Q&A: The Shulchan Arukh as Formal Authority
The Shulchan Arukh as Formal Authority
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I would ask your honored Torah to clarify what the difference is, in your view, between accepting the Talmud as a formal authority and accepting the Shulchan Arukh. Does the Rabbi accept the authority of the Shulchan Arukh? What is the criterion for determining formal authority—for example, the Talmud yes, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) no… and so on?
This evening after the "Tzurba" lecture, a lively argument arose regarding the Rabbi's approach, and I would be glad for a reasoned answer.
With the blessing of Torah
Answer
Hello,
The difference is only practical.
The Shulchan Arukh was not really accepted as an absolute authority. Even its commentators disagree with it. Therefore the rulings of the authors of the Shulchan Arukh carry weight, but it is not absolute weight (because that itself is how it was accepted). Exactly like the authority of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), which was accepted but not in an absolute way. In contrast, the Talmud was accepted absolutely. The Rosh already noted this in his rulings on Sanhedrin, chapter 4, section 6; see there carefully.
Discussion on Answer
I explained this well in column 74. In brief, the Jewish people cannot take facts upon themselves. That is utter nonsense. If the Jewish people accept some fact upon themselves, does that make it true? Regarding facts there is no formal authority, and in any case the acceptance of the Jewish people has no significance. Therefore regarding facts, at most one can persuade, but not make claims by virtue of authority or the acceptance of some forum. Sagron has also already heard this from me in various arguments (if this is one of the two brothers who argued with me several times), and it's a shame he didn't understand when I explained it. Let him read and understand.
Hello and blessings.
I would appreciate some clarification. If, for example, the Jewish people accepted upon themselves certain norms of behavior—namely, that someone who does not believe in a certain fact would be considered a heretic and would not be counted for a minyan, etc.—then indeed, that person who does not believe in that fact because he is compelled by his intellect, etc., may merit the World to Come, but still the Jewish people should continue to regard him that way (because Jewish law established normative behavior toward someone who maintains a certain fact or the absence of a certain fact).
If I define the principles this way, would there in fact be a problem?
And if the Jewish people decide not to act according to logic, would that also be fine? I don't understand this strange question.
I didn't understand what's difficult here.
Suppose the formal authority determines that someone who does not present himself as believing in Divine providence because that is what was transmitted in the tradition, etc., or in the resurrection of the dead, or in Torah from Heaven—which are things that cannot be logically proven false—would be considered a heretic as above. What is the problem with that? Granted, the person himself will think as he thinks, but the formal authority said that someone who does not nullify himself before that tradition, etc., will be considered a heretic.
This isn't a matter of claims about present-day facts that are absurd. Is it not?
The formal authority can also determine that anyone who does not declare that 2+4=17 is a heretic. There is no problem with that.
Hello,
I sent the Rabbi's answer to the "maggid shiur" of Tzurba (Rabbi Daniel Sagron); below is his response:
"In practice, the Jewish people also accepted upon themselves not to dispute the principles of faith and not to dispute Maimonides based on reasoning" end quote.
I would ask the Rabbi to clarify his position.
Sorry for the extensive correspondence.
Best regards