Pinchas (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Sabbath eve, Pinhas, 5765

Questions

1. Did the Levites enter the land?
2. What is the difference between aggadic exposition and halakhic exposition?
3. When does a matter that was included in a general category become singled out “to teach”? What does it teach: about itself, or about the whole category?
4. Two kinds of being singled out from a category in order to teach: contradiction and redundancy.
5. What is the difference between textual principles and logical principles?
6. Does the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” belong to the first type or the second?
7. On the obligation to understand the words of the Torah.

The hermeneutical principles

• A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach about itself.
• A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach about the whole category.
• Hekesh (inferential analogy).
• Gezerah shavah (verbal analogy).
• Kelal u-ferat u-kelal (general term, particular term, general term).

“These are the enrollments of the Levites by their families: of Gershon, the family of the Gershonites; of Kohath, the family of the Kohathites; of Merari, the family of the Merarites… Their enrollments were twenty-three thousand, every male from a month old and upward, for they were not enrolled among the Israelites, because no inheritance was given to them among the Israelites. These are the enrollments made by Moses and Eleazar the priest, who enrolled the Israelites in the plains of Moab, by the Jordan opposite Jericho. But among these there was not a man from those enrolled by Moses and Aaron the priest, who had enrolled the Israelites in the wilderness of Sinai. For the Lord had said of them, ‘They shall surely die in the wilderness.’ Not a man was left of them except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua son of Nun.”

—Numbers 26:57-65

“And from where do we know that the tribe of Levi entered the Land of Israel? As it is said in Numbers 26, ‘For the Lord had said of them: They shall surely die in the wilderness’—these were the Israelites. ‘And not a man was left of them except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua son of Nun.’ From the plain implication of the verse you would hear that no Israelite remained except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua son of Nun. But that is not so. Rather, you read and find that Eleazar son of Aaron the priest entered, and through him the land was apportioned to every tribe from among the descendants of those who left Egypt, as it is said in Joshua 19, ‘These are the inheritances that Eleazar the priest and Joshua son of Nun apportioned…’ What then does this mean? Since it says, ‘And not a man was left of them except Caleb…’ and yet you find that Eleazar remained, Eleazar came to teach concerning his tribe: just as he entered, so they entered. This is like what we learned: ‘Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach did not depart to teach about itself, but to teach about the whole category.’ Eleazar too was included among the Israelites in the decree, as it is said, ‘They shall surely die in the wilderness,’ and he departed from the category of the Israelites to teach. He did not depart to teach about himself, but to teach about the tribe. If you say that the entire tribe did not enter, then Eleazar too did not enter; and if you say that he entered, then the entire tribe entered.”

—Numbers Rabbah 3:7

A. “A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach”: about itself or about the whole category?

Introduction

In this essay we will discuss the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach.” This is one of Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen hermeneutical principles, but it does not appear in the core list of principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. In this principle, the accepted understanding is that the particular case that was singled out from the category did not emerge to teach about itself, but about the whole category. By contrast, among the thirty-two principles there appears, in its place, another principle, principle 24: “From a matter that was included in a general category and then departed from the category, it teaches about itself.” There, in other words, the singled-out case teaches about itself and not about the whole category.

The midrash (rabbinic exposition) cited above is an aggadic midrash, and yet it uses Rabbi Ishmael’s principle rather than the apparently relevant principle from the thirty-two principles. It is possible that the rule is used here only as an illustration, and that this is not a genuine application of the principle as a rule of interpretation. However, as we shall see, specifically from this illustration, which deals with aggadic midrash, one may perhaps understand the logic of the rule as it functions in halakha (Jewish law).

The aggadic hermeneutical principle: “A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach about itself”

In Sefer Keritut, in the section Netivot Olam—and similarly in Eisenstein’s Otzar HaMidrashim, “The Thirty-Two Principles of Aggadah”—principle 24 is presented as follows:¹

“From a matter that was included in a general category and then departed from the category, it departed to teach about itself. How so? ‘Joshua sent to spy out the land and Jericho.’ But was not Jericho included in ‘the land’? Why, then, was it singled out? To teach about itself, that in strength it was equivalent to the whole land. Similarly, you say: ‘Nineteen of David’s servants were counted, and Asahel.’ But was he not included in the total? Why was he singled out? To say that he was equal to them all.”

In Sefer Keritut, Rabbi Samson of Chinon goes on to explain why Rabbi Ishmael did not count this principle. He writes:

“Rabbi Ishmael did not count this principle. It may be that he holds that this principle does not exist; rather, in the case of a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach, it teaches about the entire category. Thus ‘and Jericho’ teaches about the category: that all the cities of the Land of Israel were closed and fortified like Jericho. Likewise Asahel: that the warriors were like Asahel. Or perhaps this exposition was stated only with regard to aggadah.”

Rabbi Samson of Chinon explains that Rabbi Ishmael does not accept this principle, because in his view whatever departs from a category teaches about the whole category and not about itself. He then raises the possibility that in aggadic exposition even Rabbi Ishmael would accept this principle, and only in halakhic exposition would he hold that what departs from a category teaches about the category and not about itself.

The principle of “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach about the whole category”

Rabbi Ishmael’s principle states that when a matter is singled out from a general category, it is meant to teach about the whole category and not about itself.¹ This is the language of the baraita of examples from the school of Rabbi Ishmael:

“Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach did not depart to teach about itself, but to teach about the whole category. How so? ‘The person who eats flesh from the sacrifice of the peace-offerings that belongs to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him, that person shall be cut off.’ But peace-offerings were included among all sacred things, as it is written: ‘This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, of the sin-offering, of the guilt-offering, of the ordination offering, and of the sacrifice of the peace-offerings.’ When they were singled out from the category to teach, they were not singled out to teach about themselves, but to teach about the whole category: just as peace-offerings are sacred things dedicated to the altar, so too the rule applies only to things dedicated to the altar; it excludes items consecrated for Temple maintenance.”

In this principle we encounter a particular case that belongs to a certain category and is singled out to teach. That means there is a case that is singled out not in order to teach, and a case that is singled out in order to teach.² If the particular case was singled out in order to teach, then according to Rabbi Ishmael it teaches about the whole category and not about itself.

It is important to note that in the formulation of the aggadic principles this special requirement—that the particular case be singled out in order to teach—does not appear. It seems from this that any particular case that departs from the category, even if it does not appear to have been singled out in order to teach, teaches about itself and not about the category. In halakhic exposition, by contrast, the particular case must be singled out in order to teach, and only then can we learn from it about the whole category.

In the example above, the penalty of karet (being cut off) for one who eats sacred food in a state of impurity is stated with respect to all sacred items. Elsewhere, the Torah repeats it with respect to peace-offerings, which were singled out from the category in order to teach. In such a situation we learn from that singling out about the whole category: the karet penalty for one who eats sacred food in impurity applies only to altar-sanctified offerings and not to things consecrated for Temple maintenance.

At first glance, this appears to be an interpretive rule, a tool of biblical exegesis, rather than a logical rule. The textual redundancy of the reference to the particular case—that is, the fact that it is superfluous, and for that reason was singled out to teach—serves as a signal that we are meant to learn from it something about the category.

Description of our midrash

We can now examine our midrash. In the verses cited above, the census of the Levites is described at the end of the census of all Israel. The verses themselves already imply—and the final part of the midrash sharpens this even further—that the Levites were counted separately because they all entered the land, unlike the adult Israelites, all of whom died in the wilderness.

Let us now describe the line of reasoning brought by the midrash in order to prove that the tribe of Levi entered the land:

1. The verses teach us that of all the Israelites, everyone died in the wilderness except Joshua and Caleb.
2. In the book of Joshua we find a verse teaching that Eleazar the priest apportioned the inheritances together with Joshua. This implies that Eleazar too entered the land. But that contradicts the statement in the first point.
3. We therefore return to the statement in the verses in the first point and reexamine it. It appears that not all Israel died in the wilderness; rather, some subset of the people remained, and that subset includes Eleazar. One might have said that Eleazar was a lone exception, but that is improbable, since in that case the verses should also have listed him together with Joshua and Caleb. It is more likely that there was some group that from the outset was not included in the category of all the Israelites who died. The term “the Israelites” apparently does not include all of Israel.
4. The midrash concludes that this group is the tribe of Levi. The decision that this group is the tribe of Levi is apparently based on considerations given earlier in the midrash, in the section not cited here. Later in the midrash, which we have also not cited, there is an attempt to reject this and propose another group—one that would include Eleazar—that did not die in the wilderness. In the end, all agree that the reference is to the tribe of Levi.
5. At this point the comparison is made to Rabbi Ishmael’s hermeneutical principle: “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach.”
6. More specifically, the midrash determines that Eleazar was included in the general category of the Israelites upon whom the decree was imposed, since the decree was imposed on all of them except Joshua and Caleb. Thus it seems that the category is all the Israelites, and the particular case that was singled out is Eleazar. We would therefore expect, in keeping with Rabbi Ishmael’s principle, that he should teach us something about the whole category—that is, about all Israel.
7. Eleazar teaches about the entire tribe: just as Eleazar entered, so the whole tribe of Levi entered the land. In his commentary on the passage, Maharzu raises an objection: apparently there is a deviation here from the mechanism of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category,” because Eleazar should have taught something about the category from which he departed, namely the whole of Israel. Instead, he teaches something only about his own tribe.³

It appears, however, that this is indeed a teaching about the whole category, that is, about all the Israelites. Eleazar’s departure from the category teaches us that the term “the Israelites” who did not enter the land refers only to those who were not Levites. There is thus a teaching here about a certain characteristic of the category, and it is learned from Eleazar, who was singled out from it: the category consists of all Jews who are not Levites. This is exactly like the peace-offerings, which teach us that the category of sacred things for which one incurs karet if one eats them in impurity consists only of altar-sanctified items and not of things consecrated for Temple maintenance. Maharzu’s objection is therefore not difficult.

To be sure, in the case of peace-offerings we learned that the category is like the particular case singled out from it. Eleazar, however, was singled out from the category by means of an opposite property, since unlike the category as a whole he entered the land. He therefore teaches the opposite property: the category consists of all those who are unlike Eleazar, that is, those who are not from the tribe of Levi.

Difficulties in the midrash

There are several problems in the course of this midrash. Let us see what we may learn from them about the logic of the halakhic principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”:

1. Why does the singled-out particular case not teach about itself, as we would expect in aggadic exposition?
2. Why is a halakhic hermeneutical principle used in an aggadic midrash?⁴
3. Why does the singled-out particular case teach about the category at all?
4. Conversely, the reasoning that appears in the midrash seems to be a clear and purely logical consideration. That reasoning is valid even if the particular case was not singled out in order to teach. Why, then, does the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” require that the particular case be singled out in order to teach—that is, that it be redundant? Why can we not learn about the whole category from a particular case that was not singled out in order to teach?
5. In the past we divided the system of hermeneutical principles into logical principles and textual principles. Logical principles, such as qal va-homer (a fortiori reasoning) or binyan av (induction from a paradigm case), are based on rational considerations such as comparison or generalization. They derive their conclusions from the content of the verses—their semantics—and not from the language in which they are couched—their syntax. Textual principles, by contrast, such as gezerah shavah, derive their conclusions from the wording of the verses and not from their content. In gezerah shavah, for example, we draw our conclusions from the linguistic fact that the Torah uses the same word in two different contexts.

At first glance, the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” does not appear to be a logical principle. It seems much closer to the textual principles. From the fact that the Torah specified a certain particular case in addition to a parallel description of the general category that includes it, we infer that it wishes to hint to us some property of the category that can be learned from the singled-out case. Yet the exposition we have seen here, as described above, is a purely logical inference. Is it really the case that the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach” belongs among the logical principles rather than the textual ones?

As for the first question, one might answer that the particular case here has nothing to teach about itself. In the cases cited above from the aggadic principle, the singled-out particulars—Jericho and Asahel—teach that they are equivalent to the category from which they were singled out. But what would we learn here? That Eleazar is equivalent to all Israel? In this context that is implausible. Let us explain a bit more.

If there had been a verse stating, “The Israelites and Eleazar the priest entered the land,” we could have learned that Eleazar was equivalent to all Israel. That inference would be based on the fact that mentioning Eleazar separately in the verse would be redundant—that is, he would have been singled out in order to teach—and therefore there would be a hekesh between Eleazar and all Israel.⁵ But in the verse from Joshua, Eleazar’s entry into the land was not singled out in order to teach at all. His appearance is incidental, in the course of the apportionment of the inheritances; there is no redundancy here that invites interpretation. Moreover, the Israelites did not enter the land but died in the wilderness, whereas Eleazar did enter the land. There is therefore no basis for comparing them. In addition, Eleazar and the Israelites do not appear as items in a list within the same verse, as in the two other examples. Here the particular case appears separately, in an entirely different place—indeed not even in the Torah—from the place where the category appears.⁶

If so, this departure from the category is not an instance connected to the principle, found in the baraita of the thirty-two principles, of “a matter that was singled out to teach about itself.” It is a different kind of departure from the category, one that more closely resembles Rabbi Ishmael’s principle. There the particular case is generally located elsewhere, and therefore there is no room to perform a hekesh between them.

As for the third question: as we have seen, in the halakhic principle according to which a matter singled out teaches about the whole category, the singled-out particular case teaches about the category only if it was singled out in order to teach. There are particular cases that were not singled out in order to teach, but were simply singled out, and from them nothing can be learned about the category. The verse in Joshua merely tells us incidentally that the inheritances were given to the Israelites by Eleazar and Joshua. There is no explicit statement here that Eleazar entered the land, and therefore no redundancy that calls upon us to interpret.

The fourth question is the reverse side of the third. On its face, the consideration that appears in the midrash is a purely logical and obvious one. That consideration remains valid even if the particular case was not singled out in order to teach. Even if the fact that Eleazar entered the land is described only incidentally, the logical reasoning described above still stands. If so, we must ask the opposite: why does the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” require that the particular case be singled out in order to teach?

B. Solving the difficulties: the logical component in the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”

Introduction: the principle is a logical one

The first conclusion we can draw from this is that the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” is indeed a logical principle and not a textual one. Its logic is apparently of the same type as the inference we encounter in this midrash. If so, we would expect it to be relevant not only to command verses, which are the sources of halakhic exposition, but also to descriptive verses, which are the sources of aggadic exposition. Why, then, is this principle not ordinarily employed in aggadic exposition? It appears that there is a difference in their textual form, as we shall see below. For that reason the principle is generally not applicable to descriptive verses.

Our case, in which this principle is in fact applied to descriptive verses, proves that the principle is indeed relevant in principle to aggadic verses as well. Apparently the biblical manifestation here, even though it appears in a descriptive context, more closely resembles the usual manifestations found in command verses. In this section we shall examine this exceptional case and see what differs here from the ordinary cases. That will hint at the logic of this hermeneutical principle.

First, let us see how this logic can be applied to a parallel halakhic inference based on the same principle. Let us take as an example the very midrash brought by the baraita itself: the liability of karet for eating sacred food in impurity, and compare it to our midrash.

The difficulty underlying the midrashic inference: “singled out to teach”

In our midrash there is a starting point that raises a difficulty: we know that all Israel except Joshua and Caleb died in the wilderness. On the other hand, we see incidentally that Eleazar also entered the land. This creates a difficulty, a contradiction between the two sources. The search for a resolution of that contradiction is what leads us to the logical solution and to the conclusion regarding the tribe of Levi. Is there a parallel difficulty in the exposition concerning karet for eating sacred food in impurity?

There is indeed such a difficulty, and it is duplication. The difficulty is this: why does the Torah need to tell us that one who eats peace-offerings in impurity is cut off, if it has already said this with respect to all sacred things?

It should be noted that in our midrash the difficulty is a contradiction. For that reason, in our case there is no need for redundancy in the singled-out particular case, because it is not the redundancy that creates the difficulty but the contradiction at the level of content. In the ordinary case of “a matter that was included in a general category,” without redundancy there would be no difficulty at all. If the peace-offerings had been singled out in order to teach something about themselves—that is, that they differ from the category of sacred things as a whole—there would have been no redundancy and therefore no difficulty. In such a case there would be no room and no need for interpretation by means of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.” This is the reason that the principle requires that the thing be singled out in order to teach—that is, that there be redundancy.⁷ This resolves difficulties 3 and 4.

We may note that this distinction gives further support to our claim that the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” is logical and not textual. It is an inference that is produced in order to answer a difficulty. In the next subsection we will elaborate on this point.

Two levels of textuality in a hermeneutical principle

As we have already noted, gezerah shavah is a clear example of a textual principle and not a logical one. One indication of this is the discussions concerning the need for the words to be superfluous, whether on one side or on both sides; see, for example, the entry “Gezerah Shavah” in the Encyclopedia Talmudit. Redundancy is required in order to draw our attention and instruct us to expound by means of this principle. By contrast, in logical principles such as qal va-homer or binyan av, there is no room for such a requirement. The midrashic inference in the logical principles arises from the content itself, and not from any textual phenomenon. Even if the text had been written in English, we would still have drawn such an inference. We see the laws in Scripture, and from their comparison with other contexts, or from the relations of leniency and stringency that they bear to other contexts, we draw conclusions. Generalization and comparison are logical acts of inference, not textual ones.

At first glance, the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” also begins with redundancy, which is a textual difficulty, just as gezerah shavah does. If so, why did we conclude above that it is a logical principle rather than a textual one?

This can be understood if we notice that gezerah shavah is textual in another sense as well. Once we encounter the difficulty of a superfluous word in the verse, the question becomes what we do with it. Do we draw from it a logical conclusion, or do we employ a formal, technical rule that was given at Sinai? In gezerah shavah it is clear that the second possibility is the correct one. The redundancy hints that we should look for another similar word in another context and draw an analogy between the two contexts. By contrast, in qal va-homer and binyan av the inference itself uses logical tools such as generalization and comparison.

What is the situation in the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”? As we have seen, the difficulty is indeed textual in character, but the solution to the difficulty is a logical inference and not a technical, textual analogy of the sort found in gezerah shavah.

The conclusion is that the textual or logical character of the principles must be discussed on two planes: the plane of the trigger, that is, what motivates the exposition; and the plane of the character of the inference itself. On each of these two planes we may find both textual principles and logical principles, and there is no necessary connection between the two discussions. The following table sketches the division of the principles according to these two planes:

Plane of analysis	Textual	Logical
Trigger for performing the exposition	Gezerah shavah; “a matter that was included in a general category”	Qal va-homer; binyan av
The inference itself	Gezerah shavah	Qal va-homer; binyan av; “a matter that was included in a general category”

Can we verify this proposal in the ordinary appearances of the principle in halakha? For example, in the case of karet for one who eats sacred food in impurity, is the situation there also similar? On the basis of what has emerged thus far, the answer should be yes. Let us now examine the ordinary halakhic inference produced by means of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.”

The logic in the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category”

The character of the solution to the difficulty in this principle is based on a logical inference and not on a technical-textual one. We saw this in our aggadic midrash, and we shall now try to see it in parallel in the midrash concerning one who eats sacred food in impurity.

We saw that the redundancy of the peace-offerings passage raises a difficulty. Let us try to see it in the same way as the difficulty in our aggadic midrash. Suppose the redundancy tells us that the verse teaching that one who eats peace-offerings in impurity is cut off teaches us that only one who eats peace-offerings in impurity is cut off. The proof is that if no limitation were intended, the Torah would not have written a separate section about it. This is parallel to the reasoning by which we argued above that Eleazar is not a lone exception, because had he been such, the Torah would have added him to Joshua and Caleb.

At this point a contradiction has already been created. On the one hand, there is a verse teaching that anyone who eats sacred food in impurity is cut off. On the other hand, there is a verse teaching that one who eats sacred food in impurity that is not peace-offerings is not cut off.

We must now seek some partial subset of all sacred things that does not include the peace-offerings—that is, a subgroup contained within the category “sacred things that are not peace-offerings”—with respect to which the general law was not stated. The logical solution is: things consecrated for Temple maintenance. One who eats altar-sanctified offerings in impurity is cut off, whereas one who eats things consecrated for Temple maintenance in impurity is not liable to karet.

This is a logical and plausible solution, and certainly not a merely textual-formal one. If so, then at least on the second plane—the mode of solving the difficulty—the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” is not textual. In this respect it differs from gezerah shavah.

We thus learn that, contrary to what we understood at the beginning of the essay, namely that the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” is textual in character, we now see that it has a logical dimension. This resolves difficulty 5.

Comparison to the principle of kelal u-ferat

This solution could be understood in two ways: either as an expansion of the particular case—expanding peace-offerings to the general class of altar-sanctified offerings—or as a qualification placed upon the category—the sacred things spoken of in the relevant passage are only altar-sanctified offerings. At this point, it seems that we should distinguish between the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” and the principle of kelal u-ferat u-kelal.

In kelal u-ferat u-kelal we expand the particular case to all particulars that resemble it. In fact, in Scripture there is no actual category there that contains the particular case. The biblical form that leads to the exposition of kelal u-ferat u-kelal is a syntactic form of a sentence that begins in general language, continues in particular language, and ends in general language. Such a case does not present us with two parallel statements, one about the category and one about the particular. It is a single statement, with a textual cue that directs us to expand the particular case.

By contrast, in the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” we are dealing with two different verses, in different places. One of them teaches us a law regarding the entire category, and the other teaches us that same law regarding the particular case. In such a situation we cannot simply expand the particular case, because the state of affairs created after the interpretation must explain both the verse about the category and the verse about the particular case. An expansion of the particular case that does not also explain the category cannot be accepted as a solution to the difficulty. Therefore we must generalize the particular case in a way that also serves as a qualification of the category, so that we can read the verse about the category in a way that accords with the verse about the particular case.

In our aggadic midrash, we read the category, “the Israelites,” and interpret it in a qualified way: “the Israelites who are not Levites.” The particular case, “Eleazar,” we interpret by generalization: “all Levites.” This resolves the tension between the two verses. It may be viewed both as an expansion of the particular case and as a qualification of the category. An expansion of the particular case that would not also be a plausible qualification of the category cannot be accepted in the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.” This is unlike kelal u-ferat u-kelal, where there is only one verse that must be understood.

The fact that an expansion of the particular case which cannot be interpreted as a plausible qualification of the category cannot be accepted as a result of this principle hints at the kinds of expansions that are open to the exegete in this rule. For example, expanding Eleazar only to the family of Aaron the priest would not be a reasonable expansion. We could not formulate that as a limitation on the expression “the Israelites.”⁸ By contrast, an expansion to the entire tribe of Levi can certainly be formulated in just that way: “all Israelites who are not Levites.”

This allows us to understand more clearly the solution to difficulty 1. The singled-out particular case cannot teach only about itself, because that would not resolve the contradiction. The exegetical result must supply an adequate interpretation for both verses in tension.⁹

We are therefore left only with difficulty 2: why did we use a halakhic hermeneutical principle here in an aggadic exposition? Conversely, although it is clear why the aggadic principle of “a matter singled out to teach about itself” should not be used here, why is there no principle like “a matter that was included in a general category” in the list of the thirty-two aggadic principles? That is the subject of the next subsection.

Departure from the category in aggadah and in halakha

In the descriptive, non-halakhic verses of the Torah, we do not encounter cases that require the use of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category.” Cases in which there are fully parallel descriptions of the particular case and of the category in different places simply do not exist. What we do find are cases of the type “the land and Jericho,” or “nineteen men and Asahel”—that is, a category and a particular case that appear together, redundantly, within the same verse.

As we saw, such cases direct us to compare the particular case with the category, since both are items in the same verse. From this we learn about the particular case, not about the category, and infer that the particular case is equivalent to the category. It is easy to understand that when the category and the particular case appear in different places in Scripture, there is no basis for a hekesh between them. In such cases we adopt the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category,” as explained above.

In our aggadic midrash we encountered an exceptional biblical phenomenon. Here there is a departure from the category that appears elsewhere in Scripture, which is not something ordinarily found in non-halakhic verses. True, this is not a case of a redundant parallel description of a particular case, but rather of a contradictory description of the particular case and the category. As we have seen, such a departure also creates a difficulty, and this difficulty cannot be dealt with by way of hekesh, because of the distance between the particular case and the category. Therefore the aggadic principle of “to teach about itself” is not applicable here. By its very nature, this difficulty must be handled by a logic similar to that found in the halakhic principle of “a matter that was included in a general category,” namely by reconciling the two contexts with one another. For that reason, a halakhic hermeneutical principle is applied here.¹⁰

We have thus completed our line of inquiry. We have seen that the logical character of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” does not allow us to say that it is, in principle, irrelevant to aggadic exposition. We proposed that the difference between aggadah and halakha lies in the biblical mode in which the departure from the category appears, and not in the difference between aggadah and halakha as such. That mode of appearance is what dictates whether one should use the halakhic principle or the aggadic one. And indeed we saw that our midrash, which is exceptional in the nature of its departure from the category, makes use of the halakhic principle. The conclusion is that this is probably the parameter that determines which rule we use: whether we make a hekesh, or whether we learn from the particular case that was singled out about the whole category.

A note on the other side of the coin

Before concluding, let us note another aspect, the reverse of the preceding one, in which there is a difference between halakhic verses and descriptive verses. In halakhic verses we saw that redundancy in the particular case that departs from the category is required—that is, that the matter be singled out in order to teach. In halakha, the departure from the category is not based on contradiction but on duplication, which we interpreted as a contradiction. In such a situation, redundancy is needed in order to create the difficulty that leads to the use of the hermeneutical principle.

To be sure, it is not clear to us why the Torah does not use, in the halakhic context, a departure from the category that creates an outright contradiction. But apparently that is the case, for otherwise the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” would be applicable even without the requirement that the particular case be singled out in order to teach. Such a departure would not need to be redundant, because it would already contain a difficulty that requires resolution even without duplication.¹¹

Summary: The obligation to understand the words of the Torah

To conclude, let us cite what we found in the introduction to Duties of the Heart, under the heading “the first of them,” where Rabbeinu Bahya writes:

“Similarly, with regard to matters that a person can attain by way of intellect and understanding: you may believe in them on the authority of the sages of the Torah and their support, and rely only on the words of their received tradition. Yet he said that after you establish such matters through tradition—which encompasses all the commandments of the Torah, their roots and their divisions—you should return to your own understanding and employ your intellect regarding things of this sort, and investigate them with your reason, discernment, and sound judgment, until the truth becomes clear to you and falsehood is driven away, as Scripture says: ‘Know this day and take it to heart…’ And the same applies to everything whose clarification we can attain by the path of reason, as the sages said: ‘Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach did not depart to teach about itself, but to teach about the whole category.’ For the understanding of divine unity is one branch of those matters that can be grasped by way of reason, and whatever is required in one is required in all of them.”

Rabbeinu Bahya instructs us to use our intellect in order to understand the tradition that we possess. After receiving the tradition, one must activate one’s reason, analyze what one has received, and understand its meaning.¹² In this context he cites none other than the principle, “Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach did not depart to teach about itself, but to teach about the whole category.” He means to say that just as we must accept the belief in divine unity, and eventually also investigate and clarify it by way of reason, so too this applies to all the teachings of the Torah.

In this essay we have tried to implement this instruction of Rabbeinu Bahya with respect to this very principle itself. After a hermeneutical rule was given to us that appears to be merely formal and textual, we tried to place it on rational and logical foundations, as in the remarks of the Nazir on the system of principles, on the page for Bereshit.

Footnotes