Question

David Enoch published an article on slippery slope arguments, and it has been mentioned here on the site several times. I would like to hear your opinion about his argument (which has not convinced me so far, mainly because of trivial objections that Enoch himself raises there). Of course, I am trying to present his view faithfully, but given the limits of my understanding and the extreme brevity required, one cannot expect too much. So I am asking about the argument as it will be presented here, which, as noted, has appeared on the site several times, whether or not this is exactly what Enoch wrote. If further elaboration would be preferable (for example, on the relation to sorites-paradox arguments), I can add more of what Enoch writes there. https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article-abstract/21/4/629/1459375
A. [Chapter 2 of the article] What is the slipperiness being discussed? Suppose that act A is in itself legitimate, and act Z is in itself illegitimate, and we are aware of the distinction between them. Now we worry that carrying out act A will lead us, through a gradual process, to do act Z as well, even though we are currently aware of the principled distinction between A and Z. Why? It may be that our very judgment will become blurred, and it may be that a difficulty of weakness of will will grow stronger. That is, there is an assumption here—and this is “the basic assumption” in slippery slope arguments—that we are not always successful at conducting ourselves in accordance with the relevant distinction.
B. [Chapter 3 of the article] A slippery slope argument depends, among other things, on the degree of slipperiness. When the degree of slipperiness is high, this is a strong slippery slope argument that we think it is right to use. When the degree of slipperiness is low, this is a weak slippery slope argument that we think it is not right (and sometimes even bad and harmful) to use. It is quite hard to distinguish between degrees of slipperiness, and therefore there is significant slipperiness between strong slippery slope arguments (A) and weak slippery slope arguments (Z). Therefore, proper use of strong slippery slope arguments may lead us to improper use of weak slippery slope arguments. Therefore, it is not advisable to use even strong slippery slope arguments. This is a slippery slope argument against slippery slope arguments, and therefore the only consistent approach is to avoid slippery slope arguments.
C. [Continuation of Chapter 3] 1. A false slippery slope argument has costs, because sometimes it forbids something that in itself is proper and necessary. 2. The degree of slipperiness between degrees of slipperiness is high, as can be seen from the fact that a great deal of literature is devoted to criticism of flawed slippery slope arguments. [End of Chapter 4] 3. In his view, a blanket avoidance of the use of slippery slope arguments has, overall, better results than using both strong slippery slope arguments and weak ones.