Q&A: A Formal Positive Skeptical Argument
A Formal Positive Skeptical Argument
Question
With God's help
Hello Rabbi,
I came across an argument close to the following one. It is used to prove that everything is subject to no small degree of doubt.
I would be happy to hear the Rabbi's opinion about it.
Premise A: In a dream one feels a sense of reality.
Premise B: In a dream one does not distinguish between the sense of reality and imagination.
Premise C: A dream occurs every day with a reasonable probability (7/24)
Premise D: Right now I feel a sense of reality.
Conclusion: The probability that I am mistaken is quite high. (Almost 30%!).
What does the Rabbi think? I thought that the conclusion cannot be derived from premise B. (Because it may be that in a waking state one can distinguish between dream and reality, and only in the dream state one cannot.) But I am not sure that this is correct, and it does indeed sound like an interesting argument. Of course, one could also challenge premise A, but as far as I know many accept it. So if we do accept A, is the argument logically valid?
Answer
These are empty pilpulim. A few offhand points:
1. In my opinion, in a dream one does not feel a sense of reality. There is a difference between a dream and reality.
2. In a dream maybe one does not distinguish between reality and imagination (what would imagination in a dream even mean? It is all imagination there), but in reality one does distinguish. The fact is that you speak about dreams and about reality, meaning you experience and understand that difference. So there is your proof that not everything is a dream.
3. The conclusion pulls the rug out from under the premises. If everything is a dream, then talk about dreaming has no meaning.
4. Even if everything is correct, then by the same token the conclusion is that everything is reality and there are no dreams at all.
In short, we have a clear sense that distinguishes between dream and reality. Whoever wants to claim that this is an illusion should bring evidence. There is not a shred of evidence here. And certainly he cannot rely on imagined sensations.
Discussion on Answer
Forget dreams.
Some Swedish philosopher who wrote a few books did a calculation and concluded that there is a 20 percent chance that we are living in a simulation!!!!
I see no point in this pilpul. I think I explained well enough why.
Sorry, but I really did not understand at all.
After all, as in the parable of Abraham and his hat, if you accept the premises you are forced to accept the conclusion.
If so, then if we take, for example, the third or fourth claim that the Rabbi raised, they basically only say:
“The conclusion is strange,” so there must be a bug in the premises. But they do not point to the problematic premise. Right?
1. As I said, this argument is fairly common, and therefore I wanted to ask about it without challenging premise A.
Does it follow logically from A, or is premise B not bidirectional, and therefore it is invalid anyway?
For example, it could be that in a dream one experiences a sense of reality, and in reality one experiences the same feeling. But in reality there will be some additional parameter A that could, say, provide us with an understanding that reality really exists, whereas in a dream we experience only the feeling without the added understanding.
An opposite example would be derealization syndrome, where a person sometimes feels detached and as if in a dream, even though he understands that he is in reality. (So the feeling alone is not enough, and you also need the understanding, which does not occur in the dream state.)
2. Of course there is no proof here that this is a dream.
But it does constitute a positive doubt with a probability of over 20%!
3. Again, dreams happen roughly 20%+ of the time. The claim is that right now you do not know whether you are in a state of “wakefulness” or “dream.” (Even though the greater probability, 70%+, is that you are awake.)
4. Same as above. And again,
the conclusion is that there is a 30% chance this is a dream. Nothing beyond that.
Where is the Rabbi who should remind himself that arguments are not necessary truths:
“If he found a way to reach such certainty, he probably made a mistake (for sure!?).”