Q&A: David Hume’s Argument
David Hume’s Argument
Question
1. In your opinion, does David Hume’s argument apply to other religions as well? That is, miracles are not something impossible, but even if they are possible, they are not at all probable; and just as we do not, by default, believe all kinds of fortune-tellers and the like, that is only the default and does not contradict our belief in Judaism?
2. If we were to assume that there was some idolatrous religion based on good evidence for miracles and so on, would you take it seriously?
Answer
I didn’t understand the questions. Indeed, it is not probable, and it depends on the reliability of the testimony. It has nothing to do with which religion the testimony comes from.
Discussion on Answer
What do you mean by idolatrous? That some stone is God?
That there is an idol or idols that revealed itself and claims one must obey its commandments—would the very fact that the religion is idolatrous, believes in multiple gods or in a limited god, be a reason not to believe it or not to be bound by it, even if it has a strong tradition with reasonable evidence?
I asked you what you mean by an idol. That some stone is God?
Either multiple gods, or a limited and embodied god—that’s what I mean by an idolatrous religion.
That same tradition, if it conveyed to me a triumvirate of gods, would be acceptable to the same extent. An embodied god—I don’t know what that is. I would not accept a tradition about an all-powerful stone that created the world.
Does the very fact that the religion believes in several gods not detract from its credibility or from the religious obligation toward it?
I wrote that it does not. There’s no point in repeating the same question again and again.
What I meant to ask was: if there were a reliable tradition, say to the same degree as Judaism’s, only for another idolatrous religion, what would you do? Would you reject it because it is idolatrous, or is the fact that it is idolatrous not in itself a problem?