reason to assume that a halakhic detail that was not fulfilled uproots the meaning of divine service inherent in the offering of the sacrifice. Only if the Torah states explicitly that it uproots the worship do we say that it has in fact been uprooted. Hence it is specifically in the sacrificial realm that a special indication is required in order to say that a given halakhic detail is indispensable. Consecrated offerings are worship, and worship exists even when it is not performed in the halakhically ideal way, as stated.

The Difference Between a Positive Commandment and a Prohibition

When the Torah commands us to do something with respect to the sacrifice, then even if we did not do it, the sacrifice is still a sacrifice and the worship is still worship. But when we are dealing with a prohibition, the Torah commands us not to do something, and by doing so it tells us that this action is invalid. In other words, here it is clear that its intention was to uproot one of the natural and intuitive actions we might otherwise have done. If the Sages had instructed us not to pray after the proper time, then one who did so would receive no reward at all. It would be a mitzvah that comes through a transgression. But what we in fact have is an instruction to pray at the proper time, and here even one who failed to do so still prayed.

From this Ritva’s distinction emerges naturally and clearly. With positive commandments, Scripture must repeat the rule in order for noncompliance to be invalidating; but with prohibitions it is obvious that they are invalidating even if Scripture did not repeat them.

This also enables us to understand the claim of the author of Kehillot Yaakov that the distinction does not really track the axis of prohibition versus positive commandment, but rather the axis of abstention versus action. The point is not the formal halakhic definition of the commandment but its content. If the command tells us that a given action is invalid, then it has no value even if Scripture did not repeat this. But if the command tells us to do something, then even if we did not do it our act still retains value — unless Scripture explains to us, by repeating the command, that it does not.

The Disqualification of Lishmah

We can now return to the point at which the question arose. We saw that Tosafot asks why the Gemara thinks that the rule of lishmah should be invalidating even without Scripture repeating it. According to what we have said, a very simple solution emerges, even without relying directly on Ritva’s principle, which apparently is not universally accepted.

The fact that prayer not recited in the prescribed way is still prayer rests on the fact that the person intends to serve God. If the intention exists, what does it matter that the act does not conform to the details of halakha? In practice he has still served God. But moving one’s lips without intention and without the motivation of serving God clearly avails nothing. No one would call such a thing service of God in the absence of a command. It should be noted that precisely after the rabbinic enactment, perhaps such an act could have some significance, since a formal mitzvah-act may perhaps have value even without intention — though this already depends on the question whether mitzvot require intention.¹⁶ But service of God in its natural sense has no meaning at all without intention.

If so, the same is true with sacrifices. We saw that sacrifices offered not in accordance with the Torah’s instructions still constitute meaningful worship, though incomplete. But that is only if they were offered lishmah. A sacrifice offered shelo lishmah has no value in itself in the absence of a command.¹⁷ Therefore the Gemara assumes, in its question, that if there is a source commanding that sacrifices be offered lishmah, then we ought to disqualify worship performed shelo lishmah. Here there is no need for the Torah to repeat the command in order to teach that it is invalidating. Worship performed shelo lishmah cannot, by its very nature, possess the value of service of God, and no special source is required for that. It should be noted, however, that once sacrifices become commandments in the formal sense — as happens with prayer on the rabbinic plane after the enactments — perhaps there is value even in offering shelo lishmah, just as there may be value in fulfilling a mitzvah without intention.

One could understand this as what lies behind Rabbi David Deutsch’s answer, according to which there is a prohibition here. His claim is that worship performed shelo lishmah is disqualified by definition even if Scripture does not repeat it. As we have seen, that is precisely what is called a prohibition, and therefore with a prohibition one does not need repetition in order to teach invalidation.

But now we can go one step further and reject Hatam Sofer’s objections to Rabbi David Deutsch as well. Rabbi David Deutsch argued that an intention of shelo lishmah falls under the prohibition “It shall not be reckoned,” and therefore no scriptural duplication is required in order to derive its invalidating force. But we saw that this claim is problematic. Not everyone agrees that there is a formal prohibition of “It shall not be reckoned” in an intention of shelo lishmah that does not disqualify the sacrifice. Even within Maimonides there is room for disagreement, although we saw that his intention indeed seems to support that view.

According to our approach, however, matters are well settled. Even if Hatam Sofer is correct that there is no formal prohibition regarding an intention of shelo lishmah, it is still clear that the requirement of lishmah is invalidating by its very nature. As we saw in Kehillot Yaakov, wherever a command has the content of abstention, even if it is not formally a prohibition, it is invalidating even without repetition. Similarly here: even if there were no additional verse commanding us to offer lishmah, it is obvious that one who did not offer lishmah did not perform sacrificial worship, and therefore this is invalidating, exactly as in ordinary, non-sacrificial areas.

The novelty in the Gemara’s conclusion is that, although the rule of lishmah removes the character of service of God, usually this harms only the offering’s capacity to gain acceptance and provide atonement, and not its very status as a sacrifice. To remove its status as a sacrifice altogether, it may indeed be that an additional command would have been required.

A Derivation from What Is Itself Derived

There is another feature unique to the realm of consecrated offerings, and it too belongs to the area of halakhic interpretation of Scripture: in consecrated offerings one does not derive from what is itself derived. The central discussion stretches over several pages in the chapter “Which Is Their Place?” in Zevahim, around page 50. It may be that this distinction too is connected to the picture described above.

As is well known, we possess methods of drash — rabbinic textual derivation — through which we interpret Scripture and extract various laws from it. We mean here the halakhic drash, especially Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen hermeneutical rules, which we discussed in our Mida Tova essays in the first two years. For example, when two similar words appear in two biblical contexts, we compare the two contexts and learn laws that appear in one context and apply them to the other as well.

Can this chain continue further? That is, can a law learned through one exegetical rule itself serve as the basis for another derivation that extends it to a third context, where a word similar to the one in the second context also appears? It turns out that this is indeed possible, and it is done fairly often. But in consecrated offerings there is a unique rule that forbids deriving from what is itself derived. As can be seen in the Zevahim discussion just mentioned, not a few combinations may in fact be applied even in the sacrificial realm. Still, the rule that one does not derive from what is itself derived exists only in the realm of consecrated offerings. Why should such a rule exist at all? What is its underlying logic?

We have addressed this question several times in the past; see, for example, our essay on Parashat Pekudei, 5765. There we explained that the hermeneutical rules are interpretive tools applied to the biblical text. Therefore they cannot be applied to a source that is not itself truly biblical. From this it follows that applying a hermeneutical rule to a law that is itself learned by derivation is problematic, because this amounts to deriving from something that is not itself biblical text. This becomes even sharper in light of Maimonides’ view, according to which laws learned through these derivations are not biblical laws; see our essay on Parashat Yitro, 5765, and many others. The reason is that these derivations do not uncover what is already present in the text, but rather extend it. It is therefore obvious that deriving laws from laws that are themselves already products of derivation means applying exegetical tools to a source that is not truly biblical.

But if this explanation is indeed correct, why does this rule not exist in every area of halakha? What is unique specifically about the realm of consecrated offerings?

Even at first glance, it seems quite possible that this difference too is connected to the distinction we made above. We saw that an ordinary command in the sacrificial realm is not perceived as a full-fledged command, since failure to comply with it is not invalidating. If so, a derivation made in this domain — which is only an extension of Scripture — surely has even lower imperative force. Therefore to derive further from it, that is, to build a derivation from a derivation, is less justified here than in other areas of halakha.

That was a general formulation. If we try to focus it more sharply, we can put it this way: in the realm of consecrated offerings, the command has limited significance. Service of God is, at base, a natural and intuitive matter rooted in our intention. Sometimes the Torah sees fit to add to this, and then it commands us regarding some particular law. We have seen that such a command is not invalidating, because it does not uproot the meaning of the intuitive divine service that existed beforehand. Only when the Torah prohibits something, or repeats a command twice, do we understand its intention as unequivocal and as coming to negate some aspect of the intuitive concept of divine service. We can now claim that too sweeping an extension of the Torah’s implications would spread the prescriptive dimension beyond its proper bounds, and that is not done in the sacrificial realm. From another angle: in order to reveal to us that a certain act constitutes divine service, the Torah must say so explicitly. When it does so by means of a derivation, that is still acceptable. But when we derive it as a derivation from a derivation, that is not an unambiguous enough source to alter the natural concept of divine service.

These matters still require further examination and clarification.

Footnotes