Q&A: Danger Is More Stringent Than Prohibition in Asking a Rabbi
Originally published:
This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.
Danger Is More Stringent Than Prohibition in Asking a Rabbi
Question
Assuming that today there is still binding force to “and you shall do according to all that they instruct you… do not deviate” (apparently there is not), and assuming there is only one such lucky person who fits that definition (Rabbi Kanievsky),
- Am I obligated to obey him even when in my view it comes close to a danger to life, or can one say “danger is treated more stringently than prohibition” even with respect to the prohibition of “do not deviate”?
- More generally, when the rabbi’s ruling concerns a factual question—for example, according to the rabbi there is no epidemic here that comes close to danger to life, or at least not one that gives rise to a reasonable concern (I have no idea whether this is his opinion, but let’s assume it is)—can one say about this “do not deviate,” whose essence is a matter of authority and guidance rather than determining truth, or when the substance of the ruling is trying to decide a factual question am I not obligated to obey him?
2.
Answer
When the Sanhedrin rules on a factual question, there is an obligation to obey it. Almost every ruling involves factual determinations (even the concern that the public may stumble over something is a factual assessment). But that is for the Sanhedrin. Whoever thinks Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky is a Sanhedrin seems to me exempt from the commandments in any case.