Q&A: Tractate Sanhedrin
Tractate Sanhedrin
Question
Hello, honorable Rabbi!
I am studying tractate Sanhedrin, and I wanted to ask the Rabbi a few questions about the passage on page 80b, “Rav Yehezkel taught it to Rami his son.”
My question is: according to the son’s version, “those liable to stoning among those liable to burning,” does it come out that the Sages hold that the ruling is liability to burning because they are the majority, and not because it is the lighter death? {As opposed to the father’s version, according to which it comes out that the dispute is only about which death is lighter, but both sides hold that one is liable only according to the lighter death.} .
2. Tosafot on the words “those liable to stoning among those liable to burning” ask why Rabbi Shimon does not follow the rule of “following the majority.” I did not understand the answer of Tosafot. I would be very glad if the Rabbi could help me.
Also, I did not understand why, according to the second explanation in Tosafot, this case has the status of “fixed, and therefore considered like half-and-half.”
I would be happy to receive an explanation of this rule.
With blessings and appreciation, Noam
Answer
- According to our version, they do follow the majority, and what they wrote is only according to the view of Rabbi Shimon.
- They argue that one does not follow the majority in order to obligate someone who is not definitely liable. What we do find is that in capital cases we follow the majority only where the person is certainly liable (that is, he certainly killed), and the only question is what exactly he is liable for (perhaps he killed a mortally ill person, and the like).
- The second explanation is that in this case we are dealing with something fixed, since the people are found in a mixture of those liable to burning among those liable to stoning, and with anything located in its place within the mixture, we do not follow the majority. The rule of following the majority applies when something separated from the majority. For example, a piece of meat found lying in the street, where most shops are kosher and a minority sell non-kosher meat. The piece separated from the shop in which it was sold, and therefore we follow the majority and permit it. But if I enter a shop and take a piece of meat from it, except that I do not know the nature of that shop, and here too most shops are kosher—in that situation the rule is fixed, and we do not follow the majority, because there was no separation of the doubtful piece from its place.
- As for explaining the rule of fixed cases, I am not worthy. See the lengthy discussion in Sha'arei Yosher, Gate 3.
Discussion on Answer
Although it is not explicit how the Rabbi understood the view of the Sages, that indeed is how the plain meaning of the Talmudic text sounds.
Thank you very much. So changing the version according to the son changes the explanation of the Rabbis {as opposed to the father’s version}, and according to the father’s version the Sages’ explanation is the lighter death, whereas according to the son’s version the reasoning is majority. According to this, it comes out that in a case where I have a majority of those liable to stoning, the Sages would hold that the ruling is that all of them receive stoning, even though according to their view this is the more severe death. Did I understand correctly?