I understand.
Basically, the cosmological argument implicitly assumes two additional things:
1) The accepted assumption is that every physical thing requires a cause. We learned this through experience (together with pure reason in the context of physical causation).
2) Only physical things exist in the universe.

As a result, we conclude that the object that does not require a cause is not physical.
Since only physical things exist in the universe, the universe as a whole (at the singular point) cannot be the first cause, because all its particulars are physical, and the whole contains nothing but what is in the parts.
Did I understand correctly?
If so, how do we know the assumption that there are no non-physical things in the universe? (Maybe there are, and then they, or the universe as a whole, could be the first cause that requires no cause outside themselves, since it and they are not within our experience).

On the contrary, such things certainly do exist. God, for example. As for the universe as a whole, I already answered that in the booklet and here too.

So basically, instead of “in our experience” one can say “material.”
Does all the argument prove is that the first cause is not material?

I would formulate it a bit differently: it proves that there is a primary cause that is not material.

Indeed, that is what I meant.
So to the best of my understanding, this is not a personal entity.
Does this argument by itself remove Russell’s claim about the celestial teapot? Can one say that we expect revelation from a being even though we do not know whether it is necessarily a personal entity? (and whether it can reveal itself and command)?

Yes. Whether it is a personal entity or not — you cannot know. What does seem to be the case is that it is intelligent (since the world it created is purposeful and special). Therefore, when a tradition arrives saying that this entity revealed itself (and that it is personal), there is no obstacle to accepting it. And that removes the teapot argument.

I’d be glad if the Rabbi could define what the difference is between a personal entity and one that is not.
Only now am I noticing that between the two extremes — mechanism, law, force, etc., and a personal entity — there is an intermediate category: a non-personal entity (this requires explanation, especially in light of the fact that it is intelligent).

I’m not sure that it’s an intermediate category. The concept of a personal entity is indeed not well defined. Simply put, the intention is “someone” and not “something.” A physical force or a stone are non-personal entities. But an intelligent being sounds like something personal (unless that is anthropomorphizing).
It may be that personhood includes, beyond intelligence, the ability to conduct relationships and dialogue with other entities (for example, to want things from them, to love and be loved, and so on). But I don’t know how to distinguish sharply between these two concepts (though I’m not sure they are identical). For example, a computer ostensibly thinks, but you can’t see it as a person. The problem is that in my opinion it also does not think. See column 35.

Basically there are three possible levels for the first cause in reality:
(1) something within our experience (2) an entity (3) a personal entity
The cosmological argument proves that the first cause is from (2) and up.
If the argument proved only that a first cause exists, and that it is within our experience (1, and perhaps beyond that), would that too answer Russell’s argument?
I just want to understand what exactly the point is that answers the argument.

And if the argument proved that there is a second-to-last entity? I don’t understand the question. I explained what the argument proves, and it is clear that this neutralizes the teapot. What is the point of dealing with hypothetical questions about what would happen if the argument proved something that cannot be proven and that it does not prove?

Because it still isn’t completely clear to me how the fact that there is a first cause that is not material significantly advances us toward rejecting the teapot argument. After all, all we have proved is the existence of a first non-material being.
My question was that according to the same logic, even if the existence of a first material being were somehow proved by some other route, apparently Russell’s argument would also be rejected, and that is hard to accept, because we would only have proved the existence of a first cause.
So in the Rabbi’s view, is the main thing that answers the argument the conclusion that that cause is not material?

I can’t understand what there is here to explain.
The tradition claims that God exists. It is commonly thought that He is a non-material being that is not the world itself. Russell claims that this is like saying there is a celestial teapot — in other words, a claim with no basis at all, an invention, and therefore it should be dismissed out of hand.
The physico-theological argument shows that a first cause exists and that it is the Creator. Beyond that, the argument shows that it is probably not material (since material beings have causes).
Therefore, now when someone comes and says that God (= a non-material first cause) revealed Himself to him, or simply that He exists, this no longer has to be dismissed out of hand by force of the teapot argument.
If the tradition’s claim had been about the existence of a material being, then proving that a first cause exists — even if it were material — would have been enough.
We are grinding water.

I’ll try one more time to explain what I mean (which seems to me a very serious challenge to the sequence that leads to the argument from testimony), and if I don’t succeed I’ll move on to the next question:
If we return to the celestial teapot: suppose it were not known at all that teapots exist in the world, and now the existence of a teapot on earth were proven. Would that move me at all toward trusting testimony about a teapot in the sky? Clearly not.
True, I proved part of the way, but not the significant part. The existence of teapots on earth does not justify trusting testimony about their existence in the sky.
So too in our case: the fact that the cosmological argument does not speak about a personal entity greatly weakens the force of the argument in the context of “from deism to theism.”
After all, the Rabbi always uses the decisive chain:
God exists — He probably wants something — it can’t be that it’s morality — therefore I expect revelation.
But if God is not a personal entity, the chain (which in my opinion is very strong, by the way) is broken. God has no will at all, and there is no expectation whatsoever of revelation from such a god (who cannot reveal himself).
True, we proved the existence of a non-material first cause and called it God, but as long as it is not personal (and has will and the ability to reveal itself), calling it ‘God’ is only equivocation, and claiming that it makes revelation more plausible, to the point of rejecting the teapot argument, seems puzzling to me once the chain has been broken.

I too will try one last time, because everything has already been explained ad nauseam.
You keep ignoring the fact that the teapot claim is an objection. Therefore my task is not to prove the existence of God but to neutralize the objection, and for that it is enough to show plausibility. The physico-theological argument not only shows plausibility but proves the existence of an object that is a serious candidate for the role of the traditional God.
And now to your example (I won’t get into the fact that it is not similar to our case). When I showed that there are teapots on earth, I neutralized the objection to a celestial teapot, because I showed plausibility. True, I did not prove that there are teapots in the sky, but that is not the goal. In our context I am neutralizing an objection, not proving. And certainly this is true if I showed the existence of teapots in general, without showing whether they are in the heavens or on earth. Then the objection is certainly neutralized. That is exactly the situation with respect to God. And that is enough.

Okay, now independently of Russell.
So when we state the chain that if God exists He probably wants something, there is here a kind of double doubt: doubt whether He can want at all (i.e. is personal), and doubt whether He does want.
So where does the sentence come from: “If God exists, He probably wants something”? Seemingly, the word “probably” indicates that He is probably also a personal entity.
Otherwise why “probably”? Most possibilities would say that He does not want anything (either not personal, or personal and does not want).
Does the Rabbi think it is more likely that the entity is personal than not? Is that because of its being intelligent? (I can’t manage to imagine a format of an intelligent, non-material, non-personal object).
(By the way, apparently according to the Rabbi’s words, Russell’s argument doesn’t get off the ground, because we know teapots exist on earth).

“Wants” is being used here in a very general sense. The intention is not that it operates the way it does with us. This is the claim that if someone creates something, he probably wants something from it. That is a perfectly reasonable assumption regarding any kind of being whatsoever.
A double doubt like yours can be raised against every generalization in the world. For example, I saw several bodies with mass fall toward the earth, and from here I generalize to all bodies. But now there is a doubt whether I saw correctly, and even if so maybe it applies only to bodies in Israel, and even if so maybe only to bodies of the type I saw. So one should not generalize from here to all bodies. Formalistic arguments of this kind only confuse matters, and it is a shame to deal with them. This is common sense, not mathematics, just as in science.

(And regarding Russell too — not true. If I had some doubt about the existence of teapots in general, because the concept “teapot” contains a contradiction or is simply something unfamiliar or implausible, then indeed the existence of teapots on earth would be relevant. But Russell is not wondering about the very existence of teapots, only about the existence of teapots on Mars [or in the heavens]. The problem is how they got there, not that there is something problematic in the concept of a teapot. For such a question, the fact that there are teapots here has no relevance. That is one of the reasons I wrote to you that your example is not similar and not relevant.)

In general, this discussion feels unnecessary to me. You are using overly formalistic thinking and ignoring common sense. You won’t get anywhere with that. If you want to symbolize a logical argument — there is no value in that, at least in contexts like these.

“If someone creates something, he probably wants something from it. That is a perfectly reasonable assumption regarding any kind of being whatsoever.”
Even regarding a non-personal being? (something rather than someone).
How can one say “wants” about something like a machine (a non-personal being)?

I’m still waiting for your definition of a non-personal being. We are talking about a being that did something complex, so it was probably done according to some plan. Is that not personal? So please define the term for me.

Seemingly the Rabbi should define the term; I encountered this concept for the first time in the booklet:
“That is essentially what the cosmological argument teaches: that there exists some object that is the primary source or ground of all that exists here. Whether and to what extent this object is personal, that is another question.”
As I understand it, a ‘non-personal being’ is a kind of machine (non-material), which is the first cause that created the world, without any real will of one sort or another.
If we return to archaic philosophy: the world emanated from God without His intention, without His will, and without His knowledge.

By the way, the Rabbi mentioned that this entity is intelligent because it created a sophisticated world.
Isn’t that mixing in the physico-theological argument? I’m speaking only about the cosmological one.
The barrier of “an entity that can create a sophisticated world like ours” belongs to the cosmological argument too?

Hello Yair. I wrote that I am not entering into the question of whether it is personal, and that is precisely because the definition of the matter is difficult. The cosmological argument shows the existence of a source for reality. And the physico-theological one indicates that it is a planner and intelligent (personal?). There is no point in making a separation between these two arguments. The separation is only didactic.

I understand, thank you.
Now I want to ask about the matter of “infinite regress.”
The parable of “turtles all the way down” is, in my opinion, very convincing. It is hard to think of someone who would actually accept such an answer, or prefer it to an answer that gives a ‘first turtle’ or solid ground.
But I have some intuition, which I have not yet managed to ground very well, that gives me the feeling that there is some essential difference between that story and an infinite chain of causes. Does the Rabbi think the two cases are completely parallel?
I’ll try to explain:
When one asks, “What is the world standing on / the first turtle / the second turtle / and so on…?” we are sure that there is supposed to be some link that connects to “solid ground,” and therefore an infinite chain is not acceptable to us as an answer.
One can look at the matter like this: take an infinite spiral of turtles converging inward.
For every given turtle, one can point and say: “It stands because it is attached to the turtle before it,” but the question that arises is: what is holding up the entire turtle structure?
Or: in fact, the turtle parable assumes that this chain never reaches solid ground, so one can also present
this turtle chain in the following way: it is an infinite chain, *parallel* to some ground. Each turtle stands by virtue of the link before it, but it is obvious that such an infinite chain would all fall to the ground, since in none of its links is it connected to solid ground.
That is not so in the matter of an infinite regress of causes: there is no “physical” necessity there that there be a first cause (at least not as clearly as in the turtle parable). The infinite chain of causes has nowhere “to fall” (if we ignore the problem of a concrete infinite).
I hope I explained myself well, and that I’m not talking nonsense.
In my opinion, if the Rabbi sees no difference between the two matters and can explain this well, then the overwhelming majority of people will not accept an infinite regress (just as they do not accept the matter of the turtles).
P.S. If the Rabbi publishes the booklets as a book (or even here on the site), I recommend writing at the beginning a recommendation that the reader read the book more than once. From my experience, I see that when I first read the booklets I thought: “After reading I’ll surely be convinced and I’ll have a tidy proof in hand as to why belief is more rational than atheism,” and then when reading, there are many new concepts that make you pause in trying to understand what is written, and not see the overall picture, whether you agree with it or not. And when you finish reading, there is a feeling: “I read it and wasn’t convinced, so apparently there is no good proof.” Only on the second reading do I see that I actually do agree with the things (or most of them).

Hello.
Maybe I can’t explain it any better, but in my opinion you explained it well. It is exactly the same thing as the turtles. What is the difference?
When you say that the whole chain of turtles has to fall somewhere, that is a double misunderstanding: 1. There is no such thing as “the whole chain of turtles,” since a concrete infinite is a fiction. 2. And even if there were such a thing, it does not fall anywhere because there is no place outside it (after all, it is infinite).

I’m speaking on the assumption that there is a concrete infinite (I don’t feel qualified to decide such mathematical matters), so only point 2 is relevant.
“There is no place outside it (after all, it is infinite)” — it isn’t clear to me why there is no place outside it. After all, the size of each turtle is, say, half a meter. Beneath it there is another turtle, but to its sides there is space. If we place the chain of turtles in a way that is parallel to the ground, at a height of ten meters above it, then at the side of the chain there is empty space through which it would fall.
Does the chain of turtles fill the entire universe? After all, the infinity is only in length, but the width is only the width of a turtle.

But that is a mistaken assumption.
The fall is downward, not sideways, and therefore there is nowhere to fall (think of a one-dimensional space. That is the correct analogy for a chain of explanations. There is no additional dimension in the space of explanations). You are taking the parable too literally.

All right.
What does the Rabbi think of the objection to infinite regress that it cannot be, because then we would never arrive at the present? (It would take infinite time for that).

What does the Rabbi think regarding the possibility of saying that the primeval matter of the world is eternal,
and that our entire universe (beginning with the Big Bang) was created as a result of the “quarrying” of quanta from primeval matter?

And therefore there is no need for an external Creator; rather, the primeval matter is the creator, and it is eternal together with the laws of nature?

Y,
That too is not a fully accurate way to present the difficulty (it seems to me that Duties of the Heart presents it this way in the Gate of Unity). It is not that we would not “arrive”; rather, such a chain has no beginning. There is no point from which to begin the process, and therefore one cannot speak of arrival or non-arrival.

Kobi,
I wrote in the third booklet what I think about that. Eternal laws also require explanation. The quantum theory that caused this formation requires explanation as well (why it is the way it is). I explained there that unlike the principle of causality, the principle of sufficient reason also applies to eternal things. Take it from there.

Assuming we say that primeval matter is not a sufficient reason for a creator, then can the formation of the world really be attributed to no creator?

Second, I didn’t understand what the law of conservation of being is that you wrote about.

Third, it is not at all certain that quantum theory requires explanation — after all, it is chaos. And perhaps a law of nature requires explanation, but chaos as embodied in quantum theory does not require explanation.
So why connect it to our case?

1. I did not understand the first question.
2. The law of conservation of being is a borrowed expression, and the meaning is that things do not come into existence ex nihilo even if all the charges cancel each other out. The creation of opposite pairs (opposite charges, opposite masses, and so on) preserves the charges (because the total mass is still 0, and so too the total charge), but it still contradicts common sense. Because something was created even though previously it was not there.
3. Quantum theory is not chaos. It is a well-defined theory that has predictions. This is not arbitrary chaotic formation and behavior with no laws at all.

Regarding the principle of sufficient reason:
1) What is the source of this principle?
2) What is its meaning? How can something have a reason that does not chronologically precede it?
3) The Rabbi also wrote: “Suppose we are walking in a forest and discover a large glass sphere with beautiful and complex colored drawings inside it. We wonder who made this sphere, and who brought it דווקא to this place. Would we accept the answer that it had always existed and had always lain here? And suppose a heavenly voice came forth from the heavens and told us that indeed this sphere had existed from eternity and had always lain here — would that be a sufficient explanation? We would still ask ourselves why there is specifically such a sphere here and not another, and why specifically here. That is, even though the sphere is eternal, we would still look for a reason for it.”
I really do not understand. How can one ask about an eternal sphere: “Why is it specifically in the forest and specifically like that?” Or: what possible answer could even be given to such a question? After all, no one brought it to the forest or created it! So there is no answer that could answer the question, and therefore the question is probably mistaken and the principle of sufficient reason collapses.

1) You must be a yeshiva bochur, because you’re looking for a source for a philosophical principle. Do you want a verse? Or a law given to Moses at Sinai?
Its source is reasoning. If you agree, then the principle exists; and if not — then not.
2) I explained it there. A reason, as distinct from a cause, is not an entity. There needs to be an explanation for why reality is this way rather than another. Usually the explanations will contain entities that are responsible for this reality, but the reason is not the entity. The entity is perhaps the cause.
3) Not true. There has to be a reason why this particular sphere is here, at least if it is a special sphere. For example, the laws of nature, even if they are eternal, their uniqueness requires a reason. Why are they specifically such and not otherwise? The reason can be that God wants them to be such, even if they have existed from eternity.

1) Indeed. But after a month of break between terms, no impression remains 🙂 . So by “source” I meant experience or an assumption of pure reason.
Can the Rabbi give a few everyday examples of “sufficient reasons” that are not causes?
3) I do not understand the meaning of “God chose that the eternal laws would be thus,” since He never chose that. At most, He chose not to change the eternal laws at some point in time. After all, they are eternal(!).
Maybe some everyday examples would help me understand.

How can there be examples from everyday life, if all the objects in our experience are not eternal and have a cause? This is an a priori intuition: if you see a unique system of laws, even if it is eternal, you still have to ask what the reason is that they are such and not otherwise. By the way, as David Hume showed, the principle of causality too is not a result of experience and observation or of everyday life, but an a priori intuition. So if you accept that, there is no reason not to accept the principle of sufficient reason.

With regard to causality, the logic is clear to me; it’s simple logic from experience, such that only because of philosophical skepticism do you need pure reason. As for sufficient reason, I have no idea what the intuition is based on, since there is not even one example of such a thing. And the concept of a “reason” for an eternal thing that was never created and never determined is not clear enough to me.
I’ve been looking for causes all my life; I have never looked for reasons.
Could there be any other answer to the reason for the world?
Is the only sufficient reason that exists in the world God in relation to the universe and its laws?
I really do not understand the comparison to good old causality.

Causality does not come out of experience in any way. It is an a priori intuition of ours. It has nothing to do with skepticism. The skeptic will say that since it does not come from experience, there is no such thing. But the fact that it does not come from experience is agreed upon even by one who is not a skeptic (except that he accepts causality by reason even without an empirical source).

I gave you the example of the laws of nature. If you do not agree with the intuition — then not. No wonder you have not looked for reasons, since the things in your experience do not require reasons, as I explained. There is no point repeating this again and again.

A child is born. I see that its cause is its mother and father — what a priori intuition do I need?

Another thing:
Why is this even called the “principle” of sufficient reason? The Rabbi said that the only thing that needs to fulfill this principle is the universe as a whole, and only if it is eternal, and the only sufficient reason that exists is God.
And the formulation is: “Everything that exists must have a sufficient reason that explains it.” What is “everything”? What is the sufficient reason for the table in front of me?
Also, seemingly the argument with sufficient reason is this: there is an eternal world. The world must have a reason. Let’s call the reason God. This looks like begging the question in the most extreme way (unlike causality, which applies to every single thing in the universe).

Hello Y.
You do not see any cause. You see correlations. Hume already pointed out that causes cannot be seen. I elaborated on this in my books Two Carts, Truth and Unstable, and The Science of Freedom, and I have no energy to go over this again and again.

The only thing that raises the question of sufficient reason is an eternal thing. But a reason can apply to other things too (where the cause is usually the reason, though not entirely. For example, when a person sets up a factory, that person is the cause of the factory, but the reason is the products and the value that come out of that factory).

In the argument as you presented it there is no begging the question. But I ask your forgiveness — this discussion has worn me down to the bone.