The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising – Aspects of the Sanctification of God’s Name

Opening Post by the Rabbi

The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising – Aspects of the Sanctification of God’s Name

Posted on 30/4/2008

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The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising – Aspects of the Sanctification of God’s Name

Today I found myself thinking about the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and I wondered about the well-known question: what permission was there to endanger lives in a hopeless battle?

As is well known, this is an ideologically charged question, since Zionism (at least in the early years of the state) tended to see the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising as the quintessential proper response to the Nazis—sacrificing life for honor—whereas religious apologetics (see Esther Farbstein’s book “Beseter Ra’am”) placed the emphasis on the sanctity of life, and even raised arguments against the uprising (because it had no chance of succeeding), according to which there is no point in rebelling merely for its own sake when it does not save lives. Ostensibly, this is a much more rational view (which is usually what characterizes religious thought, contrary to the superstitious belief commonly held about secular rationality; but I will not elaborate here on that provocation).

In this connection, the well-known ruling of Maimonides came to mind, in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 5:5, where he discusses a case in which gentiles lay siege to a city and demand that the Jews inside hand over one of their number, threatening that if they do not do so they will kill them all. Maimonides rules that it is forbidden to hand a person over to the gentiles even if they threaten to kill all those under siege, and even if they specify him (= identify whom they want), and even if he is liable to the death penalty (in which case, according to the strict law, it is permitted to hand him over), nevertheless the pious course is not to hand him over.

At first glance, what we have here is an elevation of the prohibition of murder (and not of the value of life; see below), and therefore people are obligated to give up their lives in order not to murder.

The Kesef Mishneh, ad loc., asks: after all, whether they hand him over or not, he is bound to die. So why not hand him over in order at least to save the others? The Kesef Mishneh there argues that this is seemingly contrary to the Talmudic reasoning that grounds the rule “be killed rather than transgress” in the case of murder on the logic, “who says your blood is redder?” For here he is bound to die in any case, especially since this concerns saving the lives of many. See there for the strained and rather puzzling explanation he offers of Maimonides.

At first glance, Maimonides here presents a “secular” (= non-rational) position, whereas the Kesef Mishneh represents the more sober position, which weighs costs and benefits.

Now, in my thread on the separation of conjoined twins, I suggested an interpretation according to which Maimonides is speaking in terms of sanctification of God’s name and not in terms of murder. Indeed, that ruling appears in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, in the chapter that deals with sanctification of God’s name, and not in the Laws of Murder and the Preservation of Life. The essence of the claim is that the prohibition on handing the person over to those laying siege does not stem from concern over the transgression of murder on the part of those who hand him over (for he is already a doomed man, as the Kesef Mishneh writes), but from the prohibition of desecrating God’s name. It is forbidden to hand him over to the gentiles because of the desecration of God’s name involved, and not because of the prohibition of murder. The practical implication is that nothing can be learned from this Maimonides in a dilemma such as separating conjoined twins (and therefore they must be separated; see there and in my article in “Techumin,” vol. 27), since there the discussion belongs to the Laws of Murder and the Preservation of Life, without any aspect of sanctification of God’s name. And indeed, in the absence of a situation of desecration of God’s name, there is no prohibition at all against killing someone who is in any event going to die in order to save oneself.

We therefore learn that handing a Jew over to gentiles who demand his blood is a desecration of God’s name, and because of this we are obligated to give up our lives in order not to enter such a situation. This is so even though we will gain nothing at all, since in any case he will die, and so will we. This is, to a certain extent, parallel to the above-mentioned secular approach, which prefers to sacrifice life for honor rather than live without honor.

And perhaps the cases can be brought even closer. If they had not fought in the Warsaw Ghetto, they would thereby have been surrendering everyone’s lives to the Nazis, and that involves a desecration of God’s name no less than handing over one of them.

Moreover, one may say that the very fact that Jews are murdered without any response is itself a state of desecration of God’s name (see my remarks in Shotang’s thread on those murdered at Merkaz HaRav), and perhaps for that reason it is worthwhile to wage a war, even if it has no chance of success.

From this it follows that there may perhaps be a basis in Jewish law for the above-mentioned “secular” conception. As far as I remember, some quote Rabbi Menachem Ziemba (who was also there in the ghetto) as having said something similar and even as having supported the uprising (although among the ultra-Orthodox it is customary to deny this, and I do not recall the sources).

What do you think?

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Source (forum “Stop, People Think Here”): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2402512&forum_id=1364