I’ll admit the truth and not be ashamed: I am shocked to the depths of my soul by the ease with which the Rabbi relates to adopting foreign practices. I asked the Rabbi about this in the past as well, but the answer did not satisfy me.
I would ask to receive a more orderly explanation of the Rabbi’s view regarding the adoption of foreign practices.
Also, it is important to note for the sake of intellectual integrity that it is a simple and clear matter that our ancestors did not engage in what is nowadays called “service of the Creator,” but only observed practical commandments. Any attempt to present “service of the Creator,” in whatever form, as an ancient practice is a historical distortion that makes a mockery of our ancestors and of us.

One should always admit the truth and not be ashamed, as it says: “and not be ashamed before those who mock.”
The burden of proof is on one who claims that nothing should be drawn from outside. Whatever has not been forbidden is permitted.
As for the question whether our ancestors engaged in service of the Creator, I’m very impressed by your decisiveness, but I really do not agree.

I’ll phrase my claim a bit differently: what value is there in a practice that we were not commanded to observe? Even if a practice is permitted, that does not make it religious or give it any content; it is simply an act empty of content, nothing more than that.
Regarding “service of the Creator,” the Rabbi of course may disagree, but I would ask that he bring proof that our ancestors engaged in “service of the Creator” apart from observance of commandments.
Thanks,
Benjamin

There are quite a few things we do without a commandment. For example, not to be a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah, or moral behavior, character refinement, being a chooser, and other human values. Rabbi Shimon Shkop even argues that there are binding legal directives without a commandment (Sha’arei Yosher). The question seems very baffling to me.

I feel that the Rabbi is going around in circles and trying to evade the point. Of course there are things we do without a commandment; there is no dispute about that. Normal human behavior, called by Wiesel “the doctrine of man,” does not thereby become Torah-based or commanded; these are simple things shared by all who may be called human. “The doctrine of man” does not become a religious act; it is simply an elementary human act. Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s claim makes the legal directive binding, but not a religious act. The source of the obligation is the legal consequence of the act, which certainly has halakhic ramifications; that is completely legitimate.
It is puzzling to me why the Rabbi refers to my simple question as “baffling.” There is nothing baffling here. The question is simple: how does an act become religious if it is not a commandment? I claim that there is no such reality, since I have found no proof for the opposite claim. If the Rabbi argues that a practice without a commandment can be considered a religious practice, then with all due respect, the burden of proof is on him.
I really do not see “service of the Creator” in normal human behavior. The answer to Yehuda should have been very simple: aside from a commandment, there is no “service of the Creator” at all; all the rest is a bizarre collection of imaginary inventions from the fevered minds of a delusional sect among the people of Israel.
I would truly be happy to see proof for the Rabbi’s words.

I’ll answer one last time and we’ll conclude with this (unless something new comes up).
Everything I do is done by the power of the Holy One, blessed be He. There are no norms that obligate without Him. So too with moral or human behavior and the like. See the fourth notebook. Therefore every such act has religious value. My assumption is that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the moral legislator and expects us to act this way. I do not accept the possibility of values in the world without God. Therefore every act of value is religious. True, in the case of a secular person who behaves morally (and of course he is not a consistent person), his actions have no religious value, because religious consciousness is required to give an act that kind of value. But for a religious person, every act of value done מתוך the recognition that this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of me (even if He does not specifically command me) is an act with religious value.
And in your view, does one who violates Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s doctrine of law bear no claim from the Holy One, blessed be He? Of course he does. Why do I need a verse? Reason suffices! Let me just sharpen the point: halakhic reasoning means a norm without a commandment (I am speaking about substantive reasoning, not interpretive reasoning. See my article on the status of reasonings, here on the site).
This really seems simple to me, and I do not understand what the difficulty is or why this is even a discussion.