I didn’t understand exactly what the grounding in your intuition is. That you feel/experience that you really exist in reality, for example?

Indeed, I assumed the Rabbi would make that claim, and therefore I wanted to attack it from a slightly different angle. I agree with you that you would indeed have reason to believe the senses in a case where you have no decisive reason either way — it “feels” right to me that what I experience is more likely true than not. But there is a very serious reason not to believe the senses:
After all, it is more likely that there is some flaw and error in my senses than to assume that my senses are correct. There are infinitely many (so to speak) possibilities in which the senses are incorrect. And for them to be correct there are far fewer possibilities. If so, it seems more reasonable to me to assume that they are not correct.
In other words, here there is already a significant conceptual basis against believing the experience of the truth of the senses and the cognitive system, etc.
I would be happy for a response to this very fundamental question.

Probability is a tool for dealing with lack of information. Likewise, the assumption that all possibilities have equal probabilistic weight is only a default for someone who has no information at all. But in our case I do have information: I understand directly and immediately that my perceptions are probably correct (even if not with certainty).
To give an analogy: suppose I saw that a die roll came up 5. You could argue that most likely it did not land on 5, and therefore my sight probably misled me. But in my eyes (!) the possibility of 5 is not equally weighted with all the others. That is what I saw. The chance that I’m mistaken is small in my estimation (until proven otherwise).

Thanks!
But that is the very question itself: don’t treat the understanding of the correctness of cognition as certain, but as doubtful. And if so, insofar as it is a doubt, it leans more toward the majority. You can’t answer the question by saying that for me it isn’t a doubt. That is exactly the question.

You could ask the very same question about the die: don’t believe your eyes, believe the probabilistic calculation. The burden of proof is on the questioner, not on the respondent. We say: if there is something to reconcile, one may reconcile it with difficulty, but one does not raise a difficulty on strained grounds. It seems to me I’ve exhausted the point.

Don’t run away, honored holy community and our teacher and rabbi, may he live long!
If so, why do you mention in the booklet that one must believe there is a designer in order not to end up in a situation where the odds are that we came into being by chance? Here you are arguing that I can solve this because I do not see it as a regular probabilistic situation that was unknown from the outset.

I explained this in the booklet and in the book. I pointed out the difference between ordinary skepticism and my argument; see there.

I’d be happy to know whether I understood correctly:
You are claiming that if, for example, we were to assume that we were never created but had always existed eternally,
and now we were faced with the doubt whether our cognitive system is correct or not,
the reason to assume it is not correct would be that most systems are probably not correct.
The reason to assume it is correct would be that (assuming this) we understand directly and immediately that our perceptions are probably correct.
So in such a case, it is preferable for us to say that there is no reason to doubt at all. The only reason there would be to cast doubt — that most cognitive systems are mistaken — applies when we have no information. But here we do have information, so why should we doubt?!
—–
But when we assume that we were created in an arbitrary and random process, here there is a serious reason to doubt: why assume that what we experience is in any way connected to reality itself?
And therefore, if we assume that we were created, we need to assume that there is someone who made sure to match our cognition to the world.

I’d be happy to know if I’m right about this distinction. Is there perhaps something else I didn’t notice? 🙂 I’d really appreciate it if you could check this.

P.S. I have a question about the proof from the above epistemology — who made sure to fit the creator’s understanding to the world? After all, doubt can be cast on his cognition too.

I’ll answer one last time. If you mean an ordinary skeptical question, there is no answer to it and it’s a waste of all our time. If you mean to raise a specific reason for doubt — I’ve already answered that.

As for difficulties about the Holy One’s insights, please address them to Him. I was dismissed from His embassy on earth.

I meant whether I understood correctly, when there is a specific reason to doubt, not ordinary skepticism.
The reason is that most cognitive systems probably came out defective. If so, it is reasonable to assume that we too have a defective cognitive system.
To that you answered that one assesses probability when we have no data, and then all the options have equal weight, and therefore it is preferable to follow the majority — to assume that my system is defective.
But when I experience that it is correct, then I give it more weight than the alternatives.

By contrast, if so, how is this different from the skepticism you raised regarding the argument from evolution? That insofar as I assume I was created in a random way, I am in an internal contradiction between those basic assumptions. But in the above question one can answer that I was created in an intentional way or that I am eternal. And therefore this is ordinary skepticism.

The question about the designer is a logical one, because otherwise you haven’t solved anything. (Maybe if you assume He is eternal then it is not difficult, as I said before, or that He is self-caused).

First, it is not true that most cognitive systems come out defective unless they are formed just like that. Neither evolution (after the process) nor divine creation creates defective systems.
Second, when one assumes divine creation, there is no production of masses of systems, so there is no need to get into probability. God created a good system, and that’s it. Only evolution speaks of random emergence (of the laws of nature, and within them life, and within that our cognition).
[In parentheses: regarding evolution, you do not assume that you were formed randomly; you infer it. The question is what that inference itself is based on, since it comes out of your cognitive tools and scientific thinking.]

As I said, contact the embassy.

So in practice I can argue that there is simply a designer who made sure to create me directly, and then I am coherent with my belief in the sensory system, and I don’t get into all the complications with probability (that most systems are not good, etc.). Because I simply do not start from the assumption that this is a random situation.

Indeed. That is the essence of the “theological” argument (in the fourth booklet).