That would make sense if it were a local command:
If Amalekites are still XYZ, then indeed they must be killed. But if they have already repented, then not.
But in the case at hand, it doesn’t matter whether they are good or bad—they must be killed. Even after 3,000 years.

Isn’t that so, Rabbi?

Nobody would kill them if they repented (as in the case of the Amalekite convert, and Haman the Agagite’s descendants who studied in Bnei Brak). Maimonides innovates that one even offers them peace in war.

Today too nobody would kill a Sabbath desecrator even with witnesses and prior warning; the question is what the command of the Torah is.
Obviously, according to Maimonides, if they did not make peace then everyone is killed.

Moses,
First, the discussion is about what is actually done in practice. The Nazis actually killed.
Second, even on the level of the command itself, I claim there is no halakhic obligation to kill an Amalekite who repented (who abandoned his Amalekite identity and Amalek itself). Where did you see otherwise?
And regarding Maimonides: in war, one kills whoever does not make peace with us. What is the problem with that? What I brought from him is proof that there is no mandatory obligation to kill every Amalekite, otherwise what would be the point of offering them peace?! In any case we would have to kill them all.

As far as I remember, there was someone who was punished for not killing the Amalekites’ sheep.
And it also seems to me that the sheep certainly had no less merit than a person who repented.
Once they did not make peace with us, it is a commandment to pursue every last infant, even if he repented, just as one pursues every last sheep, even though they have nothing to repent for.
That is the plain meaning of the verses, and the burden of proof is on the innovator.

Then it seems to you incorrectly. That is a foolish a fortiori argument. The value of the lives of sheep is not like the value of human life. The sheep are punished for their owners’ sin, like the property of an idolatrous city. And if the owner repents, his sheep too will be spared. [By the way, nobody was punished for not killing the sheep, but for not killing all the Amalekites including the sheep.]
I have a tradition from my father’s father’s house that the burden of proof is on the questioner, not on the one answering. Especially when reason supports the one answering. And whoever wishes to reject the reasoning is welcome to bring proof instead of pressing strained objections.

They kill all the little children. They did not sin and do not need repentance.

As I explained, this is not killing for a sin but removing evil and defending against it. The children who are educated into Amalekism will in the end grow up to be Amalek. And again, if there were an Amalek in a different culture, its law would be different.

Fine. It’s not clear to me how one can educate an infant to hatred.

Fortunate are you.

An infant (for the sake of discussion) = one week old.
P.S.: That implies cash on hand, not credit.

Sorry for going back to the basic discussion, but before discussing whom Jewish law says should be killed, there is another problem, namely—in my opinion, of course—why blood needs to be shed at all. I of course don’t mean to have compassion on murderers, but the very fact that there is a command to kill whoever opposes the Jewish people is a bit revolting.
And I do indeed understand that the definition of Amalek and its first trait is opposition to the Jewish people, not killing and destruction and terror, etc. (If I’m mistaken, I’d be happy if the Rabbi would point me to a source that contradicts me.)
And regarding the aspiration of the Jews, indeed—according to my understanding—it is to impose “good” on the world, and that good (which includes roughly the familiar moral values: compassion, charity, etc.) is opposed to the Nazi understanding (which, if I’m not mistaken, originates with Nietzsche), that good is the value of survival, and compassion and charity are inferior values of the weak (I’m oversimplifying completely for the sake of the question).
In short, according to my understanding we are like the Nazis, but the opposite. And since I cannot accept that, I ask: what is the difference?
Thank you.

“A Noahide is executed by one judge and one witness, without prior warning” (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 57b, and so too in Maimonides, Laws of Kings and Wars 10:14), not only Amalek. And according to some medieval authorities (Rishonim), even if he was inadvertent, meaning not a “conscious offender.”
(You can look at more details here https://www.yeshiva.org.il/wiki/index.php?title=%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%93%D7%99%D7%94_%D7%AA%D7%9C%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%AA:%D7%91%D7%9F_%D7%A0%D7%97)

There is no commandment to destroy Amalek; there is a commandment to compel Amalek to accept the seven Noahide commandments. With other nations there is no commandment to compel them to accept the seven Noahide commandments, and our attitude toward them is utilitarian—we neither lower them into a pit nor raise them out.

In short: a commandment of jihad or crusade for the acceptance of the seven Noahide commandments exists only against Amalek. Against the other nations there is no such commandment, except only in the Land of Israel by rabbinic enactment (“and so Moses our teacher commanded from the mouth of the Almighty, to compel all the inhabitants of the world to accept all the commandments given to Noah, and anyone who does not accept them is to be killed” — see Sefer HaMafteach and also the Radbaz).

Moses, a one-week-old infant is not educated toward anything, but if he will be educated when he grows a bit, then one can understand that already now his fate is death. As stated, this is not punishment. We’re repeating ourselves.

David, I have never heard that the burden of proof is on the one resolving things rather than on the one objecting. You assume and then object. Don’t assume and don’t object. And as for your second question—I answered it. That comparison is nonsense.

Avi,
Then those medieval authorities have no share with me. There is no punishment for the inadvertent. Beyond that, a Noahide in their time was a wild man who was not bound by moral norms (as in Meiri’s reasoning—that he was not constrained by the norms of civilized nations).

Rabbi, your response could be interpreted in several ways:
1. On the basis of the moral claim above, the Rabbi assumes that those medieval authorities erred in understanding the words of the Sages, and that is the dispute.
2. According to the approach of those medieval authorities (whose correctness should be clarified on the merits), the Rabbi disagrees with the Sages in interpreting the Torah.
3. According to their approach, the Rabbi thinks there is a halakhic-moral conflict here that is an internal Torah conflict, and the Rabbi sides with the moral side.
4. According to their approach, “Even if the Holy One Himself were to tell me, I would not obey Him,” along the lines of the Rabbi’s response to the plain reading of the Sages regarding the prohibition of reading heretical books (“That is not the God to whom I am committed”).
Which is correct?

Since the Rabbi already mentioned Meiri (whose approach, as is known, the Rabbi studied deeply in the famous article), I would like to ask a difficulty on him:
Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 15b:
“If one found an abandoned infant, if the majority are idol worshipers—he is an idol worshiper; if the majority are Israelites—he is an Israelite; if it is half and half—he is an Israelite… If the majority are Israelites—he is an Israelite. For what legal purpose? Rav Pappa said: to return his lost object to him.”
According to Meiri, what difference does it make who abandoned the infant, and why is his status doubtful? After all, the question whether to return his lost object does not depend on the identity of his parents (which is doubtful), but on his behavior (which is visible before us), since to a gentile bound by the ways of religion one returns lost property, as Meiri wrote; while on the other hand, to a Jew who worships idolatry or publicly desecrates the Sabbath one does not return it.
Does it follow from this that Meiri’s innovation applies only when gentiles in general became “enlightened,” and it does not depend on the behavior of each and every individual? Or is there another answer?

Choose whichever you want. If you bring me one of them, I can discuss what he meant and where I disagree with him.
Indeed, Meiri’s words are based on a change in the behavior of the average gentile, not of each individual person. That is what changed, because righteous gentiles always existed. There is a presumption that arises from the behavior of the average gentile, and it determines the laws.
Beyond that, who says the gentile who was found is indeed behaving properly? Perhaps if he behaves properly, then indeed the Talmudic passage was not speaking about him.

This is speaking about many medieval authorities, so I can quote them, but that will make this very long, and I also do not know how much benefit there would be from that since most of them give almost no detail. In any case, what I know is: Rashi on Makkot 9a, s.v. “Therefore” (there are other similar sources in Rashi), the Ritva there, Sefer HaChinukh on commandment 26, and Meiri on Makkot 8b.
Besides that, Maimonides ruled like Rava in the passage, that even one who says “it is permitted” is liable because he is close to intentional, and it is explained in the medieval authorities on Makkot 7b [Tosafot, Nachmanides, and Ritva] that this is not some reasoning specific to murder or to Noahide prohibitions, which are more rational/moral.
And more than that, even the leading authorities who disagree (Nachmanides on Makkot 9a and Maimonides in Laws of Kings 10:1) admit that a Noahide who killed a Jew is executed even if inadvertent (Nachmanides there, and Maimonides in Laws of Murderer 5:4, who said this even about a resident alien), and only the Ramah on Sanhedrin 57a disagrees even in such a case.
In addition, in the Talmud in Sanhedrin 54a there is a strong implication like Rashi and those with him, and Nachmanides is forced there.

Regarding Meiri, it is interesting that the status of the individual whose behavior is known is determined by the general presumption when left unspecified, especially since Meiri’s innovation is apparently built on the idea that in the case of an uncivilized gentile the very basis of the law is absent, so it is hard to see where he invented this law that the individual depends on the collective, and why once even a civilized gentile would not have lost property returned to him.
That is what I was referring to—apparently it is difficult to say that the Talmudic passage speaks of a case where the infant is not behaving properly, because if so then even as a Jew it would be forbidden to return his lost object, as explained in Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat sec. 266 (based on Avodah Zarah 26a), that idol worshipers and public Sabbath desecrators etc. are like gentiles in that one may not return their lost property. But in the Talmudic passage it says that if he were Jewish they would return it to him. Perhaps one could find a case where he is both not bound by the ways of religion and also not considered a heretic/apostate, but that sounds very forced.

Y,
That changes nothing. The attitude toward a gentile who does not keep the seven Noahide commandments is utilitarian. If there is a reason, we kill them, and if not, not. That is the whole point. It does not mean that we have an interest in killing gentiles, but neither do we have any special interest in keeping them alive. In the case of Amalek there is an interest in compelling them to keep the seven Noahide commandments, but not beyond that.

If we take as an example the Rashi in Makkot that you mentioned, he brings proof from the fact that a gentile does not need prior warning. But then it can be explained that his intention is not someone inadvertent, but someone intentional who was not warned (who halakhically has the status of inadvertent, unless he is a scholar who does not need warning). And in general I would say that if we accept Meiri’s words, then all these laws were stated about the ancient gentiles, whose lives had no value. The other medieval authorities think this is the law for gentiles in general down to our own day. And that means that according to them a gentile is like an animal. That I do not accept, at least not regarding today’s gentiles.

And Maimonides’ view is that this is speaking of inadvertence in law and not in reality (he did not know that murder is forbidden, but he understood that this was murder). And in the case of a murderer he is executed even when he erred in law, because a person is always forewarned. And one can analyze at great length the mention here of the rule that a person is always forewarned—why this rule is applied to murder unlike with Jews. It seems his intention is that this is a kind of intentional act.
In Laws of Kings 10:1:
“A Noahide who was inadvertent regarding one of his commandments is exempt from everything, except for a murderer by inadvertence: if the blood-avenger killed him, he is not executed on his account, and he has no city of refuge, but their courts do not execute him. In what case is this said? When he was inadvertent with regard to one of the commandments and transgressed without intent, for example, if he had relations with another man’s wife and thought she was his own wife or an unmarried woman. But if he knew she was another man’s wife and did not know that she was forbidden to him, rather it arose in his mind that this matter was permitted to him, and likewise if he killed and did not know that it was forbidden to kill, he is close to intentional and is executed; and this is not considered inadvertence for them, because he should have learned and did not learn.”

And in Laws of Murderer 5:4:
“A resident alien who killed a Jew by inadvertence, even though he is inadvertent, is executed, for a person is always forewarned. Likewise, a resident alien who killed a resident alien because it arose in his mind that it was permitted to kill him, he is close to intentional and is executed for it, since he intended to kill him. But a gentile who killed a gentile by inadvertence is not taken in by the cities of refuge, as it is said: ‘for the children of Israel.’”

And regarding Meiri, this is not necessarily a person whose behavior is known, but someone whose status is not clear. His status is determined according to the presumption.

Y.D.,
The objection in principle was not mainly to your words but to our Rabbi. In any case I did not understand your intention—are you claiming that even if the gentile sinned, we are not obligated to kill him but merely have permission? On the face of it that is incorrect, since we are commanded in this under the rule “and you shall remove the evil from your midst,” like anyone who did an act that incurs death (this applies both to humans and to animals). And Maimonides’ wording is “he shall be killed.” If that is not the point of dispute, then perhaps your words are correct on the theoretical level; but the fact that on the practical level we are commanded to kill every gentile (it seems to me very hard to find a gentile who, since reaching maturity [which according to the famous Hatam Sofer is even before bar mitzvah, each according to his sharpness], has not stolen anything whatsoever [they are liable even for less than a perutah]) may still create a difficulty.

Rabbi,
Your reading of Rashi is not so plausible textually in my humble opinion (why does Rashi write “inadvertent” rather than simply quoting the Talmud in Sanhedrin?), especially when one combines this with Rashi in Sanhedrin 54a s.v. “his law” (there too this follows from the implication of the passage) and in Sanhedrin 57a s.v. “similar to it” (see Yad Ramah, who explained his words). Especially since at this stage in the Talmudic passage Rashi’s explanation is apparently necessary, as Ritva writes there. And I did not find anyone among the medieval or later authorities who interprets Rashi not according to his plain meaning.

I understand that the Rabbi disagrees with the medieval authorities in interpreting the words of the Sages and goes in the path of Meiri (whose view is of course a tremendous and astounding innovation [we are talking about Torah-level laws!], apparently without support in the Talmud). But there is a principled question here that is more interesting to me: to what extent, and why, does the Rabbi think it is reasonable to hold a certain halakhic view against the formal halakhic plain meaning merely on the basis of moral intuitions? Especially since our own eyes see that in many places the plain meaning of Jewish law does not fit western moral intuitions?

Does the Rabbi want to interpret the Mishnah of the found infant as speaking of a person whose behavior is unknown to us? Of course that is very forced in the plain wording of the Mishnah. And one can further analyze that in the Talmud it is explained that in a fifty-fifty case one does not return his lost object, and if the whole reason is uncertainty about his behavior, then apparently one should discuss whether he could recover the lost object by a definite claim. (Apparently the answers to the famous difficulty of the Pnei Yehoshua [that in every case of lost property one could recover it by a definite claim even without giving identifying marks] do not apply here, where it is known that he is the loser and the question is whether halakhically he has such a right.)

This is not western morality but Jewish morality (and in general, there is no such thing as western morality or Jewish morality. There is morality): there is no punishment without guilt and without malicious intent. I have no doubt that when a religious court sits and judges the gentile, and the question of putting him to death is on the table, they would not do it. Such arguments can arise in the study hall, where these questions are not being dealt with in practice and people toss around possibilities this way and that. Like Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon in the first chapter of Makkot (if we had been in the Sanhedrin, no person would ever have been put to death).
I am interpreting it as applying to every infant. Except that when his behavior is known, perhaps the law is different. That is certainly no worse than a resident alien, to whom according to some opinions one does return lost property.

Fine, my dispute with the Rabbi regarding morality is much broader and it’s impossible to get into it here…
(I hold the position [for what seem to me purely rational reasons] that “morality” is not something that exists at all whatsoever. What is it? The Rabbi is of course well aware of the “naturalistic fallacy,” so we agree that it is not connected to material reality. It is a “system of norms.” What does that mean? In what sense does it exist? How can one know what is moral and what is not? And how are our feelings about morality an indication of anything in the matter, given that apart from them we have no access to it at all? I know the brief things the Rabbi usually writes on the subject, and unfortunately I have not found in them an answer to these foundational questions. If there is a specific place where the Rabbi writes about this more thoroughly, I would be happy for a reference.] To the best of my knowledge it has no definition that reflects the actual use of the word [if the Rabbi knows of a sharp definition of the concept I would be happy for a reference; unfortunately I have never had the privilege of encountering one. A circular definition like “what ought to be done” will of course not help me, since the concept “ought” and its parallels suffer from the very same problem]. What does exist is a collection of feelings, and talk in these areas is merely the expression of feelings, or alternatively the analysis of a theoretical system of rules whose rules are legislated by feeling.)
I read the Rabbi’s post on Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon. Here I disagree also on the practical level. I think most Jewish judges would do it without hesitation (perhaps with a stab in the heart), if their hands were not tied. All the more so in a case with close plotting witnesses.
I did not understand: are the laws of the Mishnah correct only in a case of an infant whose behavior is unknown? In plain English that is called an ukimta, and in our case it is forced. It is worse, because a resident alien applies only when the Jubilee is practiced, according to Maimonides as is well known, and also requires acceptance of the commandments before three judges; and it is hard to say that in the Mishnah these conditions were not met.

I forgot only the main point: none of this changes anything. Even if morality is “real” and “objective,” I still want to ask: what is the justification for making halakhic determinations on the basis of moral claims, given that the Rabbi declares at every opportunity that Jewish law does not necessarily reflect moral values? And I would note that specifically here, the Rabbi’s moral claim is extremely simple, so it certainly was obvious to our great medieval authorities—the necessary conclusion is that there is a principled disagreement here.

Regarding the argument about morality, I have nothing to add beyond what you will see in the fourth notebook and in my book True and Unstable. Defining the concept of morality has no importance whatsoever and is unnecessary, exactly like the definition of any fundamental concept. Can you define the concept “exists”? If not, do you give up on existence and become an idealist? (Actually, what exactly are you giving up on?) Can you define the concept of quality (see Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance)? Definitions are required for concepts that are not self-evident, and then one tries to clarify them through concepts that are familiar. Concepts that each of us encounters intimately do not need definitions. On the contrary, they serve us in defining other concepts. And of course there will always be a foundational set of concepts that will be used to define other concepts, while they themselves we do not define. If you give those up, you have given up all your concepts (for all of them are defined by means of those).

I already explained that the rule that one does not punish the inadvertent is a halakhic rule and not only a moral one.

Well, I think we’ve exhausted this.

The comparison is fundamentally absurd. There is no connection at all between the examples—the Rabbi is speaking about words that we use to describe reality, and therefore there it is justified to say that we encounter them. That is not the case with morality, which is entirely an illusory system with no connection to reality. The only thing we encounter is feelings. (That, by the way, is of course the reason there are complex moral conflicts—simply because the discussion is completely undefined.)
There is no such halakhic rule, since that goes against all the medieval authorities (and there are further examples such as conspiring witnesses).
Thank you.

Y,
As far as I know, this is not about a gentile waiting in a religious court for his sentence. What is at issue here is Judaism before the court of reason (or morality, as Rabbi Michi would formulate it) and before public opinion, which claims that the Torah is anti-humanistic (Da’at Emet, Yossi Gurvitz, and others). Such debates are not new—the Talmud already tells us about an examination carried out on behalf of the Roman government and about such controversies—but since times have changed, questions are arising that did not arise in the past. These questions are exposed to the public, as can be seen from the way they keep infiltrating this site, and therefore they require answers.

You can claim that you merely obey without exercising judgment, but as a Talmudic scholar you know very well that you do exercise judgment (if only with regard to whether a line of reasoning is good or not), and therefore indirectly you admit that you are a rational creature acting on the basis of reason, and so you will not be able to evade the questions that arise (even if for now we do not prove to you that the Torah recognizes reason).

Since these are principled questions, I do not see why the position I suggest is any worse than others, and therefore I will not refrain from presenting it here. And here is the gist of it:
A gentile who does not accept the seven Noahide commandments is guilty, but that guilt alone does not justify actively punishing him with our own hands, and therefore we end up with the law that we neither lower nor raise him. The gentile is guilty for not accepting the seven Noahide commandments upon himself (and here we will avoid the question whether that is even possible, as you raised earlier), but this guilt is not sufficient for putting him to death. In order to kill him we need an additional factor: for example, Amalekite identity, or an act he committed, or the shame caused to a Jew because of him. If such factors exist, we kill him; if not, we do not. In short, our attitude toward him is utilitarian: if there is a reason to kill him, we kill him, and if not, not.

If that gentile accepts the seven Noahide commandments upon himself, we are commanded to keep him alive, and all those reasons that previously made his killing permissible are nullified, including Amalekite identity. Amalekite identity is not enough to kill a gentile; it is also required that he not accept the seven Noahide commandments. In a similar way, the Or Sameach writes regarding a gentile woman who was raped that if she has the status of a resident alien, they do not kill her, because the obligation to keep her alive overrides the shame of the Jew. Our attitude toward her, then, is purposeful—her very existence is required.

And what about an Amalekite child? Here the answer is that it is impossible to kill him, because it is still not clear that he rejected the seven Noahide commandments. Imagine a minor convert who grew up without knowing that he was a convert, and they warned him that he desecrated the Sabbath—could a religious court judge him before informing him that he is a minor convert and asking him whether he prefers to be a gentile or a Jew? Even if we assume that in the case where he chooses to be a Jew one could judge him retroactively (something that is not clear to me at all), if he chooses to be a gentile it is obvious that there is nothing to judge him for, since he did not sin. So too in our case: if the Amalekite child grows up and chooses to accept the seven Noahide commandments, how could it be possible to kill him? The fact that he has an Amalekite label is not sufficient to kill him; it is also necessary that Amalekite law apply to him, meaning that he chooses not to accept the seven Noahide commandments. But a child lacks the capacity to reject them, so how can Amalekite law apply to him?

This could be extended, but it seems to me that the points are clear.

Y.D.,
First of all I will clarify that my joining this discussion was about that gentile. I saw a claim by the Rabbi in his response that does not accord with Jewish law (in the part about prior warning—for everyone; in the part about the inadvertent—for most medieval authorities), and I wanted to point that out. Therefore my part in that discussion came to an end following the Rabbi’s feeling that the discussion had been exhausted. If you want to have a discussion with me on the subject—with pleasure, but the question is not clear enough to me. I would be happy if you could define it, and then I can participate in the discussion. I only note that I do not have broad enough halakhic knowledge to make sweeping statements like the ones you are making (sometimes I have enough knowledge to reject them). In the meantime I will only comment on some of the things that grate on my ears:
The discussion that opens the post is not about “reason.” It was about calming the questioner’s unease (which is not something I belittle, but it should be distinguished from an analytical discussion sharply defined).
Who told you that I obey? You are indeed correct in your assumption, but my obedience is not derived from “reason.” No action is derived from reason; reason is at most a tool that a person uses to realize his desires (which have no connection to reason).
“Judgment” regarding a Talmudic-halakhic line of reasoning can be made only by means of “Talmudic intuition” that develops through familiarity with the world of the Talmud and Jewish law. Somewhat similar to an experienced chess player who sometimes plays on the basis of intuition rather than explicit calculation. “External” lines of reasoning whose source is external, such as western morality and the like, are irrelevant. If it were proven (or alternatively, if a scholar I trust told me) that there is full correspondence between the moral feelings of western people and Jewish law, then there would be something to discuss; but there is no such proof, and from my impression this is not true at all. Alternatively, one can discuss various issues, such as the reasons for the commandment of wiping out Amalek, whether there is here a deviation from God’s attributes, etc. But the main thing is to define the discussion.
Regarding your question about the minor convert—I currently do not see any necessity why not. Please present a halakhic argument. On the face of it, this obviously depends on the nature of the erasure, which is not a simple conceptual Talmudic topic, and the plain sense is that until he protests he is Jewish.
On what basis are you doubtful that they would not judge him retroactively?
Regarding Amalek: apparently your presentation of the law is very inaccurate. On the face of it, the call for peace is made to a “city” and not to each and every individual, as is the language of the verse. And this is apparently proven by the incident of Amalek in the book of Samuel, where as is known Saul was commanded to kill even the children. All this terminology of an “Amalekite label” and “Amalekite law”—its source is unclear to me. There is simply a condition in the commandment of calling the city to peace.
Likewise, I would add that your statement in the first response, “There is no commandment to destroy Amalek; there is a commandment to compel Amalek to accept the seven Noahide commandments,” is completely distorted. The call for peace is a condition in the commandment of eradication, and on the face of it there is no fulfillment of a commandment in it at all. Likewise I will quote the language of Maimonides [which is the halakhic source for the call to peace], which throughout this discussion has been presented in a very distorted way:
Maimonides, Laws of Kings chapter 6, law 1:
“One does not wage war against any person in the world until one first calls to him for peace, whether it is an optional war or a commanded war, as it is said: ‘When you approach a city to fight against it, call out to it for peace.’ If they make peace and accept upon themselves the seven commandments with which the descendants of Noah were commanded, not one soul among them is killed, and they become tributaries, as it is said: ‘they shall become tributary to you and serve you.’ If they accepted the tribute but did not accept servitude, or if they accepted servitude but did not accept tribute, one does not listen to them until they accept both. And the servitude they must accept is that they shall be debased and lowly beneath us, and they shall not raise their heads in Israel, but shall be subjugated under our hand; and they shall not be appointed over Israel in any matter in the world. And the tribute they must accept is that they be prepared for the king’s labor with their bodies and their money, such as building the walls, strengthening the fortresses, building the king’s palace, and the like, as it is said: ‘And this is the account of the levy which King Solomon raised to build the House of the Lord, and his own house, and the Millo, and the wall of Jerusalem, and all the store-cities that Solomon had. All the people who remained of the Amorites—and Solomon raised them as a labor levy unto this day. But of the children of Israel Solomon made no slaves, for they were the men of war, and his servants, and his officers, and his captains, and commanders of his chariots and horsemen.’”
As you can see, the law in its source is much less “humanistic and moral” than simply coercing acceptance of the commandments.
As an aside, I would note that unfortunately I have not been blessed with even a fraction of Rabbi Michi’s talent for replying quickly and briefly, and therefore this may be a bit long (and my amount of time is also limited)…

Correction: that is also *not* true at all.

Y,
In the end you are not disputing my claims. You admit that the guilt of the Amalekites is not that they are Amalekites, but that they do not accept the seven Noahide commandments. An Amalekite who accepts the seven Noahide commandments becomes a resident alien, and the obligation to keep him alive overrides the law of eradicating Amalek.
As for the law of one who kills inadvertently, it seems to me that Rabbi Michi explained the matter well (it is clear that even according to Rashi one who kills under compulsion is not executed).
As for the minor convert who grows up, it seems to me that I did mention that he does not know that he is a minor convert. Obviously, if he knows and did not protest, they judge him as a Jew.
As for the child, Maimonides presents a different approach regarding the idolatrous city, which he explains in the Guide for the Perplexed in light of the logic of a person’s obligation with respect to his own body, a category in which he includes children as well (an argument parallel to today’s liberal argument of a woman’s right over her own body). One can argue over this, but it seems to me that the quotation you brought does not really refute my claim. The fact that in a case of war we call for peace in a general way does not negate that in the individual case we are required to ask whether the Amalekite before us accepted the seven Noahide commandments or not; and in the case of a small child that question cannot be clarified until he grows up.

I am not disputing your claims?? It is not clear to me what I did in the previous response except dispute you, and regarding what I did not respond to, that is because I asked you for the question under discussion, which you did not bother to provide. By the way, it is clear that the basis of their liability is not non-acceptance of the commandments but the very fact of being Amalekites. Will you also say that non-acceptance of servitude is part of the basis of their liability?! By the way, see the Sifrei, which writes that if only some of them agree to peace, they kill them all—note that well.
Rabbi Michi’s interpretation of Rashi is completely untenable and contradicted by all the medieval and later authorities, as I responded to him earlier (gently, out of respect). Regarding the minor convert, you already mentioned that earlier.
The truth is that regarding an individual I do not have the necessary halakhic knowledge, nor the time to study the passage. On the face of it, your words are an innovation without a clear source, and the burden of proof is on you, especially in light of the Sifrei I mentioned, where we found a case in which an individual wants to make peace and nevertheless they kill him.
Unfortunately I see that this discussion is taking too large a part of my time, and since I do not expect it to make a very significant contribution to either of us, because of the polarization in approaches as well as a certain lack of communication, I fear I will have to withdraw. My apologies. All the best.