The Sages disagreed whether Nadav and Avihu died because they entered having drunk wine, or because they issued a ruling in the presence of their teacher. And one may say that both are true—meaning that it was because of their wine that they came to issue a ruling. Therefore let the master judge me favorably.

As for what you wrote so simply, that intentional nullification of a prohibition is rabbinic except according to the Raavad: it has not been clarified according to whom the law follows (and the Shakh on the spot in sec. 99 brought this opinion), and other authors too discussed these matters at length (see Darkhei Teshuvah there). But the main point seems to be as two great halakhic authorities distinguished, namely the Noda B'Yehuda (second edition, Yoreh De’ah 45) and the Hatam Sofer (Hoshen Mishpat 22, and elsewhere), between liquid mixed into liquid and dry mixed into dry.

The gist of their words is that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagreed whether nullification of a prohibition is Torah-level or rabbinic only in the case of liquid into liquid—meaning, when one cooks prohibited food together with permitted food and the permitted food absorbed less than one-sixtieth of prohibited taste. But dry mixed into dry is certainly, according to everyone, forbidden by Torah law. “In my humble opinion, to nullify dry in dry, of the same kind, by majority—even in a thousand—is according to all views a Torah prohibition without doubt, for this very reason. For otherwise, how could you ever have ‘to the dog you shall cast it’ or ‘to the stranger within your gates you shall give it and he may eat it’? Everyone would just mix it one into two in a way that the prohibition could not be identified, and that is not the Torah’s intent”—that is the language of the Hatam Sofer. And though one can debate the various proofs, still we may adopt the simple logic that the law of nullification of prohibitions was not given as a doctrine for use from the outset, but only after the fact, so that one not lose the majority because of the minority.

And now we return to our subject, regarding Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch’s words. What the Rabbi objected, that according to him the Sages should have forbidden every nullification by majority lest people come to nullify intentionally from the outset—I do not understand the difficulty. In every ordinary nullification by majority there is a strong reason to permit, namely financial loss. (And besides, the Sages generally do not forbid something that the Torah explicitly permitted.) But in the case of something that will become permitted, where the loss is not great, using the “theory of nullification” seems to people like unnecessary use, since there is no significant loss here. The Sages wanted to stress that the permission of nullification is a permission for after the fact, a no-choice situation. For if you use it for a loss that is not really a loss—a loss that will be permitted after some time—you lead to disrespect for prohibitions, and people may come to nullify intentionally from the outset.

You also objected that this is a decree upon a decree, and from the plain wording of Rashi, and concluded that there is no concern about being stringent in something where there is a rationale (such as returning a lost object after despair).

Now, what bothered me about the stringency regarding something that will become permitted is that I do not see any reason in it by itself. What is the motivation to forbid it? Even if the permission is “pushed aside” and not fully “permitted,” what is gained by the stringency? The same mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted; the Torah permitted it, so why withdraw from it?

Likewise, in returning a lost object after despair, I do not see a religious reason to be stringent, only a moral one. And I do not know the passage well.

Therefore I adopted the core of Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch’s words. That is, I understood that the Sages were stringent regarding something that will become permitted not necessarily because of the concern that people would nullify prohibitions, but in a more general way. It is clear that nullification of prohibitions is a permission for after the fact (as cited above in the name of the Hatam Sofer: “that is not the Torah’s intent”). Using a tool meant for after the fact where it is not really needed leads to disrespect for prohibitions, not necessarily to intentional nullification from the outset.

Therefore, it seems to me that although Rashi was brief in his wording, one may say that this is his meaning: instead of eating it with a permission that applies only after the fact, eat it with a permission that applies from the outset. And the purpose is so that you not come to belittle prohibitions.

Therefore, in something that cannot become permitted, I do not understand the one who is stringent. I do not understand what motivates the stringency. Is the stringent person afraid of the spiritual dulling of the heart from prohibited foods? That remains to be clarified. Is he afraid that his heart will become desensitized regarding prohibitions and he will come to treat them lightly? If so, then fine. But if he has no real reason to be stringent, I do not understand why he should be stringent. Abstaining from food prohibitions is part of obeying a halakhic legal system, and a prohibition that has been nullified is not forbidden according to that system.

With many blessings

Although I too am liable to stumble in issuing rulings like one who has drunk wine, I dared to object to your words:

The plain meaning of the Gemara and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) is that it is rabbinic. Where, after all, do we ever find a prohibition on nullifying a prohibition? On the contrary: in the Torah there is not even a source for the very law of nullification, and if there were a source saying that one may not intentionally nullify from the outset, that itself would surely provide a source for the very law of nullification (and not as the medieval authorities strained to derive it from “follow the majority”).
And this explains why the words of the Taz are not relevant here (and they are difficult in themselves), namely that the Sages did not forbid what the Torah explicitly permitted, because the Torah did not explicitly permit this (for things that are simply permitted were certainly forbidden by the Sages in some cases, like selecting food from waste and all other rabbinic prohibitions).
In any case, at least according to the view of those medieval authorities who say it is a rabbinic law, my difficulty has not been answered—that it is a decree upon a decree. What does it matter that nullification is only after the fact? It is after the fact on a rabbinic level. Therefore we do not make a decree because of intentional nullification of a prohibition from the outset. And once we have proved this according to those medieval authorities, there is no reason to say otherwise according to the Raavad either. Obvious.

Even if there is a reason to permit ordinary nullification (because of financial loss, as I said in the lecture), once we permitted ordinary nullification, what is to be gained by forbidding it specifically for something that will become permitted? At the end of the day, won’t people learn to nullify a prohibition intentionally from the outset from the fact that ordinary nullification was permitted? Something that will become permitted is a rare case in the laws of nullification, and most people do not know it at all.

And what you asked—what is gained by the stringency—I did not understand at all. What is gained is not eating a prohibition. Even though the Torah permitted it after the fact, from the outset it is proper to be stringent. And the same mouth that forbade did not permit it except after the fact, not from the outset. Especially since you yourself added further reasons, as your generous hand provided: to avoid spiritual dulling of the heart and not to come to be callous in treating prohibitions lightly, and so on.
I also did not understand what difference there is between a moral reason to be stringent and a religious one. Especially since for me morality too is religious.

And as for Rashi’s wording, of course the reading is forced.

That is what seems correct to me.

In honor of the gaon Rabbi Michael Abraham, may he live long.

Again, thank you for the lecture last week—small in quantity, great in quality. And with your permission I will raise a short point that surprised me.

You said that the question whether one should slaughter for a sick person on the Sabbath or feed him carrion is in no way connected to the question whether the Sabbath is “fully permitted” or only “pushed aside” in a case of life-saving danger. For as long as one can obtain meat for the patient without desecrating the Sabbath, then even if the Sabbath is “fully permitted” one may not desecrate it.

And I am astonished, for the Rashba (responsa 1:689, brought in Beit Yosef Orach Chaim 328) linked these questions to each other. And all the later authorities followed him. It is agreed that the Rosh holds that the Sabbath is fully permitted, and therefore one should slaughter for the sick person (see Magen Avraham there and Pri Megadim), while other medieval authorities (Maimonides, Rashba, and Ran) ruled that the Sabbath is only pushed aside, and therefore permitted slaughter only because the sick person recoils from eating prohibited food, or because there is a prohibition in each and every olive-sized portion.

And it is explained that the question of “fully permitted” or “pushed aside” applies only to the prohibition of the Sabbath, which is a prohibition on the person, but not to carrion, whose prohibition is one on the object itself (see Mahatzit HaShekel there).

And regarding the core question—why should we permit slaughter for a sick person when there is carrion meat available, even according to the side that says the Sabbath is “fully permitted” for life-saving danger—I do not fully understand the explanation, but the order of the matter is like what is said regarding ritual impurity, whether it is “fully permitted” or “pushed aside” for the community (for that is where it is learned from, as the medieval authorities wrote):

Whenever it is possible to treat the patient without desecration and with no exertion at all, it is certainly forbidden to desecrate even if the Sabbath is “fully permitted” (for example, if kosher meat is already available before him). Whenever it is possible to treat the patient without desecration only by considerable exertion, it is permitted to desecrate even if we say the Sabbath is only “pushed aside” (thus they proved from what Maimonides wrote in ch. 4 of the laws of entering the Sanctuary, that one need not trouble oneself to seek pure priests from outside Jerusalem even according to the one who says impurity is only “pushed aside”). The whole practical difference between “fully permitted” and “pushed aside” is only in a case of moderate exertion: according to the one who says “pushed aside,” one must exert oneself; according to the one who says “fully permitted,” one need not. And the halakhic authorities held that the prohibition of carrion is equivalent to moderate exertion. (The Bach held that it is equivalent to great exertion and therefore permitted even according to the one who says “pushed aside.” And Maharam of Rothenburg held that even a rabbinic prohibition is equivalent to great exertion and is permitted according to the one who says “fully permitted”; see Mahatzit HaShekel.) I do not know the explanation of these things, but this is at any rate the view of the halakhic authorities.

And while I am here, I would like to add a few words on the previous issue, whether one may be stringent and refrain from eating something nullified in the majority. And I hope I am not burdening you with the matter.

I spoke about the matter with a great man, and he told me simply that there is no logic at all to be stringent. I asked him from Rashi’s wording, “instead of eating it in prohibition.” And he said: even so, the logic is clear that there is no room to be stringent, as in the language of the Rosh (Hullin, end of ch. 7): “It is not because of doubt that they permitted it… rather because it is a scriptural decree, as it is written (Exodus 23:2), ‘follow the majority,’ therefore one in two is nullified and the prohibition is transformed into permission, and it is permitted to eat them even all together at once.” (And even those who disagree and forbid eating them all together, simply speaking, forbade it rabbinically.) That is to say, there is a mechanism that turns the prohibition into permission. [“When one finds wording in Maimonides or another source that seemingly implies such-and-such, but from the content it is hard to understand, and from the content we clearly understand differently, one need not cling too tightly to the wording but should follow the understanding.” (In the Torah of Rabbi Gedaliah, p. 28).]

And when I insisted on the plain meaning of Rashi’s words, he said to me: after all, there is no clear source in the Gemara for “one may not intentionally nullify a prohibition from the outset.” (As the Rabbi asked in the last response: “Where, after all, do we ever find a prohibition on nullifying a prohibition?”)

Now, according to the later authorities who hold that nullifying dry in dry is forbidden by Torah law according to everyone (even those who disagree with the Raavad), the prohibition is straightforward—that is, “why do I need a verse? It is logic,” as the Hatam Sofer wrote: “To nullify dry in dry, of the same kind, by majority—even in a thousand—is according to all views a Torah prohibition… everyone would just mix one into two in a way that the prohibition could not be identified, and that is not the Torah’s intent.” But if we do not accept the Hatam Sofer and say that nullifying dry-in-dry is only rabbinically forbidden, then one must ask: from where did the medieval authorities derive that it is forbidden to nullify a prohibition, since there is no such prohibition in the Gemara?

So we are forced to say that they learned it from the fact that “something that will become permitted” is not nullified. In other words, if they were stringent that instead of eating it in prohibition one should eat it in permission, all the more so one may not intentionally nullify a prohibition from the outset, for that same reason. This is the source of the prohibition of intentional nullification from the outset.

And once we have gotten this far, one may say that the depth of the law of something that will become permitted is that it is considered like intentionally nullifying a prohibition from the outset—for when you rely on nullification in a case where you could eat it tomorrow without nullification, you are like one who intentionally nullifies a prohibition from the outset. And that is Rashi’s intention in his words, “instead of eating it in prohibition, eat it in permission,” and there is no need for what Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch wrote. End quote.

And I will briefly address a few points the Rabbi wrote:
A. That according to Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch this would be a decree upon a decree. It seems to me that one cannot dismiss an argument by the rule that we do not make a decree upon a decree. There are hundreds of references in prohibitions that are effectively decree upon decree.
B. What you wrote, that the motivation to be stringent is because the Torah permitted it only “after the fact”—I did not understand. Can something that is permitted only after the fact not be totally permitted? “After the fact” is not something only partially permitted, but something permitted only once it has already happened.
C. What you mentioned, that there is a concern of spiritual dulling—I mentioned that only as an added point; but even if one says there is room in practice to consider such matters, there are answers as to why there is no spiritual dulling in something nullified in the majority (Kenesset HaGedolah, gloss to Beit Yosef Yoreh De’ah 109; Bnei Yissaschar, Adar II 7).

I will further note that the later authorities discuss whether one may be stringent and abstain from something that was nullified, and from their words it appears that there is no blemish in nullification itself from which one should withdraw. For not only those who forbade being stringent and abstaining (Rema responsa 54, Torat Ha-Asham 76:2, and others) certainly did not hold that there is something defective in nullification; rather, even one who permitted being stringent (Issur Ve-Heter 57:15) linked the issue of nullification by majority together with other permissions (such as a second vessel), where it makes no sense to say that the permission is not absolute (“an after-the-fact permission”), and one could be stringent in all of them because of “distance yourself from ugliness.”

I would be glad for a response.

Even though I go on at length about these “micro”-halakhic matters, that is because of the place I come from. But the “macro” thinking that the Rabbi teaches deeply impresses and enlightens me. And I attach a most disturbing letter (from Rabbi Mendel Shafran, one of the most important judges in the Haredi public), a kind of approbation for a pamphlet trying to encourage the wearing of tekhelet. The Rabbi has dealt a great deal with these issues, and I am sure he will have use for this, and perhaps even turn it into an article on the site.

Abundant peace to the master, from the honor of gaonim, may he live long.

You did not understand my words regarding “fully permitted” and “pushed aside.” It has long been known that the medieval and later authorities indeed linked these matters, but my words were not meant to explain the words of the medieval authorities, but to explain the essence of the issue itself.
The ideas of “fully permitted” and “pushed aside” in themselves have no practical difference at all, as I explained. The practical difference arises only because the medieval authorities decided that there is another concept of “fully permitted,” one that permits the Sabbath even where the action is not necessary for saving life. But in my humble opinion these things cry out from the rooftops, and this follows my heretical tendency to formulate a position for myself even against our great early authorities.
For from where did they invent such a concept of “fully permitted,” one that has no source and no logic, to permit Sabbath desecration when there is no need for life-saving danger? Some of the medieval authorities wrote explicitly that their “fully permitted” stems only from the concern that people may become lax in rescue efforts, and therefore they permitted everything. But that is not a concept of “fully permitted”; it is a permission (rabbinic?) because of concern for danger to life (that is, in the end everything is needed for saving life, even if indirectly). And in my humble opinion this is the logic of the medieval authorities you cited, who distinguished according to the level of exertion. We learn from this that the concept of “fully permitted” as such should be applied only where the matter is needed for rescue, and that is obvious.
See the whole sugya in Yoma, all the reasons and sources brought there regarding the permission of Sabbath in life-saving danger, and you will see that one cannot derive from any of them the “fully permitted” of the medieval authorities (unless you add the concern about laxity in rescue).

And regarding something that will become permitted, “the prohibition is transformed into permission” means that the Torah permitted it as if eating permitted food because of the concern. It is a literary expression. And all these unfounded forced explanations do not help, even if they are said by the greatest of the great.
And I was greatly astonished that you brought the wording of Rabbi Gedaliah, because it is proof to the contrary. From his words you should learn that I am right and you are mistaken. For the understanding is certainly as I said, and one should not infer against logic from wording (such as that of the Rosh).

And regarding the prohibition of intentional nullification from the outset, a source in the Gemara is not enough. The Gemara cannot innovate prohibitions; we need a source from the Torah from which the Gemara learned it. And whoever thinks this is a Torah prohibition is among the astonishing. The logic of the Hatam Sofer only shows that it is improper to do so, but from where can one derive an actual prohibition?
And as for the argument that everyone would go and nullify prohibitions— even if there is such a logic, it is at most a rabbinic consideration. How can we turn such logic into a Torah prohibition? By that same logic I would completely undo the entire laws of nullification of prohibitions, which themselves have no known source (and the medieval authorities wrote that it comes from “follow the majority,” and many, and good men too, have grown weary trying to explain how that is learned from there—Rabbi Chaim and Rabbi Shimon Shkop and others. After all, even a majority not physically present, in the Gemara in Hullin, could not be learned from there except according to one version in Rashi there at the conclusion of the sugya, so nullification by majority is much further still from the law of majority in court).

And regarding decree upon decree, I know very well that there are places where this is done (although the medieval authorities already discussed this, and the known dispute between Maimonides and Tosafot Rid on insulating food in chapter Kira). But to say this without a source, that something that will become permitted is a decree upon a decree based on the prohibition of intentional nullification from the outset, is very puzzling.

The term “after the fact” has two meanings: after an act has already occurred, or “pushed aside and not fully permitted” (and in both meanings, it implies that one should not do it from the outset).

And regarding what the later authorities wrote, that there is no need to distance oneself from a nullified prohibition or from a rabbinic doubt, I already mentioned this in my words. I will explain again that I was not trying to explain them but my own position.

Rabbi Shafran’s words about tekhelet are nonsense, with all due respect. Though unfortunately it is nonsense that many have followed (including Rabbi Soloveitchik and his great-grandfather). Where have we ever found that the sages of our generation—who do not dare even institute a day of joy or mourning, something every community in every generation allowed itself—suddenly permit themselves to nullify a Torah positive commandment without saying a word and without the slightest concern? Indeed it is all politics, but were I in his place I would put a muzzle on my mouth and remain silent out of shame. Woe to such shame.

To Rabbi Michael, peace and blessings.

Regarding the possibility of disagreeing with the medieval authorities:

A. In my opinion it would have been proper to mention in the lecture that according to the Rashba, and by the agreement of all the halakhic authorities, the law regarding slaughtering for a sick person on the Sabbath depends on the question whether the Sabbath is fully permitted or pushed aside in a life-saving case—and only afterward to add that in your opinion this is mistaken (unless you assume that everyone present knows what the accepted view is).
It seemed to me that the lecture implied that there is no opinion at all connecting the two issues. In my opinion, the Rashba’s view is important enough to mention, at least.

B. You often quote the Kesef Mishneh in chapter 2 of the laws of rebels, who writes that the fact that we do not disagree with the Gemara is because that is what we accepted upon ourselves. In your opinion there is no obstacle to disagreeing with the medieval authorities, since no such acceptance exists regarding them.
I did not understand your position on this. The Kesef Mishneh is not laying down a normative stance; he is looking around and describing reality: the reality is that over time an implicit acceptance took root not to disagree with the Gemara. In exactly the same way one could say today that over time the same acceptance has taken root not to disagree with the medieval authorities.
It seems to me that today there is hardly anyone who feels bound to the Gemara but not to the medieval authorities. There are some who are not bound by anything, and that is their right. But the group that does feel bound feels bound to the Gemara and to the medieval authorities, though of course there is a difference in the level of obligation (like the difference between obligation to Scripture, to the Mishnah, and to the Talmud). Therefore the distinction you made between the authority of the Gemara and the authority of the medieval authorities is not clear to me.

C. My impression is that on the basic level you are committed to the matrix. When writing a comprehensive responsum to a question (like the answer on contraception), you do not approach the verses of the Torah directly, nor even the Gemara directly. You accept the mediation of the medieval and later authorities, enter into their way of thinking, and decide among the positions.

So too in the lectures. You do not decide on your own whether quantity is preferable to quality or vice versa, but rather delve into the words of the halakhic authorities.

So what happened in the question of desecrating the Sabbath for a sick person? Is this an “edge case” where it is clear to you that everyone’s words are unfounded? Is there no basis to their words, not even a shred of logic?

Regarding Rabbi Shafran’s approbation: I know that his words are very problematic. It was important to me to raise and publicize this letter, because in my opinion there is an escalation here in concern over the slippery slope. Unlike in other places, here the concern is put on the table and does not hide behind other apologetic reasons. Here too we are talking about a prohibition against being stringent and wearing tekhelet, not a prohibition against leniency. And of course this is a prohibition against fulfilling a Torah positive commandment. These things are also being said by a recognized and respected rabbinic figure.

One more small point. Following many later authorities, I looked at the Ran in Yoma and saw that there is much room to assume that the Ran did not determine that it is preferable to slaughter for the sick person rather than feed him carrion. It may be that his words are only a response to the Raavad, for whom it was obvious that the prohibition of the Sabbath is more severe, and to this the Ran asks: who says to you that the prohibition of the Sabbath is more severe because of its quality? Maybe the prohibitions of carrion are more severe because of their number! That is, the Ran argues that it is possible the two are equal. (His language: “But it seems to me that for a sick person the prohibition of carrion is no lighter than the prohibition of the Sabbath; for although carrion is a mere negative commandment and the Sabbath is punishable by stoning, there is another stringency in carrion, namely that one who eats it violates a prohibition with every olive-sized piece in it… and therefore the many prohibitions of carrion are not considered lighter than the single prohibition of the Sabbath, even though the latter carries stoning.”) It seems to me that if the Ran had really wanted to determine that quantity is preferable to quality, he should have added a few more words to establish that assumption. No?

Thank you very much for the response.

Greetings.

A. Again I was not understood, and that depends only on me. The Rashba did not err, and I was not arguing against him. My claim was that the concept of “fully permitted” in itself has no practical difference from the concept of “pushed aside.” Indeed, the Rashba and those with him raise another idea that they also call “fully permitted,” and that one permits even what is not needed for life-saving danger. I was not dealing with that at all. True, I did write to you that in my opinion these things are puzzling, but that is not what I was discussing in the lecture. The topic of the lecture was not the Rashba nor Sabbath law, but the relationship between the concept of “fully permitted” and the concept of “pushed aside” as I defined them. In my opinion they are one and the same.

B. Commitment to the medieval authorities exists for me too, but it is different from commitment to the Gemara. If there were agreement among all the medieval authorities, I would indeed hesitate greatly to disagree with them. But that almost never exists. Rather, today people think that one cannot even decide between differing medieval opinions and must go according to the laws of doubt. But that is not so.
Beyond that, there are later authorities who disagree with the medieval authorities, and the acceptance is not so absolute. The Vilna Gaon and the Rogatchover routinely disagreed with medieval authorities. But other later authorities too disagree with them in certain cases.
So too, there is an accepted commitment to the Shulchan Arukh, but its commentators disagree with it all the time. The commitment is limited. I would translate it as respect, not obligation. Therefore, when things are puzzling, I do not feel bound.

C. Indeed, as I wrote, I too am committed to the halakhic tradition (with the limitations I noted). But the lecture did not deal with the words of the medieval authorities and the law of a sick person. The lecture dealt with underlying concepts, as above.

Regarding the Ran, that is how the later authorities and halakhic decisors understood his words. For my purposes this again does not matter, because I am not dealing in Jewish law rulings but in conceptual reasoning. The Ran raised the possibility that quantity outweighs quality, and even if he was uncertain, that possibility he raised is enough for me.