Q&A: Conflict
Conflict
Question
When the values that are in conflict are incommensurable, is it true that not only can you not measure the values against one another, but that they simply have no measure at all—that is, this is not a technical problem but an essential one?
And accordingly, a verse also cannot teach me the answer, because there simply is no answer (as you wrote in Mehalakhim). But in the Talmudic passage about saving a life in tractate Yoma, Shmuel does bring the verse “and live by them” to decide between Sabbath observance and saving a life. But didn’t we say that there is no answer to this, even from God Himself?
Answer
This verse is proof that there is no real incommensurability between values, as I have said more than once. After all, each of us makes decisions in value conflicts all the time, and that too proves that there is no incommensurability. I explained that there are general umbrella concepts that apply to all value systems. In the religious-halakhic context, the question is to what extent this is the will of God. In the moral context—how good it is. And in the context of a moral-halakhic conflict—how worthy it is. I also explained that the good and the worthy are not values that the system comes to serve, for values do not serve anything outside themselves. Rather, this is a criterion that the values reflect and express.
Discussion on Answer
At the beginning of every chain of reasoning there is an axiom. There is no point asking where the axiom comes from, because if you have an explanation then it is not an axiom. And if you keep looking for explanations all the time, you end up in an infinite regress.
The meaning of this is that an axiom is accepted without explanation, “just because.” That does not mean it is an arbitrary claim. It is a self-evident claim, and therefore it does not require explanation. What is not self-evident does require explanation, and you cannot say “just because” about it.
I understood that. What I didn’t understand is: what are you saying “just because” about—a value, or a value-principle?
First and foremost, about the value-principle. But once I am committed to the moral value-principle, I also have to determine what the moral values are. Once X has been established as a moral value, I am committed to it by virtue of the value-principle.
Of course, one can ask why X is a value (although you cannot ask why one should be committed to it, if it is indeed a value. That is a result of the value-principle). And there too the answer will be “just because.” I see that it is a value, and that’s it.
You wrote that my commitment to a moral value is based on the value-principle of commitment to morality. But what is my commitment to that value-principle itself based on? And if you say, “just because,” then I could also say “just because” about the commitment to a moral value itself. And furthermore, if it is because of “just because,” then is my commitment to the value-principle of commitment to morality arbitrary?