Lesson 34: Emor

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• Coercion and will.
• Decomposing a halakhic (Jewish legal) situation into its components, and the different kinds of synthesis.
• Nullifying negation and oppositional negation.
• Between transgression and punishment.

Summary

This week’s article deals with the laws of sanctification and desecration of the divine name. One of the basic principles in these laws is the obligation to surrender one’s life for the sanctification of the Name in certain situations. Usually a distinction is drawn between the three gravest transgressions, for which one must surrender one’s life, and all other transgressions, which may be violated in a state of coercion and pikuach nefesh (life-saving necessity).

The central part of the article discusses the comparison Maimonides draws between coercion by threat and a life-threatening illness. We examine the basis of this comparison, which seems highly problematic even though the commentators do not remark on it, and then also the qualification Maimonides introduces regarding punishment. He writes that one who violated one of the three gravest transgressions under threat is not punished because he acted under coercion, whereas one who healed himself through one of them is punished.

We present several distinctions proposed by later authorities between these two situations. Some of them even regard healing through a transgression as an intentional act, from which one might perhaps infer that even with other transgressions there is no permission to seek healing in this way.

In the course of the discussion we raise distinctions between different dimensions of the permission to violate prohibitions in a situation of pikuach nefesh: whether it depends only on the severity of the transgression or also on considerations of desecration and sanctification of the Name; what determines whether there is a transgression here, and what determines whether there is guilt, and therefore punishment; and we present several examples of decomposing a halakhic phenomenon into two components concealed beneath it. At the end of the article we discuss the logical and meta-halakhic implications of these distinctions.

The rules and principles that emerge from the article

• Healing by means of a prohibited act.
• A look at the distinction between passivity and activity.

Introduction

In this week’s article we will discuss a distinction that already appears in the medieval authorities in the laws of sanctification of the Name and self-sacrifice. They distinguish between a person who is threatened and compelled to commit a transgression, and a person who is ill and must commit a transgression in order to recover. This is a distinction based on reasoning, with no clear textual source, and yet the medieval authorities and later decisors rely upon it in practice in these severe laws.

A. Sanctification of the Name and Desecration of the Name

The commandments of sanctifying the Name and desecrating the Name

In our weekly Torah portion, the Torah commands:

“You shall keep My commandments and perform them; I am the Lord. You shall not profane My holy name, and I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel; I am the Lord who sanctifies you, who brought you out of the land of Egypt to be your God; I am the Lord.”
— Leviticus 22:31-33

The Sages and the medieval authorities derive from here two commandments:
1. A positive commandment to sanctify the Name (see Maimonides, Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 9, and Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 296).
2. A negative commandment prohibiting desecration of the Name (there, negative commandment 63, and Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 295).

The relation between the commandments: nullifying negation and oppositional negation

At first glance it seems that these are simply two sides of the same coin, meaning that every act that fulfills the commandment of sanctifying the Name is also an avoidance of the prohibition of desecrating the Name, and vice versa.¹ Maimonides indeed writes at the beginning of negative commandment 63:

“Negative commandment 63 is the warning against desecration of the Name. It is the opposite of the sanctification of the Name with which we were commanded, whose explanation preceded in positive commandment 9…”

However, as we shall immediately see, the two commandments can be distinguished. There are acts whose performance constitutes sanctification of the Name, but whose non-performance would not constitute the transgression of desecrating the Name, and vice versa. Thus, between the commandment of sanctifying the Name and the transgression of desecrating the Name there is a neutral intermediate zone. In the terminology of our article on Parashat Yitro, we claim that sanctification and desecration of the Name stand to one another as 1 and -1, not as 1 and 0. Between 1 and -1 there is a neutral zone, marked in this metaphor as 0. Again in the terms of that article, the relation between the two commandments is one of oppositional negation, not nullifying negation.

Details

Maimonides mentions several kinds of obligation included in these commandments. In positive commandment 9 he writes that there is an obligation to publicize the faith and not fear one who would harm us, including surrendering one’s life for the faith and for God’s unity. In negative commandment 63 he lists three components included in the prohibition of desecrating the Name:

1. When a coercer asks a Jew to violate any commandment during a time of religious persecution, or one of the three gravest transgressions—idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed—even when it is not a time of persecution, if the Jew does not surrender his life he transgresses desecration of the Name. Maimonides conditions this on the coercer’s intention being to make the Jew betray his religion, and not merely to serve the coercer’s own benefit.
2. Committing a transgression for no desire or benefit from it—apparently even in private—contains an element of desecration of the Name.
3. When a prominent person performs an act that is not itself sinful, but appears sinful to the masses.

The details of the negative and positive commandments are not formulated as exact opposites. For example, when a prominent person refrains from an act that would be interpreted as sinful, or when a person refrains from transgressing out of lust, they have not thereby sanctified the Name; they have merely avoided desecrating it.

The uniqueness of the first category

In situations belonging to the first category, it is customary to interpret the relation as indeed an exact inversion: one who surrenders his life fulfills sanctification of the Name and avoids desecration of the Name; one who does not surrender his life transgresses desecration of the Name and cancels the positive commandment of sanctifying the Name. A coercive threat thus creates a situation that eliminates the intermediate zone between the commandment of sanctifying the Name and the transgression of desecrating the Name. The line becomes one-dimensional, and every act belongs only to one side or the other.

This is indeed how we find Maimonides wording it in Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 5:4:

“Whoever is told, ‘Transgress rather than be killed,’ and instead is killed without transgressing, bears responsibility for his own death. Whoever is told, ‘Be killed rather than transgress,’ and is killed without transgressing has sanctified the Name. If this took place before ten Jews, he has sanctified the Name publicly, like Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, and Rabbi Akiva and his companions. These are the martyrs of the kingdom, than whom there is no higher level. Concerning them it is said, ‘For Your sake we are killed all day long; we are accounted as sheep for slaughter,’ and also, ‘Gather My faithful ones to Me, those who made My covenant by sacrifice.’ Whoever is told, ‘Be killed rather than transgress,’ yet transgresses and is not killed, has desecrated the Name. If this occurred before ten Jews, he has desecrated the Name publicly, annulled the positive commandment of sanctifying the Name, and violated the negative commandment of desecrating the Name.”

When there is a threat to commit one of the three gravest transgressions, a binary situation arises: yielding to the threat is desecration of the Name and annulment of the commandment of sanctifying the Name; standing firm is sanctification of the Name and avoidance of desecration of the Name. By contrast, when the threat concerns another transgression, a different situation arises: yielding to the threat is not desecration of the Name—or perhaps there is some desecration here, but on a lower level, and therefore it is permitted—and certainly it is not sanctification of the Name. Standing firm in the face of the threat may perhaps be sanctification of the Name, though for some decisors it is forbidden, but it is not avoidance of desecration of the Name, at least not of forbidden desecration.

Thus, the relation of nullifying negation between the two commandments characterizes chiefly situations in which one is threatened to commit one of the three gravest transgressions.

The structure of the biblical passage

Let us now return to the biblical passage cited above. At the beginning of the passage, the Torah commands us to keep the commandments. At first sight this seems empty of content, for by the very definition of commandments we are supposed to keep them. Maimonides and Nahmanides discuss this in the fourth root of Sefer HaMitzvot, but this is not the place.

After that comes the verse from which the commandment to sanctify the Name and the prohibition to desecrate the Name are derived. Presumably there is a connection between the commandment in the preceding verse and these commandments. The verse at the end is formulated as a continuation of the previous verse, for it defines who the Name is whose desecration is forbidden and whose sanctification is commanded.

Nahmanides, in his commentary there, indeed sees the verses as a sequence, and writes:

“The meaning of ‘You shall keep My commandments’ is that here He warns Israel to keep the commandments: to be careful with offerings that have blemishes, and offerings brought before their proper time, before seven days, and on the day the mother was slaughtered, and to prepare the sacrifices and the thanksgiving-offering and slaughter them so that they are accepted. It includes all the commandments together. He already mentioned earlier, regarding statutes and ordinances (above 19:37), ‘You shall keep all My statutes and all My ordinances.’ And He said, ‘You shall not profane My holy name’—that there not be among you someone deceitful who offers a corrupted sacrifice to the Lord, as He said concerning the sons of Aaron (above v. 2), ‘that they not profane My holy name,’ warning with respect to sacrifices against impurity or blemish.

“The meaning of ‘And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel’—according to our Rabbis (Sifra, Emor 9:4), this is a positive commandment: that we sanctify His name with respect to commandments for which one must be killed rather than transgress. This is the meaning of ‘who brought you out of the land of Egypt to be your God’—a reason that includes all the commandments: that it is fitting to sanctify His name for them, because we are His servants, whom He redeemed from Egypt.”

The obligation to die for sanctification of the Name: Nahmanides’ view

Nahmanides sees the main content of the commandment to sanctify the Name in the obligation to die for sanctification of the Name under circumstances that require it. According to him, the final verse in the passage is meant to justify and ground that obligation: the Holy One, blessed be He, brought us out of Egypt to be His servants. He acquired us as His servants by taking us out of Egypt, and therefore we bear a basic obligation to sanctify His name even at the cost of our lives.

At first glance, his words suggest that there is an obligation to surrender one’s life for all the commandments, whereas in practice such an obligation exists only for the three gravest transgressions. But if we read his language more carefully, we will notice that he formulates it with care. He writes that the commandment is to sanctify His name “with respect to commandments,” not “with respect to all the commandments.” Later he also writes that it is fitting to sanctify His name for them—that is, for all the commandments—because we are His servants. It seems that his intention is to say that such would indeed be the logical requirement, were it not for the fact that the Torah itself exempted us from the obligation of sanctifying the Name with respect to 610 of the commandments, leaving only the three gravest ones. In other words, this is the conceptual starting point of the sugya, not a direct halakhic description.

Where did the Torah exempt us from this obligation? Presumably the source is the discussion in the Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 85b, where the Gemara seeks a source for the principle that saving life overrides Shabbat, and concludes with the verse “and live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), upon which the Sages expounded: “‘And live by them’—and not die by them.” This verse is not interpreted as an independent commandment, for it contains no positive content; rather, it functions as an exemption from the obligation to die in order to keep Shabbat and, more broadly, the commandments in general, apart from the three gravest ones.

What emerges from that passage is that without the verse, we really would have been obligated not to desecrate Shabbat and to die under the threat confronting us. Thus the original line of reasoning indeed says that such an obligation exists, and that was also Nahmanides’ intention. But by means of this verse the Torah exempts us from that obligation with respect to most commandments, apart from the three gravest ones, which have special sources of their own (see Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 74b).

A similar picture emerges from Sefer HaChinukh at the beginning of commandment 296:

“We were commanded to sanctify the Name, as it says, ‘And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel’—that is, that we surrender our lives to die for the observance of the commandments of the faith. Our Sages of blessed memory have already explained, by received tradition and from the verses, in what matter and with respect to which commandment we were so commanded. And although it is written in the Torah, ‘and live by them,’ which implies and not die by them, they have already received that this verse was not said regarding every circumstance and every transgression, and by their received tradition we live by all the words of the Torah.

“They said explicitly (Sanhedrin 74a) that there are three commandments for which a person is obligated always to be killed rather than transgress: idolatry and all its adjuncts—that is, every matter forbidden to us by the negative commandments founded upon it, as we shall explain below with God’s help—likewise forbidden sexual relations and all their adjuncts, and bloodshed. Thus if they say to a person, ‘Worship idolatry or we will kill you,’ he should be killed and not worship it. Even if his heart remains whole in faith in God, nevertheless he was commanded to be killed and not perform that evil act, and not give the coercer room to think that he denied God. And the language of the Sifrei is: ‘On this condition I brought you out of the land of Egypt—that you sanctify My name in public.’ And similarly with the other two that we mentioned: one must be killed and not transgress, as we said.

“The root of this commandment is known: a human being was created only to serve his Creator, and one who does not surrender his body for the service of his Master is not a good servant. Human beings surrender their lives for their masters; how much more so for the command of the King of kings, the Holy One blessed be He.”

At the beginning of his discussion it appears that there is an obligation to surrender one’s life for the observance of all the commandments. He then qualifies this and says that by received tradition we have learned that the obligation does not apply to all the commandments, but only to the three gravest ones, which he details in the next paragraph. Finally, he raises the verse “and live by them” as an objection, for it implies that the Torah instructs us not to die for the observance of the commandments, and he explains in the end that our Sages received that this verse was not stated in every case.

In his concluding paragraph he returns to the same idea we saw in Nahmanides: our status as servants of the Holy One, blessed be He, establishes the obligation to die for sanctification of His name, and this appears to be said about every commandment and every matter, were it not for the limiting teaching.

Thus both Nahmanides and Sefer HaChinukh show us the starting point of the sugya of sanctification of the Name: there is a basic obligation to sanctify His name for every commandment, but the Torah exempts us from this obligation with respect to most commandments. On this basis we can understand why, in a time of religious persecution, we are indeed obligated to surrender our lives even for all commandments. The Sages assessed that in such a situation self-sacrifice for every commandment is required in order to sanctify the Name, and therefore the basic obligation to die for sanctification of the Name remains in force for all commandments. The limitation learned from “and live by them,” which exempts one from dying for sanctification of the Name in most transgressions, does not apply to a time of persecution.

Clarification regarding the source of the starting point

One might have argued the opposite. If the Torah found it necessary to command us to sanctify the Name, that implies that without such a command there would have been no duty to die for sanctification of His name. Why, then, do we infer the starting point specifically from the command “and live by them,” and not from the command “and I shall be sanctified”?

Clearly, nothing can be inferred from “and I shall be sanctified” against the starting point, for had the Holy One, blessed be He, lacked such a right—to command us to surrender our lives for sanctification of His name—then even if the command existed it would not be valid. The very existence of the command indirectly proves the starting point, namely, that even apart from the command God has such a right. By contrast, the existence of the verse “and live by them” very much points to that starting point, for from it we can clearly infer that without the verse we would have had to surrender our lives for all the commandments—perhaps precisely by virtue of the command “and I shall be sanctified” itself.

An implication of the foregoing: the law concerning a gentile

In the sugya in Sanhedrin 74b, the Sages dispute whether a gentile is likewise obligated in sanctification of the Name. In Tosafot, on the words “and if” there, the view is that the question is resolved and the gentile is not obligated. So too Maimonides rules in Laws of Kings 10:2: a gentile under threat need not surrender his life to keep one of his seven commandments.

Now Tosafot, on the words “Noahide” there on 74b, ask: why should gentiles not be obligated to surrender their lives? After all, with respect to them it is not written “and live by them.” In other words, they assume that without a special command there is an obligation to surrender one’s life, exactly like the starting point we proposed above. Tosafot answer that for Israel a verse of “and live by them” is needed because there is a basic commandment of “and I shall be sanctified.” By contrast, the gentile has no such basic commandment, and therefore no verse of “and live by them” is needed to exempt him from it. He has no basic obligation to surrender his life for sanctification of the Name.

The author of Minchat Chinukh, at the beginning of commandment 295-296, infers from this that by pure reasoning alone there is in fact no obligation to surrender one’s life, for had such an obligation existed, gentiles too would have been bound by it. The obligation stems only from the verse “and I shall be sanctified,” and that was said only to Israel.

However, these considerations do not directly bear on our issue. One must distinguish between God’s basic right to demand self-sacrifice and the existence of an actual obligation, by reasoning alone, to surrender one’s life. Clearly, without the command “and I shall be sanctified” there is no actual obligation to do so. But as we noted above, the theoretical right of the Holy One, blessed be He, to demand this certainly exists even without the verse. Only because of that does the command “and I shall be sanctified” itself have force.

Still, it should be noted that this basic right is justified in the Torah, according to Nahmanides’ interpretation above, by the fact that God took us out of Egypt. At first sight, that reason applies only to Israel and not to gentiles. If so, the conclusion would be that with respect to gentiles there is no such right of God at all to demand death for sanctification of His name. In their case, even had “and I shall be sanctified” been written, it would not have been valid, because כביכול God lacks such a “right.” By contrast, as we saw, Sefer HaChinukh formulates the matter differently. He does not tie it to the Exodus from Egypt, but to our being servants of God, and that reason may also be relevant to gentiles.

In any case, these possibilities concern only the abstract right of God to demand sacrifice from us and from gentiles. In practice, Minchat Chinukh is correct in his inference: so long as there is no command obligating one to surrender life, there is no obligation to do so. The question of the status of gentiles, regarding whom there is no command of “and I shall be sanctified,” may still have implications for our discussion here.

In the notes to Minchat Chinukh there (Jerusalem Institute edition, note 1), they cite a derivation from the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 3:5, exempting gentiles from the commandment of sanctifying the Name on the basis of the verse itself:

“‘And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel’—the children of Israel are commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, but Noahides are not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name.”

At first sight, this suggests that without a specific source exempting them there would have been such an obligation even for gentiles. But this is not necessary, for that obligation would be based on the verse “and I shall be sanctified,” and if we were indeed to interpret that verse as applying to gentiles too, then of course they too would be obligated. But without any verse at all, even according to the Jerusalem Talmud there is certainly no such obligation for gentiles.

B. Healing by Means of Prohibited Acts

Healing through a prohibition: Maimonides’ view

Maimonides writes in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 5:6:

“Just as they spoke regarding coercion, so they spoke regarding illnesses. How so? If a person becomes ill and is near death, and the physicians say that his cure depends on some prohibited matter among the Torah’s prohibitions, this is done. One may be healed through all the prohibitions in the Torah in a place of danger, except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed, for even in a place of danger one may not be healed through them…”

Here Maimonides compares a case in which a gentile threatens a Jew’s life to a case of illness in which recovery requires violating a prohibition. In both cases one may violate all prohibitions except the three gravest ones. The two situations are similar, for they are two kinds of coercion, and the rule is that under coercion one may violate every prohibition except those three.

The difficulty in the comparison

This comparison seems to be accepted by the decisors. As we shall soon see, Maimonides himself qualifies it, and in that respect he is specifically the exception. According to most decisors the comparison is complete. Maimonides’ commentators deal primarily with his qualification of the comparison, not with the comparison itself. Before we examine Maimonides’ qualification, however, we should note that the comparison itself is, at first glance, puzzling.²

The basis of the law requiring self-sacrifice for the three gravest transgressions lies in the fact that such a transgression involves desecration of the Name, while surrendering one’s life involves the commandment of sanctifying the Name. In other words, beyond the severity of the transgression, considerations of desecration and sanctification of the Name are also at work here. Only the combination of sanctification of the Name with the severity of the transgression generates the obligation to surrender one’s life and not transgress. In other transgressions, by contrast, there may indeed still be some desecration of the Name—apparently to a lesser degree—but the transgression itself is less severe, and therefore the combination of these two factors does not generate an obligation of self-sacrifice.

What about illnesses? At first sight, what is at stake there is only the severity of the prohibition that the patient wishes to violate in order to recover. Desecration or sanctification of the Name does not seem relevant to a situation in which there is no confrontation with gentiles. Yielding to illness is not desecration of the Name, and overcoming it by refusing the transgression may perhaps be sanctification of the Name, but clearly to a lesser degree. If so, one might have distinguished between threat and illness, and said that when a gentile threatens a Jew’s life, a situation of sanctification and desecration of the Name is created, and therefore the obligation to surrender one’s life applies. But when a Jew is ill and the cure requires a prohibition, there is, at least apparently, no submission to a gentile, and therefore no desecration or sanctification of the Name. One might therefore have argued that in such a case healing through a prohibition is permitted, and there is no obligation of self-sacrifice.

As noted, the halakhic fact is that all decisors agree that there is no difference between illness and threat: in both cases there is an obligation to surrender one’s life rather than violate one of the three gravest transgressions. If so, it is not clear how they compare these two cases.

Comparing illness to a coercer acting for his own benefit

A further difficulty may be raised against Maimonides’ comparison. Maimonides himself writes that if the gentile threatens for his own benefit rather than in order to make the Jew betray his religion, there is no obligation to surrender one’s life. If so, it is clear that the obligation of self-sacrifice does not stem from the severity of the transgressions alone. For if it did, then one would have to be killed even when the gentile intends his own benefit, in order not to commit such grave transgressions. The fact that there is no such obligation when he intends his own benefit proves that the duty to die is rooted in desecration and sanctification of the Name, and not only in the severity of the transgressions.

From another angle, the point may be formulated as follows: if illness threatens to kill me unless I commit the transgression, it is obviously not doing so in order to make me betray my religion. At first glance this is parallel to a gentile who threatens for his own benefit. If so, why in the case of illness is there an obligation to surrender one’s life and not be healed by means of a transgression?

In resolving these difficulties, one might perhaps say the following: if the gentile threatens for his own benefit, then there is a special exemption and the act is wholly permitted, because it is considered as though the gentile himself performed the transgression. By contrast, in illness there is no other agent to whom the transgression can be attributed, and therefore one must surrender one’s life. That is, the fact that the gentile threatens for his own benefit constitutes an exemption from the obligation of self-sacrifice; it is not that a threat intended to make one betray the faith creates the obligation. Hence recovery from illness is parallel specifically to coercion for the sake of apostasy: there is no coercer here, but there is also no exemption from the duty to surrender life for these transgressions. One could thus remain with the view that the duty of self-sacrifice is due to the severity of the transgressions and not to the desecration or sanctification of the Name involved. Yet the first difficulty still stands: Maimonides’ language makes it clear that desecration and sanctification of the Name are the basis of the obligation of self-sacrifice, not the mere severity of the transgressions.

A preliminary proposal: is the obligation of self-sacrifice related at all to sanctification of the Name?

One could say that the obligation to surrender one’s life stems solely from the severity of the transgression, entirely independently of sanctification and desecration of the Name. Only once there is an obligation to surrender one’s life do the categories of sanctification of the Name—if one does surrender it—and desecration of the Name—if one transgresses and does not surrender it—arise. On this approach, sanctification and desecration are not the considerations that ground the obligation to surrender one’s life; rather, they are secondary obligations that arise after the ruling has already been made that one must surrender one’s life.

This indeed seems to emerge somewhat from Maimonides’ wording in 5:4, cited above, where he mentions desecration and sanctification of the Name only as the result of surrendering or not surrendering one’s life.

But from the beginning of the chapter it is clear that this is not correct. There Maimonides writes, in 5:1-3:

“1. All the house of Israel is commanded concerning the sanctification of this great Name, as it is said, ‘And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel,’ and warned not to desecrate it, as it is said, ‘You shall not profane My holy name.’ How so? If an idolater rises up and compels an Israelite to violate one of any of the commandments stated in the Torah, or else kills him, he should transgress and not be killed, as it is said regarding the commandments, ‘which a person shall do and live by them’—live by them and not die by them. If he dies rather than transgress, he bears responsibility for his own death.

“2. When does this apply? To other commandments, aside from idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. But in the case of these three transgressions, if one says to him, ‘Transgress one of them or be killed,’ he should be killed rather than transgress. When does this apply? When the idolater intends his own benefit—for example, if he forces him to build his house on Shabbat, or to cook his meal, or he forces a woman sexually, and the like. But if he intends only to make him violate the commandments, then if it is in private and there are not ten Jews present, he should transgress and not be killed; and if he compels him to transgress before ten Jews, he should be killed rather than transgress, even if he intended only one of the other commandments.

“3. All this applies when it is not a time of decrees. But in a time of decrees—that is, when an evil king like Nebuchadnezzar and his fellows arises and decrees against Israel to abolish their religion or one of the commandments—one should be killed rather than transgress, even for one of the other commandments, whether he was coerced before ten or in private among gentiles.”

His language makes it clear that the obligation to surrender life is a result of desecration and sanctification of the Name. The very distinctions between a time of persecution and an ordinary time, or between a case where the gentile intends his own benefit and one where he intends to make the Jew betray his faith, are all derived from different degrees of desecration and sanctification of the Name involved in the act. It therefore appears that desecration and sanctification of the Name do play a role in the considerations that require or forbid self-sacrifice. This also emerges from the fact that Maimonides requires self-sacrifice only if the threat is made in order to make the Jew betray his religion and not for the gentile’s own benefit. As we have seen, this too proves that the obligation of self-sacrifice is because of desecration and sanctification of the Name, and not because of the severity of the three gravest transgressions.

A similar picture emerges from the words of Nahmanides and Sefer HaChinukh cited above, both of whom link the obligation of self-sacrifice to the commandment of sanctifying the Name and the prohibition of desecrating it. Nahmanides even derives it from the sequence of verses in our Torah portion. The difficulty regarding the comparison between threat and illness therefore remains fully in place.

Explaining the comparison: oppositional and nullifying negation

Perhaps refraining from transgression during illness constitutes a fulfillment of sanctifying the Name, for the person has paid with his life in order not to violate a prohibition. But it seems that eating the prohibited thing in order to recover is not desecration of the Name. This is not a transgression committed out of lust, which is how Maimonides defined the prohibition of desecration of the Name above. If so, perhaps the explanation is that Maimonides views the obligation to refrain from transgression as an obligation generated by the commandment of sanctifying the Name, and not by the prohibition of desecrating the Name. Therefore, although there is a difference between the cases from the perspective of desecration of the Name, since they are similar from the perspective of sanctification of the Name, the obligation of self-sacrifice exists in both.³

In light of what we said above, this may be formulated as follows: threat is a situation in which there is a relation of nullifying negation between desecration of the Name and sanctification of the Name. By contrast, illnesses are a situation in which desecration of the Name is not the perfect inverse of sanctification of the Name—there is a neutral gap between them. But since the obligation of self-sacrifice is a result of the commandment of sanctifying the Name and not of the avoidance of the transgression of desecrating the Name, illnesses can still be compared to threat. Even so, the matter still requires considerable thought.

The punishment for a grave transgression under coercion: a contradiction in Maimonides

Later in the same halakha, 5:4, cited above, we find:

“Nevertheless, because he transgressed under coercion, he is not flogged, and needless to say he is not executed by the court, even if he committed murder under coercion. For lashes and execution are imposed only on one who transgresses willingly, with witnesses and prior warning, as it is said regarding one who gives of his seed to Molekh, ‘And I shall set My face against that man’—by oral tradition they learned: ‘that man,’ and not one who acted under coercion, nor one who acted unwittingly, nor one who acted in error. And if with idolatry, which is graver than all, one who worships under coercion is not liable to karet (spiritual excision), how much more so for the other commandments stated in the Torah. And regarding sexual transgressions it says, ‘But to the young woman you shall do nothing.’ But if he can save his life by escaping from under the hand of the wicked king and does not do so, then he is like a dog returning to its vomit. He is called one who worships idolatry deliberately, he is cut off from the world to come, and descends to the lowest level of Gehinnom.”

That is, one who committed one of the three gravest transgressions and did not surrender his life did indeed commit the transgression of desecrating the Name, but he is not punished. The reason is that one is not punished for a transgression committed under coercion. The novelty that an act done under coercion can still count as a transgression does not mean that one is also punished for it.

Now at the end of 5:6, also cited above, Maimonides addresses the punishment of one who heals himself by means of one of the three gravest transgressions, and writes:

“If he transgressed and was healed, the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.”

Maimonides thus rules that if someone healed himself through one of the three gravest transgressions, he is punished by the court with the appropriate punishment. This is a qualification of the comparison between illness and threat. In both cases it is forbidden to violate the three gravest transgressions, but with respect to punishment there is a difference: under threat there is no punishment, while in the case of healing there is punishment.

Later authorities were astonished by Maimonides’ words. If he compares threats to illnesses, and sees both as forms of coercion, why does he rule that one who heals himself under coercion is punished, whereas one who yields to a threat is not? The matter becomes even sharper in light of our earlier remark: yielding to a threat has a dimension of desecration of the Name, whereas healing from illness does not. If so, there would seem to be more reason to punish the one who yielded to a threat than the one who was healed by means of a prohibition.⁴

Transgression, guilt, and punishment

This question sharpens the need to clarify the relationship between two different planes regarding transgressions under coercion: the plane of the transgression itself and the plane of guilt, and therefore punishment. When we say that there is no punishment for such a transgression, this can be understood as an exemption from punishment because of coercion—that is, a consideration of lack of guilt. But it can also be understood as a claim based on the absence of any transgression at all. Usually, coercion is a consideration that deals with exemption from punishment, that is, with guilt. Here, however, the possibility arises that there is an additional component in this permission, one that nullifies the transgression itself. Most commentators tie this to the teaching from the verse “and live by them.” We will return to this distinction shortly.

Explanations of Maimonides’ view

There are two main directions in explaining Maimonides’ approach:

1. Uncertainty in the threat or uncertainty in the rescue. In Yad HaMelekh it is written that in healing, the transgression is not a certain way to recover, and therefore there is punishment. It may be that he will commit the transgression and still not recover. In Merkevet HaMishneh a similar but opposite point is made: it may be that even if he does not commit the transgression he will still recover, so it is unclear that the transgression was needed. Yet the author of Yad HaMelekh remains uncertain as to the source of Maimonides’ distinction—especially since, as a matter of law, even doubtful danger to life is treated like certain danger to life. It seems that he still sees this as a case of coercion, but with a side of stringency.

One might have said that such a case is not called coercion at all, for circumstances count as coercion only when the step of transgression necessarily takes us out of danger. But if that step does not certainly remove the danger, then these circumstances should not be seen as compelling that step, and therefore he is not considered coerced. On that reading, Maimonides’ ruling is straightforward. If this is not coercion, then clearly he deserves punishment for the transgression. Yet the claim that such a situation is not considered coercion would itself, in their view, require a source.

2. One who heals himself is not exempt as one under coercion. The authors of Ohr Sameach, Noda BiYehuda, Avodat HaMelekh, and other later authorities wrote that the distinction does not stem from uncertainty in the danger—perhaps he will not die even without the medicine—or uncertainty in the means of rescue—perhaps he will die even if he takes it—but from a distinction between the two situations themselves: threat and healing from illness. Their words can be interpreted in several different ways, and it is not always clear what exactly they intended. We will therefore present here the main directions that appear in later authorities, without attributing each one to a particular decisor.⁵

The distinction between one who heals himself and one under threat

We will present four main directions in distinguishing between one who heals himself and one under threat:

1. Some explained that in illness the benefit is the direct result of the transgression itself. The recovery is a result of the transgression, and therefore he benefits from the transgression itself. By contrast, in yielding to a threat, the benefit is not produced by the transgression itself. The fact that he committed a transgression causes the threatener to withdraw the threat, but the transgression itself did not directly produce his benefit.

2. Some tied the distinction to the presence of an external threatening agent. In yielding to a threat, the real actor is the threatener, and therefore the threatened person did not actively commit the transgression at all. By contrast, in the case of one who heals himself, no other person is in the picture, and therefore the one who committed the transgression must be the patient himself.

3. Some explained that in yielding to a threat, the threatener pointed directly to the specific transgression and indicated that this is what he wanted. The threatened person had no choice but to commit that very transgression in order to be saved. By contrast, in the case of one healing from illness, the illness does not point him specifically to this transgression, and perhaps he might have recovered in another way. If so, he is the one who chose the transgression in order to recover, and therefore it is his own act.⁶ Below we will see implications of this conception for the question whether yielding is forbidden even with other transgressions, and not only with the gravest ones.

4. For the same reason as in the first direction above, some argued that although in both cases he is considered coerced, in the case of illness he wants the transgression, and therefore he is liable to punishment. He wants to eat the prohibited thing—not for its taste, but in order to recover; but why should the reason matter? In the end, he wants the transgression. By contrast, in yielding to a threat he does not want the transgression at all; what he wants is the removal of the threat. The transgression is merely the means by which that threat is removed.

The meaning of these explanations: is one who heals himself considered coerced?

Some of these explanations can be understood to mean that such a situation is not considered coercion at all. This is a difficult direction, for if it truly is not coercion, then it would be forbidden—and punishable—even with other transgressions, not only with the three gravest ones. If such a situation is not coercion, then even one who heals himself by violating Shabbat should have to surrender his life and not desecrate Shabbat, for this would not count as desecrating Shabbat under coercion. Moreover, the fact that the threatened person is considered coerced serves as the basis for exemption from punishment—but why should such a step not count as a transgression at all, that is, why is it permitted ab initio with all the other prohibitions?

Below we will see that there are commentators and decisors who indeed held that this is not coercion, and therefore forbade healing even through other prohibitions. But if we understand Maimonides to mean that with other prohibitions there is no prohibition against healing oneself, it seems that this can be answered in two ways:

1. It is indeed not coercion, but coercion serves only as an exemption from punishment. The initial permission does not stem from the fact that it is coercion, but because of the commandment “and live by them”; that is, there is permission to violate prohibitions in order to save life. Thus, even if there were no exemption of coercion in such cases, he would still be exempt because the verse “and live by them” teaches that this is not a transgression at all. Consequently, he is also exempt from punishment. This distinction has significance specifically in a place not defined as coercion, such as illness: there the verse “and live by them” still applies, but that verse was not said regarding the three gravest transgressions. Therefore in such a case there is a transgression, since there is no permission to violate, and consequently there is also punishment, since this is not defined as coercion. With respect to the other prohibitions, however, there is an exemption on the basis of “and live by them,” and therefore there is no transgression and thus no punishment, even though it is not coercion.⁷

2. It can also be explained that even in a situation of illness he is indeed considered coerced, but because he wants the thing—after all, he wants to recover—he has no exemption from punishment. If so, there is a situation in which a person is considered coerced and yet still commits a prohibited act and is punished for it.

At first glance, these possibilities depend on the well-known dispute among later authorities about a case in which a person is coerced to do something that he would also want to do even without the coercion: is he still considered coerced or not?⁸ The first explanation we suggested goes in the direction that coercion accompanied by desire is not coercion. The second explanation holds that it is coercion, but coercion does not create an exemption in such a case because there is desire for the transgression.

The underlying point is that the fact that a person is coerced exempts him only because he does not want the act. Therefore, if there is coercion and at the same time there is also desire for the act, it does not generate an exemption. But it seems that in our case the situation is even worse, for the desire for the transgression does not merely coexist with the coercion; it arises because of the coercion itself. The person wants to eat the prohibited thing in order to be healed from the danger, that is, in order to escape the coercion. This is a desire that undermines the coercion itself, not merely a desire that exists alongside it. Therefore here the act is certainly a transgression, and there is not even an exemption from punishment. It is possible that for this reason the argument is correct even according to those who hold that coercion together with desire still counts as a case that receives the exemption of coercion.

Summary: a coercer who intends his own benefit

Indeed, the medieval authorities dispute whether, when the coercer intends his own benefit, the rule is still “be killed rather than transgress.” The Baal HaMaor, in Sanhedrin (pages 47-48 in the pages of the Rif), holds that when the coercer intends his own benefit the rule is “transgress and do not be killed.”⁹ As we saw above, this is also how Maimonides appears to formulate it. Nahmanides, however, in Milhamot Hashem there, disagrees with him, and in his view even when the coercer intends his own benefit the rule remains “be killed rather than transgress.”

On the simple level, the dispute is whether the permission of coercion learned from “But to the young woman you shall do nothing” is not merely an exemption from punishment, but also causes the act not to be considered a transgression at all. Only when the coercer intends to make the Jew betray his religion is there an obligation to die because of desecration of the Name. And if he transgressed, there is no punishment because punishment for the transgression does not apply when one transgresses under coercion. In fact there is no transgression at all: he did not actually worship idolatry, but only desecrated the Name. And for desecration of the Name we do not find any specific punishment. The same is true, in practice, with other transgressions: coercion causes the act not to count as a transgression at all, except that here even if the coercer intends to make him betray his religion there is still no obligation to die, because the desecration of the Name is on a lower level—not only is the severity of the transgression different, but also the degree of desecration of the Name involved. On this understanding, in the case of illnesses this is not coercion at all, and therefore there is a transgression and there is also punishment. As noted, this is also Maimonides’ view. Indeed, in Perach Mateh Aharon (there, p. 35) it is inferred from Maimonides’ language that one who transgressed rather than being killed violated desecration of the Name and annulled the positive commandment of sanctifying the Name, but Maimonides does not mention the actual prohibitions of idolatry or forbidden sexual relations themselves. This proves that one who transgressed did not, in fact, violate those transgressions as such, for he was coerced, and coercion wholly nullifies the transgressions one performs.

Nahmanides, by contrast, holds that the permission of coercion is only an exemption from punishment, so the transgression remains in place regardless. Therefore, when the coercer intends his own benefit, the rule still is “be killed rather than transgress,” because the transgression remains in place. There is only an exemption from punishment. The nullification of the transgression itself in a case of pikuach nefesh is learned from “and live by them,” and that was not said regarding the three gravest transgressions. Therefore even when the coercer intends his own benefit, the rule for the three gravest transgressions is still “be killed rather than transgress.”

An implication: the law concerning Noahides

Tosafot, on the words “Noahide,” Sanhedrin 74b, write that the law of “and live by them” was stated only with respect to Israel and not with respect to Noahides. Indeed, Maharsha there asks how they know that this was not written with regard to gentiles, and proves it from the fact that the Talmud is uncertain whether a Noahide is commanded concerning sanctification of the Name, as we noted above. So too writes Mishneh LaMelekh on Laws of Kings 10:2, and in his derashot in Parashat Derakhim, “Derekh HaAtarim” (homily 2). It nevertheless appears that the law of coercion does apply also to Noahides.

If so, a Noahide who is threatened to commit a transgression is coerced, but does not have the exemption of “and live by them.” According to the Baal HaMaor and Maimonides, this means that because he is coerced there is no transgression here at all, and therefore he will not be punished. According to Nahmanides, however, it seems that there is indeed a transgression here, and he is only exempt from punishment. But it would then seem that for all transgressions he would be obligated to surrender his life—not because of sanctification of the Name, but because he lacks the permission of “and live by them.”¹⁰

Views according to which illness is not coercion at all: the distinction with respect to other transgressions

Until now we have seen a comparison between illnesses and situations of threat, in the sense that with the three gravest transgressions there is a prohibition, while with other transgressions there is permission. We also saw that Maimonides distinguishes between them with respect to punishment for the three gravest transgressions: in illness there is punishment, under threat there is not.

This distinction concerns the three gravest transgressions. As for the other prohibitions, it is clear that Maimonides holds that one may violate them even in order to be healed, not only under threat, and certainly there is no punishment for one who heals himself through them. But several decisors argued that since healing is not coercion—as in the possibility we raised above—it is forbidden to transgress even with other prohibitions in order to be healed.

This appears in Mekor Mayim Chayim, Yoreh De’ah 157:1, at the end, where he writes that one who heals himself is literally like one who acts deliberately, and therefore it is forbidden to heal oneself by means of any transgression. At first sight, one could still explain that there is permission to heal through other prohibitions because of the command “and live by them,” which certainly does apply to the other prohibitions. But regarding this, the author of Minchat Chinukh, in our commandment, writes that in the case of one who heals himself there is no law of “and live by them”:

“It seems to me that there is a great difference between a coercer forcing him to violate this transgression, and if not he will kill him—for then the pressure of death comes upon him by way of the commandments of God. We can then say that Scripture said, ‘and live by them,’ that through the commandments a person shall live and not die because of them. But if no one forced him regarding the transgression, and instead he became ill and was near death, and through the transgression he can save his life from descending to the pit, but the illness did not come upon him because of the commandment—in such a case we can say that ‘and live by them’ does not apply, nor ‘and not die by them,’ for he did not become ill because of the commandment; rather, the commandment merely prevents rescue.”

From his interpretation of the Sages’ exposition, Minchat Chinukh derives a conceptual distinction between threat and illness. The permission to violate prohibitions derived from “and live by them” means that if the commandment itself constitutes a threat to his life, then he may violate it. The verse teaches us that a commandment cannot itself be a threat to life, for it was given in order that one live by it. But all this is only when the commandment itself is what threatens his life. By contrast, if the threat is external, and the commandment is only what prevents him from escaping the threat, then the commandment itself is not threatening him at all, and therefore the permission derived from “and live by them” does not apply. In such a case, it would be forbidden to heal oneself by means of a prohibited act even if it is not one of the three gravest transgressions.¹¹

However, Minchat Chinukh presents all this only as an initial suggestion. In the end, Rabbi Yishmael cites another source that permits healing through other prohibitions. According to Rabbi Yishmael, these conceptual arguments are correct, but they merely explain why an additional source is required in order to permit healing. But according to Samuel, who derives the source from “and live by them,” it seems that this is indeed the law, since, as Minchat Chinukh explains, the permission of “and live by them” does not address one who heals himself, but only one who is under threat.

Later in his discussion there (Minchat Chinukh, note 3), he infers from Maimonides’ wording that in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah he compares illnesses to threat, but in the parallel law regarding a gentile (Laws of Kings 10:2) he writes only about coercion by threat and does not mention illnesses. Minchat Chinukh writes that Maimonides holds that for a gentile, even in practice, there is no permission to heal himself through any transgression, and no obligation to surrender life under coercion for any transgression. That is, coercion by threat permits all transgressions, but illness permits nothing at all.

The explanation is that in illness the situation is not coercion, and whatever is permitted in order to recover is permitted only because of “and live by them” or some other derivation—and that was not stated regarding the gentile. He therefore has no liability for a transgression committed under coercion, but neither does he have permission to transgress in order to live.

C. Methodological Implications: Transgression, Punishment, and Coercion

Introduction

Throughout our discussion we have seen a number of distinctions and modes of thought that are typical of halakhic thinking. We saw a decomposition of the permission of coercion into two aspects: the physical compulsion and the subjective will. Some decomposed the permission to violate prohibitions in situations of coercion into two components: the component that nullifies the transgression itself—”and live by them”—and the component that nullifies guilt—coercion, learned from the verse “But to the young woman you shall do nothing”—and thereby nullifies punishment.

We also saw a distinction between the component of desecration and sanctification of the Name and the component of the severity of the transgression, with respect to whether it is permitted or forbidden to violate a prohibition under coercion. We saw a distinction between illnesses and coercion by threat, and according to some opinions this reaches the extreme that illness is not coercion at all, but rather a deliberate act.

These distinctions raise several fundamental questions regarding the principles of halakhic thought. In this section we will briefly discuss some of them.

Implications of logical decomposition

What characterizes many of these distinctions is the decomposition of a phenomenon into two components hidden beneath it. This method is related to the method of “two laws” from the school of Rabbi Hayyim of Brisk, although in our discussion one can see earlier sources that already use it.

This is not the place to discuss the method at length. Some have seen in it a logical contradiction,¹² because in many cases the two components are mutually opposed. That is not correct, even in places where it may at first seem that they really are opposed.¹³ Another question goes in exactly the opposite direction: are these really two distinct components? Sometimes the two sides of a halakhic conceptual inquiry are two theoretical poles, while in reality different combinations of the two appear. Sometimes, upon closer examination, one sees that these are two sides of the same coin.¹⁴

If we continue in this mode of thought, we may say that sometimes the analysis that separates a phenomenon into components is only an approximation to the truth. The truth itself cannot be described by simple logic and sharp definitions, and therefore we must try to construct it as a synthesis between two theoretical poles. Creating such a synthesis requires a dialectical process, beginning with a dichotomous distinction between two poles—the sort of distinction handled by halakhic conceptual analysis—and then forming different combinations and fusions between those two poles. Since the two poles are not taken from actual reality but are theoretical abstractions, their combination too is not necessarily an exact expression of real reality, but rather a theoretical approximation, a kind of model, of it.

Another issue, one that is not general in character, concerns what lies behind these analyses in each specific sugya. A distinction between two aspects of a sugya usually presupposes and expresses certain worldviews, without which there would be no basis for separating the components. Therefore this sort of analysis is not merely a matter of formal logic.

We cannot deal with these questions here in detail, since each of them requires careful and extensive treatment. We will present a few sample points in their application to the distinctions that arose above.

Transgression and punishment

One of the distinctions made above was the separation between the transgression and the punishment for it. In halakha there are parameters that are relevant to the question whether there is a transgression here—intention, awareness—and there are parameters relevant to the question whether there is guilt, or whether punishment is warranted—coercion, inadvertence, and the like. In our context, the verse “and live by them” teaches that there is no transgression at all in an act done to save life, whereas the verse “But to the young woman you shall do nothing” teaches that there is no guilt here, and therefore no punishment.

Underlying this is a separation between the dimension of guilt and punishment and the dimension of the transgression itself. We may ask what assumption lies behind this separation. The claim that transgression and guilt are two different things may seem obvious to us, but it requires clarification. This sugya leads us to several questions about the nature of transgression. One question is whether a transgressive act constitutes some sort of damage in the world—spiritual or physical—or whether it is only rebellion against the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. Put differently: is there an ontological basis to prohibitions and commandments, or do they belong entirely to the purely normative plane? A second question is whether the problem with a transgression lies in the fact that God’s command has been violated, or in the damage caused by the transgression.

If the entire content of a commandment is simply that God commanded us regarding it, and there is no consequence or claim about reality behind it—spiritual or physical—then it is not clear what there is in a transgression beyond guilt. For example, if eating pork contains no evil at all other than the fact that God commanded us not to eat pork, then one who ate pork without guilt has done nothing. Not only is there no guilt here, but in the simple sense it would appear that there is no transgression here in any meaningful sense.

Of course, guilt is not necessarily connected to command as such. There can be a moral norm without a command, and yet we may still ask whether someone who violated it is guilty or not. Guilt is connected to the subjective dimensions of the act, not its objective dimensions—but not necessarily to command. This leads us to the question of deontological morality, measured by intentions, versus teleological morality, measured by results and benefit.

The plausible way to explain the distinction between transgression and guilt is to argue that eating pork harms the world or the soul in some way, and therefore even if I did it without guilt, a transgression has still occurred here: the soul or the world has been damaged. The question of punishment and guilt is then straightforwardly distinct from the question of whether a transgression exists in itself. Deontology determines guilt; teleology determines the transgression.

Another question related to this discussion is the philosophical problem known as the Euthyphro dilemma. In Plato’s dialogue, Socrates asks: is good or evil good or evil because God—the gods, in the original terms—commanded or forbade it, or did God command or forbid it because it is good or evil? The view that good and evil precede command and do not depend on it means that a transgression can have significance even without guilt. Damage to that objective layer is a transgression even if there is no guilt in it.

Different levels of synthesis

One possible view is that this objective damage is itself the transgression, for perhaps a transgression has no objective meaning and is only disobedience to command and guilt in failure. Such a view identifies the transgression with guilt. This is a synthesis between these two theoretical poles, but it is a simple synthesis—identity.

Some would say that without guilt there is no transgression, but still without fully identifying the two. For example, there is a claim that one who eats pork where the act is permitted according to halakha—such as a sick person who needs it, assuming that healing through an ordinary prohibition is permitted, as discussed above—does not spiritually coarsen his soul. The reason is that the objective result does not follow merely from the act of eating pork—”it is not the snake that kills”—but from the transgression in it, or more precisely from the guilt in it. This too is not really a synthesis, for one side serves only as a condition for the other, while the conceptual distinction between transgression and guilt remains intact. In the conceptual sense there is still no real synthesis here.

A genuine synthesis means that guilt and transgression are truly intertwined. On the positive side, one can find such an example in Maimonides at the end of chapter 8 of Laws of Kings, where he rules that a ger toshav (resident alien) who performs some commandment on the basis of his own judgment—he thought it was a proper act—even though he is doing something wise and correct, this is not a commandment-act. Maimonides explains that the reason is that a commandment-act requires, at its foundation, faith in Torah from Heaven. Here, awareness and intention, which lead to obligation, are part of the definition of the commandment itself. One may perhaps infer from this a parallel conclusion regarding transgressions as well: a transgression committed without faith in God is not a transgression. It may be a bad act, but not a transgression.¹⁵ Again, this is not that coercion exempts the sinner from punishment—that is, nullifies guilt—but that it is not a transgressive act at all. Here we see an aspect in which “guilt” is part of the definition of the transgression itself.

The connection to the concept of coercion

We have seen that one can arrive at a view in which guilt and transgression are not two distinct poles. In certain contexts they are almost synonymous. A transgression is an act for which the person is guilty, because it contains an element of wrongdoing against the norm—and not necessarily damage to anything.

This leads us to different conceptions of the concept of coercion. On the simple level, when we say that an act was done under coercion, the claim is that the actor is exempt from punishment. There is no guilt here. But there are conceptions in halakha according to which an act done under coercion is not a transgression at all. Such conceptions identify, at least on some level, transgression with guilt. It is possible, however, that this is not a sweeping and absolute identification, for perhaps only a total absence of guilt—as in coercion—means that there is no transgression at all. Reduced guilt may still perhaps count as a transgression.

We saw above a dispute as to whether coercion means the absence of transgression and not only exemption from punishment. Nahmanides says that even if the coercer intends his own benefit, the transgressor is exempt. The reason is that in the end the act was done under coercion, and therefore it is not a transgression at all. This is an identification of transgression with guilt. By contrast, the Baal HaMaor and those who follow him hold that coercion is only an exemption from punishment, and only the verse “and live by them” permits the transgression itself. This is a distinction between transgression and punishment, or guilt. That dispute, which concerns the relation to coercion, is therefore intimately tied to the distinction between guilt and transgression.

Footnotes