Thinking Without Words

The rabbi’s opening post

Thinking Without Words

Sent on 25/8/2004

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Thinking Without Words

The topic arose this past Monday in the newspaper ‘Haaretz’ (p. A11). It reported on a study by Dr. Peter Gordon (Columbia University, USA), who researched the Pirahã tribe in Brazil. In the language of this tribe there are terms for the numbers 1 and 2, and for ‘many.’ There is no specific number from 3 onward. Gordon conducted experiments of the following kind (for example): he put several candies into a jar, and then took them out one after another. At the end he asked the subjects whether the jar was empty. When two candies were involved, the answers were precise. From three and up, problems began. With ten candies there was already colossal failure. And so it went in other experiments as well.

His conclusion (at least as formulated in the newspaper) was that one cannot think without words. Some reactions described the findings as ‘astonishing,’ while others objected.

Now, we find among later authorities that they explained a dispute among the early authorities in precisely this way. Rashba in Berakhot 15 explains the view of Rabbi Yosei regarding the recitation of the Shema in any language, and says that the innovation that one may recite it in any language and that one may do so without articulating it with one’s lips are one and the same innovation. The reason is that something not articulated with the lips (or not made audible to one’s own ears—I do not remember at the moment) does not have the status of language.

Now, some have explained Rashba to mean that thought is not carried out in words (although it is also possible to interpret him as meaning that there is no requirement that it be done in words, and there are other possibilities as well). Note that Rashash on Tosafot, Shabbat 40, understood him to disagree with Rashba on this point; see there, for the matter is longstanding.

Now, the results of the above study would seemingly contradict this interpretation of Rashba. However, in his book Damasio (‘Descartes’ Error,’ pp. 138–141), he reaches the conclusion in accordance with Rashba. It therefore appears that these later authorities are divided over a dispute among the early authorities!

And now three matters require further inquiry:

1. How is it possible for later authorities to disagree within a dispute among the early authorities?

2. What is the law in this matter?

3. Can the empirical reality reported in the study be inferred from it?

4. And the question for the sake of which I am writing all this is the following:

How is it possible to conduct such a ridiculous study, publish it in an important journal like SCIENCE, and even elicit reactions that it is ‘astonishing’?

After all, the direction is obviously the opposite. Since they do not know the concept (not the term, or the word) of 3, there is correspondingly no word for it in the language. Therefore, the fact that there are no words is not the cause of the inability to think ideas that involve the number 3; rather, the opposite is true: the fact that they do not know the concept is what causes there to be no word for it in the language.

This is the general pathology of the methodology of what are called the ‘social sciences,’ in which the direction of the correlation is very difficult to determine. But here I am particularly troubled. Here דווקא it seems that the direction of the correlation is clear, and not merely doubtful. For it is obvious that a word can arise only after one understands the meaning of the term. Can a word precede its meaning?

If so, then precisely in this case the direction of the correlation is clear, even though we are dealing with the human/social sciences, and it is the opposite of what is described there.

An important caveat should be noted. I have not read the original article, and it may be that Gordon is not as foolish as described here. The description is taken from the article in ‘Haaretz,’ and therefore the objection may be only to them.

Still, the general methodological pathology I described almost precludes any sharp determination in questions of this sort, and therefore our first two difficulties above also seem to be explained.

As for the substance of the issue being studied, this is an excellent example of a case in which the conclusion can be reached a priori, without any research. A word cannot come into being without prior understanding of the concept, and therefore thought (in a raw and vague form) can exist even without words, and indeed must precede verbal thought. Afterwards, verbalization improves and sharpens the thought.

From this the reader can readily see that neither Rashba nor Tosafot can really disagree about this. And in truth, the Hazon Ish contains a contradiction between two places in his explanation of Rashba. However, most later authorities seem more intelligent than the Columbia researchers mentioned above (or the writers at ‘Haaretz’), and they interpret Rashba correctly (see Rabbi Gustman on Nedarim, who gathers several treatments of the matter, and much more could be said).

Beethoven, any response?

I would be glad if the other regulars of the study hall here would respond as well. It would be worthwhile to indicate exactly which point one is addressing, because there is quite a lot here, and confusion in the discussion is to be expected.

Has anyone seen the original article in SCIENCE? Is the description in ‘Haaretz’ accurate? Or perhaps I am mistaken on some point?

Source (‘Stop Here, Think’ forum): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=1083983&forum_id=1364