Lesson 33: Acharei-Kedoshim

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• Halakhic (Jewish-legal) territory.
• Mechanisms by which one norm overrides another in halakha: the logical and the normative.

Summary

In this week’s article we discuss honoring parents. We present the sources for the obligation to honor parents, and especially the elevated status of that obligation, which is equated with the obligation to honor God Himself.

We then discuss a situation in which this obligation conflicts with a mitzvah (commandment) or with a transgression. At first glance, we would expect such a conflict to be resolved according to the relative status of the competing norms. But it turns out that whenever obeying one’s parents involves any transgression whatsoever, even a rabbinic one, there is no obligation to do so. We explain this by arguing that, in these cases, the override is not normative—that is, based on the superior value of the overriding norm over the overridden one—but logical: in the situation under discussion, the value of honoring parents is simply absent. Therefore this is a case of outright permission, not mere override. We define and sharpen the distinction between these two types of overriding principles.

We then present two responsa dealing with a son’s right not to obey his parents when they instruct him not to sign on for extended officer service in the Israel Defense Forces, or not to attend a yeshiva where only religious studies are taught. Rabbi Yaakov Ariel and Rabbi Ovadia Yosef analyze these cases in light of the principles of override presented above. We propose analyzing them on an entirely different basis. In our view, there is no obligation to obey parents in such cases because their directive exceeds their halakhic territory. This is a third mechanism of override. It too is a case of outright permission rather than mere override, but it is neither logical nor normative in the earlier senses. Several proofs are brought for this conception with regard to the suspension of the obligation to honor parents, and the possibility arises that even the override by mitzvot and transgressions stems from a similar principle.

Finally, we present additional examples of halakhic override that operate by virtue of considerations of halakhic territory—from Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s “law of legal domains” all the way to the position that would grant Zimri the right to continue sinning and to kill Pinchas in self-defense in order to protect that right.

The rules and principles that emerge from the article

Qualifications on the commandment of honoring father and mother¹

A look at a person’s halakhic territory

Introduction

There are a number of obligations that children owe their parents, some positive commandments and some prohibitions. The two basic obligations are both positive commandments: honoring father and mother, and revering them.

The commandment to honor father and mother originates in the verse in the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:12):

Honor your father and your mother, so that your days may be long upon the land that the Lord your God gives you.

The commandment to revere father and mother, by contrast, originates in our Torah portion (Leviticus 19:1-3):

The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the whole congregation of the children of Israel and say to them: You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy. Each of you shall revere his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths; I am the Lord your God.

From the latter verse the Sages derive an important limitation on the commandment of honoring father and mother: when parents instruct their son or daughter to violate the Torah, they may not obey them.

In this week’s article we will deal with this limitation, along with additional limitations on the commandment of honoring parents, and we will encounter several halakhic mechanisms of override. We will then note that at least some of the limitations on honoring parents have a special character, connected with a phenomenon we will define as limitations by virtue of “halakhic territory.” Later we will discuss a few additional examples in which this phenomenon appears.

A. Qualifications on the commandment of honoring father and mother: mechanisms of halakhic override

The honor and reverence of father and mother, and the honor and reverence of God

When a person’s father or mother instructs him to violate one of the commandments, he is not obligated to obey them. This is the language of the Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 6a):

As it was taught in a baraita: One might think that if his father said to him, “Become impure,” or if he said to him, “Do not return a lost object,” he should obey him. Scripture therefore says: “Each of you shall revere his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths”—all of you are obligated to honor Me.

The Talmud derives that there is no obligation—and indeed there is even a prohibition—to obey one’s parents when they instruct him to violate one of the commandments. The reason given is that all of us are obligated to honor God. This is a situation of conflict between honoring parents and honoring God, and in such a conflict the honor of God prevails. The reason is not a quantitative hierarchy, as if the honor of God were simply higher than the honor of parents. The reason is qualitative and essential: all honor given to parents is itself an expression of honoring God, and therefore when honoring them requires injury to the honor of God, the obligation to do so is null from the outset.²

We can see this through a formulation, seemingly the opposite one, that appears in Maimonides regarding the very basis of the obligation to honor parents. This is his language at the beginning of chapter 6 of Laws of Rebels:

Honoring father and mother is a great positive commandment, and likewise revering father and mother. Scripture equated their honor and their reverence with His own honor and reverence. It is written, “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is written, “Honor the Lord with your wealth.” Regarding father and mother it is written, “Each of you shall revere his mother and his father,” and it is written, “The Lord your God shall you fear.” Just as He commanded regarding the honor and reverence of His great Name, so He commanded regarding their honor and reverence.

Here we see that the obligation to honor parents stems from the comparison between them and the honor of God. At first glance, this seems to contradict the picture that emerges from the Talmud in Yevamot, for there it appears clearly that the honor of parents has a lower standing than the honor of God.

Nevertheless, it seems that these are not opposite perspectives at all. On the contrary: they reflect a single principle. Precisely because honoring father and mother is derived from honoring God, their honor is equated with the honor of God. And yet—for that very reason—if honoring them requires injury to His honor, there is no source obligating us to honor them. That is, the obligation to honor them stands on the same plane as the obligation to honor God, even though the former is derived from the latter. The relationship between the two obligations is not one of relative importance, but of logical derivation. One arises from the other, but it does not therefore stand on a lower level.

Perhaps this can be formulated somewhat differently. Since God commands us to honor parents, honoring parents is itself a way of honoring God. It follows that the status of the two obligations is identical, for in both cases we are honoring God—either directly, or indirectly through honoring parents.

A note from the She’iltot

In the book She’iltot of Rav Achai Gaon this can be seen from another angle. Thus he writes in section 56, after bringing the scriptural analogies that equate honoring parents with honoring God:

And it is fitting, as a matter of principle, to equate their honor with the honor of God, for all three are partners in him. For the Sages taught: There are three partners in a person—the Holy One, blessed be He, his father, and his mother. The white seed emitted by the man gives rise to sinews, bones, brain, nails, and the white of the eye. The red seed emitted by the woman gives rise to skin, flesh, blood, hair, and the black of the eye. And the Holy One, blessed be He, gives spirit and soul, understanding, knowledge, intellect, sight, hearing, and facial appearance. And when a person dies, the faithful Master of the world takes His share and leaves the share of his father and mother before them—worm and maggot—while his own labor remains in its place, as it is said: “And the spirit returns to God who gave it.”

The She’iltot writes that the comparison to honoring God is logical and appropriate. The reason is that God and the parents are partners in the creation of the person (see Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 30b), and equal partners—at least in the passive sense that without any one of the three, the human being would not have come into existence—deserve equal treatment.

The underlying assumption in this reasoning differs from the one at the basis of the earlier argument. Above we saw that the obligation to honor parents is derived from the fact that God commands us to honor them, and perhaps even from the fact that honoring them constitutes honoring God Himself. In the She’iltot, by contrast, it seems that the basis for honoring parents is that they are part of our own formation, and just as we must honor God who created us, so too we must honor them. Here the obligation appears independent of the obligation to honor God.

It should be noted that the reasoning of the author of the She’iltot also explains how the obligation to honor parents, who are flesh-and-blood human beings, can stand on the same level as the obligation to honor the Creator of the world. According to the She’iltot, honor is not a function of the objective status of the honored entity, but of our obligation toward it. In that sense, the obligation is equal toward all the partners.

A similar idea appears in Sefer Ha-Chinukh, commandment 33:

Among the roots of this commandment is that it is proper for a person to recognize and repay kindness to one who has done him good, and not to be base, alienated, or ungrateful, for that is a thoroughly evil and repulsive trait before God and before human beings. He should take to heart that his father and mother are the cause of his being in the world, and therefore in truth it is fitting for him to bestow upon them every honor and every benefit he can, for they brought him into the world and also labored greatly on his behalf in his childhood. Once this trait is fixed in his soul, he will rise from it to recognizing the goodness of God, blessed be He, who is his cause and the cause of all his ancestors back to Adam the first man, and who brought him into the air of the world, provided his needs all his life, established him in proper form and with whole limbs, and gave him an understanding and discerning soul—for without the soul with which God endowed him he would be like a horse or mule without understanding. He will then assess in his mind how very much he must be careful in the service of God, blessed be He.

Here too, in the Chinukh, honoring parents does not appear to be a derivative of honoring God, but rather equal to it and independent of it. The comparison between them rests on the same foundation of gratitude toward the source of our existence.

At this point, it is no longer entirely clear why the honor of God overrides the honor of parents. If their standing is equal—that is, if there is no normative superiority—and if there is no relation of logical priority, then one would expect their halakhic status to be equal as well. There is no avoiding the Talmud’s consideration in Yevamot, which apparently underlies the obligation to honor parents even according to the She’iltot and the Chinukh.

A logical mechanism of override and a normative mechanism of override: the question of transitivity

We saw above that according to the Sages, the relation between honoring parents and honoring God is complex: there is no difference in status, but there is logical priority. The honor of parents is no less important than the honor of God, but it is derived from it. From this, the Sages infer that in a situation in which these two obligations conflict, the obligation to honor parents disappears. Why, in such a conflict, does the honor of God indeed prevail? We have here an interesting halakhic mechanism of override that does not arise from the legal status of the competing norms, but from the logical relation between them.

When parents demand an act that constitutes a transgression, the Sages say that there is no source obligating us to honor them. The general derivation by which the honor of parents branches out from the honor of God does not operate here, and therefore the obligation to honor them disappears. In this mechanism of override, it is precisely the logical relation, and not the legal status, that is decisive. This override is not the result of a difference in importance between the two competing norms, but the result of the logical priority of one over the other.

Other halakhic mechanisms of override, by contrast, stem from legal status rather than from logical relation. Usually, when one norm yields before another, it is because of differences in the legal standing of the two norms.

With regard to every mechanism of override in halakha, one must ask whether it stems from a logical relation or from a normative relation. One typical consequence concerns the question of transitivity. A relation is called transitive in the following sense:

If there is some relation P between two objects A and B, denoted P(A,B), then it is called transitive if it satisfies the following condition:

P(A,B) and P(B,C) imply P(A,C).

For example, the relation “to be the father of” is not transitive. If Reuven is the father of Shimon, and Shimon is the father of Levi, then Reuven is not the father of Levi. By contrast, the relation of equality or identity is transitive: if A equals B and B equals C, then A necessarily equals C. A relation that establishes hierarchy generally appears to us to be transitive. For example, the relation “greater than” is transitive. So too, “more beautiful than” seems transitive, though one can discuss that.

Relations of halakhic override appear hierarchical, and therefore our intuition is that they should be transitive. But that is true only if the relation is indeed based on a hierarchy of status—that is, if it is a normative override. A relation of logical override, by contrast, can break the chain of transitivity. In an article on Parashat Vayetze, 5767, we discussed an example of the breakdown of a transitive relation (see also the article on Parashat Bo, 5767, especially chapter 4).

Let us recall that in our article on Parashat Yitro, 5767, we also saw that the relation between a positive commandment and a prohibition does not obey the ordinary logical pattern: a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, yet for the sake of fulfilling a positive commandment one is required to spend only one-fifth of his assets, whereas to avoid violating a prohibition one must spend all his assets. This too stems from the fact that at least one of the mechanisms of override is not due to superior normative status, but to some other consideration. Indeed, there we pointed to two kinds of negation—logical and normative—parallel to the distinction we have made here.

An example of non-transitivity in the laws of overriding the honor of father and mother

Maimonides (Laws of Rebels 6:12) rules that even a rabbinic prohibition overrides the commandment of honoring father and mother. The Or Sameach, in the supplements printed in standard editions in volume 1 after Laws of Hanukkah, raises the following difficulty. Human dignity overrides rabbinic prohibitions (see Maimonides at the end of Laws of Diverse Kinds). But the commandment of honoring parents is not overridden in the face of human dignity, just like any other biblical commandment. If so, the relation would apparently not be transitive.

The Or Sameach brings a further example from the mishnah that derives, from the verse “Each of you shall revere his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths,” that one may not obey a father who commands him not to return a lost object. Yet returning a lost object is itself overridden by human dignity—as in the case of a priest in a cemetery, or an elderly scholar for whom it would be beneath his dignity, who are not required to demean themselves in order to return a lost object. If so, how is it that returning a lost object nonetheless overrides honoring father and mother? Here too we see that there is no transitivity in relations of priority, or override.

According to our analysis, the explanation of these difficulties is simple. The suspension of the commandment of honoring father and mother in the face of other commandments is not a rule of normative override—that is, an override that stems from a gap in importance between commandments. It stems from a logical principle, not a normative one. The consideration is that without honor for God, honoring father and mother has no value at all. Therefore the honor of God, even when expressed through a rabbinic prohibition, overrides the honor of parents. The obligation to honor parents in such situations is not overridden; it does not exist in the first place. But where the obligation to honor parents does exist, there it is not overridden by anything at all, since it is as important as the honor of God. That is precisely the meaning of logical override. By contrast, the rule that human dignity overrides rabbinic prohibitions is an ordinary normative override, meaning one based on a hierarchy in the importance of the two values.³ Therefore the lack of transitivity is both expected and understandable.

Outright permission and mere override

Another consequence of the difference between mechanisms of override concerns the distinction between outright permission and mere override. When the override is normative—meaning that one value is superior to another and therefore displaces it—the simple understanding is that we have a case of mere override: the displaced value remains fully in force, but it yields before the overriding value. Some would even say that one still requires atonement for the transgression one was forced to commit. When the override is logical, by contrast, the more plausible interpretation is that we have a case of outright permission. Under the circumstances under discussion, the second obligation simply does not exist, and therefore it is clear that one should fulfill the first.⁴

Several additional examples of non-normative mechanisms of override

A reason with a similar logical structure can be seen in the Talmudic discussion at the end of the eighth chapter of Yoma concerning the rule that saving life overrides Shabbat. The Talmud there brings several sources and arguments for this, and one of them is the consideration: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths.” One should note that this argument does not depend on a hierarchy of importance between Shabbat and human life, but on the consideration that one leads to the other, and therefore clearly prevails.

Something similar can also be found in the rule that Torah study is set aside in the face of any time-sensitive commandment, and we do not say in that context that one who is engaged in one commandment is exempt from another. The early authorities explain the reason by saying that Torah study exists for the sake of action, and if the study prevents action, it loses its point. Therefore action overrides study, even though study is more important.

Some have explained similarly the ordinance of Usha not to give more than one-fifth to charity, even though charity involves both a prohibition and a positive commandment, and with respect to prohibitions one must spend all one’s assets. The explanation is that if a person gives away all his property, he himself will become poor, and then he too will require charity.

A difficulty in Tosafot on Yevamot

Above we explained the displacement of honoring parents by the honor of God as a logical and not a normative mechanism of override: honoring father and mother is an expression of honoring God, and therefore there is no room to honor them against His honor. This does not stem from the fact that His honor is greater than theirs, but from the fact that without His honor theirs has no meaning at all. In a place where the honor of God is violated, there is no obligation whatsoever to honor them.

This requires discussion in light of Tosafot on Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 5b, s.v. “All of you,” for their words seem to imply that this is an ordinary case of override, and not a case where the greater automatically encompasses the lesser—for if it were, their difficulty there would not arise. The same appears from Tosafot on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 33a, s.v. “His lost object,” which raises a problem of transitivity with respect to this principle. From these two sources there emerges a conception according to which honoring father and mother is displaced by commandments through normative override, not logical override. This resembles the approach of the She’iltot and the Chinukh mentioned above.

Another formulation

There is, however, room to understand this principle of override differently. Perhaps the displacement of the honor of parents by the honor of God does not arise from the fact that the obligation to honor them is derived from the honor of God, but from the fact that they too are themselves obligated to honor God. If so, when they demand that their son violate a commandment, they are injuring the honor of God to which they themselves are bound. One should note that this is, at least apparently, what the language of the baraita itself says. It is not entirely clear whether this is a logical mechanism or a normative one. One could understand it as a logical mechanism: the obligation to honor them stands on the same plane as the obligation to honor God, but the latter has logical priority. But one could also understand that the fact that they themselves are bound to honor God teaches us that their honor is less than His. On that reading, the override is normative rather than logical. Indeed, Tosafot on Yevamot 5b, s.v. “All of you,” clearly suggests that this is a normative override, and that they understood it in precisely this way.

Yet this explanation seems difficult, because it is unclear why the son should be obligated to ensure that his parents honor God. What difference does it make that they are obligated to honor Him? Does that uproot the son’s obligation toward them? Is there some sort of transferred lien here, akin to Rabbi Natan’s doctrine? If this were only their problem, then he should still be obligated to honor them, while they themselves would receive from God what they deserve for not honoring Him.⁵ In any event, the wording of Maimonides cited above in Laws of Rebels, together with the rabbinic midrash cited there, proves that they did not understand it this way.

It nevertheless seems that this is the explanation of the principle of override according to the Chinukh and the She’iltot, and according to Tosafot in Yevamot and Bava Metzia cited above. If the parents too are obligated to honor God, then His honor is greater than theirs, and therefore theirs yields. This is normative override, not logical override. Admittedly, the scriptural analogies drawn by the Sages between the two obligations remain somewhat difficult according to this approach, and perhaps those analogies do not necessarily imply full equality in their halakhic—that is, normative—status. One could read them as homiletical statements rather than as binding legal determinations.

It seems that according to these approaches, the transitivity of override should hold. Therefore it is possible that, contrary to the Maimonidean ruling cited above, they would hold that a rabbinic prohibition is indeed overridden by honoring parents, since it is overridden even by human dignity, and human dignity is itself overridden by honoring parents. According to these approaches, it is legitimate to draw conclusions in this way, because the relation of override is transitive.

The honor of parents is greater than the honor of God

Several midrashic sources imply that the honor of parents is greater than the honor of God. For example, Pesikta Rabbati, section 23, brings the following:⁶

Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai said: Great is the honor of father and mother, for the Holy One, blessed be He, gave it precedence even over His own honor. Regarding the honor of the Holy One, blessed be He, it is written, “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9). How does one honor Him with his wealth? By setting aside gleanings, forgotten sheaves, the corner of the field, the first tithe, the second tithe, and hallah; by making a shofar, a sukkah, and a lulav; by feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, and clothing the naked. If you have wealth, you are obligated in all these; if you have no wealth, you are not obligated in any of them. But when you come to the honor of father and mother, what is written? “Honor your father and your mother,” and so on—even if you must go from door to door.

Perhaps the explanation is that the obligation to honor God is one obligation, whereas the obligation to honor parents is both because of the honor of God and because of the parents themselves, as partners in creation. The honor of parents thus contains two distinct laws: both that of the She’iltot and that of Maimonides. Therefore their honor is greater than the honor of God, because the larger includes the smaller.

Of course, on the basis of this picture we should now examine all the halakhic implications—by applying the two laws in parallel: normative override with respect to the She’iltot‘s obligation of honor, and logical override with respect to Maimonides’ obligation of honor—but we will not do so here.⁶

B. Qualifications on honoring parents due to considerations of halakhic territory

Introduction

In this section we will mainly discuss two halakhic responsa on the subject of honoring father and mother. Both appeared in Techumin (volumes 3 and 15), and both deal with a conflict between the obligation to honor parents and other values. We will see here principles of override, and we will examine whether these are indeed the same principles we have encountered thus far, and whether they are logical or normative in character.

The first responsum is that of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, who discusses whether a son may decline to obey his parents when they oppose his attending a yeshiva where only religious subjects are studied. The second, by Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, deals with volunteering for officer training against the wishes of one’s parents. We will not be able to follow all the details of these responsa, which touch on the very foundations of the obligation to honor parents. We will focus only on the principles at their base, principles that point to a certain conception of override.

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s responsum: parents instructing a son not to attend a yeshiva devoted exclusively to religious studies

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef discusses whether a son must obey his parents when they tell him to study in a yeshiva high school rather than in a yeshiva where only religious subjects are studied.

The discussion in the responsum addresses questions such as the halakhic obligation to study sacred subjects—the obligation to teach Torah—and the permission, obligation, or prohibition regarding the study of secular subjects—the obligation to teach a trade. It then turns to the application of the halakhic rule we saw above: that when parents instruct their child not to perform a commandment, he is not obligated—and indeed is forbidden—to obey them.

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef concludes that the son is not obligated to obey his parents in this matter. If he has decided to be like a Levite, as described by Maimonides at the end of Laws of Sabbatical Year and Jubilee, and to devote himself solely to Torah, this is considered a genuine matter of commandment. And we saw above that even a rabbinic prohibition overrides honoring parents; one need not be dealing specifically with a biblical commandment.

Already here, however, we should note that Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s words imply that the son may certainly also obey his parents, yet he also has permission, if he wishes, not to obey them—and perhaps it is even preferable for him not to, in order to be like a Levite. Such a claim seems puzzling on its face. If the permission is based on the principle that one must not obey parents when they tell him to go against a matter of commandment—whether biblical, rabbinic, or otherwise—then we should have said that it is absolutely forbidden for him to obey them. How can one understand a ruling that merely permits him not to obey them, but does not obligate him to act thus? Put differently: how can there be permission in both directions when commandments are pulling in both directions?⁷

One could explain that the halakhic “obligation” under discussion here is itself only an existential commandment rather than a mandatory one, and therefore the son merely has permission not to obey his parents. But that itself would be a major novelty: that even an existential commandment overrides honoring father and mother, although at first glance this is a case in which “both can be fulfilled.”

Rabbi Yaakov Ariel’s responsum: parents instructing a son not to sign on for extended officer service

Another responsum, by Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, deals with the permission to volunteer for officer training against the wishes of one’s parents. He discusses whether the volunteering is itself permitted—given the risk to one’s life—and concludes that it is permitted, and indeed there is even a commandment in it, or at least an enhancement of the basic commandment inherent in ordinary military service. He then considers whether the commandment to honor and revere parents overrides this permission or commandment.

In the end he explains that this depends on whether an enhancement of a commandment overrides honoring parents, since in the commandment of obligatory war one already fulfills one’s duty even as an ordinary private soldier. Rabbi Ariel proves that an act of piety does not override honoring parents, nor does custom. The question he poses is: what is the status of an enhancement of a commandment in this regard?⁸

Ultimately, Rabbi Ariel is led to ask what exactly the commandment of honoring father and mother consists in. On this see Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli’s Amud HaYemini, sec. 22; Rabbi Akiva Eger’s responsa, sec. 68; Berkat Shmuel, Yevamot, sec. 3, subsecs. 2-3; and more. In Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, end of sec. 240, the Rema cites the responsum of Maharik (root 166) that if a father protests and tells his son not to marry the woman the son desires, the son need not obey his father. The Vilna Gaon explains that Maharik holds that the commandment is not obedience to parents as such, but providing benefit to them. According to that view, the commandment is not the preparing of food and drink and bringing them to the parents, but rather the fact that the father and mother actually eat and drink.

A source for the Vilna Gaon’s explanation appears in the sugya in Yevamot 6a, although it seems that Rashi and Tosafot disagree there. We will not enter the details, since the sugya is complex and we are mentioning it only in passing. In any case, what emerges from there is that according to Rashi the commandment is obedience itself, whereas according to Tosafot—and likewise Nahmanides and Rashba—the commandment is the result, namely the benefit that comes to the parents.

Rabbi Ariel concludes that in practical halakha we rule in accordance with Tosafot, Nahmanides, and Rashba. Therefore, if the parents have a genuine concrete need, it may be that there is no permission to enlist for officer training, since this is only an enhancement of a commandment. But if they have no real need, and the issue is only the lack of obedience, then this obligation does not override even an enhancement of a commandment.

An alternative proposal: logical rather than normative override

There is, however, room to sharpen the matter further. An enhancement of a commandment, even if it is not a commandment in the full sense, clearly constitutes honor to God—no less than a rabbinic law does. It is a full duty by virtue of the verse “This is my God and I will beautify Him,” even though it is not indispensable to the commandment itself. It therefore seems that the considerations we encountered in the previous chapter lead to the conclusion that even an enhancement of a commandment should override the commandment of honoring father and mother, because the obligation to honor them simply does not exist in a place that runs contrary to the honor of God. Put differently: Rabbi Ariel tries to view this as a normative override, whereas there is room to view it as a logical override. In such a case the obligation to honor parents simply does not exist, even though we are dealing only with an enhancement of a commandment, whose normative status is lower than that of the full and important commandment of honoring parents.

Perhaps something similar can also be said regarding Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s case. The desire to study Torah more fully may not be defined as a strict halakhic obligation, but clearly it involves giving fuller honor to God. A parental directive not to give full honor to God is void because of the very nature of the obligation to honor parents. As we saw, the entire obligation to honor parents is itself a form of honoring God. How could it be that by virtue of the obligation to honor Him, they are given authority to coerce the child not to study Torah as he wishes? As we have seen, such a consideration does not depend at all on the formal strength of the obligation involved in the specific commandment. That is why even a rabbinic commandment overrides honoring parents. This is a logical, not a normative, override.

It should be noted that according to this analysis, obeying one’s parents in such a case—even if one does so—would not ultimately count as fulfillment of the commandment of honoring parents. On the other hand, attending that yeshiva is not quite the fulfillment of a commandment either, certainly not of a mandatory commandment. Therefore, in practical terms one could say that this is a situation of permission in both directions. The basis of the matter is that we are not dealing here with a case of override, but with an ab initio cancellation of the obligation of honor—a logical override. In such a case the commandment of honoring parents is not merely displaced; it is simply inapplicable. Perhaps this explains the wording of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s ruling, which puzzled us because it seemed to imply that disobeying the parents is permitted rather than obligatory.⁹

A new proposal: considerations of halakhic territory

In both responsa we find a discussion that assumes that the suspension of the obligation to honor parents, insofar as it exists in the cases under discussion, can only stem from the fact that the parents are instructing the child not to perform a commandment or to commit a transgression. In other words, the discussion is tied to the principles we encountered in the previous chapter. But had it not been for their analysis, it would seem that the halakha in both cases ought to be decided in light of more fundamental considerations, and not according to the laws of override discussed previously.

It seems that in both cases a deeper aspect arises than the one discussed until now. Until now we saw that the honor of parents yields before halakhic obligations, either by normative override or by logical override. Logical override means that the obligation to honor parents simply does not exist in circumstances that involve dishonor to God. But are there additional circumstances in which the obligation to honor parents would have no force? Is there a principle of logical override that does not arise from conflict with a commandment?

Our claim is that in certain cases the obligation to honor parents does not exist at all because it lies outside its domain of validity. By issuing such directives, the parents have moved beyond their own “halakhic territory,” and there their words have no force. We claim that there are cases in which a parental directive does not bind the child because of the child’s own rights, and not because it is displaced or voided by some halakhic factor. In these areas, only the child himself should make the decisions, and therefore they lie outside the sphere of control that the Torah grants to parents. When it is important for the child to realize himself in a particular area, and the step in question is essential to the form of life he chooses for himself, it is inconceivable that the Torah grants the parents the right to sabotage that—at least not when they do not have an especially clear and deep interest in the matter.¹⁰ Here he has the right to resist and not obey them.

Three proofs

1. According to halakha, a son is not obligated to honor his parents out of his own money, but only out of theirs—see Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 240:5, for the details. At first glance this is a puzzling rule, for throughout halakha there is an obligation to spend one-fifth of one’s assets in order to fulfill a positive commandment. If so, why specifically with respect to honoring parents, a commandment of such great importance, is there no rule of spending one-fifth of one’s own money?¹¹

It is highly plausible that here too we are not dealing with a rule of override, but with part of the very definition of the obligation to honor parents. The obligation to honor parents does not apply to a person in a domain that is under his own control. His money is his, and the Torah does not expect a person to be compelled against his will to spend from his own money merely because his parents demand it. That obligation simply is not imposed upon him. The reason the son is not required to spend even one-fifth of his own money is not some rule of override, nor a conceptual cancellation of the sort we saw regarding transgressions, where all are bound to honor God, but a qualification built into the very obligation to honor parents because of the son’s own rights.

This allows us to understand the distinction of the Rema in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 240:5, who rules that there is no obligation to give parents from one’s own money, not even less than one-fifth, but there is an obligation to honor them through one’s own person even if this leads to going door to door, meaning that he loses more than one-fifth of his assets. The explanation is that the obligation to honor them from one’s own resources is not overridden; it simply does not exist. As we explained, the parents have no authority to demand in the domain of the son’s money. By contrast, the obligation to honor them through personal service does exist and is not overridden, and in that regard he is obligated even if it leads him to beg from door to door.¹² Thus the commandment of honoring parents is indeed very weighty, and the fact that it is suspended in certain cases apparently points not to weakness in the force of the obligation, but to limitations in its domain of application. In our terminology: this is logical rather than normative override.

2. It seems that this conception underlies the ruling of Maharik, root 167, cited above, regarding obedience to parents in the choice of a marriage partner. The Rema in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 240:25, cites him as saying that if parents object to their son marrying a woman he desires, he is under no obligation to obey them. It is implausible that this is a case of the commandment to honor parents being displaced by the obligation to marry a woman, for he can marry a woman acceptable to his parents and thus fulfill the commandment in any case—and even the commandment of procreation can be fulfilled in some other way.

Therefore, here too the explanation seems to be that the parents have no right to coerce the son, or to demand that he relinquish his choice, in a matter entrusted to his own personal decision. This is not override, but absence of authority. That area lies outside the scope of the obligation to honor them, or outside their “halakhic territory.”

This explanation should be distinguished from the earlier one. The Vilna Gaon explained the ruling by saying that the parents derive no benefit from such a demand, and therefore they have no authority to make it. We are claiming something different: that the parents have no right at all to command in this sphere. The practical consequence of the difference would arise when the parents do derive benefit from his not marrying the woman he wants. According to the Vilna Gaon’s explanation, it seems that Maharik‘s rule would not apply in such a case. According to our analysis, by contrast, even in such a case they have no right to prevent him, for there is simply no obligation to obey them in a matter like this—not merely because they gain nothing from it. The right to marry the woman of one’s choice is certainly no less than the right over one’s own money, and we have already seen that one is under no obligation to honor parents out of one’s own money.

Thus, in the sphere of one’s money, or in the sphere of choosing a marriage partner according to one’s own desire, the parental directive is non-binding because the rights over that sphere belong to the son alone, not because the obligation is displaced for some other reason.

3. In Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 240:16, there is a law that does not concern self-realization, and yet it clearly seems to belong to the son’s private sphere, and therefore the father has no authority with respect to it:¹⁴

If a father commanded his son not to speak with a certain person, and not to forgive him until a fixed time, while the son wished to make peace immediately were it not for his father’s instruction, he need not pay attention to that instruction.

What exactly is the defining criterion that marks the boundary of the validity of a father’s commands? It is difficult to identify it precisely, but it is clear that such a boundary exists. On the other hand, it is equally clear that we are not speaking here of the son’s “rights” in the ordinary sense of that term. There is some domain that simple reasoning tells us is not relevant to a father’s commands, but these are not rights in the straightforward sense.

Back to the two responsa above

For that very same reason, there is room to explain that volunteering for officer training, in Rabbi Ariel’s responsum, and choosing a place of study, in Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s responsum, are also decisions that lie within the sphere of the son’s own control. One should perhaps take the parents’ wishes into account, but in the end they have no right to prevent him from realizing his basic desires and his personal development. The reasons for this are not various kinds of halakhic override, but the fact that his personal development is entrusted to his decision alone, and the parents have no right to intervene in it. His self-realization, and his decisions about how to conduct his life, are given over to him alone; they lie outside the parents’ “halakhic territory.”

Perhaps one can also explain the rule that a son is not required to commit a transgression for his parents as part of the same principle: the right not to commit transgressions is part of the son’s rights, and the parents have no right to infringe it. To explain, however, why obeying them in such a case is prohibited—and not merely that there is permission not to obey them—we also need the explanation that both he and they are bound to honor God.¹³

The character of override based on considerations of halakhic territory: logical, normative, or something else

At first glance, this mechanism of override would seem logical rather than normative. The displacement does not stem from the importance or superiority of one value over another, but from the fact that under the circumstances that have arisen, the displaced value simply does not apply. But one should note that here the reason for the override is not logical, at least not in the same sense as above. The obligation to honor parents yields before the obligation to honor God because it is derived from it. There the logic is root and branch: where there is no root, there can be no branch. Considerations of halakhic territory, by contrast, are not the result of logical dependence between the obligations, but the result of a value judgment. The obligation to honor parents does not take precedence over the son’s right to self-realization. The Torah did not grant it such force.

That is to say: the obligation to honor parents is a case of outright permission rather than mere override, but the reason is not logical dependence; it is a relation between values. In that sense, one might say that this is apparently normative rather than logical override. It is normative override, except that in this case its result is outright permission rather than mere override.

But closer examination shows that this is not override by virtue of the superiority of one value over another. The right to self-realization is not anchored in any commandment whatsoever. It is a natural right of the child. Moreover, the conflict is not between one obligation and another, but between a person’s obligation and his own right to avoid fulfilling that obligation. This is not a question of one obligation taking precedence over another, but of a reasonable consideration that limits the obligation to situations in which it does not injure the child’s right to self-realization. Therefore this is not truly normative override, nor is it truly logical override. It is a third type of override: the expiration of the child’s obligation, or of the parents’ right, because the matter has moved outside the boundaries of the halakhic territory of those who possess that right—that is, the parents.

The character of override based on considerations of halakhic territory: permission or obligation, and proportionality

In the above-mentioned article in Meisharim, M. Avraham noted several points that emerge from this proposal. Among other things, one can see that the conception suggested here leads to the conclusion that the resolution of such conflicts is not one-sided and absolute. The question is how important the matter is to the child—how far it truly is an issue of self-realization for him—and how necessary or burdensome the matter is for the parents. Unlike the cold halakhic determination according to the override principles of the previous chapter, which is sharp and clear—when there is a commandment, there is no obligation to honor parents—according to our proposal, proportionality is what will determine which side of the conflict prevails.

Likewise, we saw in the discussion of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s responsum that the result of our proposal is permission not to obey one’s parents, not an obligation to refuse. Everything depends on how important the matter is. In practice, override of the sort proposed here is by its nature the kind that leads to permission to disobey one’s parents, not to an obligation to do so.

C. Additional examples of principles of limitation based on considerations of halakhic territory

Introduction

The principle according to which a halakhic obligation is limited because of another person’s rights or territory, rather than displaced because of conflict with opposing obligations, appears in other halakhic contexts as well. In this chapter we will briefly consider several of them.

We should note that in our article on Parashat Lech-Lecha, 5767, we argued that the guilt-offering in its various forms is nothing other than atonement for stepping outside our halakhic territory. We saw there that even in circumstances in which there is no formal halakhic prohibition on such a step, the very infringement of halakhic boundaries requires atonement. That phenomenon is closely connected to our present topic.

A. “You shall not covet” and “you shall not steal”

Let us imagine a situation in which an object belonging to Reuven is in Shimon’s sight, and Shimon strongly desires it. Shimon says to himself: I have two options before me—either I steal the object from Reuven and violate the prohibition of stealing, or I leave the object with him and violate the prohibition of coveting.¹⁴ It is unthinkable that the result of this reasoning should be that Shimon may steal the object from Reuven. Why indeed is this impossible? At first glance, this seems to follow from a valid halakhic consideration.

The answer is that Shimon’s halakhic considerations cannot dictate his relation to Reuven’s objects, which lie outside the domain in which those considerations apply. His halakhic considerations, even if valid and correct, pertain only to himself, his own property, and his own decisions. The decision what is to be done with Reuven’s objects belongs to Reuven alone, and therefore Shimon’s considerations add nothing and detract nothing with respect to them. That domain lies outside his halakhic territory.

B. “Torat Ha-Mishpatim” and saving oneself at another’s financial expense¹⁵

Rashi’s view in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 60b, is that a person may not save himself at the expense of another’s property. Put differently: there is a rule that one must be killed rather than violate the prohibition of theft. The question is how we can add a fourth prohibition to the three cardinal transgressions. Where is the source for the idea that the prohibition of theft overrides human life? The answer is that the prohibition of theft is not merely a formal halakhic prohibition. The legal prohibition is derived from the fact that another person’s property lies outside my own domain, and therefore I may not take it. This approach is developed by Rabbi Shimon Shkop in his book Sha’arei Yosher, gate 5, where he calls it a prohibition by virtue of “Torat Ha-Mishpatim.” In such a situation, the consideration of saving life—which overrides all prohibitions—cannot be applied. What stands opposite saving life is not another prohibition, but an act of crossing the boundary of another’s territory. In that sphere, all halakhic considerations are invalid.

Similarly, it is unthinkable that a person who needs an organ donation in order to survive could forcibly take an organ from someone else—even if the donor’s life does not depend on it—on the basis of the halakhic consideration that saving life overrides the prohibition of causing injury. Rashi’s view regarding saving oneself at another’s financial expense is indeed a lone opinion, but several early authorities disagree with him only because the other person’s property is already subject to a lien for the sake of the victim’s rescue. Without that factor, they too would agree that there is no permission to rob in order to save oneself.

Therefore it is fairly clear that with respect to the parallel case of organs, most decisors would probably agree. Here too the reason is that the sphere of application of the relevant halakhic consideration is limited by the other person’s rights over his own bodily organs.

C. Yielding to a threat and “the right to sin”¹⁶

Reuven threatens Shimon and says: give me a certain object, or else I will kill you. May Shimon kill Reuven in order to save his property, or must he hand over the object, since money is less important than life? At first glance, the halakhic consideration says that money is indeed less important than life, and therefore Shimon would have no permission to kill Reuven. After all, a person may commit a transgression in order to save his own life, and one is required to give up all his money in order not to transgress. If so, it would seem that he is obligated to surrender all his property in order to save himself and to save Reuven.

But this is not a correct consideration, because Shimon has a right to preserve his own property. If Reuven creates a situation in which Shimon’s life is pitted against his property, then Reuven himself must bear the price. That halakhic consideration lies outside the bounds of what is relevant for Reuven, and therefore it is not to be taken into account. According to our analysis, even if the attacker wants only ten agorot, there is no obligation to give them to him, and one has permission to kill him in order to save oneself from the threat to one’s life.

Something similar is discussed in Kli Chemda at the end of Parashat Balak regarding the episode of Zimri and Pinchas. His conclusion there is that although Zimri could have saved himself from Pinchas simply by ceasing to sin, the Talmud nonetheless rules that Zimri would have been permitted to turn around and kill Pinchas under the law of a pursuer. The reason is very similar: Pinchas created a situation in which Zimri’s life stood against Pinchas’s own life. Pinchas must bear the consequences. Zimri does not owe Pinchas the cessation of his sin. He is indeed obligated to stop, but that is an obligation toward God, not toward the pursuer. Therefore he retains the “right” to continue his sin, even if this forces him to kill Pinchas, who endangers him as a pursuer. This is an extreme case of limiting the scope of a halakhic consideration because of a consideration of rights. We are acting here, apparently, against the ordinary calculus that decides according to the relative halakhic importance and significance of the two relevant courses of action.

Footnotes

However, in my opinion such an explanation is problematic for several reasons:
1. It assumes that the obligation of Torah study depends on desire. Several early authorities make it clear that there is no such obligation, and that this commandment lies outside the strictly legal sphere.
2. Even if we accept the premise that with Torah study there is an obligation according to one’s desire, then at any given level of desire that obligation is full. Why, then, would the student still have the option of obeying his parents? At the end of the day, he stands fully obligated at that level of study.