Q&A: The Physico-Theological Proof from the Physical Constants
The Physico-Theological Proof from the Physical Constants
Question
I tried to argue to someone (making the claim I read in your writings) that the very fact that the physical constants are suited to a state that allows the creation and survival of life proves design.
And he answered me:
(a) Maybe these constants are not arbitrary, but are derived from other things (unknown to both of us laymen, or perhaps not currently known to science at all) that necessitate them.
And in his words: "Because the Big Bang came into being in a world with zero data, somehow all the laws are a 'necessity of reality'; the laws of nature were determined then from zero, and it is hard to apply a concept like randomness to absolute zero."
(b) Life could have been possible in countless other situations, under countless bizarre laws of nature, with countless types of materials and atoms. All you need is some primordial soup that allows chemical combination (and even that not necessarily) of random materials, until some material happens to form that can replicate itself. Once replication can change from time to time, we already have competition in which the fittest survives. From there the way is open for increasingly sophisticated matter that knows how to protect itself at higher and higher levels, until there exists a sufficiently intelligent structure that can simulate a brain, and can also simulate the computer familiar to us today, and many other things as well, that could support 'consciousness.' The biology would of course then be very different.
But I can't sign off on that; that's just how it feels to me from my memory of the years when I read a lot on these topics. Right now I'm not there. And if you trust the person who convinced you of this more, that's your right.
End quote.
So we decided to turn to you to clarify the matter. What are the facts?
Answer
I already answered all this in my book.
1. Even if there is something that generated the constants, that is God. If it is another law of nature, then it too has constants. If it is mathematics alone, then physics is not an empirical science but a branch of mathematics. Nobody believes that today.
2. I'm not sure I understood what you wrote here. But the number of systems of laws (the constants) that would yield life with our level of complexity is absolutely negligible.
Discussion on Answer
The fact that you understand them doesn't really matter here. There's no point in this kind of telephone game, especially with someone who hasn't read the material. If you read it and you are bothered by some question, then ask me yourself. If he wants to talk, let him read it and then speak for himself. I'm not looking for a UN mediator. He raises difficulties here that I've already answered in full (he writes that he didn't read it, so maybe he didn't see that).
I will answer briefly, and with this I am done:
1. One Big Bang is not my claim but physics'. You can raise the hypothesis that there were countless universes that nobody has seen, but that is a claim with no basis whatsoever. It's Russell's celestial teapot claim. The claim is that creation is more plausible than infinite universes, because there is no reason to assume they existed if we haven't seen them. By contrast, if there is something here, then apparently someone created it. That is a common-sense inference that we use in all contexts. Besides, even if there are infinite universes, I would still argue that someone created them.
2. If there are infinite universes and in each one there are different laws of nature, then in each such universe there will be different beings: demons and spirits and gods. So what is the problem in the first place with assuming there is a God, given that the hypothesis of countless universes forces that kind of possibility anyway? In a randomly selected universe, no monsters at all would come into being. Complex beings arise only in very special systems of laws, and those are very rare. Of course, if there were infinitely many attempts then anything could happen, but there is no reasonable indication of that.
3. I am not limiting the concept of life. A complex being is a being with low entropy. That is a completely objective definition.
4. Just randomly generate systems of laws and see. An overwhelming majority of them will not produce any living creature. Cellular automata experiments assume very particular systems of laws and capture a very special moment. Obviously, in such cases complex things of various kinds can arise, because you are putting the complexity in with your own hands. No research is needed for this. It is just straightforward statistical and physical common sense.
That's it. I'm done.
His response regarding point 2 after looking through your book.
Thank you for the book. I read a bit on the pages you pointed to, and it didn't convince me. I'm not sure I read it properly, but this is where things stand for now.
He tries to mock the idea of a world of infinite universes as a substitute for creation—I didn't understand why that's funny. Why is one Big Bang more logical than an infinity of them? But mainly, I don't understand how he assumes both a world of strange monsters and infinite universes. The moment he admits that by changing the constants you could get a world with monsters, then again there is no need for infinite universes. Our universe is the one and only example, and indeed monsters were created in it in the form of human beings and so on; with other laws, monsters of a different form would have been created.
That is, he did not clearly refute a world containing 'some kind of beings without a definition,' even if the constants were different. And that is really what I am saying: with different constants, you would get a world with a form of reproduction that has nothing to do with what we know. That of course depends very much on how one understands the essence of life. I say that any sufficiently complex being (and also one sufficiently free of forced design—and about that I want to speak in a book I will write…) is 'alive,' and even more than that. It seems that he limits the concept of life to a more specific domain.
I also don't know how one can calculate a world with constants different from ours. He can only know that the familiar laws of nature would not prevail there—but mightn't an entirely different kind of 'chemistry' emerge? Is he even capable of calculating a change in more than one constant? That is, if the gravitational constant were different, but some other constant also shifted in the appropriate direction, then perhaps we would again arrive at a chemistry of atoms the size of the solar system—who knows. Not I, but neither has he, done serious research on the matter.
There is no point in conducting a discussion like this.
What's the problem?
Relate to it as though I were the one making those arguments. I definitely understand them.