Q&A: Chazon Ish
Chazon Ish
Question
Chazon Ish, Bava Kamma, siman 11
"What the medieval authorities wrote, of blessed memory, that the words of Rabbeinu Chananel are words of tradition requires explanation. Did Rabbeinu Chananel say nothing based on reasoning, but only what he had received? And likewise his teacher, and all their teachers up to Rabbeinu and Rabbi Elazar—did they say nothing based on reasoning, but only what they had received? Surely all of them received what they received and innovated what they innovated, just like all our medieval authorities, of blessed memory. And after all, many halakhic decisors disagree with Rabbeinu Chananel and are not concerned about doing so. It therefore appears that Rabbeinu Chananel attended upon one great sage who had an exceptional memory and was very old, and he received from him many things that his contemporaries did not know. And he, of blessed memory, would recount before the sages of his generation matters he had received—hidden and astonishing things. This gives him special importance, since the generations keep declining; and one who is rich in the traditions of the early authorities possesses extra holiness and extra wisdom. But this does not prevent disagreeing with him on the basis of clear proofs. And when they wrote that his words are words of tradition, they meant from a generation or generations that preceded him. But that does not establish that these are traditions received from the sages of the Talmud [aside from isolated cases, such as what Tosafot brought in Eruvin 41a, s.v. 'Beitzah'—'we have a tradition,' etc.]. Rather, the closer they are to the sages of the Talmud, the more they should be regarded as tending toward the truth, since forgetfulness had not yet taken hold. But none of this is decisive in ruling out disagreement with them on the basis of proofs from the Talmud."
I have to say I was very surprised by this passage when I came across it in the course of learning.
Are there other places where the Chazon Ish expresses himself like this? Does this fit his style of halakhic ruling?
According to his approach, can one disagree with the medieval authorities only on the basis of proofs from the Talmud, or also on the basis of our own new reasoning?
Answer
The Chazon Ish had a distinctly autonomous outlook. So this is really not surprising. Although in my opinion there is no need to get too pilpulistic about statements concerning Rabbeinu Chananel. “His words are words of tradition” means that one should relate to them as words of tradition. Just as “everything that an experienced student will one day innovate was taught to Moses at Sinai” is not a historical statement but a normative one: all of it should be treated as though it was shown to Moses at Sinai.
Discussion on Answer
Just as the Chazon Ish writes about the Mishnah Berurah that all its words are as though they were said in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, and at the same time he disagrees with it. It should be treated with great seriousness, but one can still disagree. That is exactly what he writes in the passage you quoted.
Seemingly, what the Chazon Ish wrote in that letter is that a ruling upheld by all our rabbis together, down to the Mishnah Berurah, is as though it was said in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. I understood his intention to be that there is “acceptance by the public” and formal authority even over a ruling that has spread among the overwhelming majority of the halakhic decisors of Israel, just as there is over the Talmud. (And even though the Chazon Ish is known for emphasizing substantive authority, it seems obvious that he also holds of formal authority.)
In any case, that also seems to me to be the accepted way of understanding that letter. Right now I can’t find the quote in the databases (or the book either) to verify it.
Part 2, Letter 41:
<a href="https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46852&st=&pgnum=49" rel="nofollow">https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46852&st=&pgnum=49</a>
It really does seem that there is room for your interpretation. At least regarding Rabbeinu Tam he writes that this is only where no one is found to disagree with him.
See here a very long discussion:
<a href="https://www.tora-forum.co.il/viewtopic.php?f=24&t=9810&sid=492fef09319b9a880ace3dd356ecdc74" rel="nofollow">https://www.tora-forum.co.il/viewtopic.php?f=24&t=9810&sid=492fef09319b9a880ace3dd356ecdc74</a>
(It seems that there it is written that even where people do disagree with Rabbeinu Tam, since the ruling spread to be stringent in accordance with his view, that is solid Jewish law, and it does not matter even if the dissenters are both Rashi and Maimonides and not just Rashi alone—the Jewish law is still solid.)
But this is an opportunity to return to an old question I asked in the past and it got swallowed up in correspondence with someone else. If a certain person thinks it proper, worthwhile, and fitting that there should be public acceptance of a certain book corpus (for example, the Shulchan Arukh with the main commentaries), just as they accepted the Talmud upon themselves—but he knows that right now the public has ‘not yet’ accepted it—how can he set that acceptance process in motion? After all, it is clear that at no stage, even if he gathers communities and holds persuasion conferences, are they going to vote and decide to accept some particular corpus; rather it has to be a process that seeps in and spreads. So in your opinion, can or must he instruct his listeners, and himself, as though that acceptance has in fact already taken place, and in that way set the wheels of acceptance turning? Or does everything have to happen entirely on its own, in a completely natural way, and only when one discovers after the fact—whoops, we actually accepted it—does that acceptance solidify into authority? [I thought this might be a way to argue on behalf of Rabbi Ovadia, regarding acceptance of Maran’s rulings. But the idea itself seems logical to me, because otherwise how can such acceptance spread—do you expect agreement in a single day, etc.?]
You answered yourself how this can happen: through a slow, unintended process, at the end of which there is a “whoops.”
As for the question itself, I do not know what it means that someone thinks a book ought to be accepted. Acceptance is a fact, not the result of a thought or a reasoning. Rabbi Ovadia thought that the Mechaber had been accepted, not that he was worthy of being accepted.
But of course, if for some reason you think some book should be accepted, why shouldn’t you act to make that happen?! But falsehood is not justified.
If it has to be treated as though it was shown, for example, at Sinai—how can one disagree with his spirit?