Pinchas (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Friday eve of Parashat Pinhas, 5766

Questions

1. What is similar, and what is different, between the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” and the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization”?
2. When does the Torah use this principle, and when does it use its counterpart?
3. Is the principle of “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion” in the school of Rabbi Akiva the same as the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” in the school of Rabbi Ishmael?
4. What is the logical relation between restriction and expansion? Why is expansion easier than restriction?
5. Is there an approach according to which the Torah contains no hermeneutical principle of “a matter singled out from a general category”?

The principles

• A matter that had been included in a general category and was singled out to teach about the general category
• Generalization, specification, and generalization
• Generalization and specification
• Inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion

“And these are the Levites counted by their clans: of Gershon, the clan of the Gershonites; of Kohath, the clan of the Kohathites; of Merari, the clan of the Merarites… Their count was twenty-three thousand, every male from a month old and upward, for they were not counted among the children of Israel, because no inheritance was given to them among the children of Israel. These are the counts made by Moses and Eleazar the priest, who counted the children of Israel in the plains of Moab by the Jordan at Jericho. But among these there was not a man from those counted by Moses and Aaron the priest, when they counted the children of Israel in the wilderness of Sinai. For the Lord had said of them, ‘They shall surely die in the wilderness,’ and not a man of them remained except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua son of Nun.”
(Numbers 26:57-65)

“And from where do we know that the tribe of Levi entered the Land of Israel? As it says: ‘For the Lord had said of them, “They shall surely die in the wilderness”’—these were the Israelites—‘and not a man of them remained except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua son of Nun.’ From the plain sense of the verse, you would hear that not a single Israelite remained except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua. But that is not so. For you read and find that Eleazar son of Aaron the priest did enter, and by his hand the land was apportioned to each tribe from the descendants of those who had left Egypt, as it says in Joshua 19: ‘These are the inheritances that Eleazar the priest and Joshua son of Nun apportioned…’ What then does this mean? Since it says, ‘not a man of them remained except Caleb…,’ and yet you find that Eleazar remained, Eleazar came to teach about his tribe: just as he entered, so they entered. This is like what we learned: any matter that had been included in a general category and was then singled out to teach was singled out not to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire category. Eleazar too had been included among the Israelites in the decree, as it says, ‘They shall surely die in the wilderness,’ and he was singled out from the Israelites to teach. He was singled out not to teach about himself, but to teach about the tribe: if you say that the whole tribe did not enter, then Eleazar too did not enter; and if you say that he entered, then the whole tribe entered.”
(Numbers Rabbah 3:7)

A. Summary of last year’s article

The principle of “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out to teach” appears in Rabbi Ishmael’s list of hermeneutical principles. The accepted view is that the specification that was singled out from the general category was not singled out to teach about itself, but about the entire category. By contrast, in the list of principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean, a different principle appears in its place, namely: “from a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out from the category, it emerged to teach about itself.” That is, there the singled-out matter teaches about itself, not about the whole category.

We saw that the author of Sefer Keritut in the section Netivot Olam explains the absence of this principle from Rabbi Ishmael’s list in two ways:
1. Rabbi Ishmael disagrees with it, since he holds that the specification was singled out to teach about the category and not about itself.
2. Rabbi Ishmael agrees with this principle, but it belongs to aggadic exposition, whereas Rabbi Ishmael lists only principles of halakhic exposition.

We noted that in the aggadic principle it does not say that the specification was singled out “to teach,” and from this we concluded that, unlike the halakhic principle, this one is not based on a difficulty in the plain sense of the verse.

The midrash quoted above is an aggadic midrash, and yet it uses Rabbi Ishmael’s principle. In our earlier article we tried to understand the logic of the halakhic principle specifically through this unusual case. We analyzed the midrash in detail and saw that the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category” is indeed a logical principle—that is, an inference meant to answer a difficulty—and not a merely textual rule. It is based on a difficulty of redundancy, and in our case of contradiction, and it resolves that difficulty by treating the redundancy as hinting to a lesson that must be learned about the entire category.

We then distinguished between two levels on which one may discuss the textual nature of hermeneutical principles:
1. Is the basis—the trigger—for using them a textual difficulty?
2. Do we solve that difficulty by means of a technical rule, or by means of logical inference?

We saw that gezerah shavah (verbal analogy) is based on a difficulty in the text—a word that is available for exposition, at least from one side. In that respect the principle is logical. But the solution to the difficulty is technical: the rule instructs us to compare the two contexts in which the similar words appear, a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from purely logical rules. By contrast, qal va-homer (a fortiori reasoning) and binyan av (reasoning from a paradigm case) are not principles based on any difficulty. They are inferences from the content of the teaching verse to the context being taught. These principles are therefore logical on the second plane of our discussion. As we saw, the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category” begins with redundancy, which is a textual difficulty, exactly like gezerah shavah. But its solution is logical: the redundancy is intended to teach us something from the content of the teaching case to the taught case, because the taught case is an example that teaches about the category from which it emerged. This, then, is a logical principle on both of the above planes.

We then demonstrated, with respect to the exposition brought in the baraita of examples as an illustration of the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category,” how the singling out creates a contradiction, and therefore the solution is logical, of the sort that we find in the aggadic midrash quoted above. The Torah states in a separate passage that one who eats a peace offering in impurity is liable to karet (the punishment of spiritual excision), in addition to the verse that teaches this concerning sacred offerings in general. The singling out of the peace offering would seem to teach that only in the case of peace offerings is there a punishment of karet for eating in impurity, and this creates a contradiction with the verse that imposes such a punishment for eating sacred offerings in general. The solution is to find a partial group that includes peace offerings and to limit the general verse to that group alone. That group is all altar-sanctified offerings.

We remarked that, in principle, this solution may be understood in two ways: as an expansion of the specification, expanding peace offerings to the whole class of altar-sanctified offerings; or as a restriction that qualifies the general rule, namely that the sacred offerings spoken of in the passage in Leviticus are only altar-sanctified offerings. At this point one must distinguish between the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category” and the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization.”

In the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization” we expand the specification to all the items that resemble it. In fact, Scripture contains no actual general category that already includes that specification. The biblical form that gives rise to this exposition is a mode of formulation within a sentence: it begins in general language, continues in specific language, and ends in general language. Such a case does not present two parallel statements, one about the general category and one about the specification. It is a single statement, and there is a textual hint in Scripture directing us to expand the specification. Therefore this is a textual principle.

By contrast, in the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category,” we are dealing with two different verses in two different places. As discussed at the beginning of the page for Parashat Tzav, 5765, where a generalization and specification are separated from one another they are not expounded by the rule of generalization and specification, but by the rule of a matter included in a general category. One verse teaches us a law concerning the whole category, and the second teaches us the same law concerning a specification within that category. In such a case we cannot simply expand the specification, because the resulting reading must explain both the verse of the general category and the verse of the specification. An expansion of the specification that does not also explain the general category cannot serve as a resolution of the difficulty. Therefore we must generalize the specification in a way that also qualifies the general category, so that we can read the verse of the general category in a manner consistent with the verse of the specification.

In our aggadic midrash, we read the general expression “the children of Israel” and interpret it in a qualified way: “the children of Israel who are not Levites.” The specification, “Eleazar,” is interpreted by generalization: “the entire tribe of Levi.” This resolves both verses, and it can be seen both as an expansion of the specification and as a qualification of the general category. An expansion of the specification that does not amount to a plausible qualification of the general category cannot be accepted within the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category.” This is unlike the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” where there is only one verse that must be understood.

An expansion of the specification that cannot be interpreted as a plausible qualification of the general category cannot be accepted as the halakhic result of the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category.” This hints at the kinds of expansions the interpreter may make within this principle. For example, expanding Eleazar only to the family of Aaron the priest is not a plausible expansion. We would not be able to formulate it as a restriction on the expression “the children of Israel.”¹ By contrast, expanding it to the entire tribe of Levi can certainly be formulated that way: “all Israelites who are not Levites.”

Finally, in light of all this, we explained the fact that a halakhic principle of exposition is used in relation to non-halakhic verses. We noted that in the descriptive verses of the Torah we do not encounter cases in which there are completely parallel descriptions of the specification and the category in different places. What we do find are cases of the form “the land and Jericho,” or “nineteen men and Asahel”—that is, category and specification appearing side by side, and redundantly, in a list within the same verse.

As we saw, this is a kind of comparison by juxtaposition: such cases instruct us to compare the specification to the category, since both are items within the same verse. From there we learn about the specification, not about the category, and infer that the specification is equivalent in weight to the category. When the category and the specification appear in different places in Scripture, there is no room for such a comparison, and therefore we use the principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category.”

Against this background we can understand that in our aggadic midrash we encountered an unusual biblical phenomenon: here there is a singling out from a general category that appears elsewhere in Scripture, which is usually not found in non-halakhic verses. Because of the distance between the specification and the category, one cannot make a comparison by juxtaposition here, and therefore one cannot apply the aggadic principle of “to teach about itself.” A case of this sort, by its very character, must be treated with logic similar to that found in the halakhic principle of “a matter that had been included in a general category,” that is, in a way that reconciles the two contexts with one another.

B. The relation between the rule of generalization and specification and the rule of a matter singled out from a general category

Introduction: “generalization and specification” and “a matter singled out from a general category”

On the page for Parashat Hukat, 5766, we noted the resemblance between the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization” and the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category”: both usually teach about the scope of halakhic groupings, and do not directly introduce new laws. By contrast, in our article on Parashat Pinhas last year we noted a difference between these two principles: the result of applying the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization” is an expansion of the middle specification. By contrast, the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” produces a restriction of the general category. In other words, both deal with the scope of halakhic groupings, but they do so from opposite directions. Both attempt to define an intermediate group, lying between the specification and the broadest general category, but they do so from opposing directions.

In last year’s article we also saw that there is a difference between the biblical situations in which we apply these two principles. “Generalization, specification, and generalization” is applied when a single verse, or at most a single subject matter, uses language that begins with a general expression, continues with a specific expression, and ends with a general expression. By contrast, the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” is applied to a biblical situation in which there are two normative instructions: one verse speaks about the whole category, and another verse elsewhere says the same thing about a specification within that category.² In cases expounded by the rule of generalization and specification there is no duplication at all—no instruction about the category together with an identical instruction about a specification included within it. In fact, there are not two normative instructions there in the first place.

Difficulties

The picture described in the previous section raises several difficulties:

1. Any group can be defined in either of these two ways: either as a restriction of a broader group, or as an expansion of a narrower one. If so, why does the Torah sometimes choose one route and sometimes the other? Why would one hermeneutical principle not suffice? Beyond that: can one define the situations in which the Torah chooses the first mode of definition, and those in which it chooses the second?
2. We have mentioned several times in the past the statement of the Gemara in Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 55a and Pesahim 6a, and see also Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 33a, according to which a biblical case of “a matter singled out from a general category” ought in principle to have been expounded by the rule of “generalization and specification.” Yet in those passages it is expounded specifically by the rule of “a matter singled out from a general category,” because when the category and the specification are far from one another, “there is no before and after in the Torah,” and therefore one cannot use “generalization and specification,” which is a directional rule.³ But in light of what we have said here, it would seem that there was never any room to expound a case of “a matter singled out from a general category” by the rule of “generalization and specification,” since we are not dealing here with one normative instruction that shifts from plural language to singular language, but with a duplication of two normative instructions. Such a case should not be expounded by the rule of “generalization and specification” at all.

In the next two sections we will examine these two points.

C. The logical relation between expansion and restriction

A possible solution to the first difficulty

The first solution that suggests itself is that the Torah chooses the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” precisely in those situations where, by our own reasoning, we would have thought to apply the halakhic principle to the entire broader group, yet the Torah wishes to narrow its range of application. By contrast, the Torah chooses “generalization, specification, and generalization” in laws where we would have thought to apply the principle only to the specification itself, and the Torah wishes to teach that we must widen the circle of application.

Another solution is that the matter depends on which way the desired group is easier to define, or in which form the definition will be sharper and more unambiguous. In cases where the halakhic group cannot be clearly defined as an expansion around some specification—for example, where several equally plausible expansions are available—the Torah chooses the option of restricting a broader category. By contrast, in cases where the restriction would come out vague and ambiguous, the Torah chooses to define the halakhic group by generalizing from some representative specification.

It seems that there is a connection between these two solutions. The convenience of a definition is a function of our intuitive reasoning. Where, absent the Torah’s instruction, our own reasoning would have greatly broadened the halakhic principle, it is not plausible to choose a definition by way of expansion. In such cases the expansion would lead us to a group that is too broad. By contrast, where our natural reasoning would have applied the law only to some specification, definition by way of restriction would not be effective, because the restriction would lead us to narrow the law to a group that is too small.

In our article on Parashat Va’era, 5765, we discussed this feature of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” and we raised the question whether there is a group of Sages in rabbinic literature who also view “generalization, specification, and generalization” as a restriction of the general category rather than an expansion of the specification. We also discussed the character of the interpretive method associated with the school of Rabbi Akiva, and we saw that its characteristic mode of thought proceeds from the broader category toward the narrower one—“inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion” in place of “generalization, specification, and generalization.”⁴

We will now illustrate our point using the two expositions brought in the baraita of examples as illustrations of these two principles.

First example: eating consecrated food in impurity

The example for the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” concerns the punishment of karet for eating sacred offerings in impurity. We saw that there is a verse teaching the punishment of karet for anyone who eats a sacred offering in impurity, and an additional verse teaching the punishment of karet for one who eats a peace offering in impurity. The resulting halakhic group is all who eat altar-sanctified offerings in impurity. The alternative way of teaching this by means of “generalization and specification” would have been to formulate the general verse concerning punishment for one who eats sacred food in impurity in some general language, and immediately thereafter to mention peace offerings as the specification.

Let us now examine what our simple intuition would say about such a punishment. It seems that, absent a special novelty in the Torah, if there is a punishment of karet for eating sacred offerings in impurity, then anyone who eats sacred food in impurity ought to be liable to karet. All such cases profane the sacred. Therefore, if the Torah had chosen the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” we would have had to expand the punishment written regarding peace offerings. In that case we would have expanded it to all sacred offerings, whereas the Torah’s intention is only altar-sanctified offerings. That is why the Torah chose to teach this law specifically by means of the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category,” which operates by restricting the category and not by expanding the specification through “generalization, specification, and generalization.”

To be sure, it must be noted that the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization” usually does not expand the specification to the largest possible group. Normally the expansion stops at some intermediate point. If so, even had the Torah written the punishment only with respect to peace offerings, we would not necessarily have expanded it to all sacred offerings, and it would seem that this route too should have been possible.

This claim is correct. However, since our a priori reasoning is that the punishment ought to apply to everyone who eats sacred offerings, even our ability to define partial expansions around peace offerings becomes problematic. Because the expansion would not carry us all the way to the point our reasoning would suggest, several possible intermediate groups would stand on equal footing. Perhaps offerings of lesser sanctity; perhaps all altar-sanctified offerings; perhaps everything eaten by the owners; perhaps everything that is eaten at all; and so on. The fact that our reasoning would have applied this law to the broadest possible group means that several intermediate groups would have equal standing, and ambiguity would arise concerning the mechanism of expansion. Therefore the Torah chose to teach us the punishment of karet for eating sacred offerings in impurity specifically by the opposite mechanism, namely through the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category.”⁵

Another way to understand this is that, had the Torah written this instruction by means of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” we would have expanded to a group that is the union of the sacred offerings resembling peace offerings along two dimensions of similarity. But such a union would not yield the category of altar-sanctified offerings. This line of thought should be checked systematically, by proposing defining features of peace offerings and seeing to which group we would arrive through the use of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” that is, through expansion along two dimensions of similarity.

Second example: redeeming the second tithe

The example brought in the baraita of examples for the principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization” concerns the redemption of the second tithe.⁶

“How does one derive from generalization, specification, and generalization? ‘You shall give the money for whatever your soul desires’—a generalization; ‘for cattle, sheep, wine, or strong drink’—a specification; ‘and for whatever your soul asks of you’—it returned and generalized. Generalization, specification, and generalization: you may infer only what is similar to the specification. This tells you that just as the specification is explicitly something generated from the earth’s produce and dependent on the soil, so too I include only anything generated from the earth’s produce and dependent on the soil; truffles and mushrooms are excluded.”

At first glance, this example is more problematic. Seemingly, our reasoning would have led us to a broader group than the one the law permits. On the face of it, one might say that the redemption of the second tithe can be made onto any food, since the point is to consume the second tithe in Jerusalem. On the other hand, we must remember that the duty of tithing is to separate it from produce of the soil. The purpose is not simply to eat food in Jerusalem, for the second tithe is one of the tithes. The purpose is to give the Holy One something from the produce of our land, as a sign of gratitude for His help. It is true that in this case the “giving” to God is done by eating the second tithe in Jerusalem; in other cases the giving is to the priests, to the Temple, and the like. If so, there was certainly room to think that one may redeem the second tithe only onto produce of the soil. The conversion into money for the journey to Jerusalem is only a temporary stage: we separate the tithe from produce of the soil that itself should have been eaten in Jerusalem; then we exchange it for money; and finally, in Jerusalem, we purchase food from produce of the soil.

The conclusion is that our a priori reasoning could have applied the law of redeeming the second tithe only to produce of the soil. The midrash now comes and broadens the picture. The group of things onto which one may redeem the tithe is broader than we would have thought on our own: all produce of the soil and all things generated from the earth’s produce, including animals. True, truffles and mushrooms are excluded, but from the outset we would not have thought that things that do not count as produce of the soil were included in the law of redemption. Thus this is not an exclusion relative to our a priori reasoning.

If so, the exposition regarding the second tithe comes to expand what we would have thought, and not to exclude from a broader group. It is therefore now clear why the Torah chose to do this specifically through “generalization, specification, and generalization” and not through “a matter singled out from a general category.”

A note on the dimensions of similarity

We have already pointed out several times in the past that the structure of “generalization, specification, and generalization” instructs us to expand the specification along two axes, that is, two dimensions of similarity. We saw that a whole family of “generalization and specification” principles serves to define different forms of expansion, and different “radii” of expansion.⁷ Perhaps we can now understand that the reason there are so many such structures is that our a priori reasoning would have restricted the law under discussion solely to the specification, and the Torah is therefore guiding us how to move beyond that initial intuition.

But another question now arises: why is the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category,” which is meant to restrict a group that is too broad, not structured with such a detailed framework of dimensions of similarity? Why do we need detailed instructions for how to expand a group that is too narrow, but not detailed instructions for how to restrict a group that is too broad?

Let us reflect on the mechanism of expansion. We take some specification, which is our point of departure. We then look for all its characteristics, each of which defines an axis of expansion, that is, a dimension of similarity. Finally, we act in accordance with the instructions of the biblical text: we expand along one axis, or two, or three, depending on the biblical form. “Generalization and specification” is the most restrictive: expansion only to what resembles the specification in three respects. “Generalization, specification, and generalization” is an intermediate expansion: to what resembles it in two respects. “Specification and generalization” is sweeping expansion: to anything that resembles it even in a single respect.

The mechanism of restriction is different. We begin with a general category. Such a category has no sharply defined characteristics, or at least very few. The greater the number of characteristics, the smaller the scope of the group. In such a situation it is very difficult to define axes of restriction, because the group before us is not characterized by them. We would have to abstract the broad group, attempt to reconstruct it as a union of several subgroups that we ourselves invent, and then omit some of them. Precisely for that reason, the Torah cannot instruct us in a more detailed way how exactly to narrow the original group.

Explanation: a description in terms of features

To understand the difference more clearly, let us now describe it in terms of the features of groups, beginning with the mechanism of expansion. The specification that serves as our point of departure is characterized by several traits that we can identify. Usually rabbinic literature assumes that it has three such traits. In our example: food that is generated from the earth’s produce and dependent on the soil. The Torah now instructs us to expand along one axis. There is, of course, a question which of the two axes to choose, and that choice is made by reasoning, as we have noted in several previous articles.⁸ We choose the axis of being generated from the earth’s produce and leave the requirement of dependence on the soil in place; we do not expand along that axis, and therefore truffles and mushrooms are “excluded,” or more accurately, not included. Thus, in the mechanism of expansion all the data of the specification lie before us, and we perform elimination: we discard some of the information already before us.

By contrast, in the mechanism of restriction, the situation is the reverse. Let us suppose that the general group has one clear feature. In our example of the punishment of karet for eating sacred offerings in impurity, the broadest possible group is all sacred offerings. The feature of this group is that all the items included in it are consecrated to God. Now let us ask how the Torah could instruct us to exclude some concrete part of this group. We have no features that can simply be discarded. An inclusive group has no concrete characteristics. Obviously, we cannot discard the one defined feature here, for in that case the punishment of karet would apply to everything under the sun. We are therefore forced to invent partial features of subgroups, present the inclusive group as their union, and then eliminate some of them. In our case, the class of sacred offerings is composed of several subgroups—for example, altar-sanctified offerings and items consecrated for Temple maintenance. We then eliminate the second group and are left only with the first.

As we remarked earlier, this process is problematic. First, there may be other possible ways to divide the class of sacred offerings. Second, the terms “altar-sanctified offerings” and “items consecrated for Temple maintenance” are not given to us in this context; we define them, as it were, out of nothing, as subgroups within the general class of sacred offerings. It is now clear why, unlike the process of expansion, this process cannot be mechanically formalized in logical terms.⁹ This is probably the reason that the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” is not elaborated the way the principles of “generalization and specification” are, since one cannot mechanize and characterize in a general way, that is, formalize, different forms of restricting groups.

D. Is there, in the Torah, a rule of “a matter singled out from a general category”?

Introduction

We now turn to the remaining difficulty raised above. We saw there that the Gemara states in several places that when a specification is singled out from a general category and appears far away from it, one does not apply the rule of “generalization and specification,” because “there is no before and after in the Torah.” Therefore one applies the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category.” This clearly implies that if the specification had been adjacent to the category, then we would indeed have applied the rule of “generalization and specification.” Yet, as we have noted, the rule of “generalization and specification” is not applied to cases of duplication, but to a mode of expression that shifts from a general formulation to a specific one.

To sharpen the matter, let us examine the examples that the Gemara itself wished to apply the rule of “generalization and specification” to, were it not for the distance between them. We should state already now that we do not have a satisfactory explanation of this point, and the matter remains difficult.

The sugya in Menahot 55a-b

The Mishnah in Menahot discusses the law of baking a meal offering as leaven. It states that when one makes a leavened meal offering one is liable for its kneading, arranging, and baking:

“All meal offerings are kneaded with lukewarm water, and one must guard them so that they not become leavened. If their remainder became leavened, one transgresses a negative commandment, as it says: ‘Every meal offering that you bring to the Lord shall not be made leavened’; and one is liable for its kneading, arranging, and baking.”

The Gemara asks what the source is for the Mishnah’s ruling:

“This verse is needed for what was taught in a baraita: ‘It shall not be baked as leaven’—what does this teach? Has it not already been said, ‘It shall not be made leavened’? Since it says, ‘It shall not be made leavened,’ one might think that he is liable only once for them all. Therefore Scripture says, ‘It shall not be baked’; baking was included in the general rule, so why was it singled out? In order to compare the others to it: just as baking is a distinct act for which one is liable separately, so too I include its kneading, its arranging, and every distinct act involved in it, including kittuf, which is a distinct act for which one is liable separately.”

“But say rather: baking, which Scripture specified, incurs one separate liability, while the others incur only one collective liability! Because this is a case of a matter that had been included in a general category and then singled out to teach; it was singled out not to teach about itself but to teach about the entire category.”

The Gemara is saying that there is one verse that makes one liable for producing a leavened meal offering, and we might have thought that liability applies only if one performed all these actions together. But the Gemara says that there is an additional verse that specifies baking, and from it one learns, by the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category,” that one is liable for each of these acts separately, including kittuf. This is similar to other expositions where one act was singled out in order to divide separate liabilities.

The Gemara now asks why this should not be learned here by the rule of “generalization and specification,” in which case one would be liable only for baking:

“But say rather: ‘It shall not be made’ is a generalization; ‘it shall not be baked’ is a specification; and in a generalization and specification, the rule is that the generalization includes only what is in the specification. Baking, yes; anything else, no. Rabbi Aftoriki said: because this is a case of a generalization and specification that are far from one another, and whenever a generalization and specification are far from one another, they are not expounded by the rule of generalization and specification.”

This is the focus of our problem. We are dealing here with two verses: one imposes punishment for preparing leavened meal offerings, and the second for baking leavened meal offerings. Even if the two verses had been adjacent, there would still be two normative instructions here, and there is duplication between the instruction regarding the category and the instruction regarding the specification. If so, what room is there even to discuss “generalization and specification” here? As noted, that rule deals with a single instruction that shifts from broad language to specific language.

After that, the Gemara brings another example of such a situation:

“Rav Adda bar Ahavah, and some say Kedei, raised an objection: Do we not expound a generalization and specification that are far from one another as generalization and specification? Was it not taught in a baraita: ‘He shall slaughter it in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered before the Lord; it is a sin offering’—where is the burnt offering slaughtered? In the north; so too this one is in the north. But do we learn it from here? Has it not already been said: ‘In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered’? Why then was this verse singled out? To fix the requirement there, so that if he did not slaughter it in the north he invalidated it. You say it was singled out for that purpose; or perhaps it means that only this one requires the north, and no other does? Therefore Scripture says: ‘He shall slaughter the sin offering in the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered’—this establishes a paradigm for all sin offerings, that they require the north. The reason is that Scripture wrote ‘He shall slaughter the sin offering’; but were it not for that, I would have said that only this one requires the north and no other does. Why? Is it not because this would have been a case of generalization and specification, and even though they are far from one another, we do expound them by the rule of generalization and specification?”

There is one verse, in Parashat Tzav, teaching that all sin offerings require slaughter in the north, and another verse, in Parashat Vayikra, teaching that the ruler’s sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The Gemara sees this as “generalization and specification,” which would mean that the verse establishing that sin offerings require the north must be interpreted as referring only to the ruler’s sin offering, for in “generalization and specification” one infers only what is contained in the specification.¹⁰

The only thing that bothers the Gemara about this exposition is that the generalization and specification are far from one another. The very attempt to expound such a biblical case as “generalization and specification” seems to the Gemara entirely obvious and legitimate. Here too the difficulty mentioned above arises: how can such a case be expounded in general by “generalization and specification”? Surely this is the classic raw material for the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category,” not for “generalization and specification.”

Immediately afterward, the Gemara raises another problematic point:

“Rav Ashi challenged this: Is this really a generalization and specification? It is a specification and generalization, and in that case the general term adds to the specification, so everything would be included.”

This point is not directly related to our subject, but it too raises a great difficulty: how could the Gemara have thought, just before this, to expound the passage as “generalization and specification,” when the specification appears in the earlier passage and the generalization in the later one? Before Rav Ashi raised this problem, did no one notice that this is a case of specification and generalization rather than generalization and specification?

It should be noted that in expositions based on the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category,” the order is of no importance, because what matters there is the duplication, not the sequence of appearance or the form of expression. But in the rules of “generalization and specification,” everything depends on the order of appearance. That is precisely why the problem of distant generalization and specification arises, for between two distant passages there is no fixed order of earlier and later. This is the most basic foundation of exposition by the rules of “generalization and specification,” and yet, for some reason, the Gemara’s initial assumption here ignores it.

Summary of the difficulties

In the Gemara here there arises the possibility that even distant generalization and specification may be expounded as generalization and specification. It is important to note that this possibility is rejected and does not remain as the conclusion, including in the parallel sugyot. True, within a single subject matter there are views that even as a matter of law expound distant generalization and specification—for example, the opinion of Rava in Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 33a, and the tannaitic dispute in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 85a, together with Tosafot, s.v. “generalization and specification,” there—but in all those cases the biblical forms really fit the rules of “generalization and specification,” in the sense that they contain a single normative instruction with a change of language. In those cases, therefore, the difficulty we are addressing here does not arise. The problem remains only with respect to the initial assumption of our sugya.

From the Gemara here it appears that, had the possibility of expounding distant “generalization and specification” been accepted, then the rule of “generalization and specification” would also have applied to biblical cases involving normative duplication. In addition, it would have been indifferent to the order between the specification and the generalization. Both of these features indicate that it would have been very similar to the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category.” And yet it would still have been called the rule of “generalization and specification,” not “a matter singled out from a general category,” because according to the initial assumption of the sugya such a biblical case would not have been expounded in a way that teaches about the entire category—that is, by restricting the general category, as we saw above—but rather by a drastic narrowing, as in the rule of “generalization and specification”: only what is in the specification.

One could therefore say that, according to this initial possibility, there would have been no distinct Torah principle of “a matter singled out from a general category” at all. A duplicated case of generalization and specification would have been expounded as a narrowing, like “generalization and specification,” regardless of order of appearance, and even in a case of normative duplication. All of this remains very difficult.

In any event, all this is only within the initial assumption of the sugya. As a matter of law, according to all views, distant generalization and specification are not expounded as generalization and specification when they occur in two separate subject matters. That is, when they are distant we really do apply the principle of “a matter singled out from a general category.” The rules of “generalization and specification” apply only to shifts in language within a single normative instruction, exactly as is familiar and well known.

Footnotes

It may be that one simply cannot define dimensions of similarity for peace offerings that would lead us to the group of altar-sanctified offerings, either because that group is itself a dimension of similarity, or because it cannot be presented as a union of dimensions. This depends on the nature of the expansion in “generalization, specification, and generalization”: do we choose one particular dimension of similarity out of the three, or do we take the union of the expansions produced along a single dimension of similarity? Rabbinic literature contains examples in both directions.

This suggestion leads toward the solution proposed in the next paragraph, and in any event this point still requires further examination.

If one treats the features themselves as a set, then the operations on those sets have the opposite character: restriction is, as it were, “induction,” that is, the addition of features, whereas expansion is analytical in character, though of course not truly deductive.