Q&A: Saving a Life on the Sabbath
Saving a Life on the Sabbath
Question
In section 329, paragraph 2, the Shulchan Arukh rules that in a case of saving a life we do follow the majority when they all left their fixed place of residence (nine gentiles and one Jew), following the rule "whatever separated is treated according to the majority."
And in paragraph 3 it is ruled that even with several doubts piled one on top of another (perhaps he is not there, perhaps he is not alive, perhaps he is not a Jew), one still desecrates the Sabbath.
From a statistical perspective, I do not understand why the 33% in paragraph 3, for which it is permitted to desecrate the Sabbath, is different from the percentage in paragraph 2 (which could also be two gentiles against one Jew = 33%), where one does not desecrate it.
Answer
I haven’t checked, and I’m answering off the top of my head.
First, when there are three doubts, that is not 33% but 12.5%. There are not 3 possibilities here, but 8.
Beyond that, a statistical way of looking at these cases is incorrect. I wrote here in the past (see, for example, the columns on probabilistic multiplication, and the columns on an immediately present majority) that in most cases of doubt and majority, this should not be translated into 50% or some particular percentage. You do not really know whether the chance that he is there or not there, and whether he is alive or dead, are equal. These are counts of possibilities, not percentage quantification.
Also regarding the very comparison between a double doubt and majority: that is only according to the Rashba, who sees double doubt as an implementation of the rule of majority. But according to most opinions these are different rules.
Now to your question. Since this is not about statistics, these are formal rules and not statistical ones. And Jewish law relates to them as such, not as probabilities. According to Jewish law, in this case one does not follow the majority, but in a case of doubt one is stringent even if there are multiple doubts.
In this Talmudic passage they draw fine distinctions between different situations and different kinds of majority. I seem to recall that in Sha'arei Yosher, at the end of volume 1, he discusses this at length.
Discussion on Answer
Of course I would, since nowadays one should desecrate the Sabbath even for a gentile.
If we are talking about the gentile of earlier times, an idol worshipper, a descendant of Amalek
Then Jewish law forbids it. I assume that whoever found himself in such a situation would find a way around it. Doing it in an unusual manner and the like. No one would leave a person to die over a formal issue.
I mean a person who is not supposed to die (not an Amalekite).
And if one imagines a situation where, for the sake of the rescue, you must perform the labor in the normal way, without any unusual modification, what should be done in such a case?
Then theoretically one is supposed to refrain and leave them to die. It is a big question whether I would do that. The obligation to obey the ruling of the Talmud stands against the value of life, and the question is which overrides which.
If you reached a situation where there is a majority and a minority, and you have a reasonable concern that if you do not desecrate the Sabbath someone here will die, would you not desecrate the Sabbath?