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Q&A: Presumptive Status in an Argument Regarding Midrashic and Plain-Sense Conservatism

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Presumptive Status in an Argument Regarding Midrashic and Plain-Sense Conservatism

Question

Hello Rabbi,
Following up on last week's lecture about conservatism, a question came up there about an Eskimo who received from his ancestors a tradition that one should wear long clothes. Over time, the Eskimo's descendants migrated to a warm region, and a dispute arose whether they should continue wearing long clothes or whether they should specifically wear clothes suited to the climate. In a case where neither side in the dispute raises a midrashic argument that would justify its position, you said in the lecture that the side claiming they should remain with long clothes would win by force of presumption. But if, in the dispute, an argument is raised that the reason for the long clothes is modesty, while on the other hand the reason to switch to short clothes is adaptation to the climate, then you said that in such a case neither side has the advantage of presumption. I wanted to ask about that: how is this different from the first form of the dispute, where neither side has a justifying argument? After all, in both forms of the dispute there is a kind of tie in the justifying arguments (0-0 or 1-1). And then what should decide the tie is the presumption. Isn't that so?

Answer

I am about to get to these issues. There are two levels of midrashic argument: there is the interpretive proposal itself (clothing suited to the climate versus warm clothing), and there is the evidence for that claim. When there are no arguments, it is clear that we continue as before. But when there is no evidence, I will discuss that later.

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