Q&A: The Minority’s Consent to Participate in the Democratic Game
The Minority’s Consent to Participate in the Democratic Game
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I looked into the argument you raise, that the moral right of the majority to coerce the minority stems solely from the fact that the minority agreed to participate in the game. And when the minority is not willing to participate in the game, or when the rules of the game are changed in a way on the basis of which it never joined the game in the first place, then the majority has no moral legitimacy whatsoever to impose its view on the minority. (Of course, it still has the option of trying to impose its will by force — the Altalena, for example.)
But when one looks at individual rights themselves, it is impossible to ignore that they exist only by virtue of society.
After all, in the reality of the world there are not really any rights. This is a conceptual notion that human beings alone created and assigned some sort of value to. (Each society and its values.)
A “right” is basically the definition of the relationship between the individual and society, and once an individual excludes himself from society, then his rights within that society disappear, do they not?
For example, a person’s ownership of property stems from the very fact that the public agrees that only he will have the right to control that property.
And even the right to life exists only because the public recognizes it and gives it value. (We have no moral complaint against a lion that devours a giraffe.)
In summary,
Would you agree to say that all of the minority’s rights are derived from society’s consent, and that when a minority removes itself from society, then in fact it has no rights in that society, and therefore it has no moral claim against the society when it acts in a way that harms its “rights,” which in fact do not exist!
Answer
The fact that rights are an abstract matter belonging to the realm of concepts is of course true. How did you jump from that to the conclusion that society or the majority are the ones who grant them? Some rights are indeed about the relationship between the person and society. How did you jump from that to the conclusion that society is the one that gives them?
In light of what I wrote here, of course not.
Discussion on Answer
Seems to me you’re getting tangled up for no reason.
The sheep isn’t impressed by the 2 wolves coming to devour it and doesn’t hand itself over to them just because they’re the majority.
It will run, climb trees, and do everything in the power of its legs and strength to save itself.
Maybe it will succeed, maybe it will be torn apart, but it won’t be convinced to surrender itself as prey just because they’re the majority.
Let’s say there are no rights — so what?
Should we agree to be devoured by a dictatorial government with no restraints?
Absolutely not.
We’ll make every effort and use every possibility to save ourselves and save others.
If that’s by virtue of right and morality, all the better.
And if, like the beasts of the field, there are no rights, no rules, and no morality, then the natural law of force returns.
And by force we’ve seen that the government did not succeed in doing what it plotted.
No, I mean in my answer here.
It’s like asking where morality comes from. Rights come from the Holy One, blessed be He, just as morality comes from Him (really, rights come from morality, which comes from Him).
The question whether democracy presupposes God is a good question. But I would first ask whether morality presupposes Him. In my opinion the answer is yes to both questions. Except that there are people who are mistaken and think morality has an independent status (and doesn’t need God in order to be valid). But as I said, they are mistaken, and therefore, as I wrote in column 456, they are either covert believers or inconsistent.
So if I understood correctly, the foundation of everything is really that there are absolute good and evil that morally obligate everyone.
That’s a pretty frightening thing, because it is basically a “moral” foundation for dictatorship, and it pulls the rug out from under the basic force of democracy.
There can be no moral claim against someone who “understands” that the absolute good is to destroy LGBT people, right?
In my opinion, democracy cannot be founded on the assumption that there are absolute values of good and evil, because that completely undercuts the rationale of “majority.” And it gives clear legitimacy to moral/value-based anarchy.
Of course you will argue that it is not true that destroying LGBT people is moral. But that is your subjective opinion (which you assume is absolute), and the “destroyer,” of course, will argue back that it is moral. And in the end, the stronger side will impose its values.
On the moral/philosophical plane there will be no decision as to who is right. And we’ve eliminated all moral justification.
You can argue about what moral justice is,
but it’s clear to both sides that a majority is not above or beyond that moral justice we are striving for.
The discussion began with the claim that the majority has no moral power over the minority unless the minority accepts the rules of the game.
My claim is that without absolute morality, the majority does not need the minority’s consent to be in the game in order to impose its “values” on it, because the minority has no “right” within society when it decides it is not part of society.
All this, of course, on the assumption that there are no absolute values, but only give-and-take among human desires.
But if it is true that there are absolute values, then clearly the forceful side/majority can impose its values on the minority, since they are absolute and the minority is bound by them against its will. Of course, the minority can resist if it has the power to do so, since it has value-based justification (its subjective values, which it holds to be absolute).
So in practice we arrive at the conclusion that whichever way you look at it, the majority can impose its values on the minority מתוך a moral justification (in its own subjective opinion, of course), whether the minority has removed itself from society or whether there are absolute values.
And at the same time, the minority can resist as much as it can (out of its own subjective moral justification).
Ronen,
What you wrote here is really bizarre. It’s דווקא the existence of objective morality that frightens you? And the absence of morality, or arbitrary and subjective morality, doesn’t frighten you? I have seen an upside-down world. Beyond that, my claim is that there is objective morality, and you say that this is a basis for dictatorship. Again, bizarre. On the contrary, morality says that dictatorship is something bad. The absence of morality is a basis for dictatorship.
In my estimation, you are simply mixing up two different questions: what morality is, and what will cause the world to follow it. The fact that morality is objective can only improve the world. And even if not — it could still be true. The fact that something is frightening does not mean it isn’t true. But beyond that, you are dealing with the question of how we should defend ourselves against wicked people who think it is moral to murder or be dictators. Why is that a question for me? How do you intend to deal with them? What does that have to do with the question of the objectivity of morality?
There absolutely can be a moral claim against someone who “understands” that the absolute good is to destroy LGBT people. And there can be such a claim only if one understands that there is objective morality. You cannot have any claim against that, because according to your approach morality is only an agreement. So there is someone who has a different agreement, or who simply doesn’t feel like honoring agreements. What will you do against him? Probably use force. That’s exactly what I will do too.
To say that objective morality provides a basis for subjective moral anarchy is really George Orwell in a nutshell (ignorance is strength, illiteracy is wisdom, etc.).
In short, it’s been a long time since I’ve seen such a bizarre message.
Without absolute morality, what rules is force. In your view, is that the best situation morally, or in terms of convenience? I’ve really lost you completely. By the way, if the minority has more force than the majority, it will rule the majority, so your remarks about the majority are unfounded in themselves even without all the other oddities in what you wrote.
I’ll explain what I mean.
When the (psychological) foundation of a person is that personal/subjective desire is the basis and cause of his relations with his surroundings (liberalism), then there is room for democracy to flourish, or at least to survive.
But when you establish a foundation that there is one truth, that there are absolute values to which everyone is obligated, then a person’s default assumption is that the other person is obligated to the absolute values (which I, of course, am the owner of).
Zeal for truth and justice will drive him into an LGBT demonstration wrapped in explosives from head to toe. (If he is unable to calculate what the worthwhile path is for realizing those values.)
I personally definitely think there are absolute values that obligate every human being in the world. But — and this is a big but — I do not assume that my relationship with others is founded on their being obligated to those values.
Democracy, in my opinion, is the arrangement of relationships among individuals in the least bad way available, where the foundation of that system of relationships is not the system of absolute values, but rather the subjective desires of the individuals (who may think of them as values).
Within my personal world of values and actions as an individual, I will try not to collide with my absolute values. But I will never be able to see them as a basis for coercing others — not when I am the majority, and all the more so not when I am the minority.
And from what I understood of your opinion, the minority definitely can impose its values (subjective ones) on the majority out of the thought that they are absolute.
And therefore I said that this leads to anarchy, because everyone will see his values as the absolute values of the world (for if they were not so, they would not be his values), and therefore he has the legitimacy to impose that on everyone. The minority too will feel good and whole with itself when it imposes its “values” on the majority. And that is exactly the “enlightened” public that feels it has the legitimacy to impose on the unenlightened majority.
As for your comment about the rule of force, it seems to me that even when there is absolute morality, you still need force in order to enforce it. In fact it is exactly the opposite: if there is absolute morality, then I have legitimacy to use force to coerce the other person (religious coercion). And if there is no absolute morality, then live and let live gets much stronger force. And that, in my opinion, is the essence of democracy. And this invention called substantive democracy is simply an oxymoron. It is really a religion = absolute values that everyone is obligated to, and the public has no say at all, and therefore one judge can impose values on 10 million citizens who think otherwise.
And it’s rather charming that my level of delusion is so exceptionally high.
I’m already exhausted because you’re not reading what I’m explaining. I’ll repeat myself one last time, and with that we’ll part as friends.
You are assuming all sorts of premises that are completely detached from reality and drawing from them conclusions that are even more detached. I claim that there is objective and binding morality. That does not mean that everyone thinks so, only that I think so. You say that this is a dangerous approach. To that I replied in two ways: 1. Dangerous does not mean false. 2. It is dangerous only if people selectively listen to me — they accept that there is objective morality (as I say), and then decide that this morality obligates murder (which I do not say). By contrast, on your approach everyone does whatever he has the power to do (in your sanitized language: personal subjective desire). And that’s not dangerous? What if someone has a subjective desire to murder you? Because you personally don’t have that desire? So what? Why do you assume that they will listen to you but not to me?
On the question of coercion I already responded. I too am against coercion, even though in my opinion there is objective morality. My objective morality forbids coercion. Beyond that, I already wrote to you that if in your view coercion is not justified, then don’t coerce. How is that connected to the question whether there is objective morality?
You write that you have objective values, but democracy is not based on them. That is irrelevant. If you have such values, then you are supposed to act according to them. And if objective values require coercion and will lead to cruelty, then that is what will emerge from your own method as well. I too do not assume that others accept my method. I do assume that it is my method and that it is the correct one.
The naive hope you express — that if we are pluralists and do not believe in universal values, things will be better — has been disappointed many times, and many good people have already written against it. The situation is exactly the opposite. If everyone acts according to his personal desire, that is a proven recipe for anarchy and cruelty.
That’s it. It’s hard for me to repeat myself again and again.
Thank you for the patience. I truly and sincerely did not understand your perspective.
And I think the reason you think I’m not reading what you write is exactly the reverse point — in my opinion, you do not understand what I’m writing, because I know at least about myself that I am reading what you write carefully.
Please, if you can, gather a bit more patience, because I’m not writing out of boredom, but truly out of a search for truth.
If you could please point out a problem or mistake in the presentation below, I really would be very grateful.
To me it seems as if there is an unnoticed dissonance in your view. As though you are traveling on two parallel tracks,
and when there is a problem on one track, instead of overcoming it or coming to terms with it, you simply move to the second track, even though at the beginning of the journey you did not get onto it at all and in reality cannot actually jump to it. (Except that in the world of thought, without paying attention, one can do such tricks because there are no real barriers to crash into.)
The relationship between individuals in society (“rights”) can operate in two ways:
Either it is based on universal values to which everyone is subordinate, from which both the individual’s rights and his obligations derive (which are really the rights of the other individuals). And according to this method, one individual can impose his values (which are really universal) on another, even if the other is not interested.
Or the relationship between individuals in society is based on agreements among them, and one person’s values do not obligate another. And the individual’s rights in society derive from agreements (arbitrary/self-interested/desires), and in the case of democracy, from the consent of the majority.
Agreed? Or in your view is there another way (rational and not arbitrary)?
This is a view of the system from above. Of course, for the individual within the system there is always the choice to die for his values. But that is his subjective perspective from within his life. Our discussion, however, is about the objective perspective on the system.
And again, I would greatly appreciate a response and some patience.
I’m sorry, but I’ve lost patience. We’ve completely exhausted this.
Maybe other readers will be able to understand my questions and answer them, or agree with them.
In any case, thank you for the time and patience so far.
Have a good day.
Ronen,
In my opinion it’s very simple.
Only someone who assumes an absolute (metaphysical) basis, on top of which objective morality can be built, also allows for the additional layer built upon the first layer — the level of relative and subjective morality.
Therefore, one who believes in objective morality — for example, in the very recognition that there is an objective basis for concepts like “justice” or “good” — can also allow discussion and debate about how to get closer to discovering that morality. According to his approach, all of us can be mistaken (including himself) in moving from the given objective level to a concrete act regarding which some subject made a decision.
For example, murder. The objectivist understands perfectly well that murder is an objective prohibition, but admits that his own definition of “murder” (like the definitions of others) is necessarily biased. After all, there are differing opinions on the matter. Consequently, he preaches keeping an open mind and is willing to discuss it.
In the eyes of the subjectivist, by contrast, there is no common standard to discuss. There is no room for rationality. If he decided to define something as “murder” in a certain case, then according to his view that is a truth that cannot be challenged.
From here one can move on to discuss democracy.
The topic of the thread is:
“The minority’s consent to participate in the democratic game” — this claim comes to explain the power of the majority to coerce the minority from a moral standpoint.
That is: the majority has no inherent moral superiority to compel the minority, and only the minority’s consent creates the moral legitimacy for that.
This claim comes to morally “justify” the minority’s “rebellion” against the democratic decision, and to strip the majority’s decision of its morality. That is, in such a situation the majority has no moral permission to coerce the minority, even according to the majority’s own worldview.
As I understand it, this claim is mistaken (or I did not understand it properly).
And the basis for understanding my claim — or my mistake — is the definition of democracy.
In my opinion, it is a management agreement among members of a group. That management agreement defines “rights and duties.”
If an individual withdraws from the management agreement, he loses all his “rights,” even the right to life, which exist by virtue of society.
There is not and cannot be any claim of “rights” against the society from which he withdrew, and no action of society toward him can be considered immoral unless the society itself decides so within the framework of its management.
Of course, since each individual has his own set of values (which are not at all the values of the group and are not binding within the group), those values will dictate his behavior toward the individual who withdrew. (Just as his values guide him in relation to animals or anything else outside human society.) And certainly, from the point of view of the individual who remains in the society, with respect to his own set of values there may be behaviors toward that individual who withdrew that he would regard as immoral.
But he will not be able to force society to behave according to his set of values.
The question regarding the rights of a minority that chose “not to participate in the democratic game” (what does that mean? In what sense is it “not participating”?) necessarily rests on morality, and in my opinion only objective morality is a stable support. Therefore, if you deny the reality of objective morality (and that is how I understood you), then your specific claim about the legitimacy of a democratic regime not to grant rights to a minority that has withdrawn is also meaningless. That is to say, from a subjectivist point of view like yours, I think your claim has no meaning at all (and neither do opposite claims).
Now, if you ask about the matter itself — about denying those rights — I do not have a very sharp answer, and maybe there cannot be one. What does seem to me possible to say is that there are quite a few cases in which democracy is still obligated to at least some of the rights of those who withdrew from it. For example, children. They did not exactly “withdraw” from the democratic game, but in any case we are talking about sociopathic and murderous creatures whom no democracy would proudly present as “model citizens.” Would you say that as a democracy we are permitted to deny them their rights completely (as your words imply)? I think even you would agree that we are not, and you would necessarily have to base your answer on “meta-democratic” considerations, that is, moral ones. Of course, there may be other situations (traitors, terrorists, etc.) in which the state has a moral and “democratic” right to deny rights to a minority that has withdrawn. But even that is not only by virtue of your belief that rights are solely the product of social convention, as you said, but because of an objective justification.
You wrote, “In light of what I wrote here.” If you mean the current answer, then I didn’t understand. And if you mean somewhere else, I’d be glad if you could point me to it.
In any case, if possible, please enlighten me: from where, in your view, does the individual draw his “rights”?
As I understand it, a person’s desire for the existence of a “right” of the individual within society is the reason for the existence of that “right,”
and therefore it is arbitrary and self-interested. And that is basically a give-and-take among the individuals in society.
Of course, the more enlightened and high-quality a society is, the give-and-take is conducted on a higher level, but that is only in the type of “rights,” because the reason for “rights” is always selfish desire.
Of course, if we assume that there is an objective “good,” that is, a world of values that exists outside man (maybe let’s call it divinity), then the whole calculation changes. But then the individual person has the legitimacy to impose that on the whole world. And that is certainly not the foundation of the democracy under discussion.