Q&A: The Chief Rabbinate Retracted Its Proposal to Allocate Leavened-Food Areas in Hospitals on Passover – Haaretz – 28/1/19
The Chief Rabbinate Retracted Its Proposal to Allocate Leavened-Food Areas in Hospitals on Passover – Haaretz – 28/1/19
Question
Hello Michi,
I’d be glad to hear your opinion about the Rabbinate’s position, and whether there really is any impediment to visiting a hospital if others have leavened food in their possession, even if a certain room or hall in the hospital were designated as the only place where leavened food could be consumed during Passover. [This is aside from the Chief Rabbinate’s estimate that this would cause 70% of the Jewish population to refrain from coming to the hospital under such circumstances, which in my opinion is completely detached from reality].
I find it hard to believe that observant families, for example, avoid going during Passover to a hospital in New York, where as is well known there are many Jews, only a minority of whom are observant and careful about kashrut, among the patients, staff, and visitors; so it is hard to base the assumption on the idea that all the leavened food found in the hospital is owned and possessed by non-Jews.
With appreciation,
Answer
Hello,
My opinion is that this is utter nonsense. He himself blurs, and not by accident, the distinction between the substantive argument (that this is a prohibition) and the practical argument (that the public will refrain from coming, even if that is a halakhic mistake because there is no prohibition).
Substantively, of course, there is not the slightest trace of a prohibition here according to all halakhic views, without dispute. The prohibition of “it shall not be seen” applies to your domain, meaning within a domain that is yours. There is absolutely no prohibition against being in a place where others possess leavened food, even if they are Jews, and certainly if they are non-Jews. And when it is a public place, there is no problem at all. [One could argue that if the place is public then its owner is the public, and if there is leavened food there then the owner violates the prohibition of “it shall not be seen,” but that too is incorrect. If someone brings his own leavened food into my house, I do not violate any prohibition, as stated explicitly in the Talmud and by all the halakhic decisors, unless I am defined as a guardian of the leavened food—the topic of “here it is before you.”]
Therefore, on the substantive plane, at most one could raise the argument that perhaps people may come to eat the leavened food. This is a rabbinic decree (which is why they instituted a search for leavened food and did not suffice with nullification). But I have never heard in my life that someone was forbidden to be in a place where someone else possesses leavened food because of that enactment. It was enacted regarding nullified leavened food found in my own domain.
As for the assessment of the actual situation, in my view it is baseless. My estimate is that an overwhelming majority of the public would not refrain from coming, either because they know or because they do not know. But beyond that, if this is indeed a mistake, and in fact he too admits that there is really no prohibition, then there is a simple solution: the Rabbinate should announce and inform the entire public that there is no prohibition, and then people will not refrain from coming, and redemption will have come to Zion.
This is the nonsense of a weak person who was pressured by parties interested in coercion (he himself says they approached him about it), and he is not standing up to the pressure. That is probably why he is retracting his agreement to the arrangement that had been reached (which is also not halakhically necessary, but perhaps is a reasonable compromise for preserving the public atmosphere).
You may publish these remarks in my name anywhere you see fit.
Goodbye,
Discussion on Answer
That is indeed how it appears from Rashi, but no one rules that way in practice.
The question was about the legal opinion given by the Rabbinate, not about what the state ought to do.
For the sake of discussion, if the Jewish law followed Rashi, what do you think the state should do?
By the way, you wrote above regarding Rashi’s opinion that “no one rules that way in practice.” I tried to look into the issue and saw that it’s not so clear-cut; see, for example, at this link:
https://www.etzion.org.il/he/%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%A5-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D
Do you have clear proof that the Jewish law does not follow Rashi?
Beyond what the halakhic decisors say, that is also the accepted practice in the world. Even the Shulchan Arukh speaks about a deposit entrusted to him even though he is not liable for it. That is not like leavened food that is in the possession of others who are walking around within my own domain. I have never in my life heard of anyone who forbids being in a house where someone else is walking around with leavened food. See, for example, here at the end:
https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/37300
The question regarding the state is not well defined. The state as it exists today does not act according to Jewish law. The state would have to do many other things differently from what it does.
The prohibition is not on the person present in a house that contains leavened food, but on the homeowner, that he should not bring leavened food into his house, even if that leavened food belongs to another Jew.
As for the state, why is the question not well defined? Even if the state does not in practice conduct itself according to Jewish law, one can still discuss whether it ought to do so. And besides, it does conduct itself according to Jewish law in some matters, for example in Sabbath observance and kashrut in public institutions.
But in hospitals I am not the homeowner. Beyond that, we are talking about a deposit (even if he has no liability for it). It was brought in with his permission, with his consent, and knowingly. And even there, only the Vilna Gaon says it is forbidden in accordance with Rashi.
The question is not well defined because if the state acts according to Jewish law, then it will implement Jewish law. I didn’t understand the question. Are you asking whether it is appropriate that the state, even if it acts according to Jewish law, should coerce secular people to observe Jewish law? Here this is not coercion but consideration for religious people (assuming there is a prohibition on entering a hospital).
In a hospital, the public is the homeowner. The question is whether the public should post at the entrance to the hospital (or any other public institution) that no leavened food may be brought in on Passover (and that is enough to make its view known that the leavened food was not brought in with its consent).
The question is whether there is any value at all in the state conducting itself according to Jewish law. In addition, if you were the Chief Rabbi (in the state’s current situation) and you had the power to decide whether to put up a sign at the entrance to the hospital saying that it is forbidden to bring leavened food into the hospital on Passover, would you put up such a sign or not?
Since the Jewish law does not follow Rashi, I see no reason for it. If the Jewish law did follow him, then yes.
Regarding this matter, a new article was published today:
The High Court of Justice: Hospitals will not prohibit bringing in leavened food on Passover
The Supreme Court ruled today by majority opinion that hospitals in Israel have no authority to prohibit bringing in leavened food on Passover or to search the food and utensils of people entering hospitals, as had been the practice until now.
https://www.kikar.co.il/357856.html
The judge in the minority opinion was the religious judge Neal Hendel.
I saw the ruling. Another case where the one who determined the outcome was whoever assigned the judges to the panel. And of course another case in which an “objective” decision was reached that had nothing to do with the judges’ worldview and values.
What do you think the ruling should be?
I think they should have arrived at an arrangement in which everyone could eat whatever they want. The consideration of “it shall not be seen” is not relevant, as stated.
It is interesting to note that there are views in Jewish law according to which a person violates the prohibition of “it shall not be seen” even with respect to leavened food that is not his own (but is owned by a Jew, which everyone is commanded to eliminate). Details appear in another responsum:
In addition, it seems to me that there is room for the reasoning that just as the state is careful about Sabbath observance and kashrut in its institutions, perhaps it should also be careful about the prohibition of “it shall not be seen” in its institutions. After all, the state defines itself as Jewish and democratic, and sometimes the Jewish aspect overrides the democratic aspect. Likewise, the prohibition “No leavened food of yours shall be seen, and no sourdough of yours shall be seen, within all your borders” also addresses the borders of the public. Therefore, at least in public areas there is room to enforce a prohibition on bringing in leavened food (owned by a Jew), even though this infringes on individual freedom, because the harm to the individual is quite small relative to the value on the other side.