Q&A: The Uncertainty Principle, Hume, and the Cosmological Argument
The Uncertainty Principle, Hume, and the Cosmological Argument
Question
Good afternoon!
The accepted interpretation of the uncertainty principle is that there really is no causality at the subatomic level.
If so, a few difficulties occur to me: 1—How can one assume that there is no causality, when causality is not the product of observation but is imposed on our cognition a priori? If so,
on what basis was it decided that there are no causes there? At most, shouldn’t we say that we simply have not managed to identify what the cause is?
2—Insofar as we do in fact learn that causality exists only in the macro world (and is in any case only statistical), then the cosmological argument collapses, since
there is no reason to assume that causality applies there as well. In other words, all causality exists in our perception of the world only at the everyday level.
3—Some argue that one cannot raise an objection to free choice from determinism because of the uncertainty principle. But the difficulty is that insofar as one uses this to answer
questions of causality, then one should claim that there is no causality at all regarding the cosmological argument—so how can one dance at two weddings?
Isn’t it simpler to assume that there is causality, and still say that it can be intervened in and changed? (Though I assume Heisenberg had good reasons to deny this.)
Thank you very much!
Answer
1. I never said anywhere that it is forced upon us. God too is without a cause. I said that the truth of the principle of causality is a priori. That does not mean it is certain or necessary, nor that it has no exceptions. And still, that is the default.
2. Same as above. In my view there is causality in quantum mechanics too, just not in the usual sense. I explained this in The Science of Freedom and in God Plays Dice. First, the quantum character of the world is a cause; second, there is a distribution of outcomes, and that itself is a cause.
3. I didn’t understand the question. In The Science of Freedom I explained that quantum mechanics has nothing to do with the question of free choice. See there.
Discussion on Answer
No. A distribution points to something in nature. Think of a loaded die, where the distribution of outcomes is a one-quarter chance of an even result and a three-quarter chance of an odd one. Why does that happen? Because the structure of the die (the weight distribution) is a certain way.
Compare it to another die with a different distribution—for example, one-quarter for odd outcomes and three-quarters for even ones. That would mean the structure of this die is different from that of the first one.
Every distribution has a root in reality; it merely describes its outcomes.
If so, what is the basis for the assumption that there is no causality in quantum mechanics? After all, that is the accepted interpretation.
I wrote that this is a different kind of causality. It operates on the wave function and not directly on the measurement outcome.
With Heaven’s help,
The Rabbi wrote that the statistical distribution itself, for our purposes (the distribution of outcomes), is the cause. But the difficulty is that this seems to say only that in nature itself there is no cause at all, but only in us, on the side of the phenomena, so that we can make sense of things. But is there really no causality in nature itself?