You wrote: "A complex structure is rare, and as such it is obvious that it will not *appear* in all cases" — do you mean that its existence would not even be *possible* in all cases?
I do not understand why this is obvious. The fact that it is a rare outcome does not force the conclusion that it is not possible in all (or most) situations.
Here are two examples: it is very rare for a die to land on 6 a hundred times, and yet this is possible with any die. You don’t need "fine-tuning" here to *allow* it; you only need chance (or a loaded die) to bring it about in practice.
It is very rare that I would win the lottery ten times in a row, and yet it is possible in all types of lotteries in the world. You do not need the lotteries to be special for this to be possible.

Thanks in advance.

If the die lands on 6 a hundred times, that indeed could happen by chance, but there is no doubt that the far preferable interpretation is that it is not fair. Meaning: a hand was involved and it did not happen on its own. And that is exactly my point.

With all due respect to the Rabbi, I am pretty sure you did not understand me.
I am talking about fine-tuning. The fine-tuning argument claims that nearly all laws do not even *allow* the *existence* of complex structures (that is, if I moved to a universe with different laws, my body would fall apart in an instant. And the same would happen to any complex object moved there).
About this I am asking whether the Rabbi agrees that it is not trivial that nearly all laws would not allow the existence of complex things at all (regardless of their creation). It is not trivial that most universes would instantly break apart every complex structure inserted into them.
This is completely different from the *creation* of complex structures in practice, where it is obvious that nearly all initial states of affairs will not produce life (just as nearly all storms will not produce an airplane).
Indeed, if in practice the die landed on six then probably someone caused it. But one need not conclude from this that such a thing is not possible at all with any die whatsoever (for example, if an invisible demon directed it).
That is, you do not need a special die for an invisible demon to be able to control it. The conditions for possibility are not as rare as the conditions for actually producing the special result. (Let us set aside for a moment the possibility that the die is unfair, and suffice with an invisible demon moving it so that in every throw it lands on 6.)

If so, then I really do not understand you. I also do not agree with your claim about existence, but why is that interesting?

It is interesting because it is not clear to me what the fine-tuning argument is based on.
Let me explain more: it is obvious that not every collection of words we feed into software for building programs in the computer language C SHARP will yield a working program. It is obvious that nearly all combinations are meaningless and will not produce a program that does something, and therefore if there is such a program, that points to a programmer.
But there is a different claim, namely: nearly all human languages in the world do not make it possible to create programs with them (with a suitable interface, of course). For example: with the Syriac script you could never produce program code that does something meaningful.
The second claim is not at all trivial, and it is doubtful whether it is even true. Clearly not every combination will create a working program, but why assume that only in certain languages does the very *possibility* of creating a working program exist? It seems quite clear that by means of any language (Hebrew, Aramaic, and Syriac) one could create computer programs, even if they would differ from one another.
In practice, the fine-tuning argument makes the second claim, and it is not at all clear what it is based on.
Indeed, for life actually to arise is rare, but what is the basis for saying that only certain laws would allow complex forms of any kind whatsoever? In a universe with different constants, other complex products would be *possible* (even if they would not in fact arise, for just as the Hebrew language allows one to create a meaningful program, that does not mean one will in fact arise randomly) to create computer programs, even if they would be different from one another.
It is really strange to claim otherwise. Life could be carbon-based, nitrogen-based, or earth-based.
To emphasize: this is not the atheist argument claiming that complex things would actually arise under every system of laws, but only that the existence of such things may be possible (and therefore the estimate you wrote in the notebook about the fact that even in our universe, which is proven to allow life, very few such things arose — is not relevant).

With the blessing of faith / belief, and with tremendous anticipation from the great genius for a detailed explanation to a worm like me,
Yitzhak.

Despite my tremendous genius, I did not understand a thing.

So without examples, a simple question:
Why assume that just as, within a certain set of physical constants, the probability of the formation of something complex is tiny (like a storm over a heap of scrap), so too only a narrow range of physical constants would even allow the existence of complex things, whatever they may be.
I cannot understand how the second claim follows from the first. The fact that the probability of formation within the laws is small does not entail that outside those laws, only a small set of constants would allow the existence of complex things.
Do you understand?

Put differently: why not assume that every set of constants *allows* complex products of another kind, and within every given set the probability of actually producing a complex product is tiny.
Now I think I managed to explain it.

And to sharpen it further: why assume that we passed two hurdles on the way to life: 1. Constants suited to complex things. 2. Their actual creation.
One could argue that every constant would allow complex products, and the wonder of life boils down to the fact that life was created within one of those sets (something with an exceedingly small probability).

First, a logical note. Even if indeed one does not follow from the other, it could still be that both are true.
As for the matter itself, very few systems of laws would allow the formation of stable complex things. This is a simple intuition, and if you do not understand it then I have nothing to say. Just try drawing systems of laws and see. Once a system that allows this has arisen (like our system), it does not matter that within it the probability of formation is small. In practice it happened (perhaps because there were many attempts, or perhaps by chance). But this discussion is completely meaningless, and I suggest ending it.