Q&A: The Meaning of a Heretic’s Commandments
The Meaning of a Heretic’s Commandments
Question
Hello Rabbi, regarding someone who according to the Sages is considered a “heretic”:
- Can he be counted as the tenth for a prayer quorum, so that he himself can pray with a quorum?
- If he joins a minimal quorum, is he causing others to stumble?
- Is there value in it when he fulfills rabbinic or Torah-level commandments—both from a halakhic standpoint and from a value-based standpoint (something like “What need have I of your many sacrifices,” meaning: if according to Jewish law he is disconnected from God / from the people, then perhaps there is no value-based significance to his observance)?
Or:
Is it possible to observe commandments without belief that the Torah is from Heaven?
Though I am asking about a case where there is some basis for observance of the commandments, but according to Jewish law he is still a denier and a heretic.
Thank you very much.
Answer
1. The discussion should be divided between logic and law. In my logical understanding, someone who believes in prayer and in the Holy One, blessed be He, joins a prayer quorum even if he observes nothing and even if he is a heretic. But someone who denies God, or the Torah, or prayer—even if he is like a child taken captive—is like a flowerpot. His joining has no significance whatsoever.
But one could argue that the law prevents a heretic from joining even if he meets the logical criteria—not because it has no value, but because they want to impose sanctions on him. In my understanding, this is not about sanctions, and even if it were—there are no sanctions against someone who genuinely believes what he believes, even if in your eyes he is considered a heretic.
2. If someone joins a minimal quorum and is not permitted to join, then clearly he is causing others to stumble. There is no quorum here, and people think there is. The same applies to any matter requiring sanctity.
Discussion on Answer
Obviously not. Someone who genuinely believes something is under compulsion (in matters of belief), and it makes no sense to impose sanctions on him. The Sages simply assumed that there could be a situation where a person does not believe because of negligence / impulse. They did not encounter people who had genuinely arrived at different conclusions, at least not in significant numbers. Nowadays that is the usual situation.
The question of who is a “heretic” is not really interesting. A person determines his positions for himself according to what he thinks, not according to the label—believer, apostate, heretic, denier, skeptic, and the like. Other people’s attitude toward him does not really matter as long as he believes what he believes. All these discussions are meaningless and there is no point dealing with them.
There is a moral problem (and also a halakhic one) in causing people to stumble in something they consider forbidden, even if you think it is permitted. See Column 503 and my article here:
How do you know that in the past people did not genuinely arrive at different conclusions, and denied only because of negligence and impulse? Is it not possible that the separatist sects in the Second Temple period truly believed what they believed?
Two reasons: 1. It is well known that the phenomenon of ideological denial of faith (secularism) is new—at least as a phenomenon. In the time of the Sages there was an apostate out of spite and out of appetite. There was no ideological apostate, at least not as a phenomenon. 2. If the Sages had seen before their eyes an ideological denier, then clearly they would not have imposed sanctions on him. He is completely under compulsion. But they do see this as a transgression that warrants sanctions, and therefore I conclude that apparently their deniers were not under compulsion. See Column 568, which was just posted now.
By the way, even if there were ideological deniers there, the presumption in the eyes of the Sages was that they were not such. The burden of proof is on the one who claims that he is. You see this in countless contexts.
Are you denying that in the time of the Sages there were many separatist sects, each with its own ideology, and not just plain deniers?
No. I deny that the Sages viewed them as ideological deniers (mistaken in their analysis). They saw them as sinners because of their impulse: apostates out of spite or out of appetite. And if there was someone who was not, then indeed sanctions would not have been imposed on him.
How can someone fail to believe because of negligence or impulse? At most, one can fail to carry out actions or behaviors that follow from belief. But if a person thinks a certain claim is true, no impulse can move him away from that.
It’s like someone who thinks that for health reasons he is forbidden to eat meat. Maybe he will be tempted and eat meat, but obviously he will not think that from a health standpoint he is allowed to eat meat.
Or a person who breaks the law because, say, of greed for money. That does not mean he thinks there is no law here.
If a person could choose what to believe, then people would live in an imaginary world and lose touch with reality. Because it is always easy to imagine that you are in a perfect world. To believe that the world you created is reality is impossible. Maybe under the influence of drugs.
You’d be surprised, but it definitely is possible. An apostate out of spite or appetite can also exist in matters of belief. He gets himself into a certain outlook because of impulse, and then lives inside it. This happens every day. A person finds justifications for actions he does, even though deep down he knows there is no justification here. I have discussed this in many places, and you can search here on the site for my discussion of the turkey prince parable.
There is an interesting letter by Rabbi Shach about “deceiving his Creator” (if I remember correctly, this was said about Cain). A person’s hat flies outside the Sabbath boundary or outside the eruv, and he convinces himself that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not see, so he quickly goes out and comes back. People convince themselves of many things.
If deep down he knows there is no justification, then where is the unbelief here? He believes, but suppresses the belief because of guilt feelings.
And if in the end he really does believe because of impulse, then it follows that a person really can choose to believe, and then how can there be compulsion in a person who does not believe out of ideology? After all, he could convince himself to believe and change ideology, but chooses not to.
Likewise, if a person can choose what to believe, then he can convince himself to believe nonsense because life is hard, and in practice lose touch with reality. Like believing that he will never die, that he is a billionaire, that he is Napoleon. But a healthy person will not believe these things. It doesn’t make sense to me.
Following up on A’s question,
why would someone go through this whole strange process of convincing himself there is no God and denying faith, and along the way also live a harder life without belief, instead of convincing himself that the prohibition he wants to violate does not exist, or that it can be bypassed in some way, as many traditional and even religious people do?
Yesterday I read about a traditional woman who believes, lights Sabbath candles, and prays, but does not keep the commandments. If she can convince herself that this is okay, why go all the way to total denial?
Also, if it is clear to him that his denial is not genuine, then doesn’t he believe while in denial?
People are complicated creatures. There are impulses, influences, etc. You are asking Rav Ashi’s question about King Manasseh.
Thanks for the clarity.
“there are no sanctions against someone who genuinely believes what he believes, even if in your eyes he is considered a heretic”
Meaning what? Did the Sages impose the sanctions of “heretic” only on someone who denies out of culpable negligence?
Or is he a heretic with respect to other people, but not with respect to himself, because from his perspective this is the truth and sanctions cannot apply to the truth? According to that assumption:
Even if according to the Sages I do not count for a prayer quorum, if according to my own view I can count, then I have no problem “causing others to stumble,” because I know I am right—just as it would be permitted for me to feed someone a piece of meat about which 100 witnesses testified that it was forbidden fat, if I know it is permitted fat. (Or am I mistaken in that case too?)