Q&A: 'And Do Not Stray'
'And Do Not Stray'
Question
A clarifying question:
In the lecture on dogmatism, you cited Maimonides' words about "and do not stray" and explained the basic difficulty in it. In the end you presented two models: (1) A person who is genuinely in doubt and examines other religions out of real uncertainty—such a person does not violate "and do not stray," and it cannot be that there is a prohibition for him. (2) A person who wants to justify various desires and urges on an ad hoc basis, and therefore adopts alternative theories. About this it says "and do not stray," since the various positions are only a cover, and he himself—inwardly—knows that there is nothing to these theories.
I want to ask about a third case, not as extreme as the previous two: (3) A person who believes, but out of intellectual curiosity and broad-mindedness is interested in additional positions—what is his status? On the one hand, it seems quite clear that here too there is no prohibition, because either way: if he comes to believe it sincerely, then once again he is under compulsion. And if he does not believe it, then what is the problem? After all, he is not justifying any problematic desire. Is it possible to say that there is a prohibition in the very object itself, to engage in these topics? And perhaps that is what is meant by "and do not stray." That is, the prohibition applies specifically when a person believes in God, while the transgression consists simply in the fact that these topics are idolatry. If so, then it is quite clear that there is no need to reach your proposal that the problem is the justification of desires, since the prohibition lies in the very engagement with this problematic realm.
Of course, this suggestion rests on the assumption that there is such a prohibition at all (engaging out of cultural or intellectual curiosity). Are there indeed authorities who explain it this way?
Answer
First, I should clarify that I do not accept either of those two positions. In my view, even the second formulation is not reasonable, because it cannot be that a person is forbidden to think about and engage with substantive arguments even if his motivation is problematic. What if, out of his impulse, it turns out to him that he really is mistaken? Is what I currently think necessarily the truth? Even if I have no doubts, it is still not reasonable to forbid me from checking.
Perhaps there is room to explain that the prohibition is not on reading books and becoming familiar with the arguments, but only on adopting them as a kind of split consciousness (that is, when deep down you know it is not true).
This already comes very close to the situation you describe. But now the question no longer arises, because there is no prohibition on engaging with these topics, only on drawing conclusions if in your own eyes they are not correct. In that case, the motivations for engaging these topics are irrelevant.
Beyond that, I have already suggested in the past that this is a prohibition meant for those who accept it. One who accepts such a prohibition does not have autonomous thought, and therefore the prohibition is relevant for him. One who possesses autonomous thought knows that such a prohibition has no meaning, and therefore will not accept it. Notice that this comes very close to the formulation I proposed here. In essence, there is no prohibition on engaging with this, only on forming positions in a way that is not genuine. Here I am only adding that this is a prohibition intended to protect people who are likely to form positions in that way.
Be that as it may, I am not dealing with the question of what explanations exist among the halakhic decisors for this prohibition, since the various explanations are nourished by different philosophical conceptions. I discuss it according to my own view, not as an investigation of the different approaches. By the way, Maimonides also wrote that there is a prohibition here, and at the same time engaged in it quite a bit.
Thank you for the detailed response.
Yes, I understand. Nice.