Lesson 31: Pesach and Pesach Sheni (article)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concerning the Second Passover

A View of the Individual and the Community

A. The Commandment of the Second Passover

Introduction

In our passage, the Torah commands Israel to observe the Passover. A question then arises regarding one who was on a distant journey or was ritually impure at the time of the Passover offering, and therefore could not fulfill the commandment. Concerning such a person, the Torah commands that he observe the Second Passover (Numbers 9:3-13):

Moses spoke to the children of Israel to observe the Passover. They observed the Passover in the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month at twilight, in the wilderness of Sinai; in accordance with all that the Lord had commanded Moses, so the children of Israel did.

There were men who were impure through a human corpse and therefore could not observe the Passover on that day. They approached Moses and Aaron on that day, and those men said to him: “We are impure through a human corpse. Why should we be deprived of bringing the offering of the Lord at its appointed time among the children of Israel?” Moses said to them: “Stand here, and I will hear what the Lord commands concerning you.”

The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If any man among you or among your generations is impure through a corpse, or is on a distant journey, he shall observe a Passover to the Lord. In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall observe it; they shall eat it with unleavened bread and bitter herbs. They shall leave none of it until morning, and they shall not break a bone in it; according to all the statute of the Passover they shall observe it. But the man who is pure and not on a journey, and nevertheless refrains from observing the Passover—that soul shall be cut off from his people, because he did not bring the offering of the Lord at its appointed time; that man shall bear his sin.”

This passage raises several difficulties. First and foremost is the uniqueness of the Passover commandment: why specifically with regard to Passover does the Torah see fit to take into account someone who was prevented by circumstances beyond his control and could not fulfill it? Why, for example, do we not find regarding Grace after Meals the possibility of fulfilling it after the time has passed, or of compensating for the fact that someone was prevented and could not recite it? Moreover, the description here suggests that those who could not observe the Passover took it for granted that Moses had to find a solution to their problem. That is, even before the Torah’s innovation, it was obvious to them that it could not be that the possibility of fulfilling the commandment was simply closed off to someone who had been ritually impure¹ on the fourteenth of Nisan.

In any event, the movement of the passage makes clear that the commandment of the Second Passover is intended to make up the Passover commandment for one who was prevented and did not observe it at its proper time. Such a person must offer the Second Passover sacrifice on the fourteenth of Iyyar, one month after the first Passover. From the language of the Torah it appears that the laws of the Second Passover are identical to those of the first Passover, but the Sages and later commentators identify several differences between them, as we shall see below.

The commandment of the Second Passover for future generations

The commandment of the Second Passover is counted for future generations by the classical enumerators of the commandments as well. There is a commandment to slaughter the Second Passover sacrifice (Maimonides, Positive Commandment 57; Sefer HaChinukh, Commandment 380), a commandment to eat the meat of the Second Passover (Positive Commandment 58; Commandment 381), a prohibition against leaving any of it until morning (Negative Commandment 119; Commandment 382), and a prohibition against breaking a bone in it (Negative Commandment 123; Commandment 383).

In Negative Commandment 123, there is also a prohibition against taking the Passover sacrifice outside the company, but with respect to the Second Passover we do not find such a prohibition. More generally, there are no companies in the Second Passover, and there is no requirement of prior registration for eating it. The reason is apparently technical, because the Second Passover essentially concerns individuals; if the community is impure, the first Passover may be offered in impurity. It therefore cannot be demanded of these individuals that they form companies for offering and eating, since such companies may not in fact exist. There are additional differences between the first and second Passovers, as can be seen in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 95a. The Talmud there explains that the laws of the offering itself are identical, and the differences concern only the ancillary laws that accompany the sacrifice.

Is the Second Passover compensation for the first?

Everything we have seen so far suggests that the Second Passover is a solution for one who did not succeed in observing the first Passover for justified reasons. This is indeed what Sefer HaChinukh writes at the beginning of Commandment 57:

That anyone who could not observe the first Passover on the fourteenth of Nisan must observe the second Passover on the fourteenth of Iyyar, for example because of impurity or because he was on a distant journey, as it is stated: “In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall observe it” (Numbers 9:11). Our Sages of blessed memory further taught us (Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 93a) that this does not apply specifically to impurity and distance alone. Rather, anyone who erred, or was prevented, or even acted deliberately and did not offer the first one, offers the second.

Sefer HaChinukh adds that the Sages expounded the Second Passover as a commandment even for one who did not observe the first deliberately—that is, for anyone who did not offer the first Passover sacrifice.

The question that arises here is why the enumerators of the commandments needed to count the Second Passover as a commandment in its own right. At first glance, it seems to be only one detail among the laws of Passover: one who did not observe it for a justified reason makes it up with the Second Passover. Maimonides himself sensed this difficulty, and this is what he writes in Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 57:

The fifty-seventh commandment is that we are commanded to slaughter the Second Passover for one who was prevented from the first Passover. This is His statement, may He be exalted: “In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall observe it.” Here the questioner may challenge me and say: Why do you count the Second Passover, when this contradicts what you laid down in the seventh root, namely that a law of a commandment is not counted as a commandment before itself? Let the questioner know that the Sages already disputed whether the Second Passover has the same status as the first Passover, or whether it is an independent commandment; and the law was decided that it is an independent commandment. Therefore it is proper to count it separately.

Maimonides cites the dispute among the tannaitic sages as to whether the Second Passover is compensation for the first or an independent commandment. The ruling is that it is an independent commandment and not compensation for the first, and therefore it should be counted separately.

This dispute is very surprising, since the verses themselves suggest that the Second Passover is a remedy for one who did not observe the first Passover. None of the tannaitic sages disagrees that the commandment of the Second Passover was stated only regarding one who did not offer the first Passover for a justified reason. So why relate to the Second Passover as an independent commandment?

Another puzzling point in the laws of the Second Passover appears in Sefer HaChinukh’s discussion of women’s obligation, based on Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 91b:

This commandment applies in the time of the Temple: for men as an obligation, and for women as an option. For our Sages of blessed memory taught us there that women who were deferred to the Second Passover because of impurity or because of one of the other factors we mentioned—the observance of the Second Passover for them is optional. If they wish, it is slaughtered for them; if they do not wish, it is not slaughtered for them. For this reason, it is not slaughtered for them separately on Shabbat.

That is, with regard to the first Passover women are obligated, but with regard to the Second Passover it is only optional, not obligatory. It is unclear why the first Passover is obligatory and the second is not. It seems reasonable that this difference too is connected to the special character of the Second Passover, which is not merely compensation for the first.

Is the Second Passover an independent commandment or compensation?

As noted, the Sages, in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 93a-b and parallel passages, disputed the character of the commandment of the Second Passover:

Our Rabbis taught: One is liable to karet (spiritual excision) for the first, and one is liable to karet for the second—this is the view of Rabbi. Rabbi Natan says: One is liable to karet for the first, but exempt for the second. Rabbi Chananiah ben Akavya says: One is not liable even for the first unless he also did not observe the second.

And they each follow their own reasoning, as it was taught: A convert who converted between the two Passovers, and likewise a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, is obligated to observe the Second Passover. This is the view of Rabbi. Rabbi Natan says: Whoever was subject to the first is subject to the second; whoever was not subject to the first is not subject to the second. What is the basis of their dispute? Rabbi holds that the second is a festival in its own right. Rabbi Natan holds that the second is compensation for the first; it does not repair the first. Rabbi Chananiah ben Akavya holds that the second does repair the first. And all three expounded the same verse…

Accordingly: if one acted deliberately with regard to both, all agree that he is liable. If he erred with regard to both, all agree that he is exempt. If he acted deliberately in the first and erred in the second, Rabbi and Rabbi Natan obligate, while Rabbi Chananiah ben Akavya exempts. If he erred in the first and acted deliberately in the second, Rabbi obligates, while Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chananiah ben Akavya exempt.

The basic dispute is between Rabbi and Rabbi Natan. They disagree over whether a convert who converted between the two Passovers, or a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, is obligated in the Second Passover. According to Rabbi Natan, they are not obligated in the Second Passover, since they were not obligated in the first Passover, and the Second Passover is only compensation for one who had been obligated in the first and did not observe it. Rabbi, by contrast, holds that they too are obligated in the Second Passover, because it is a commandment in its own right.

The question of karet with regard to the second nevertheless remains. According to Rabbi, the second is like the first, and with regard to each of them, one who deliberately does not observe it is liable to karet. Rabbi Natan holds that the second is indeed compensation for the first, and therefore one who was not obligated in the first is not obligated in the second. But observing the second does not exempt a person from karet for the first, if he deliberately failed to observe the first without justification. Moreover, one who deliberately fails to observe the second is not liable to karet for the second, because it is not an independent commandment that carries karet, but only compensation for the first. Rabbi Chananiah ben Akavya holds that one who observes the second is also exempted from karet for the first. That is, he clearly joins Rabbi Natan in viewing the second as compensation for the first, but in his view the second also removes the karet for the first, and on that Rabbi Natan disagrees.

The tannaitic sages agree that even one who did not observe the first Passover deliberately, or for an unjustified reason, is obligated in the second. This is seemingly contrary to the plain wording of the verses themselves, which speak only of a distant journey or impurity. The Talmud, in the omitted part of the passage quoted above, explains this according to each of the disputing opinions. In general it says that a distant journey or impurity are cases in which failure to offer the first Passover does not incur karet, and therefore the Torah referred specifically to them. But the basic obligation of the Second Passover applies to anyone who did not offer the first.

The summary of the laws of karet according to the three tannaitic opinions appears in the final paragraph of the Talmudic passage quoted above. We should note that the legal ruling follows Rabbi, according to whom the Second Passover is a commandment in its own right. Therefore a convert who converted between the two Passovers and a minor who came of age between them are likewise obligated in it.

Preliminary conclusions regarding the legal character of the Second Passover

We thus learn that according to the law, the Second Passover obligates anyone who did not offer the first Passover, even if he had not been obligated in it at all. In other words, it is not compensation for failure to perform the first commandment. It is a commandment in its own right, and therefore anyone to whom it is relevant is obligated in it. The one exemption is for a person who already observed the first Passover.

According to the approach that the Second Passover is compensation, anyone who had been obligated in the first Passover and did not fulfill his obligation is compensated by the second. Only one who failed with respect to the first becomes obligated in the second. Therefore a minor or a convert is exempt. But according to the approaches that view the Second Passover as an independent commandment, anyone who is obligated in commandments on the fourteenth of Iyyar is obligated in the Second Passover; there is simply an exemption for one who already offered the first Passover. According to this view, offering the first Passover is an exemption, not a condition for obligation. As we have seen, this is also the accepted legal ruling.

These two approaches read the verses in two different ways. According to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chananiah, the verses mean this: one who offered the first is not obligated in the second at all; only one who did not offer the first is obligated. According to Rabbi, the verses mean something else: everyone is obligated, but one who already offered the first is exempt from the second.

Summary of the differences and the difficulties

The very assumption that the Passover commandment is unique—that all those who did not offer the Passover must have some alternative solution—is in fact mistaken according to Rabbi. In the commandment of the Second Passover there is no special “solution” for them. Yet their original assumption still requires explanation.

On the other hand, the fact that for women the Second Passover is only optional, even though the first is obligatory, seems to support Rabbi’s view. If this were compensation, there would be no logic in exempting women who had been obligated in the first Passover.

However, Rabbi’s view, which is the accepted law, is very difficult in light of the wording of the verses. There it is clearly implied that this is a solution for one who did not offer the first Passover. How, then, was the problem of those who did not observe the first Passover solved by the commandment of the Second Passover? In the verses it plainly appears to be a solution to their problem. Moreover, if the second Passover is truly not compensation for the first but an independent commandment, then why is one who offered the first exempt from the second? We are forced to conclude that there is some sort of connection between the two Passovers even according to Rabbi.

Indeed, we find a puzzling law in Maimonides, Laws of the Passover Offering 5:2. He writes:

How so? If one erred or was prevented and did not offer on the first, then if he deliberately did not offer on the second he is liable to karet, but if he also erred or was prevented on the second he is exempt. If he deliberately did not offer on the first, he must offer on the second; and if he did not offer on the second, even if his failure there was inadvertent, he is liable to karet, because he did not bring the offering of the Lord at its appointed time and his first failure was deliberate. But one who was impure or on a distant journey and did not observe the first—even if he deliberately fails on the second—is not liable to karet, for he was already exempted from karet with regard to the first Passover.

Maimonides rules that one who did not offer the first Passover is liable to karet even if his failure regarding the second was inadvertent. It follows from his words that if he did in fact offer the Second Passover, he is exempt from karet. This also emerges from his words in halakha 4 there:

One who was impure but could have become pure for the first Passover, but did not immerse and instead remained in impurity until the time of the offering passed, and likewise an uncircumcised person who did not circumcise until the time of the offering passed—this counts as deliberate nonperformance with respect to the first Passover. Therefore, if he did not observe the second, even inadvertently, he is liable to karet.

This stands in tension with what he wrote in Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 57, where he follows the plain sense of the Talmud: according to Rabbi, whose view he accepts, the karet for the first is entirely independent of whether one offered the Second Passover:

There, in Pesachim 93b, they said: Accordingly, if he acted deliberately in both—that is, he did not offer the first Passover and also did not offer the second Passover deliberately—all agree that he is liable. If he erred in both, all agree that he is exempt. If he acted deliberately in the first and erred in the second, Rabbi and Rabbi Natan obligate, while Rabbi Chananiah ben Akavya exempts. Likewise, when he acted deliberately in the first and offered the second, he is liable according to Rabbi, since in Rabbi’s view the second is not compensation for the first. And the law in all this follows Rabbi.

Here it is stated explicitly that even if he offered the second, the karet for the first remains in force, since the second is not compensation for the first.

It appears that in his legal code Maimonides retreated from that position. In the Mishneh Torah, he seems to explain Rabbi’s view differently: offering the second does not change the status of the karet for the first only if, in the end, he did not offer the second, even if that was through inadvertence. But if in fact he did offer the second, he is exempt from the karet for the first. This indicates that even according to Rabbi there is in the second Passover something akin to compensation for the first. That is, the connection between the second and the first in Rabbi’s view is not only negative—that one who offered the first is not obligated in the second. Rather, the second also repairs the karet incurred for not offering the first.

A sign or a cause

The different tannaitic opinions raise an additional problem, one that touches the methodology of the entire halakhic realm. In Scripture we find that only those who did not offer the first Passover are obligated in the second. How are we to interpret this? At first glance, the meaning is that the second Passover completes the obligation of those who did not observe the first. In other words, failure to offer the first Passover is the cause of the obligation of the second. But according to Rabbi, failure regarding the first is only a sign, not a cause. The people obligated in the commandment are only those who did not offer the first, but the cause of the obligation is not the fact that they did not offer it.

These are two possible ways of relating to any correlation, halakhic or otherwise. One may see it as accidental, or as the result of a cause-and-effect relation. According to Rabbi, the correlation between failure to offer the first Passover and obligation in the second is apparently “accidental”: failure to offer the first is not the cause of the obligation in the second. By contrast, according to Rabbi Natan, the correlation is the result of a cause-and-effect relation. The fact that they did not offer the first is the cause of the obligation in the second. The question thus arises: when do we treat a correlation, scriptural or otherwise, as a sign, and when as a cause? Are there rules for this?

We should note that according to our earlier proposal the sting of the problem is somewhat blunted. Even according to Rabbi, the correlation is not really accidental. Failure to offer the first is not the cause of the obligation in the second, but offering the first exempts one from the obligation of the second. Moreover, as we saw, according to Maimonides in his legal code, offering the second exempts one from the karet for failure to offer the first. Thus this correlation has substantive significance even according to Rabbi. Of course, on this definition Rabbi’s view remains only a formal definition. We still lack a substantive explanation: if failure to offer the first is not the cause of the obligation in the second, then why does offering the first exempt one from that obligation? And why, according to Maimonides, does even Rabbi agree that offering the second removes the karet for failure to offer the first?

B. Passover as a communal offering

Introduction

The verse that commands us to offer the Passover is formulated as though it were a communal commandment (Exodus 12:3-6):

Speak to the whole congregation of Israel, saying: On the tenth of this month each man shall take for himself a lamb for his fathers’ house, a lamb for each household. If the household is too small for a lamb, then he and his nearest neighbor shall take one according to the number of persons; according to each man’s eating shall you apportion the lamb. Your lamb shall be without blemish, a male in its first year; you shall take it from the sheep or from the goats. It shall be kept in your charge until the fourteenth day of this month, and the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.

This suggests that the command is addressed to all Israel.

The commandment is presented in Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 55, where Maimonides writes:

The fifty-fifth commandment is that we are commanded to slaughter the Passover lamb on the fourteenth day of Nisan. This is His statement, may He be exalted: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.” One who transgresses this command and deliberately does not offer it at its proper time is liable to karet, whether man or woman. For it has already been made clear at the end of tractate Pesachim, 91b, that the first Passover is obligatory for women and overrides Shabbat—that is, when the fourteenth falls on Shabbat—just like every Jewish male. The Torah’s language concerning liability to karet in this matter is: “But the man who is pure and not on a journey, and refrains from observing the Passover, that soul shall be cut off.” At the beginning of tractate Keritot, when they listed the commandments whose violation incurs karet—and all of them are prohibitions—they said: “And Passover and circumcision among the positive commandments.” We have already mentioned this in the introduction. The laws of this commandment have been explained in tractate Pesachim.

Is the Passover sacrifice a communal offering?

The Passover sacrifice is unusual. On the one hand, the obligation rests upon every Jew, though within the framework of a registered group, that is, a paternal household. This is unlike communal offerings, in which one offering is brought on behalf of all Israel. On the other hand, the obligation to bring the Passover was stated to all Israel. That means there is an obligation resting on the entire collective of individuals. This is unlike other individual offerings, such as a sin offering, a guilt offering, a vow offering, or a freewill offering, which are brought by a single individual when he becomes obligated in them. Those offerings have no communal aspect at all.

Indeed, in Mikra’ei Kodesh by Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank, Passover, volume 1, section 2, he argues that Passover also has a communal obligation. He cites the Mekhilta, a halakhic midrash, that is, a rabbinic legal exposition on the Torah, in Parashat Bo, section 5; see also Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 41b:

From where do you say that if Israel has only one Passover offering, all of them fulfill their obligation with it? Scripture says: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.”

The very wording of the Mekhilta treats the expression “the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel” as referring to a community. But the content of the exposition also pushes in a similar direction. He cites the commentary Birurei HaMiddot on the Mekhilta, which proved that according to the Mekhilta, eating the Passover offering is indispensable. He explains that for this reason the Mekhilta writes that only if they have no possibility of offering more than one Passover may they all fulfill their obligation with a single offering. But if they have the possibility, they must offer enough so that each person can eat an olive-sized portion of the Passover meat.

But what happens when that is impossible? Seemingly, if eating is indispensable, they do not fulfill their obligation without eating. So how does it help to offer a single Passover? Here he explains that in such a situation the Passover is treated like communal offerings, in which eating is not indispensable.

Rabbi Frank objected to this from a mishnah in Pesachim 96b, which states:

Five things are brought in a state of impurity and are not eaten in impurity… The Passover that is brought in impurity is eaten in impurity, because from the outset it comes only for eating.

If so, the Passover comes only for eating, and therefore even when it is offered in impurity, it is eaten in impurity. So too Maimonides rules in Laws of the Passover Offering 7:8.

He cites there, in the name of Rabbi Moshe Zamba, a fundamental principle in the laws of the Passover sacrifice. According to him, just as there is an obligation upon the community to bring the daily offerings and additional offerings—meaning that the entire community brings a single sacrifice—so too with Passover there is an obligation to bring a communal sacrifice. However, with Passover there is an additional obligation: that each individual bring a sacrifice in such a way that he can also eat from it. Under normal circumstances, when each individual brings a Passover offering, those offerings also constitute the bringing of the communal offering, and therefore there is no need to add an extra communal sacrifice beyond the private Passover offerings. This is what the Talmud says in Yoma 51a: since the Passover comes in a collective gathering, all bring it together on the festival, it is regarded as a communal offering.

On this basis he explains the Mekhilta cited above: if they do not have a Passover offering from which they can eat, at least they should bring a single sacrifice, and that sacrifice fulfills the communal obligation. They do not fulfill the private obligation, but they do fulfill the communal one.

He then cites his friend Rabbi Avraham Aharon Prag, who held that a Passover offering brought in the capacity of a communal offering would have to come from the Temple treasury contribution, in which case it would be the property of all Israel even if no individual had a perutah’s worth in it.

He adds, however, that in the Babylonian Talmud this is difficult to say, because the Talmud in Pesachim 78b tries to bring proof from that exposition that eating is not indispensable. Indeed, in the Babylonian text the reading does not say that they have only one Passover. This claim rejects the possibility that there is an additional obligation in the Passover sacrifice to bring a separate communal offering. But the very view of the sacrifice as a communal offering certainly exists in the Babylonian Talmud as well, since it too derives from the verse “the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel” that all of them can fulfill their obligation with a single Passover. According to this view, the ordinary Passover offering itself is the communal offering, and in this unusual communal offering there is also a requirement that eating be indispensable.

Passover in a state of impurity

The Sages teach us that ritual impurity is permitted—or at least overridden—in communal matters, meaning that in communal offerings impurity does not prevent the offering from being brought. This rule is learned explicitly from the Passover sacrifice. There we learn that if the majority of the community is impure, the first Passover is not deferred to the second Passover but is offered in impurity. Maimonides writes as follows in Laws of the Passover Offering 7:1:

If many were impure through corpse impurity at the first Passover, then if they were a minority of the community they are deferred to the second Passover like other impure individuals. But if the majority of the community were impure through corpse impurity, or if the priests or the sacred vessels were impure through corpse impurity, they are not deferred. Rather, they all offer the Passover in impurity, the impure together with the pure, as it is stated: “There were men who were impure through a human corpse”—individuals are deferred, but the community is not deferred. This applies only to corpse impurity, as we explained in the laws of entering the Temple.

Thus, the setting aside of impurity for Passover is learned from our verses.

It should be noted, however, that the Talmud in Yoma 50a deliberates whether this rule applies only because these offerings have a fixed time, or perhaps to all communal offerings. In the conclusion, it seems that the override is because the offering has a fixed time, even in an individual offering. Thus Maimonides writes in Laws of Entry into the Sanctuary 4:9:

Any offering that does not have a fixed time overrides neither Shabbat nor impurity, for if it is not offered today it may be offered tomorrow or the day after. But any offering that has a fixed time, whether communal or individual, overrides Shabbat and overrides impurity. Yet it does not override every kind of impurity, only corpse impurity.

But the “individual offering” under discussion is only the Passover,² and even with regard to Passover it is clear that the override applies only when the majority of the community is impure. In other words, this override has a communal aspect, as the Talmud itself says there in Yoma 51a: since it comes in a collective gathering, it is regarded as a communal offering. It is clear that if there were some theoretical situation in which the majority of the community were obligated to bring a sin offering and were impure, that would not override impurity.³ It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the Passover sacrifice has a communal aspect. Among the Sages, the setting aside of impurity in offerings is called “ritual impurity is permitted in the community,” meaning that not only the fixed time of the offering but also its communal character is what sets impurity aside.

This is also the conclusion that emerges from our earlier discussion of a situation in which all Israel fulfill their obligation with a single Passover offering.

The obligation of women

We see that although this is a positive commandment dependent on a fixed time, women are obligated in it. There are sources for this in the Talmudic discussion in Pesachim 91b. At the end, the Talmud says:

In accordance with whom goes this statement of Rabbi Elazar: A woman in the first Passover is under obligation, and in the second it is optional, and it overrides Shabbat. If it is optional, why should it override Shabbat? Rather say: In the second it is optional, and in the first it is obligatory, and it overrides Shabbat.

That is, the conclusion of the Talmud is that the first Passover is obligatory for women and overrides Shabbat. What is the connection between these two laws? We suggest that the fact that women are obligated despite the commandment’s dependence on time stems from the fact that it is a communal offering. Women are obligated in bringing the Passover sacrifice because the one obligated is the community, and women are part of the community. In other words, there is no separate obligation on women as women to bring a Passover sacrifice. Rather, there is an obligation upon the community, and women are included within it. Therefore they do not have an exemption on account of the commandment’s dependence on time.

From here it also follows that the Passover sacrifice overrides Shabbat, because communal offerings with a fixed time override Shabbat. Thus these two laws are connected to one another, since both derive from the fact that the Passover sacrifice is a communal offering. Indeed, Maimonides in Positive Commandment 55 cites these two laws together:

For it has already been made clear at the end of tractate Pesachim, 91b, that the first Passover is obligatory for women and overrides Shabbat—that is, when the fourteenth falls on Shabbat—just like every Jewish male.

Thus the obligation of women here derives from their inclusion in the community, and that is why they are obligated despite the fact that the commandment depends on a fixed time.

In an article on Parashat Ki Tisa from 5767, we pointed out that women and minors are obligated in the half-shekel commandment as part of the community. There too we argued that the obligation rests upon the community, and therefore women are included in it.

Another example is the obligation of women in the commandment of Hakhel, the septennial public assembly. In the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 34a-b, the Talmud cites the following baraita:

All positive commandments dependent on time… Our Rabbis taught: Which is a positive commandment dependent on time? Dwelling in the festival booth, taking the palm branch, sounding the ram’s horn, ritual fringes, and phylacteries. And which is a positive commandment not dependent on time? The doorpost scroll, the parapet, returning lost property, and sending away the mother bird.

The Talmud then asks:

Is this really a general rule? What about eating unleavened bread, rejoicing on the festival, and Hakhel? These are positive commandments dependent on time, and women are obligated. And furthermore, what about Torah study, procreation, and redemption of the firstborn? These are not positive commandments dependent on time, and women are exempt.

And it answers:

Rabbi Yochanan said: One does not derive rules from general statements, even where an exception is stated. For we learned: “With all things one may establish a shared arrangement and participate in a shared alleyway arrangement, except water and salt.” Is that all? Are there not also truffles and mushrooms? Rather, one does not derive rules from general statements, even where an exception is stated.

That is, one cannot derive law from general rules, even when they contain the word “except,” which appears to make them precise. Even so, the question of why women are obligated in Hakhel, despite the fact that it is time-dependent, remains unanswered. According to our approach, we would say that with Hakhel too the verse speaks in the language of an obligation upon all Israel, and therefore women are obligated in this commandment as part of the community, just as we saw regarding the Passover sacrifice.⁴

C. Between the first Passover and the second Passover

Returning to the second Passover

What is the law regarding the second Passover? Are women obligated in it? Does it override Shabbat and impurity? The Talmud itself, in Pesachim 91b and parallel passages, deals with these questions, and it even points out that the second Passover is also brought in a collective gathering, see Yoma 51a. Yet we saw above that Maimonides and Sefer HaChinukh rule that for women the second Passover is optional.

At first glance, the conclusion that follows is that the second Passover is not a communal offering. On the contrary, it is essentially an individual offering, because if there is a community obligated in it, it has already been done on the first Passover. The second Passover is the Passover of individuals, and therefore women are exempt from it just as they are exempt from other positive commandments dependent on time.

As for Shabbat and impurity, the tannaitic sages disagreed, see Yoma 51a and Pesachim 95a-b. In practical law, Maimonides rules that the second Passover does not override impurity. It does, however, override Shabbat, as Maimonides writes in Laws of the Passover Offering 10:15:

What is the difference between the first Passover and the second Passover? In the first, leaven is prohibited under the rules that it may not be seen and may not be found; it is not slaughtered while leaven is in one’s possession; it may not be taken outside its company; the recitation of psalms of praise is required while eating it; a festival offering is brought with it; and it may be brought in impurity if the majority of the community became impure through corpse impurity, as we explained. But in the second Passover, leaven and unleavened bread may both be in the house; the recitation of psalms of praise is not required while eating it; it may be taken outside its company; no festival offering is brought with it; and it is not brought in impurity. Both override Shabbat, both require the recitation of psalms of praise at the time of their preparation, and both are eaten roasted, in one house, with unleavened bread and bitter herbs. One may not leave any of either until morning, and one may not break a bone in either. Why then is the second not equal to the first in every respect, since it is said: “According to all the statute of the Passover they shall observe it”? Because it specified some of the statutes of the Passover, teaching that it is equal to the first only in those matters explicitly stated regarding it, namely the laws intrinsic to the offering, and these are the statutes of the Passover…

Maimonides summarizes here what is similar and what is different between the first Passover and the second Passover. Among other things, he rules that the second Passover is not brought in impurity, though it does override Shabbat.

In the simple sense, it does not override impurity because it is not a communal offering. For that same reason, women are not obligated in it.⁵ Indeed, this is what Tosafot write on the words “it overrides Shabbat,” in Yoma 51a:

It overrides Shabbat but does not override impurity: it seems to me that both Rabbi Yehudah and the Rabbis derive this from the verse “according to all the statute of the Passover,” and they disagree in this line of reasoning. The first tanna holds: according to the statute of the first Passover—just as the first does not override impurity except where the majority of the community is involved, but when only a minority of the community is involved it is deferred because of impurity, so too the second Passover. Rabbi Yehudah holds that the verse means: just as the first Passover is not entirely canceled, so too…

That is, Tosafot explain that according to all tannaitic opinions the second Passover is compared to the first, and the dispute is only over how that comparison should be understood. In practice, the ruling follows the first tanna, and according to him the second Passover resembles the first in the sense that even in the first Passover, when only a minority is impure, it is deferred because of impurity. See there also regarding the distinction in the case of Shabbat.

The meaning of the second Passover

We saw above that the Passover sacrifice has two dimensions at once: it is a sacrifice of individuals and at the same time a communal sacrifice of all Israel. When only a minority are impure, the Passover brought by the majority constitutes the offering of the communal sacrifice, and what remains is to complete the aspect of the individuals, for those who were impure. That is what is done through the second Passover. But when the majority are impure, the Passover is observed in the first month, because halakha provides no way of compensating for the communal aspect of Passover later on. If even in such a case the offering were deferred to the second Passover, then the result would be that no communal offering at all had been brought that year. In the second Passover, even if the majority of the public were to bring it, only the individual aspect exists.

It may be that the reason is that the Exodus from Egypt is the creation of the nation, and the Passover sacrifice is the act that gathers all the individuals together and fuses them into a single community. In the second Passover one can complete the obligation of bringing a sacrifice, which is an individual obligation, but not the creation of the nation. That is not the relevant appointed time for that.

Something like this we saw in our article on Parashat Ki Tisa, 5767, where we argued that the commandment of the half-shekel has two aspects: the obligation of individuals to contribute to the Temple treasury, and the obligation of individuals to be included in the community. This is very similar to what we are discovering here.

In fact, these ideas are explained in the discussion in Yoma 51a, where it says:

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rava: As for this tanna, why does he call the Passover an individual offering, and why does he call the festival offering a communal offering? If it is because it comes in a collective gathering, the Passover too comes in a collective gathering. — There is the second Passover, which does not come in a collective gathering.

That is, the Passover is called a communal offering because it comes in a collective gathering, that is, the whole community together, whereas the second Passover does not come in a collective gathering and is therefore an individual offering.

Later in the same Talmudic discussion, they explain the view of the first tanna, which is also the accepted law, as to why the second Passover does not override impurity:

For it was taught: The second Passover overrides Shabbat but does not override impurity. Rabbi Yehudah says: It even overrides impurity. What is the reason of the first tanna? He can say to you: Was it not because of impurity that you deferred it? Should it then be done in impurity? Rabbi Yehudah can say to you: Scripture says, “According to all the statute of the Passover they shall observe it”—even in impurity. The Torah gave him another opportunity to perform it in purity; if he did not merit that, let him perform it in impurity.

The first tanna holds that the deferral of the Passover because of impurity means that these are only individuals offering it. Precisely for that reason, the second Passover cannot override impurity. By its very nature, it is an offering of individuals, since had they been the majority of the community they would have had the status of a community, and then they would have offered it in the first month even in impurity. Rabbi Yehudah disagrees, because he sees the second Passover as a continuation of the first—another opportunity to observe it in purity. If they still do not manage to do so, then it may be offered in impurity, just as the first Passover may be offered in impurity where necessary.

Resolving the difficulties regarding the second Passover

Above we wondered how it is possible to interpret the verses concerning the second Passover in a way that disconnects it from the first, contrary to the plain sense of Scripture. Our conclusion was that there is indeed a connection between the two Passovers even according to Rabbi: one who observed the first is exempt from the second, but it is still not correct to say that the second is compensation for the first, which is Rabbi Natan’s view. We can now see the deeper meaning of this. In the first Passover there are two aspects: a communal offering and an offering of individuals. In the second Passover there is also a possibility of fulfilling the obligation of the individual aspect, but this is not compensation in the ordinary sense. It is another opportunity to fulfill that obligation.

One might perhaps go further and say that this is not merely another opportunity to fulfill the individual obligation, but that the individual obligation exists only in the second Passover. According to our approach, there are two obligations in the Passover sacrifice: the obligation of the community to bring Passover offerings in the first month in order to constitute the nation as a community, and the obligation of individuals to bring a Passover offering, which exists only in the second Passover. According to Rabbi, the innovation is that one who observed the first, that is, one who participated in bringing the communal Passover, thereby also fulfilled the obligation of the private Passover. Therefore, when the second Passover arrives, he is already exempt from that obligation. According to this suggestion, in a certain sense the first Passover is an “advance fulfillment” of the second.

Perhaps here we can also find an explanation for what troubled us at the beginning of our discussion. In Scripture it seems that Moses and the people assumed that there had to be a possibility of completing the Passover commandment. We wondered why Passover should be exceptional among all other commandments, such that if one did not fulfill it he could still make it up later. The answer is that the communal aspect truly cannot be completed later. But the obligation of the individual is, from the outset, specifically in the second Passover; those who offer in the first month merely fulfill that individual obligation there as well. The people therefore ask: why should someone who could not offer in the first month lose the opportunity to offer in the second and thus fulfill his obligation to bring the individual Passover sacrifice? Moses answers that indeed he can still do so. This will not be compensation for the first Passover, because the communal sacrifice has already been brought, but the individual obligation can still be fulfilled.

Fulfilling the communal obligation

We may now ask how those individuals who brought the second Passover fulfilled their communal obligation. At first glance, they brought only an individual offering. It is certainly possible to say that in truth they lost the communal commandment, and that this is exactly what the entire discussion revolves around: the second Passover is not a full compensation for the first, if it is compensation at all.

But if we note that this is a communal commandment, then the addressee of the commandment is the community. If the majority offered in the first month, then the community fulfilled its obligation. What remains is the obligation of the individuals, and that is fulfilled in the second Passover. The individuals who were deferred to the second Passover fulfilled their communal obligation together with the community even without bringing a sacrifice, because they are included in the community that fulfilled the obligation.

Perhaps this is also the explanation for the innovation we found earlier in Maimonides, namely that one who offered the second Passover is saved from the karet for deliberately failing to bring the first Passover. At first glance, this seems contrary to the plain meaning of the Talmudic discussion, as we already noted. According to our approach here, one might understand it by saying that if someone offered the second Passover, he is included in the community that offered the first. He fulfilled his individual obligation, and as an individual included within the community he fulfilled the Passover through their offering.

This also explains why one who erred or was prevented in the first Passover and therefore did not incur karet, but then deliberately failed in the second Passover, does incur karet. The reason is not failure to fulfill his individual obligation. Rather, failure to offer the second prevents his inclusion in the community that offered the first, and he therefore incurs karet for the first. It follows that the karet attached to the second Passover is, in essence, karet for the first Passover. The punishment of karet applies only for failure to fulfill the communal obligation, not the private one.

Indeed, we find that Kesef Mishneh writes on Laws of the Passover Offering 5:2 that the essence of the karet is for the first Passover. It may be that this is only within the view of Rabbi Chananiah ben Akavya, but see there.

D. A note on karet in circumcision and in positive commandments generally

We find one other positive commandment that carries karet, namely circumcision. This commandment too is imposed upon the individual, but its meaning is entry into the covenant of belonging to the community of Israel. Therefore, although it is a positive commandment, it carries karet. The meaning of karet is severance from the people of Israel—“that soul shall be cut off from his people”—and therefore it is imposed only for commandments whose significance is inclusion within the people of Israel.

It is interesting to note that in the commandment of circumcision, as in Passover, we also find a possibility of later completion. The primary commandment is upon the father to circumcise his son. If he fails and does not circumcise him, the court circumcises him; and when he becomes an adult, the son himself is obligated to circumcise himself. Thus Maimonides writes in Laws of Circumcision 1:1-2:

1. Circumcision is a positive commandment for which one is liable to karet, as it is stated: “And an uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin—that soul shall be cut off from his people.” It is a commandment upon the father to circumcise his son, and upon a master to circumcise his home-born slaves and purchased slaves. If the father or master transgressed and did not circumcise them, he has neglected a positive commandment, but he is not liable to karet, because karet depends only on the uncircumcised person himself. The court is commanded to circumcise that son or slave at the proper time and not to leave any uncircumcised male among Israel or among their slaves.

2. One may not circumcise a man’s son without his knowledge unless he has transgressed and refrained from circumcising him, in which case the court circumcises him against his will. If the court overlooked him and did not circumcise him, then when he grows up he is obligated to circumcise himself…

The relationship between these obligations is complicated, and we will not enter into it here. In general, we may say that the father is the representative of the community, whose role is to bring the child into the people of Israel. If he does not do his duty, then the court or the child himself performs it in his place. This continues the parallel between Passover and circumcision: the community in Passover parallels the father in circumcision.

In any event, there is a well-known dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad later in the same law:

Every day that passes after he comes of age and does not circumcise himself, he neglects a positive commandment. But he is not liable to karet until he dies uncircumcised and deliberately so.

Raavad’s gloss: “But he is not liable to karet until he dies…” The Raavad wrote: This has no substance. Are we exempting him from heavenly punishment because the warning is uncertain? Every day he stands under liability to karet.

Maimonides holds that karet applies to the final outcome. If in the end the person remains uncircumcised deliberately, he is liable to karet. The Raavad, by contrast, holds that there is liability to karet on every day in the meantime.⁶

In Minchat Chinukh, Commandment 2, section 26, two practical implications are noted. First, with regard to repentance on Yom Kippur in the meantime: if the transgression is one that carries karet, repentance alone does not suffice, and additional processes of atonement are required—Yom Kippur and suffering; see Maimonides, Laws of Repentance 1:4. Second, if one deliberately did not circumcise himself and was then prevented at the end of his life: according to Maimonides he is exempt, because in the end he was prevented; according to the Raavad he is liable, because he had already become liable to karet from the moment he failed to circumcise himself upon reaching adulthood, and the prevention at the end merely kept him from escaping karet.⁷

Minchat Chinukh there notes that with regard to the Passover sacrifice, Maimonides rules in Laws of the Passover Offering 5:2 that if one acted deliberately in the first Passover and inadvertently in the second, he is liable to karet. This is seemingly contrary to his position in the laws of circumcision, where karet comes only at the end. For if karet is only at the end, then if one is prevented at the end he should be exempt from karet. He explains that in the Passover sacrifice the essence of the karet is for the first Passover, as Kesef Mishneh wrote above. Even so, it is still not clear in what respect the Passover sacrifice differs from circumcision. According to our approach, it seems that in Passover the first obligation is essentially different from the second, and therefore the essential karet in Passover is for the first, that is, for the communal obligation. By contrast, in circumcision it is clear that circumcision by the court or by the individual himself is a complete fulfillment of the father’s original duty, and therefore there is no special karet on the first stage. On the contrary, as can be seen from the quotation above, the father himself is not liable to karet if he did not circumcise his son, because the obligation is on the son. Therefore, in circumcision the primary obligation is upon the son himself for remaining uncircumcised.

It seems that this is precisely the point on which the Raavad disagrees with Maimonides: in his view, even in circumcision the primary obligation is fixed at the first moment of adulthood. Minchat Chinukh already noted this as well in Commandment 5, section 16.

Insights

1. From the plain sense of the verses, the second Passover appears to be compensation for the first Passover.
2. However, one may see this as no more than a correlation. If so, there are two possible ways to understand it:
3. A is the cause of B.
4. There is a correlation between A and B, but no causal relation.
5. This is probably the dispute among the tannaitic sages over whether the second Passover is compensation or an independent sacrifice. In practice, the ruling is that it is independent.
6. The sage who holds that it is compensation maintains that only one who did not offer the first Passover is obligated in the second. The sage who holds that it is an independent sacrifice maintains that the obligation to offer the second Passover rests on every individual, except that one who offered the first is exempt from this obligation. Thus, according to both, there is a connection—active or passive—between the two sacrifices.
7. The first Passover is a communal sacrifice brought by a collection of individuals. Some therefore see in it two aspects: a communal sacrifice and an individual sacrifice. That is why one who offered it has also fulfilled the obligation of the second Passover.
8. The second Passover is, by its very nature, an individual sacrifice, and therefore it cannot be a full replacement for the first Passover sacrifice. Even so, it repairs the liability to karet for one who did not offer the first.
9. The obligation of women and the setting aside of impurity are two consequences of this distinction. Women are obligated in the first Passover even though it is a positive commandment dependent on time, because the party obligated is the community, and women are included in it as part of Israel. In the second Passover there is no communal aspect, and therefore women are not obligated in it. As for impurity, the consequence is straightforward: only a communal sacrifice overrides impurity.
10. Communal obligations rest upon the community, but every individual is commanded to take part in them in order to ensure their fulfillment.
11. Maimonides and the Raavad disagreed regarding circumcision: is there an ongoing liability to karet for one who remains uncircumcised until he is circumcised? With Passover the situation is different according to all views.
12. Liability to karet, at least with respect to positive commandments, is imposed for withdrawal from a communal obligation, both in circumcision and in Passover. Therefore even when there is karet for failure to bring the second Passover, it exists only because the first Passover was not brought—and not because of the second as such—since only the first is a communal obligation.

Footnotes