Q&A: David Did Not Sin
David Did Not Sin
Question
In the Daf Yomi, “whoever says David sinned is merely mistaken.” If I understood the Rabbi’s view on providence correctly, there is no difference between the intellect of the Sages and ours [almost?], and therefore there is no need to reach far-fetched readings of reality because of their statements. If so, then David did sin, because when I study the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) it seems quite clear that he did indeed sin, and seriously! And likewise with the sons of Eli. If I learn from such a point of view, then one could cut out pages of Talmud that speak about facts [as an addition to the provocative statement that there is no need to study the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh); there must be some reason why billions of people study it, apparently], and learn facts from the sages of our own generation and not from the fools of the past?
This position also seems to contradict the Talmud’s view, which says “a refutation” against the one who says “there is no death without sin” [perhaps because it is “a received tradition,” but that doesn’t seem likely to me]?
Precisely support for the capacity of our own intellect I saw in Abarbanel on I Samuel 8:6, where he speaks in praise of democracy, and what Solomon praised, “he interpreted for his own sake.” Does the Rabbi think one may also disagree with the wisest of all men on rational grounds?
2. At the end of the cosmological proof, why is it impossible that there was primordial matter from which the world was formed, about which one cannot say that its complexity requires explanation? In short, what exactly is the meaning of the principle of sufficient reason? [Regarding the unique laws of nature one can make the argument, and likewise regarding a ball found exactly in the middle of a forest, but not regarding primordial matter.] Thank you.
Sorry for the wording. Precisely because I connected to the Rabbi’s words, this attitude toward the Sages and toward the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) at this level bothers me. Sorry in advance as well for my ignorance, and if I am repeating things that already exist.
Answer
I didn’t understand the question. The Talmud is dealing with aggadah. For that you don’t need examples. So what is the question? It is certainly possible that the Sages were mistaken and David did sin, or that they did not mean to say that he did not sin (because they too are not idiots, and they know how to read), and there are ways to reconcile it. Much ink has already been spilled on this.
2. Even if there were primordial matter, the question is how it became complex. What do you solve by positing primordial matter?
Discussion on Answer
1. It seems to me from the text that David sinned with Bathsheba, and that the sons of Eli were complete criminals. If the Sages were not much wiser than we are, then their words when not based on tradition are equal to the words of a sage in our own generation who, if he says something that doesn’t seem right to me, I won’t even look into. I’ll add further that I could dismiss it and say that, like the Greek legends in their day, which tried to glorify the early Hasmoneans, it is nothing but myth. [
When the Sages say David did not sin, and explain that she had received a bill of divorce, it really seems that they meant it, unlike aggadot where the intention is allegorical.
Even more: if this is the approach, perhaps the Sages believed myths, and thought that on the Temple Mount there really was an astronomical number of people [and so too in all the aggadot], and why interpret it allegorically?
If that is so, why do they say “a refutation” against the one who says there is no sin without iniquity?
Regarding Abarbanel’s words—was that his intention, and does the Rabbi agree with his approach? I would be glad to hear. I will quote his wording, I Samuel chapter 8 verse 6:
“And although Solomon praised the institution of kingship, he was expounding for his own sake. But how can we tolerate matters that are self-evident? There is no doubt that when the king is perfectly righteous, it is better for the governance of the public than many righteous and upright men governing together by mutual agreement.” [Before that he explains that Solomon’s words about princes are not relevant to the discussion about kings.]
2. If there is simple primordial matter that is not perfect and therefore exploded and made the Big Bang, that is not considered ‘complex and therefore requiring a reason why it is that way.’ The reason it became precisely a beautiful world may be that there were billions of various ‘bangs’ of that sort, and if you go into unique perfection then that is already the cosmological argument.
3. I forgot to ask: from page 138, “If he had spoken about a very large island there would be no problem, since he is proving the existence of an existing entity.” So it would be possible to prove the existence of the greatest flying teapot and the spaghetti monster, or else you would go back to the proof about the greatest conceivable being, and there you explained that one cannot prove it, since it is not necessary. But before that you explained quite well why even if I think it exists, the proof still stands [that it really exists], unless I am a skeptic, and one is forced to say, like Kant, that this is analytic emptiness.
Thank you for everything.
Nur.
I ask that you divide the questions by topic. Whatever does not belong here, ask separately. At the beginning too you did this, and I answered because I thought we were wrapping up briefly.
Question 1 is connected to this, right?
It is indeed connected to this, except that I already answered it.
I already wrote that I agree that in interpreting aggadah and Scripture, the Sages have no advantage over us. It is possible that they were mistaken. But they are also not stupid, and contrary to what is implied by your words, they do allow themselves to criticize the Patriarchs and the great figures of previous generations. So your hypothesis has nothing to stand on. And since their words are very reasonable, and there is no difficulty in reconciling them with the plain meaning of the verses, I do not see why not do so.
There is nothing in the text that shows David did not sin, even if it can ‘work out’ easily, especially in light of God’s words to David.
If I heard a contemporary preacher claim this, I would shake my head. Regarding the sons of Eli, it seems clearly the opposite. Why accept their words, and why do they say “a refutation” from a tanna against an amora?
I do not accept their words; rather, I agree with them. That is a very big difference. The explanation satisfies me. If a contemporary preacher said the same thing, I would have to accept his words too. If I did not do so, that indeed would not be honest. It seems to me there is an entire book by Rabbi Medan on the passage and on the Sages’ relation to it. If this interests you, it would be worth reading.
And why did they say “a refutation” against the one who said there is no sin without iniquity??
What is the question? I didn’t understand.
If in factual matters there is no essential authority due to differences between generations, then why when an amora claimed that there is no death without sin was his view rejected because of the opinion of a tanna? Seemingly there is no great essential difference between a tanna and an amora in that respect.
“There is no death without sin” is not a fact but a norm. The dispute is over the question whether it is proper that there be death without sin, and from that it follows that the Holy One, blessed be He, does this (or does not). Otherwise, liability for death for desecrating the Sabbath is also a fact and not a norm.
Whether it is proper that God should watch over us is also a norm.
And in general I did not understand—do you mean that if it is ruled that way below, that is how they ruled above??
Or that it is a fact that comes about because of a norm? If so, it is still a fact.
It is a fact that none of us can arrive at except through the norm. Therefore there is a dispute about the norm, and it has implications for the fact.
Then what does “a refutation” against an amora have to do with the factual plane if it comes through the norm??
If it is the fact, what is the difference between a tanna and an amora in this matter?
If normatively there is no justification for death without sin according to the tanna, then one cannot say there is room for death without sin. What is unclear?
As for me, I do not think tannaim have authority in matters that are not Jewish law, even if they are not factual matters. That may perhaps be a harder question in this Talmudic passage.
Nur.
Regarding what you wrote:
When I study the Hebrew Bible it seems quite clear that he did indeed sin, and seriously! And likewise with the sons of Eli. If I learn from such a point of view, then one could cut out pages of Talmud that speak about facts [as an addition to the provocative statement that there is no need to study the Hebrew Bible; there must be some reason why billions of people study it, apparently].
What kind of argument is that? Do the billions who study the Bible understand the connection between “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” and the prohibition of meat and milk, or alternatively the thirty-nine categories of labor on the Sabbath?!
If you accept the words of the Sages, then your simplistic reading of the Bible is irrelevant!
By the way, did the Rabbi also mean David’s prohibition of evil speech, or only Bathsheba?
Why not judge him favorably?
Have a good week.
Tam.