Q&A: Torah-Level Doubt and Rabbinic-Level Doubt
Torah-Level Doubt and Rabbinic-Level Doubt
Question
Hello Rabbi!
What is the reasoning behind the rule that a rabbinic-level doubt is treated leniently?
It would seem more intuitive to say that in any case of doubt one should be stringent so as not to violate a prohibition.
Can the Sages nullify a prohibition (which in their view is definitely prohibited) just because of the doubt?
Thank you
Answer
When we are dealing with a rabbinic prohibition, we are talking about an act that is not problematic in itself; rather, there is some concern or another that it may lead to problems. Therefore, if you are in doubt, they did not require you to be stringent out of concern for problems that might arise. Put differently, there is a double doubt here: the question is whether there is in fact a rabbinic prohibition here, and even if there is, there is still doubt whether the problems will actually arise.
For example, poultry with milk was prohibited lest one come to eat meat with milk. If you have doubtful poultry that got mixed into milk, there is doubt whether there is poultry with milk here, and even if there is, there is doubt whether this will lead you to eat meat with milk.
A lot more could be analyzed here, but this is not the place.
I did not understand your last question.
Discussion on Answer
Your explanation resolves why there is leniency in a doubtful rabbinic prohibition, but the rule is that every rabbinic-level doubt is treated leniently, even a doubt about a rabbinic enactment is treated leniently, and there the explanation of “doubt whether the problems will arise” does not apply.
The reason that a rabbinic-level doubt is treated leniently depends on the dispute between Maimonides and Rashba regarding Torah-level doubt. According to Maimonides, even a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently; it is only the Sages who were stringent regarding Torah-level doubt. In rabbinic doubt they were not stringent, in order to create a distinction between their words and the Torah. According to Rashba, who holds that Torah-level doubt is stringent by Torah law, that is because the object itself is prohibited, and if it turns out that you violated the prohibition, that harms you. But with rabbinic prohibitions, the object is not prohibited; rather, the Sages prohibited the person from doing the act, so in a case of doubt there is no reason to prohibit it.
Do you mean to distinguish between a decree and an enactment? Indeed, with an enactment it is not because of some concern. But with an enactment your reasoning also does not apply. Enactments have their own intrinsic rationale (like the Hanukkah candle or Purim), so it is like a law in the object itself. Rather, the Sages were lenient, since they are the ones who instituted it and they are the ones who said it.
And your point that rabbinic prohibitions apply to the person rather than to the object is certainly not agreed upon, as is well known.
And your explanation according to Maimonides does not really answer the difficulty. On the contrary, now it is also difficult to understand why a Torah-level doubt should be treated leniently.
My last question assumed that even a rabbinic prohibition is an act that is problematic in itself. So I was asking how the Sages can nullify a prohibition if it is problematic in itself, like a Torah-level prohibition. The Rabbi answered that.
Thank you very much!