Q&A: Following the lecture series "Contemporary Judaism from a Bird's-Eye View"
Following the lecture series "Contemporary Judaism from a Bird's-Eye View"
Question
Hello Rabbi,
- There seems, ostensibly, to be a contradiction between the claim that it is desirable to have a moral system of norms that also critiques Jewish law (lecture 8), and the claim that the validity of morality exists only insofar as it is a divine command, and that no coherent moral theory is possible without God (lecture 3). (The line of argument in lecture 8 is clear in itself, but it is less clear in relation to lecture 3).
- Is the claim that studying the Bible is not useful directed at someone who has already "filled his belly" with Talmud and halakhic decisors? Or: what is the proper order of study, in the Rabbi's opinion, for beginners, for children, and for anyone who has not yet reached "Ketzot"? And also: is studying the Bible for the sake of understanding Jewish law and its sources (as was also done in one of the lectures) likewise considered a kind of study that is not useful?
- What is the basis for the claim that just as nowadays there is no prophecy and no overt miracles, so too prayers are ineffective? Why link the effect or lack of effect of prayer to prophecy and miracles? And why assume sweepingly regarding all those who pray that their prayers are ineffective? Perhaps there are some whose prayers are effective and some whose prayers are not? Is the Rabbi relying on any sources, or on his own reflection?
- Thank you very much for a fascinating course!
Answer
- There is no contradiction here at all. Both morality and Jewish law come from God, and yet Jewish law passed through human mediation and therefore can go wrong. Beyond that, even if there is no distortion in Jewish law, there can still be a contradiction between the halakhic and moral aspects, and then a conflict arises. In such a situation there are two conflicting divine wills: from a halakhic perspective to do X, and from a moral perspective not to do it (as in the chocolate example I gave). There is no principled problem with that.
- Studying the Bible does not teach, regardless of whether one has already "filled his belly." Talmud and halakhic decisors are not the alternative. I mean the narrative portions and their interpretation, and Talmud and halakhic decisors are unrelated to that. I definitely agree that it is worthwhile to teach children Torah for their general education. That they should know about the Exodus from Egypt and our forefather Abraham and the rest of the history of the Jewish people, and that they should recognize the sources of Jewish law.
- I am relying on my own reflection. In your description you skipped a step: my claim is that there is no involvement nowadays, and therefore requests are generally not answered. The absence of miracles and prophecy is an indication of a change in God's policy in the world, that is, of His ceasing to be involved. These things were explained at great length in the trilogy and in several columns and responsa on the site.
- Gladly.
Discussion on Answer
1. Not correct. I suggest you read the book or listen to the series on Jewish law and morality. Jewish law and morality are two different and independent normative systems, even though the validity of both is based on God's will. Even so, conflicts between them are possible, as I demonstrated in the lecture with the chocolate example.
3. I did not infer from that that He is not involved. Quite the opposite: from the conclusion that He is not involved, I infer that there was probably a policy change (or that this was the plan from the outset, as you wrote). The reasons why I think He is not involved are scientific and observational, and also intuitive. They were explained at great length in the trilogy and also here on the site in quite a few columns and responsa.
Thank you!
It is still not clear what the claim to some kind of moral realism is based on — one that obligates all human beings and is not based on belief in the Torah given from Heaven. Is it based only on reflection showing that there is no coherent morality without that assumption?
The moral intuition within a person is perceived by him as the product of observing the moral ideal. For that, belief in God is needed, but not necessarily a command from Heaven.
But it is clear that these divine intuitions have never helped the world become more moral. Without specific commands there is no moral behavior. On the contrary, in the name of undefined divine intuitions, serious crimes are committed.
And in the name of commands nothing has ever been done that was not lofty moral nobility? No massacre, murder, robbery, or plain rape?
Of course it has. That is exactly what I meant. In the name of supposed commands, and in the name of divine intuitions. And also in the name of theories that deny God.
The ancient world sacrificed children to Molech, the Romans threw prisoners from wars of conquest to fight lions as public entertainment, in the Inquisition and the Crusades they slaughtered, robbed, and raped millions, and no less in the name of Allah. At the beginning of this century there were still tribes of savages cooking and eating the flesh of an enemy who approached their territory in the name of some divine spirit, while in the other hemisphere people were being burned in gas chambers in the name of a non-divine theory. It is obvious and pointless to detail the horrors of human societies.
The tiny amount that may ever have been done in the name of the Torah of Israel is practically zero compared to what happened in the world in the most refined and "moral" societies there were. The "moral" dilemmas posed by Jewish law according to the Torah of Israel are a pathetic joke compared to what still goes on in the world, and they really are on the level of whether to eat chocolate or not eat it.
Of course there are also moral societies, but not consistently, as the Rabbi says. And any "anthropological" explanation of establishing local, specific rules for the benefit of most individuals in society can explain them.
Therefore it is still not clear to me what this ontological moral realism is whose basis is general belief in a general God.
I completely lost you. What is the question, and why? There is a basis for the validity of morality, but that basis does not force people to act accordingly or to think the same way (without disputes about morality). What exactly is the discussion about?
Have a good week, sorry, apparently that was not clear.
In brief:
A. Everything that we (within the framework of this discussion) know about God is from the Torah. Including what we think we know about divine morality.
B. Therefore, I cannot understand what the idea is based on that there are two separate systems of norms, both divine. One anchored in the Torah and one not.
C. Add to that the observation showing that in the name of divine intuitions or supposed commands that are not from the Torah, endless grave crimes have been and still are committed, while in the name of the Torah almost none at all.
D. And the question is — how do you know that values which, in your eyes, belong to the divine normative system that is not according to the Torah are not actually your own personal normative system? As happens with the rest of humanity?
E. Did Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed I:2 not mean that "good and evil" refers to relative, changing human morality, whereas "truth and falsehood" refers to the one ontological normative system embodied in the Torah and its commandments?
Thank you for your time. Usually I manage to understand you. This time I didn’t.
1. I disagree. If He implanted moral feelings in me, I assume that this is what He expects from me. When people commit crimes, they usually do not lean on their moral feelings (but rather on religious commands. See ISIS).
2. I did not say that morality is not anchored in the Torah. I said it is not anchored in Jewish law. The Torah says, "And you shall do what is right and good." The Torah itself expected Cain not to murder, even before he was commanded. I would add that morality does not need the Torah, but it is anchored in it. I mean that even if the Torah had not written, "And you shall do what is right and good," I would still understand that the moral command implanted in me is a divine demand.
3. I did not understand this question. If problematic acts are done in the name of command, that is precisely my claim above, that command does not necessarily bring about a better world than natural morality. That no bad acts are done in the name of the Torah is simply not true. Massacres and the like are not committed, but that may be only because we did not have the opportunity for it. Usually we were not independent and did not have power (this is an argument of the Kuzari).
4. On Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed, see column 177.
Thank you.
– It is very easy to talk about moral feelings when dealing with extreme acts such as those of ISIS, and to attribute the understanding that they are forbidden to divine morality, but it becomes complicated and impossible in more delicate questions. How would you know then what divine morality demands of you?
(And by the way, perhaps the biblical story of Cain is brought precisely because it is not self-evident).
This can remain open; apparently there is no answer to that.
I really cannot follow this strange discussion.
In delicate questions there are disagreements. That is true whether the source is command or natural feelings. There is no difference at all. On the contrary, with natural feelings there are, in my estimation, fewer disagreements.
Thank you very much for your answer.
Regarding question 1 — it follows from this that we, who believe in God and His command, relate to only one system of norms. And that's fine. As far as our abilities allow, we strive to examine the rulings of the system from within the system itself, and to decide a moral dilemma according to the rules of the system. There is no place for a morality that is not within the framework of this one system, because, apparently, there is no such thing.
Regarding question 3 — even if God "changed policy" (of course, it may be that this was the policy from the outset — that the world is intended for some process), still, how can one conclude from that that the effect of prayer disappeared together with prophecy and overt miracles? Maybe that is a different level of influence, another dimension, which may still exist in some way. Why assume that it does not?