Q&A: A Torah-Level Doubt Ruled Leniently
A Torah-Level Doubt Ruled Leniently
Question
Hello and blessings. According to Maimonides, who holds that a Torah-level doubt is ruled leniently, why is an unintentional act nevertheless forbidden according to Rabbi Yehuda? After all, in the end there is a doubt whether the forbidden result will occur, so how can this action be prohibited? According to this reasoning, we should even permit it when he intends the prohibition, since it is still a case of doubt.
Of course, according to the approach of Sha'arei Yosher, that this is a permission based on the laws of doubt, this is not difficult, because in that passage we indeed discover retroactively that he actually committed the prohibition. So my question is directed to those who maintain that a Torah-level doubt is permitted as a matter of certainty.
Answer
This is an ontic doubt, not an epistemic one. See column 326 and the whole series there. And perhaps from here there is indeed proof in favor of Rabbi Akiva Eiger and against the Taz.
But beyond that, the doubt here is not necessarily evenly balanced, and therefore the laws of doubt do not apply here.