Q&A: On Defining Doubt and Its Resolutions
On Defining Doubt and Its Resolutions
Question
It seems possible to explain that a doubt is never handed over to be judged as a thing in itself by means of certain decision-rules in a case where the person in doubt does not know and is concerned, for his knowledge and the feelings of his heart are not something that should be judged in themselves by fixed rules, since each person relates differently to his own concerns. Rather, it seems that a doubt is handed over to be judged as an independent matter, and to be decided by certain rules, only where the possibility that the matter is forbidden succeeds in placing the prohibition before the doubter as certain knowledge. (What I mean will be clarified based on the fact that the laws of the Torah are never mere statutes in the sense that the obstacle to acting according to the Torah is that one would violate some abstract rule about what is fitting or unfitting; rather, the laws of the Torah are commands and obligations directed to the individual person, who is commanded to refrain from one act and permitted to do another—and awareness of the prohibition is itself the place where the prohibition is realized, since the prohibition exists in that one who knows of the prohibition is commanded to refrain from it, whereas one who certainly does not know of the command is not held accountable for it—and therefore the forbidden side is, as it were, what places that prohibition before him in this awareness.)
And so, because of the side of prohibition, he is certainly obligated to refrain from that act; opposite it stands the permitting side, which denies the presence of any prohibition in the act before him.
It seems that this is the definition of doubt: both prohibition and permission stand before him together, each making its own claim. (As the Ritva wrote that twilight is both day and night; and similarly regarding an androgynous person and a tumtum; and similarly the medieval authorities wrote in the laws of ritual purity that a garment half of whose fabric is wool, which is susceptible to leprous afflictions, and half not, is a doubt; and Rabbi Chaim wrote similarly regarding the koy.) It seems that this is the place where doubt is properly judged as a matter in itself, and rightly given over to rules and definitions of what is appropriate and how each side of the doubt should be treated. And it seems that majority, presumption, double doubt, and the like are rules within this system of doubts, determining which possible scenario in which the event may have occurred is entitled to stand in the doubt as a side and demand its practical consequences. This can be explained briefly.
For the idea of presumption can be explained as whether we are allowed to entertain a possibility that contradicts what has already been established and known to us from earlier. The explanation is that when a certain fact has been established for us, and we have been acting on that basis (and according to some of the medieval authorities, even if it was in error), then a possibility different from what is established in our knowledge is not a possibility fit to stand before us as one side of the doubt and demand its practical consequences, as against that side which had already been established for us in practice.
And likewise, this seems to be the idea of majority: when in a doubtful case most of the possibilities tend toward deciding in a certain direction, then the proper thing in such a case is to follow the majority, and not to act as one in doubt because of the minority side, since it is right to act in accordance with the majority, and therefore the minority side is not entitled to demand its practical consequences from the doubter in place of the majority side. (With presumption, the possibility of change is not fit to stand as a side because of the force of the side against it through its established status, whereas with majority the minority side is impaired in its standing as a proper side insofar as it is the minority of cases.)
But there is a certain difference between majority and presumption. In presumption there is no truth-content in the presumption by itself; rather, the claim of the side that had been established is that one who comes to argue for another side bears the burden of proof. In contrast, the decision of majority comes from the fact that there is a real content here: in cases of doubt it is right to follow the majority. And this seems to be the superiority of majority over presumption.
Similarly, it seems possible to explain the idea of double doubt, for we do not find a verse teaching us this rule. It would seem that its meaning is that each forbidden side, taken on its own, is not justified in demanding its practical consequences because of the permitting side in the second doubt; therefore, any side in the doubt such that even if we reject the opposing side it still would not be proper to impose the legal consequence—such a side is certainly disqualified from being considered a valid side of the doubt. And we are not commanded to be concerned for the side of prohibition in both doubts together.
And based on this it also seems possible to explain the topic of whether a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently or leniently, concerning which Maimonides and Rashba disagree. According to this, it seems that Rashba holds that in a Torah-level doubt for which no resolution has been found within the rules of doubt, the demand of the prohibiting side to refrain from the act remains valid even against the permitting side; that is, the prohibiting side, though it exists only as one side within a doubt, is still justified in demanding practical refraining even while there is an opposing side denying the existence of the prohibition. Maimonides disagrees with this and holds that this stringency is only rabbinic law. However, this discussion of Torah-level doubt is not part of the definitional rules of doubt for the doubter; rather, in a state of doubt it is appropriate to discuss the force with which each side presses its practical demand.
Answer
What you wrote is not clear. It is hard to understand what you mean, especially in the introduction. I’ll respond briefly to what I understood.
Not all presumptions operate the way you described. When a woman was a married woman and a doubt arises concerning her, we place her under the presumption that she is still a married woman. Are there not two sides of doubt here? Or when a ritual bath is found lacking and previously it was complete, do we not have before us two sides of doubt as to when the ritual bath became deficient? Of course we do. You can of course say that if there is an original presumption then Jewish law tells us not to take the other possibility into account. But that is not an explanation of the laws of doubt; it is just a declaration.
And there are also presumptions based on assessment that are not original presumptions (for example, the presumption that a person does not pay a debt before its due date), and those are similar to what you described as majority, but this is not the place to go into it.
What you are talking about applies only to presumptions of the type about which it was said, “We stone and burn based on presumptions.” If there is a presumption that a certain person is my father, then even if some uncertainty arises, there is no room for doubt. See Ein Ayah by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Sabbath 30a.
In general, what you are saying may depend on what the later authorities investigated: whether a doubt that has been resolved through presumption or majority is still considered a doubt, or whether the other side is treated as if it does not exist at all (and they discussed the same regarding nullification by majority). For example, regarding doubt of ritual impurity in the public domain or in the private domain, when there is a presumption or a majority, do we say the rule of doubtful impurity, or is there no doubt here at all.