The Meaning of a Majority: Does the Majority Decide? (Column 66)
With God’s help
In recent days a stormy election campaign has been underway in France. Marine Le Pen threatens to win the presidency, and reporters and commentators are unanimous that this is an apocalypse (at times it sounds as though we are dealing with something like the Nazis’ rise to power in 1933). Because of journalists’ built-in bias to the Left, I do not have a shred of trust in the tendentious descriptions portraying her as some racist monster. Look at similar descriptions here of Miri Regev, Bibi, Liberman, Smotrich, or in fact of the State of Israel as portrayed in the mainstream press, and you will understand what such journalistic descriptions are worth and how far they should be accepted. In some cases these are false and slanted depictions driven by political agenda, but in my impression in most cases it is simply stupidity and a lack of understanding of the concepts involved (such as racism, etc.). But that is not what I wanted to discuss here.
Among other things, people are asking these days whether the French election will once again demonstrate the public’s rebellion against the establishment (a euphemism used by journalists who themselves are the establishment, whose real meaning is: rebellion against their own left-liberal indoctrination), as in Brexit in Britain, Trump’s election in the United States, and more. Even those who ask this question generally assume that the public is mistaken and that its decisions will bring humanitarian and political disaster upon us, and the only question is whether the public will make the same mistake again in France.
Replacing the People
It is hard not to recall the saying attributed to Yitzhak Ben-Aharon after he saw the 1977 election results—the political upheaval that brought Likud to power—that the people had erred and that the people should be replaced. We are used to ridiculing such a statement as arrogant and undemocratic, but it is worth examining whether that is indeed so. Can the public not be mistaken? That is certainly possible. Alternatively, is it not reasonable that the majority is mistaken? That is, is the majority by its nature closer to the truth than the minority? Here too the answer is not trivial.
Regarding the above statement attributed to Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, a man named Uri Yizhar from Mishmar HaShivah wrote some very pointed words in response in Haaretz:
In an article reviewing the course of Yitzhak Ben-Aharon’s life, it was said that following the Labor movement’s loss to Likud in the 1977 election, he said: “If this is what the people want—then the people must be replaced.”
This never happened, nor anything like it. On Israeli television on the night of the upheaval, after hearing the television exit poll, Ben-Aharon said that if this was the people’s decision, then he was not prepared to respect it. This segment was rebroadcast on the day of Ben-Aharon’s death, 19.5.2006, on Channel One’s program “Yoman”.
There is a fundamental difference between the claim that one must “replace the people,” and what Ben-Aharon actually said. In a democratic regime there is an obligation to accept the people’s decision in an election, but there is no obligation to hold it in esteem.[1]
In other words, the public can be mistaken, but there is a democratic obligation to respect its decisions even if it has erred.
The Meaning of a Majority
In the next two columns I will try to address these questions through Uri Yizhar’s remarks, on two levels: 1. Does the majority decide? I will discuss here the meaning of democratic elections and majority rule. I will elaborate and clarify the obligation to respect the majority’s decision. 2. Is the majority right? Here I will examine the assumption implicit in his words that following the majority is not necessarily the best way to reach the truth or the most correct decision. That is, the majority can be mistaken.
Rule by Philosophers
Already Plato raised the proposal of entrusting rule in the state to philosophers, that is, to wise people. On its face this is a very sensible proposal, since we all want the best and wisest decisions to be made. Seemingly, the best way to arrive at a correct and rational decision is to entrust it to wise people.[2] A more moderate version of this proposal would be to weight each person’s vote according to his intelligence. That is, when some public vote is held (such as elections to the Knesset), each vote would count according to the IQ of the person casting it. Thus the more intelligent a person is, the more influence he would have over the decision, which ostensibly would improve the quality of society’s decisions.
One can of course question our ability to measure the relevant wisdom, and I will address this below. But at least on the theoretical plane the question remains. Assuming that it is indeed possible to measure the relevant wisdom and assign weight to each voter according to his wisdom, is Plato’s proposal (or my softened version) really a good one, and should it be adopted, or not?
Two Common Answers
Usually two objections are raised to this outrageous proposal. The first is that we have no way to determine who is wise for this purpose. What is the wisdom required for voting in an election, and how can it be measured? How can wisdom at all be determined objectively? Education is certainly no guarantee of wisdom (it has already been said that there are pieces of nonsense so infantile that you will hear them only from academics). But this is only a technical problem, since what is really assumed here is that if there were indeed a way to define such wisdom, the Platonic proposal would be correct and worthy.
The second objection is that if we give the decision to the wise, they will use that authority for their own interests. That is, the fact that someone is wise does not mean that he is thinking about all of us. We fear that he will use his wisdom for his own interests, and therefore he will not necessarily make the right decisions for all of us. Here too this is a technical problem. This objection as well actually assumes that in principle the Platonic proposal is a good one, but there is concern that it will not succeed. If we were to entrust the decision to an intelligent computer program (devoid of interests), that could be perfect.
These two objections implicitly assume that Plato’s proposal is correct. Rule by philosophers really is the proper and just form of government; there are merely technical problems in implementing the idea.
The Mistake in the Question
But a second look shows that, in truth, there is a mistake in raising the question, or in the Platonic proposal itself. The assumption behind this proposal is that we are looking for a mechanism that will give us the most correct decisions. But that itself is the mistake, and therefore the Platonic proposal should be rejected out of hand. Even if we find a mechanism that measures wisdom, and even if we neutralize interests (create a perfect program), it is still not right to let philosophers rule and make decisions for all of us.
The reason is that the assumption underlying democracy is that we are not looking for the most correct decisions, but for decisions that reflect the will of the public. What lies in the background here is not the conception that the majority is right, but a conception of rights according to which every citizen, as such, has an inherent right to participate in making the decisions that affect him. Again, not because that is how we will reach the best decisions, but because it is his right. If a given citizen chooses of his own will to entrust the decision to someone else (which is essentially what we do in a representative system of government), there is no principled problem with that. Thus, for example, Haredim vote in elections according to the rabbi’s instructions, and their members of Knesset vote (ostensibly—if you can believe it) according to the directive of some Council of Sages. But the fundamental right belongs to the citizen himself.
Our conclusion is that Plato’s proposal is fundamentally mistaken, and not only because of technical reasons. It is based on a false assumption. Even if the philosophers sat and made the very best decisions, that decision still would not reflect the will of the public, and therefore it would not be the binding decision.
The Meaning of a Democratic Majority
Contrary to what those with a halakhic background are accustomed to thinking, the democratic majority is not a way of reaching the truth, but a way of expressing the will of the public. Assuming that a citizen has a right to influence his fate, then the decision society makes for him should fit his wishes. If the decision applies to all citizens, it is difficult to tailor it to everyone’s will. Of course, if all citizens agree there is no problem, but in a situation of disagreement among individuals and groups, a decision that is meant to express the public will requires a mechanism to determine what the public will is in such a case. What does the public want when there is a dispute?
For example, suppose a proposal for some diplomatic agreement is on the table, and part of the public opposes it while another part supports it. The agreement binds everyone and is supposed to be signed on behalf of everyone. Here we cannot proceed according to the wish of each citizen, and one decision must be made for all. Therefore, in such a case we need to create a mechanism that defines what the public will is in a situation of dispute. The accepted practice is to adopt the mechanism of following the majority. But following the majority is not based on viewing the majority as a clarifier of truth; it is based on the fact that the majority is a reasonable criterion for expressing the collective will of the public as a whole.
There can of course also be other mechanisms or criteria. For example, one could weight each citizen according to the number of years he has lived, according to the degree of his contribution to society, according to how critical this decision is for him, according to how strongly convinced he is that it is right or wrong, and so forth.[3] But one can see that the proposal to weight a citizen’s standing according to his degree of wisdom is irrelevant within democratic discourse. This is because in democracy we are not looking for the correct decision, but for the decision that reflects the will of the public.
Halakhic Implications
The rule of following the majority in Jewish law is derived from the verse “follow the majority” said regarding a religious court. When there are differences of opinion in a religious court, we follow the majority. In its plain sense, this is based on the idea that the majority is a criterion of truth (this is also what Sefer Ha-Hinukh writes in commandment 78).
In Jewish law there are several different principles that involve decision by majority. There is the rule of “following the majority,” that is, making decisions on the basis of probability (without entering into the differences between a halakhic majority and a probabilistic majority). For example, if a woman has given birth and we do not know in which month, the halakhic presumption is that the birth was in the ninth month (this is a majority not present before us). Or in a case where we found a piece of meat in the street, the assumption is that if most of the stores sell kosher meat, the piece is kosher (this is a majority present before us). In addition, there is a second rule of nullification by majority in a mixture, meaning that the minority component in a mixture is nullified and takes on the identity of the majority (for example, a piece of pork that fell into a pot containing pieces of kosher meat—strictly speaking, the entire mixture may be eaten). There is also a third rule, that the majority counts as the whole: if some requirement is fulfilled by most of the individual cases, this is considered as though it were fulfilled by all of them (for example, if the majority of the public is ritually impure on Passover eve, the Paschal offering is brought in impurity and not deferred to the Second Passover).
The Talmud in Hullin brings a source for the first rule from the verse “follow the majority”. Some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) write that the second rule as well is derived from there (in different ways, not always clear and not always agreed upon). Some later authorities (Acharonim) wrote this about the third rule as well. Against this background, it is very interesting that there is one halakhic context in which a long-standing controversy arose regarding following the majority: communal decision-making. There, the connection to the verse “follow the majority” is not agreed upon, and perhaps does not exist at all. It now seems that the explanation of this puzzling matter also lies in understanding the democratic majority as I presented it above.
An Implication: The Concept of the Community and Decision-Making within It
The departure of the Jewish people into exile occurred in stages. First, we lost our political autonomy in the Land of Israel, but the overwhelming majority of the people was still here. Afterward, a substantial part of the people went into exile, but the majority of the people still lived in Babylonia, under a fairly autonomous Jewish leadership and legal system. In Babylonia there was a hierarchical national structure, even if not political independence. In such a situation the concept of the community had still not crystallized, because in essence this was still a cell within an active and effective national organism. But toward the end of the first millennium and the beginning of the second CE, the dispersion of the people from Babylonia began, and then small independent cells began to form around the world, organized as communities as we know them today. Such a community lived its own life, and there was no Jewish government or Jewish legal system above it to which it was subject. Such a community made decisions by itself and for itself.
It is no wonder that only beginning in the eleventh century did the halakhic decisors begin seriously to discuss how decisions are made in a community. Naturally, they turned to the familiar mechanisms, foremost among them the mechanism of following the majority. Most decisors held that the majority is determinative in communal decisions, but some objected to this. For example, Rabbenu Tam held that the majority has no significance and that communal decisions should be made unanimously.[4] This dispute was finally resolved only toward the end of the Middle Ages, and since then it has been accepted that communal decisions too follow the majority (as ruled as well in the Shulchan Arukh and its commentators, Yoreh De’ah sec. 228). It seems to me that on the substantive level, only then was the democratic character of Jewish life established.
What is interesting is that most of the medieval authorities who discuss the question of communal decision-making cite as a source for following the majority the verse “follow the majority”, but many of them are careful to add an additional rational consideration. For example, in the Rosh’s responsum that deals with this matter (kelal 6, sec. 5), he writes:
And you asked: whether two or three of the average townspeople can exempt themselves from an agreement made by the community, or from a decree of excommunication enacted concerning some matter. Know that with respect to a matter of the many, the Torah says: “follow the majority.” In every matter on which the community reaches agreement, we follow the majority, and the individuals must uphold whatever the majority agrees upon for them. For if not, the community would never be able to agree on anything, if individuals had the power to nullify their agreement. Therefore the Torah said, regarding every matter that is agreed upon by the many: “follow the majority.”
And so too in several responsa of the Rashba. The question is why the Rosh does not suffice with the verse “follow the majority”, and adds the consideration that if we do not follow the majority, it will be impossible to reach agreements. Is this the rationale of the verse? After all, the verse deals with a religious court, and the explanation brought by the Rosh is not really relevant to the case of a religious court. He is speaking about communal decisions.
In my article Midah Tovah on parashat Mishpatim, 5767,[5] I expand on this subject. Among other things, I argue there that a majority in a religious court is meant to reach the truth, as opposed to a majority in a community, which is a democratic majority whose purpose is to express public opinion (and not to hit upon the truth, as explained above). In my article I show several implications of the different conceptions of the law of majority, and especially of the question whether its purpose is to uncover the truth or to express the public will. For example, the decisors disagreed whether in a religious court one follows the majority in wisdom or the majority in number (for example, if the head of the court, who is greater in wisdom, disagrees with his two colleagues who are lesser than he). My claim is that if what we seek is the truth, there is logic in following the majority in wisdom (this is precisely Plato’s proposal), and even those who do not advocate that view refrain from it only for technical reasons. By contrast, in a community, as I explained, there is no reason at all to adopt Plato’s proposal, since there the decisions do not come to uncover truth but to define the public will.
This is probably the reason that Rabbenu Tam thought that the rule of “follow the majority”, whose concern is clarifying the truth, cannot teach us about the way decisions are made in a community. There is no source in the Torah that teaches that the majority is the way that best expresses the public will, and therefore, if there is a dispute in a community, the majority cannot impose its view on the minority. That would be an infringement of the right that every citizen in a community or democratic state has to decide regarding his own fate. Rabbenu Tam’s conception prefers liberalism and concern for individual rights over democracy as majority rule.
It should be noted that even the medieval authorities who disagreed with Rabbenu Tam probably agreed with him on this principled point, and therefore they always took care to add the rational argument alongside the verse itself. Even according to their view, the verse that deals with decision-making in a religious court (that is, striving for halakhic truth) does not teach us about a democratic majority (whose purpose is to define the public will), and therefore it should be seen at most as a distant source of inspiration for the law of democratic majority (the majority within a community). The main thing is the reasoning that says that without this it will be impossible to function.[6]
In my article I mention a dispute between the historians Yitzhak Baer and Haym Soloveitchik (see his aforementioned book): was democracy imported into general thought from the Torah, or was Jewish law in this matter influenced specifically by general thought? There I am actually inclined to Baer’s view, since as we have seen, the verse “follow the majority” (which Soloveitchik cites as the source of the democratic conception) has nothing whatsoever to do with democracy.
Summary: Back to Uri Yizhar
If we return to Marine Le Pen and Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the conclusion is that there is indeed no impediment to criticizing the majority’s decision, but at the same time there is an obligation to accept it. The majority’s decision is the result of a mechanism that reflects the public will, and that is what is binding in a democracy. True, we have no guarantee that the majority in fact reflects the most correct decision, but we also do not need such a guarantee in order to determine that the majority is decisive.[7]
So in this column we dealt with the question Does the majority decide, and we saw that indeed it does. But at the same time we saw that this does not depend on the question whether the majority hits upon the truth or not. Seemingly, the question of majority and truth (Is the majority right) remains open. On the other hand, the laws of majority in Jewish law usually assume that a probabilistic majority does indeed constitute an indication of the truth. Thus, for example, we saw that in a religious court whose purpose is to uncover halakhic truth, the Torah instructs us to follow the majority. That is, the majority does indeed seem to be a criterion of truth, even if this has no connection to the democratic validity of the majority’s decision. It is no wonder that the Sages derived from this verse the entire body of majority laws, whose purpose in most cases (perhaps except for the rule that the majority counts as the whole) is to clarify the truth. In the next column I will try to go a bit more deeply into the question of the connection between majority and truth (Is the majority right) and show that this connection too is far from trivial.
[1] He adds there one more personal sentence that is less important for our purposes, but I will bring it here as well for completeness:
It seems that the upheavals and hardships Israel has undergone since 1977 can teach us that the justified punishment the people inflicted on the Labor Alignment in 1977 did not heal the ailments of society and the state, and Ben-Aharon’s words, even if they were spoken then as an angry reaction, were a kind of forecast that, sadly, has largely come true.
[2] There are versions that demand entrusting the decision to professionals. My assumption is that in matters of state, such as security and foreign policy, there are no experts. As Ben-Gurion said, experts are experts in what has been, not in what will be. Therefore I am dealing here with the question of entrusting the decision to wise people and not to professionals.
[3] These different mechanisms are discussed in the field of mathematical economics. There is a wonderfully fascinating book by Prof. Shmuel Nitzan, Preference and Social Choice, published by the Open University, which surveys the topic and presents a number of mathematical theorems with interesting and surprising conclusions about it.
[4] See Mordechai, Bava Kamma sec. 179, Bava Batra sec. 480, and also the responsa of Maharam ben Barukh, sec. 230, and others.
For a survey, see Menachem Elon’s Ha-Mishpat Ha-Ivri (vol. 1, chapter 19), as well as Prof. Haym Soloveitchik’s Responsa as a Historical Source, and also Wikipedia, s.v. ‘Communal enactments’.
[5] It also appears in my book (with Gabriel Hazut), B’Tzel Ha-Hokhmah, Kfar Hasidim, 2010.
[6] Ironically, it is specifically the rule that the majority counts as the whole, which is usually perceived as the furthest thing from the meaning of the verse “follow the majority” (only some of the later authorities connect the two), that is the closest to the law of democratic majority. It essentially says that the majority gives its character to the whole aggregate. So too in a democratic majority, the will of the majority defines the will of the public as a whole.
[7] I would only note that a similar mistake arises with respect to the authority of the Talmud or halakhic authority. There too people tend to think that if the Talmud has authority, then it is wiser and does not err. There too this is not necessary. The Talmud has authority because that is what was decided by the Jewish people as a whole, but that does not mean that there are no errors in it, and perhaps not even that it contains more wisdom than any other sage. The binding force of a decision and its correctness are not coextensive principles.
Discussion
Following up on the remark about Dr. Soloveitchik’s words:
As best I remember, the Sanhedrin themselves were not chosen through democratic elections, but rather along the lines of Plato’s proposal, according to their wisdom, or by a seniority system (though that would only apply to the addition of new members; regarding the Sanhedrin at its inception, I do not recall any mention of how the system as a whole was chosen, aside from the days of Moses, when they were chosen on the basis of merit).
The plain meaning of the Torah’s wording is interesting here (before Hazal’s interpretation regarding a Sanhedrin that convicted unanimously): “incline after the majority” means to incline/conduct oneself accordingly, i.e. a technical decision procedure and not something absolute.
“And you shall not follow the majority to do evil” means to establish absolute facts—that the many do not determine the truth.
A. Did Plato claim that the system he proposes is democratic? If not, there is no point in attacking his system on grounds of lack of democracy…
B. Can one take a system that arose as a matter of necessity in communities or was copied from the gentiles and turn it into an ideal from the outset? When I pray “cause the shoot of David to flourish,” one of my intentions is the end of this lousy democracy.
Plato was looking for the best system, not the one that represents the public will.
It seems you do not even notice that the basic question is what is better—the very best, or the public will. It seems to me Plato need not make much effort to explain his position that the best is better than anything that is not the best.
You can say that his question is not relevant for you (but, as noted, not attribute an error to him on that account), because you start from the premise that the public chooses the system—but that is, of course, begging the question. The very issue under discussion is whether the public is what does the choosing, or whether there is some other way of choosing.
Shmuel,
I know Rav Nadel’s words very well, and I agree with most of them. But I will not deal with that here, nor (directly) in the next column.
Moshe,
As for your linguistic remark, I’m not sure I agree.
Yishai,
I did not say that Plato was wrong, but that the Platonic proposal in the democratic context is mistaken. Beyond that, I am saying here and now that Plato was wrong, because I believe in democracy as a value (and he did not believe in that).
The question of what is better—what is best, or what the public wants—is of course meaningless nonsense. What is best is what is best. That is a silly tautology, not some question I failed to notice (so if I didn’t notice that question, good for me). Bottom line: this is a value question, and on the value plane I am against Plato. Indeed Plato need not make an effort to explain his tautology, and yet he is wrong (in terms of values).
Eliad,
Regarding your first remark—see what I wrote to Yishai.
As for the second remark, I disagree. I do not evaluate views and ideas by their source but on their own merits. I support democracy even if its source is outside (as I wrote). When I pray “cause the shoot of David to flourish,” I mean that I hope your prayer fails utterly and that our lousy democracy remains here with us.
I still have not managed to understand what you wanted to say here in the column—if you wanted to say that Plato is wrong on the value level, then you did not say that in the column either, only in the comment, and you did not give much justification (it seems to me you actually think one can give some justifications even in a value dispute). If you started from the assumption that he is wrong on the value level and wanted to say that if one starts from the value premise that democracy has value, then one should follow the majority because that is a value—well, that could be said in one sentence (and even that would be unnecessary).
Well, if you didn’t understand, I’ll explain.
What I meant to say is that there are people who think the problem with Plato’s proposal is technical, and apparently that stems from their tacit assumption that the goal is to reach the best possible decision. But there is another option, which I endorse: to reject Plato’s proposal on value grounds—that is, to hold that the goal of a decision is not the best result, but rather a reflection of the public will. In other words, this is a matter of value and not merely technique. Perhaps what I did is unnecessary or self-evident in your view, but that is what I wanted to say.
Since I have quite a bit of experience, and have already discussed this subject in several forums, it turns out this is probably not entirely unnecessary. If you ask people (and I have done so more than once) what they think of Plato’s proposal, you usually get the two technical objections I mentioned. You will no doubt say they simply agree with Plato on the value level, and everything is trivial. But that is not so. It turns out that most of them actually do not agree with him but with me, yet they do not notice this value option (that the decision need not be the best one). Somehow people assume that the goal is to reach the best decision. And the proof is that when I tell them my view, many of them agree (I have also tested that more than once).
My aim was not to persuade anyone of the value of democracy and the citizen’s right to influence his fate, but only to present this option to someone who in fact embraces it unconsciously—to bring it to his awareness. That is why I saw no need to justify it (and by the way, in my opinion values cannot be justified, especially not this one).
That is what I meant to say in this column, and if you are able to say it more briefly and better—good for you. To each his own abilities. Moreover, it turns out that I am so unsuccessful that not only do I not know how to be brief, but even when I elaborated I still did not manage to clarify my intention. That is a double failure, and of course it depends on no one but me (as the late great Mr. Mark Twain said: sorry, but I did not have time to make it shorter). I will try to improve.
There is value in your autonomy in performing the good act, and not only in the mere performance of the good act.
It occurred to me that one could say Plato too supports the position that one should do what the public wants, except that in his view, since the public is uneducated and so on, it does not really know what it wants.
Like a small child who wants to drink bleach. His father certainly knows that if the child really understood what bleach is, he would not want it. And so too in the analogy.
Of course this is a slippery slope, and everyone will say he knows the public’s will, and nevertheless in my view Plato too agrees with the value of the public will, as above.
“My assumption is that in matters of state, such as security and foreign policy, there are no experts. As Ben-Gurion said, experts are experts in what was, not in what will be.”
Why?
Because of the multiplicity of variables?
How would R. Tam explain the story of the Oven of Akhnai if “incline after the majority” is intended to find the truth? (I assume the heavenly voice reflects the truth.)
I do not understand the difference between what is best and the public will:
Surely the goal is that the public should be satisfied—but not with the election results, rather with the actions of the government formed afterward!
If there is (theoretically) a council of sages that knows what is best (= can assemble a government whose actions will satisfy the public), then it would be preferable to use it and not hold elections. It seems to me the public itself would agree to that.
So I do not understand the value preference for the public will over what is best.
In my humble opinion, what the rabbi wants to say is that if a public does a good deed without it coming from itself, then the deed has no value. There is value in arriving at the best decision only on condition that the public itself is the one choosing it; otherwise it is just a machine carrying out neutral acts (an act is good if there is intention behind it). So the only remaining question is whether democracy expresses the public will in the best way. But to me it is clear that the public will in itself is not an end in itself. What happens if the public is evil? (Sodom.) And in general, what is the public for? To perform random actions? Rather, it is a necessary condition for choosing the good (whatever the ultimate purpose for which it exists may be).
In that context, the prayer “Cause the shoot of Your servant to flourish” is connected to the purpose of existence, whatever that may be. Apparently that purpose will be achieved by a king and not by democracy. But in my humble opinion this will not be a king like in ancient times, a sort of shepherd of sheep. Rather, a kingship that in a sublime way beyond understanding is more mature than democracy (which, as a tool for good life, is successful and beneficial to a people to the same extent that the people living in it are good people; otherwise it will be a tool in the hands of the corrupt—a system of government cannot replace education). That is, a framework in which the people’s will will somehow be expressed more fully than in democracy.
Indeed, others have answered nicely here in my place. There is value in a good act done by a person’s own choice. There is no value in programming a person to do the right act, for there is value in autonomy and not only in truth. I elaborated on this here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA/
And see also here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94/
The claim that Plato is proposing a paternalistic approach empties a person’s right to decide of all content. Therefore there is no logic in adopting such a conception, even though my estimation of the abilities of the public is certainly not very high. But this is the human being, and this is what he wants, and he has the right to try to influence matters according to his own desires. To say that a person does not know what he himself wants empties his responsibility and his moral and religious obligations of all content. Program him, and that’s it.
The decisions that need to be made are not about what so-and-so should do in some moral question, where autonomy matters. These are public decisions: whether to go to war, where to pave a road, exactly how to build the interchange, from where to hang the thief, and so on.
To Yishai:
True, all the examples of decisions you gave are not fit to be carried out by the public, but in fact they are not carried out by the public (except whether to go to war, which in an indirect way is still somehow in the public’s hands), because they require professionalism, experience, and knowledge in various fields that the public itself does not have. What the people do choose is the character of the executive branch and the general way things will be done—and again, not exactly how to carry out what the executive branch is supposed to implement.
As for the decision “whether to go to war,” that is a bit more complex, because it is built from two parameters that have to be considered: one on the value plane, meaning whether it is right to go to war, and one on the factual plane, meaning whether it is possible to go to war, what it entails, etc. And of course the content of one parameter affects the considerations on the other plane, and vice versa.
Yishai, those are exactly the decisions I was talking about. I was not speaking about the conduct of an individual person. Precisely with decisions of that kind, every citizen has the right to influence what the society of which he is a member does in his name.
Okay, thanks for your words. I understand that the paternalistic approach very often—though not always—empties a person’s right to decide of content.
But why is it not correct? In my opinion the public generally does not truly understand, or does not read the map correctly. If it knew more, it would decide differently. So why is this approach not moral? On the contrary. Again, every sane person would agree regarding an infant drinking a toxic substance, and similarly here.
Does the whole dispute come down to where the boundary lies? That is, are there many gray areas?
To Rabbi Michi:
When you say, “Those are the decisions I was talking about,” do you mean that among the decisions in which it is proper for the people to take part are also things like “exactly how to build an interchange,” as Yishai wrote?
There are cases in which one may coerce even a private person against his will (such as preventing suicide, for example). Likewise there are decisions that, theoretically, the public has no legitimacy to decide—such as appointing Hitler as Führer. That is, even the range of mistakes the public has a right to make has a theoretical limit. In this spirit, people can speak out against the people’s desire to elect Le Pen—not because it is a mistake, but because it is a mistake the public has no right to make.
The left broadcasts that for it the election of Le Pen/Trump is like appointing Hitler as Führer, so even if it is exaggerating and lying, still, according to its mistaken view, its discourse is legitimate.
Shmuel,
Because part of a person’s right is to make his own decisions even if he is mistaken (and even if he is mistaken about understanding his own position). A person has the right to err, and therefore paternalism is itself an infringement of the other’s right. A deaf-mute, an incompetent person, and a minor are exceptional cases. It is not reasonable that anyone endowed with a bit more intelligence should make decisions for all those beneath him.
Amir,
Indeed. In principle, whatever is done in my name—I have a right to influence the decision. Sometimes the public decides to hand the decision over to an expert who will make the correct decision. But that is not because the goal is the correct decision; rather because that itself is the public’s will. It decided on that.
Only in a situation where it is completely clear that the person making the decision is not fully competent (such as a deaf-mute, an incompetent person, or a minor). Even preventing suicide is not self-evident (certainly once you step outside halakhic thinking). Anyone can claim that another person’s decisions are a mistake, like Hitler. Cheapening this criterion once again empties the whole issue of rights of all content.
“Cheapening this criterion once again empties the whole issue of rights of all content”—it does empty it, yes. But a person who claims emphatically that the other’s decision is not the right one, and that if he knew the truth, etc., then this is a value claim and one that is logically justified. He may be wrong, but his line is correct to the same extent as in the case of a father saving his incompetent son from suicide.
You wrote: “There is value in a good act done by a person’s own choice. There is no value in programming a person to do the right act, for there is value in autonomy and not only in truth.” That has nothing to do with choosing in public matters.
You define denying a person the right to act as he wishes only where it is clear that he is not fully competent. In that, you are placing liberty as the supreme value that overrides every other value, and if people decide to appoint Hitler, that is legitimate as long as it is done knowingly.
But it seems to me many people will not accept that, and preventing suicide [ordinary suicide, not borderline situations intended to prevent suffering and the like] is legitimate not because the person is not competent, but because the value of his life is higher than the value of his liberty, and we may coerce him against his will on that basis.
Of course this is a slippery slope, because everyone will say he has some value that is clearly above human liberty. Still, no one has actually used force to prevent the public’s right to choose whomever it wants; they only speak about the terrible choice, because it lies on the border of the liberty of the public will. And there must be some boundary beyond which the public may not appoint Hitler; according to the left, we are close to that boundary.
[Hard to believe, but there are people who are genuinely convinced that the State of Israel is fascist.]
It seems to me that in the introduction to Two Carts and a Hot-Air Balloon you elaborated on this issue of imposing values while denying the liberty of the other (I do not remember precisely; I read it years ago).
Clearly, but by analogy it is the same thing. A person’s right to influence public decisions is analogous to his deciding in personal matters. And just as in personal decisions there is no value in programming, so too a public act carried out against a person’s will does not fulfill his right to have influence.
Hello Itai. You are absolutely right (and I also wrote this in Two Carts, in the chapter on tolerance and pluralism). I also know there are people who think the State of Israel is fascist. Moreover, it is clear that liberty is not the supreme value. Where did I say that? I said it is a value, and one must take it into account. There are situations in which I would agree that certain values override the value of liberty (including in the question of suicide. I only wrote that the claim that one may prevent suicide by force is not self-evident). If it were clear to me that my state was heading for collective suicide, I suppose I would not honor the rights of others so much. But because liberty is an important value to me, I would weigh very carefully where and when to apply such a consideration.
I agree with the theoretical statement, but in practice its use must be very sparing. Therefore it should be applied only to an incompetent person, and not to an adult whom you think is mistaken (except perhaps in the rarest of cases).
What I meant to say is that the left’s claim against Le Pen is not that the public is mistaken (and then, as you rightly say, it has the right to err), but that electing Le Pen leads the state to collective suicide and is illegitimate, and therefore the public’s right to err should not be respected. And clearly the left values liberty, but from its perspective we are very close to the border of legitimate liberty.
— By the way, on this issue it seems that the left (at least officially) is more accepting of the value of human liberty, whereas the right is willing to accept many values that are imposed on the individual against his will. And also in right-wing discourse one speaks in the name of values (family values, nationhood, etc.), while the left speaks in the name of individual liberty, and therefore is unwilling to see a person as bound to any tie, familial or national. But that already goes beyond the discussion here.
I understand the value in a person deciding a certain matter rather than others deciding for him, even if there is a guarantee that if others decide for him they will reach the correct decision, when we are talking about decisions on the value plane. But when we are talking about decisions on the factual plane (and there is no disagreement about values between the citizen and the philosopher), then clearly it is preferable that the philosopher be the one to decide, and if he can take the power of decision into his own hands, then the right thing is for him to do so and not place that citizen’s autonomy above the value of “the desired result.” Does the rabbi agree?
In a public decision there really is no value in programming, but that is entirely marginal in a public decision. You can say that if you forced someone to put on tefillin it is valueless, but even regarding an individual you would agree to coercion when it affects others. In public decisions, the main issue is the effect on others. If I impose my opinion on the public, my goal will usually be to bring about the desired result, not that they perform the desired act.
I would like to draw attention to the Talmudic story of the famous dispute between R. Eliezer and the Sages in the case of the Oven of Akhnai. In my opinion, there R. Eliezer represents the truth, while the Sages represent what the majority wants. And the message that emerges from that story is that the public will with the autonomy to err is preferable to arriving at the truth. And that, in my opinion, is the true meaning of democracy: giving the public the possibility to make a decision and yes—to make mistakes as well. This idea is deeper than what appears on the surface. If we take the story of creation, we see many contradictions between planning and execution. God wants light—and what emerges is light mixed with darkness, which has to be separated from the darkness. In the end there is judgment: “And God saw that it was good.” So what is good about that? Rather, that is exactly the idea: truth is the correct thing. It cannot err. And that is the divine will. Yet that same God judged and determined that He gives place to reality. That is, He gives the possibility of error—and that possibility is the existence of reality. And that is the meaning of “that it was good”: there is room for reality, even not to obey the divine will exactly, and that is okay. Thus there is room for humanity too to act autonomously, with the possibility of error.
Hello Barak.
I disagree. The Sages have no right whatsoever to act contrary to the truth. What is at issue here is not the right of the Sages but the value of autonomy. A person is obligated to act and rule autonomously, and that overrides the value of truth.
I also disagree regarding the story of creation. Inanimate creation has no will of its own, and therefore also no rights and no value of autonomy. So what happened there should not be connected to questions of autonomy and/or rights. At most, what we have there is a bending of the divine will before the constraints of reality (I have written about this idea here several times when explaining how there can be natural evil in the world, such as plagues or tsunamis and the like. My claim was that the laws of nature also necessitate the phenomena of evil, and therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, was compelled to do this).
With God’s help, 29 Nisan 5777
Although Jethro advised Moses to choose the judges of the people in a hierarchical way according to their qualifications—“And you shall choose out of all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating unjust gain” (Exodus 18:21)—Moses adds a basic condition: that the judge be accepted by the public: “Get you wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes” (Deuteronomy 1:13). And so Hazal instructed: “One does not appoint a leader over the public unless one first consults the public.”
Even the son of King Solomon and the grandson of King David were advised by the elders: “If today you will be a servant to this people, and serve them, and answer them, and speak good words to them, then they will be your servants forever” (I Kings 12:7). And so Hazal instructed: “Anyone with whom people are pleased—God is pleased with him.” And thus Rabbi taught to “choose for yourself a path that brings honor to the one who follows it and honor from other people” (Avot 2:1).
On the other hand, even where a community has been given authority to decide, it is proper that they consult sages, for although the townspeople were given authority “to stipulate regarding measures, prices, and workers’ wages, and to enforce their decisions” (Rashi: to fine one who violates the limits they set…; Bava Batra 8b), and not only the townspeople but also guilds of craftsmen (ibid. 9a)—that is only on condition that “there is no distinguished person there. But where there is a distinguished person, it is not within their power to stipulate” (ibid.).
So too Maimonides wrote:
“The townspeople may fix prices for anything they wish, even for meat and bread, and stipulate among themselves: ‘Whoever violates this shall be punished in such-and-such a way.’ Likewise craftsmen may agree among themselves that one will not work on the day another works, and the like, and whoever violates the condition shall be punished in such-and-such a way.
In what case is this said? In a city where there is no distinguished sage to regulate the affairs of the city and make the ways of its inhabitants prosper. But if there is a distinguished sage there, their condition is of no effect at all, and they cannot punish or inflict loss on one who did not accept the condition unless he stipulated with them and they acted with the sage’s approval” (Laws of Sale, chap. 14, halakhot 9–11).
[On Maimonides’ words, “unless he stipulated with them and they acted with the sage’s approval,” R. Yosef Qafih brought the explanation of the Or Sameach, that two conditions are needed in order to fine the violator: that he first stipulate with them, and that the matter be with the sage’s consent; and the explanation of Halakhot Olam (by R. Dovber Karlovitz), that one condition suffices: either that he stipulated with them, or that they acted with the sage’s approval. And apparently the matter depends on the discussion among the Rishonim whether the majority may coerce the minority.]
It seems that Jethro and Plato—both taught by the bitter experience of the “tyranny of the majority”—did not want to rely on the “consent of the assembly.” But Moses, who was sent to establish “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation,” believed in a leadership that knows how to raise the people up to its own height, and was not eager “to take a stick and strike them on the skull,” though he knew how to act that way too when necessary.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
Honorable Rabbi, thank you for your response. I did not really understand what the sentence “a bending of the divine will before the constraints of reality” means. That is only a statement, apparently. I am trying to say there is a possibility of taking the following message: reality/the world cannot always contain the absolute truth. There is the well-known dispute between the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai: “a bride as she is” or “a beautiful and gracious bride.” There are situations in which values are ranked: peace is sometimes preferable to truth. There is a different perspective, a stepping outside the whole system. Another point: “to rule autonomously” seems to me an empty phrase that needs explanation. If the sage knows the truth—then there is no room for autonomy just for the sake of principle. If the majority does not know the truth and the majority errs, only it (what can you do?) does not know it errs, while only God knows, then in that situation God says, “My children have defeated Me,” because He also established the principle of following the majority (which can err). In any case, if I infer the following from your words: the Sages have no right to act contrary to the truth as they understand it, so long as they decide freely and without any limitation. Regarding the story of creation—I did not really mean to say that inanimate creation has a will, but to point to an idea on the literary level—a message. One cannot relate to the act of creation as a factual description. Rather, from the description that there is a gap between command and execution, one can speak of a bending of the divine will and interpret it as granting autonomy to reality. That is what I think, though I may also be mistaken…
I do agree with that formulation—that the world does not contain the divine truth in its fullness. That is precisely the bending I was talking about. But what does that have to do with human autonomy?
There is value in autonomy even when a person knows he is mistaken. That is why the Gemara says that the halakha was not ruled in accordance with R. Meir because his colleagues could not fathom the depths of his reasoning. If he was so wise, then the truth is with him, and the halakha should be ruled accordingly—no? Rather, because they did not understand, they ruled otherwise even though that was probably not the truth. A person must rule according to how he understands. See also the Maharal in Netiv HaTorah, chap. 15, on one who rules from his own reasoning being preferable to one who rules from books, even if the latter is correct.
In a halakhic dispute, this is not a matter of rights, because a person has no right to determine the truth. He must strive for the truth. That is exactly the difference from majority rule in democracy, where the purpose of the decision is to reveal what the public wants, not what the truth is. Therefore my remarks should not be applied to disputes in a court or study hall.
“There is value in autonomy even when a person knows he is mistaken”?!
If a person knows he is mistaken, that is not autonomy but distortion. A sage who rules on halakha is convinced he is right, because he has reasoning and proofs that support his view. The reason the Sages disagreed with R. Eliezer and R. Meir despite their greatness was that their own reasoning seemed correct to them; and there is no necessity that the greater sage is always right.
In any case, there is no “autonomy” against the majority of sages who deliberated together, took a vote, and decided by majority—then the minority is forbidden to rule against the majority’s decision, and the Oven of Akhnai proves it, so that the Torah not become like two Torahs.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
Hello Shatzal.
When R. Meir’s colleagues could not fathom the depths of his reasoning, then if their own reasoning differed from his, they should have concluded that the mistake was theirs (even if they did not understand where and why), and therefore ruled the halakha in accordance with him. Moreover, this is a sweeping principle, not a single case. It is a statement that systematically the halakha was not ruled like R. Meir despite his greatness and despite the fact that they apparently did not understand him. So clearly this is not some particular case in which they thought he was mistaken, but a general statement that even though, if you asked them, they themselves would say that he is probably right and they simply did not understand, since according to their own opinion and understanding the halakha is otherwise, they must decide according to their own understanding, even though they themselves admit they are probably mistaken.
I did not mean to say that autonomy means a person should do the opposite of what he himself thinks. That is ridiculous. But there are situations in which I hold X, while my interlocutor, who is far greater than I am, holds Y, and in my estimation he is probably closer to the truth. Still, since my own position is X, that is what it is incumbent upon me to do. And see the Maharal I mentioned (Netiv HaTorah, chap. 15), who elaborates on this.
On the matter of autonomy in halakhic decision-making, see my article here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94/
With God’s help, 29 Nisan 5777
This was Abigail’s innovation when David wanted to judge Nabal as one rebelling against the kingdom, since he had been anointed king by Samuel the prophet. Abigail argued: “Your coin has not yet gone forth in the world.” The sign of public recognition of the king’s rule is that the coin the king issues is accepted as legal tender in commerce, and as long as this condition is not met, he is not king in practice, even though he was anointed by a prophet. And David acknowledged her words, saying: “Blessed be your discretion…”
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
An additional condition for the legality of “the law of the kingdom is law” is that it be a fixed law and equal for everyone, as Maimonides says: “The principle is this: any law the king enacts for all, and not for one individual alone, is not robbery. But anything he takes from this one man alone, not according to the known law for all, is robbery” (Laws of Robbery and Lost Property 5:14).
[And I seem to recall seeing in a book by a sage from Hungary (apparently Sefer Mabit by R. Meshulam Rubinstein) that this is why Israel had to accept the Torah upon themselves, because an obligation of commandments that is not equal for all who enter the world—even the King of the universe cannot impose on His creatures, since “the law of the kingdom is law” must be equal for all.]
Only today did I get around to reading the whole post with its comments,
and my conclusion is this:
And surely many will disagree with me: “If someone tells you there is wisdom among the nations—believe it; Torah among Israel—sometimes don’t believe it!”
That is: the nations were given wisdom, and we believe them—but we have withheld from ourselves the wisdom of Torah, because the nations will not believe us, since we ourselves admit that sometimes we do not go by what is correct—so what is the point? To give all the credit to the nations?
With God’s help, 11 Av 5777
The Maharal in Netiv HaTorah (end of chap. 15) does not reject relying in practice on the opinion of a halakhic decisor. In his view, the problem with those who “render halakhic rulings from their learning” is not the concern for error, but that the decisor does not know the reason for the halakha—something unfitting for an intellectual Torah.
On this basis the Maharal explains that Maimonides and the Tur composed their works in order “to teach the final halakha and what emerges from the Talmud. But that a person should decide from them without knowing from what place the law emerges—mere halakha without reason—never entered their minds or thoughts.”
The Maharal says that had Maimonides and the Tur known that their halakhic works would cause people to abandon Talmud study, they would not have composed them. For compared with the abandonment of the Talmud, “it would be more fitting and more correct to rule from the Talmud,” and even if “his wisdom and understanding lead him into error, nevertheless he is beloved when he instructs according to what follows from his intellect, for the judge has only what his eyes see, and this is better than one who rules from a single work and does not know the reason for the matter.”
There is nothing in the Maharal’s words against one who relies in practice on the words of great halakhic decisors after laboring in the Talmud and understanding their reasons and sources. His main rejection is directed at one who does not know their reasons and sources in the Talmud (whereas R. Yosef ibn Migash held the opposite—that one who rules from the words of decisors is preferable, even if he does not know their source in the Talmud).
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
It is worth noting that what Hazal expounded—“and his banner over me was love”—about Torah scholars who “challenge one another” in halakha, that their Torah is beloved even though they err, has already been explained by them as applying specifically “when they have no master in town.” That is to say: for us, who do have “a master in town,” the words of the Rishonim and Aharonim who have clarified the halakhic conclusion—it is incumbent upon us to “make our ears like a funnel” and toil to understand their reasons and sources in the words of Hazal, and “if you have labored and found—believe it.”
More than that: there is great concern that the current use of the slogan “halakhic autonomy” will not lead most hearers to study carefully all the words of Hazal in the Talmuds and Midrashim and from them issue halakhic rulings, but the opposite—to issue rulings based on “Rabbi Google’s rulings,” without foundational knowledge either in the Talmud or in the decisors, so long as it sounds good and one “connects” to it 🙂 Clearly that is not what the Maharal intended.
To our rabbi Shatzal, the man of Menashe, may he live and be well,
It seems to me that your interpretation of the Maharal is untenable on its face. According to your approach, he is not speaking at all about the mode of ruling, which on your view certainly ought to be done from books. He is only claiming that one must understand the source of the halakhot and decisions in the books (and not be like a magician). But if so, why does he add that in God’s eyes one who rules from his own understanding, even if he errs, is preferable to one who rules from books, even if the latter is correct? According to your approach, there should be no difference in the ruling. The one who errs here would err there as well, and vice versa.
It follows necessarily that he advocates autonomous ruling and not ruling from books, in light of the rabbi’s own understanding of the reasoning and grounds of halakha and his own judgment (rather than that of the books). Therefore he says that such a person may err, for surely the great Rishonim and decisors are no reeds in the marsh. And nevertheless he adds that autonomy still has importance. Consider this carefully.
Musha,
First, if many agree with you, that is of course support for my point (see column 66 and especially 69 🙂 ).
Second, the considerations of who will believe whom and why, and what the consequences will be, are irrelevant. The question is what the truth is, not what the truth will or will not do for us, and whether we are giving someone credit.
And third, do not take autonomy lightly. You assume that only truth has value, but the modes of halakhic decision-making are themselves Torah, and autonomy is a value no less important than truth. And tactically too, today such an approach would certainly win a great deal of esteem (if that matters at all. See my previous remark), contrary to what you say.
With God’s help, 11 Av 5777
To Ramda—many greetings,
The knight Don Quixote of Menashe, to whom you alluded, is an excellent example of the limitations of the ethos of “autonomy.” A knight deserves commendation when he is alone in the field and applies his independent judgment, and even if it turns out he was mistaken and the fortress he charged was only a windmill, he deserves praise for acting properly in light of the data he had.
However, when the knight is within a military unit, with experienced commanders above him who possess effective intelligence—then he should not act in “autonomy,” but rely on the judgment of the commanders, who have reliable tools to distinguish between “an enemy post and an innocent windmill.” The knight will fulfill his knightly duty “to use his head” in an orderly army by asking his commanders “what and why?” and carrying out their tasks מתוך deep understanding. Then he can apply sound judgment even when the commander is not right beside him.
The Maharal’s words must be read with the tools he himself provides: awareness of the source of things in the words of Hazal. The source for the idea that even one who errs in his study is beloved before the Omnipresent is in Shabbat 63a: “R. Abba said in the name of Resh Lakish: Two Torah scholars who challenge one another in halakha, the Holy One, blessed be He, loves them, as it is said: ‘and his banner over me was love.’ Rava said: and that is only when they know the form of the teaching and they have no master in town from whom to learn.”
That is to say: one who errs in his study is beloved only when this is a last resort—when he has no teacher to learn from!
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
To the honorable Rav Shatzal, may he live long.
I disagree with you even in the setting of a military structure, and I have already written this. An army that is too disciplined is a bad army.
But I posed a difficulty regarding your interpretation of the Maharal and received no answer. Set aside the source of the idea and read him inside. You will see that your interpretation is impossible in his words.
In the Maharal’s words it is explicit that ruling from Talmudic study, even if mistaken, is preferable to ruling from books correctly but without knowing the source and reason. As I wrote in the first response, there is nothing in the Maharal saying that mistaken personal ruling is preferable to reliance on a great decisor when one knows the reason; and presumably when there is “a master in town,” it is preferable to learn from him.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
The Maharal’s reason for the necessity of knowing the reason is that this is what befits an intellectual Torah, and it may be that this is connected to his approach in the opening chapters of Tiferet Yisrael, that the commandments were given in order to connect man to the higher wisdom, and it is understandable that action without connection to the higher wisdom is deficient.
There is nothing in the Maharal’s words about “halakhic autonomy” as a supreme value. All the “autonomy” is a situation forced by exile, so long as there is no Sanhedrin or agreed-upon halakhic authority. Can it enter one’s mind that “each man will do what is right in his own eyes,” which entails factionalism and making the Torah into a million Torahs, should be the Torah’s heart’s desire?
With God’s help, 12 Av 5777
The Maharal’s words about connecting man to divine wisdom through performing the commandments are in his book Tiferet Yisrael, chapter 8:
“And the person who performs and keeps this order which the Blessed God arranged—this is the joining and refinement of the human soul, for through performing the commandments, which are the intellectual order, he cleaves to the intellectual, and thereby cleaves to Him, may He be blessed.”
Even when a person does not understand the reason for the commandment, he still connects to the intellectual order, as he says there:
“And although he does not know and does not understand the matter of this statute, nevertheless the Torah was given only to refine creatures, and this refinement applies to a person whether he knows the reason for the commandment or not, so long as his actions are drawn after the intellectual order, what is fitting for him… for the Torah is the intellectual order fitting for a person insofar as he is a person, and through the commandments he cleaves to the intellectual, and through this he cleaves to Him, may He be blessed.”
It thus seems that although even without knowing the reason there is cleaving to the intellectual order, still when one knows and understands the reason, the cleaving to the intellectual order is incomparably greater. That is why the Maharal sees special importance in understanding the reason and source of the halakha.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
Well, this is simply a reading-comprehension error. Read him again. By the way, many have already noted that this chapter was written as part of the polemic he (together with his brother and the Maharshal) conducted against the Shulhan Arukh and the precedential approach in general. So it is clear that he holds as I do regardless of this chapter, but here too it is written.
Clarification: of course when I speak of personal ruling, I mean from within the Talmud. I did not mean that you should do whatever comes into your head. Doing whatever comes into your head is not halakhic decision-making, and that is not what is under discussion. But even when there is “a master in town,” it is not preferable to learn from him. That is exactly what he writes.
So the Maharal, who bears the banner of ruling from the Talmud, would hold the opposite of the Talmud’s words (Shabbat 63), that where there is “a master from whom to learn,” it was not said that “and his banner over me was love”?
On the contrary, in his Hiddushei Aggadot there, the Maharal speaks about the importance of “to learn,” and he laments the situation in his time: “for alas, we have no ‘to learn’ at all, and this itself causes us also to have no reasoning at all, for if one has not learned, from where can he reason when he knows no law?”
Knowledge of the laws, according to the Maharal, is a foundation for analysis and reasoning, and it is clear from his words that his opposition is to a situation in which the words of the decisors become a substitute for Talmudic study, instead of their true purpose of serving as an aid to the learner in clarifying the halakha.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
And in his way, beyond the practical necessity of “to learn,” the Maharal adds the value dimension in the need to receive intellect from another: “for every supreme success comes from the Blessed God, which was not fitting by one’s own power, and this is caused when one becomes wise by a higher intellect which is not fitting for a person מצד עצמו… and for this reason it is also said that they rise to greatness… for when they attain the higher intellect, which is beyond the level of man by his own power, greatness is fitting for them as well… for even if one were a very, very great sage—if he did not attain it by means of ‘those who sharpen one another,’ it is not as much, because since it came to him from another, this is called an excellence, for it is not fitting for a person by his own power.”
In short: autonomy is not enough. Precisely heteronomy, by which a person acquires intellect from another that he could not have attained on his own—that is how a person reaches higher intellect.
Shatzal, I presented my clear proof from the Maharal’s words, and despite asking again and again, I have not seen in your words any refutation, only more and more slogans. I think we have exhausted this.
With God’s help, 14 Av 5777
I will repeat for the fourth time:
The Maharal in Netiv HaTorah, chapter 15, spoke of the superiority of ruling from the Talmud, even at the risk of error, over ruling from a halakhic book without knowledge of the source in the Talmud. There is nothing in his words against ruling on the basis of a halakhic book when one understands its reason and source in the Talmud. And presumably this option is preferable, for in Shabbat 63 it is explained that “and his banner over me was love” was said only “when he has no master from whom to learn.”
The reason for the necessity of knowing the source in the Talmud is explained in the Maharal’s words: that this is what befits an intellectual Torah. I connected this to his words in Tiferet Yisrael, chapter 8, that the purpose of the commandments is to connect a person’s action to the divine intellect. According to that principle, it is well understood why ruling without intellectual understanding is insufficient. On the other hand, in his Hiddushei Aggadot to Shabbat 63, the great importance of “to learn” is explained—both because without knowing the law properly there is no ability at all to reason, and because of the need to be open to receiving intellect from one’s fellow, an intellect a person could not attain alone, which is why even a great sage needs to hear another opinion.
The words of the Maharal, like those of any great thinker, are not acquired through superficial reading, but through close attention to his words, understanding his foundations in the words of Hazal, and being aided by his words elsewhere that explain the deep conceptual foundations of his approach.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
Indeed, here itself it has been proven that the Maharal’s words are not acquired through superficial reading. You did not answer. We have exhausted this.
The Maharal’s words about the necessity of knowing the source of the halakha and its reason in the Talmud are integrated into his struggle against the method of pilpul and “distinctions” practiced in the yeshivot, which detached Talmud study from the goal of “bringing the discussion to its halakhic conclusion,” and also reduced breadth of knowledge.
Once the Talmud ceased to be the source for clarifying halakha, this also negatively affected halakhic decision-making, as the number of teachers of halakha increased who did not understand the words of the decisors from their roots in the Talmud. The Maharal (Derekh Hayyim 4:4) cries out bitterly against those who “are authorized to bear the name of rabbi, anyone whose hand is filled, merely because he has begun chirping aloud in the Talmud.” This is a reality that causes Torah to be forgotten, because neither the student in the yeshiva nor the halakhic teacher has an incentive to deepen his learning toward bringing the discussion to its halakhic conclusion.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger.
Incorrect. If anything, it is part of his struggle against the codification of R. Yosef Karo and the Rema. True, he also fought against pilpul, but this chapter has nothing to do with that in any way whatsoever, as is clear to anyone who reads it.
Go and see that the possibility of error is linked there specifically to one who rules precisely out of understanding and without dependence on the decisors. According to your approach, the possibility of error lies דווקא with one who relies on the decisors and not on his reasoning (because he does not understand them).
This is really just a matter of reading comprehension, and I truly do not understand the need for all this discussion over something that is explicitly written there.
With God’s help, 15 Av 5777
I have not encountered in the Maharal’s writings any “struggle” against R. Yosef Karo and his work Beit Yosef. Presumably the Maharal did not hold by the Beit Yosef’s technical method of deciding according to the majority of the “pillars of instruction,” but the interpretive enterprise of R. Yosef Karo itself—Kesef Mishneh on Maimonides and Beit Yosef on the Tur, which connect the rulings of Maimonides and the Tur to their reasons and sources in the Talmud—accords well with the Maharal’s requirement in Netiv HaTorah, chap. 15, that the halakhic decisor know the reason and source of the law in the Talmud.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
I don’t know whether you are familiar with Maimonides’ opinion regarding decisions of the majority of a community or the community’s rabbi in enactments or halakhic customs (not monetary matters), where he differs from all those you mentioned—whether Ramban, Rashba, Rosh, or Rivash. He holds that only a figure like Samson in his generation or Samuel in his generation—that is, an authority accepted by all of Israel—or like the authority of the Talmud, which was accepted by all of Israel; but an authority accepted only in one land or one community does not have that power, unless it is by way of a protective fence, unlike the other Rishonim.
Responsa of Maimonides, Pe’er HaDor (Makhon Yerushalayim), no. 283 (briefly also in no. 286).
You can also see this in Responsa of the Ra’em, no. 57.
And also in Responsa Rashba 7 (the responsa attributed to Ramban), no. 280, p. 390 in the Makhon Yerushalayim edition, note 19.
There was a mistake in the previous email: on line 6 it should be 286 briefly.
In any case, I now saw that you wrote that this is indeed Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion as well.
It is also brought in the above-mentioned Responsa of the Ra’em that I mentioned, and he also cites the Raavyah in the name of his teacher, the Elder of Metz.
And he emphasizes this point—that according to their view, only the Great Court or some figure to whom all Israel listens has this power.
Responsa of Maimonides:
“You asked about that ban which some of you imposed regarding permission… Anyone who was standing in the synagogue at the time of the ban and answered Amen became obligated by oath; but one who did not answer Amen is exempt from everything and need neither stop up his ears nor shut his eyes, as you said, even though he is standing beside the one imposing the ban. Even if he were holding a Torah scroll at the time of the ban, if he did not utter an oath with his mouth and did not answer Amen, he is exempt from everything. How much more so one who was not in the synagogue. And all those who did not answer Amen or were not there at the time of the ban—if they afterward accepted it upon themselves… And anyone who accepted upon himself a ban imposed by the many at the time he heard it, or who answered Amen… But certainly those who did not hear, or who heard the ban and did not accept it and did not bind themselves, are obligated in nothing. However, they are forbidden from another standpoint, because of ‘You shall not form separate factions’… And it is evident that anyone who did not answer Amen and did not bind himself, but practiced the prohibition all these years and did not hear permission because it entered his mind that he was obligated—if he hears permission from the time they imposed the ban, he is permitted to place himself under the authority of whomever he wishes once they inform him that he is permitted, because he did not swear and did not bind himself by oath… And likewise, the fact that the majority of the people imagine that when many impose a ban regarding some discretionary matter, such as this ban, all are obligated to accept it—this is not so… For there is no one in the world who would think that this one takes an oath and another becomes forbidden. But in terms of excommunication, one would be liable if that matter which they banned is something whose doer is liable to excommunication. But regarding discretionary matters, in which there is no commandment at all, a person is forbidden to impose a ban on others that they should do or not do. But regarding himself and whoever wishes to join him, he has permission to impose a ban.”
Regarding all of the above (and probably even more so regarding the next article), one should note R. Gedaliah Nadel’s comments in his article about matters of majority rule.
But it is true that his words there are difficult, for several reasons, in my humble opinion.
Let’s wait and see the next article…