Q&A: On the Logic of a Present Majority
On the Logic of a Present Majority
Question
Hello and blessings,
It is accepted by most halakhic decisors and commentators (and one could discuss whether this itself is a present majority or a non-present majority in its own right, but that is a longer discussion), that a present majority is stronger than a non-present majority.
For example, if we found a piece of meat in a city, and in that city there are ten stores selling kosher meat and one selling non-kosher meat, we rule that the meat is kosher, because it is reasonable to assume that it came from one of the majority stores — those selling kosher meat. But here is the problem: this assumes that we need to investigate which store the meat came from, and we rely on the majority that is supposedly relevant to the specific issue we want to decide — whether there is a majority of kosher stores or not. That sounds like a convenient assumption, but not necessarily a correct one.
Suppose that out of the ten stores in the city, nine also sell vegetables and one sells only meat. Would we now assume that the piece of meat came from one of the stores that also sells vegetables — because most stores sell vegetables? And if nine stores are painted white and one is painted blue, would we then have to decide that the meat came from a white-painted store because most stores are painted white, and so on? Based on different indications and characteristics, we would end up deciding that the meat came from different stores — which means that we cannot really use this kind of majority to determine where the meat came from, and the very strength of the claim seems to work against it.
By contrast, a non-present majority is much more logical: most acts of intercourse are with the husband, most animals are not non-kosher, most people who buy oxen buy them for plowing, etc. This is a majority based on a broad assumption about reality, and therefore irrelevant characteristics and indicators do not create this kind of problem.
Therefore, if we found meat in a city, it would seem proper to check whether most of the meat in the city is kosher or non-kosher, and rule accordingly regarding the meat’s status — not to search for where it came from and then use whichever characteristics are convenient for checking the majority.
Thank you very much!
Lavi
Answer
First, that is seemingly the straightforward meaning of the Talmudic passage in Hullin, as Rabbi Shimon Shkop noted at the beginning of Gate 3. However, he brings that Maimonides disagrees there. Second, there are halakhic authorities who say exactly this (to take the size of the store into account). Third, your argument is not connected to the question of which of the two types of majority is preferable. On that issue, you can search here on the site — I have written about it more than once. See, for example, Column 79 and more.
Discussion on Answer
I wrote that this is what emerges from the plain sense of the Talmud. Rabbi Shimon also writes this explicitly.
As for your claim, the majority of white stores is irrelevant. It indeed came from stores painted white, but that has no practical implication. We examine what interests us, and there we follow the majority. So I did not understand your argument.
That is exactly the flaw: defining the practical implication as the exclusive criterion in the probabilistic calculation / clarification by majority of which store the meat separated from. Why relate only to one characteristic (kashrut) that distinguishes between the stores? There are many other variables. After we discuss all the variables and decide from which store or stores the meat separated, then we can check whether they are kosher. After all, the probability assessment of which store the meat came from does not specifically depend on its kashrut; it is a question of real-world probability, and if we use other characteristics as the criterion (for example, the color white), we will reach different conclusions.
It seems to me that this is what Rabbi Shimon himself argues, in somewhat different words (and therefore he later explains that this is a majority similar to the majority of judges, etc.):
“Indeed, when we come to judge in the case of the nine stores and determine that the separated meat is from the nine stores that sell slaughtered kosher meat because the majority makes it more likely that this event occurred among them, this clarification is not true. For regarding each one of these ten stores we could conclude that the meat did not separate from it, since there are nine others against it, and in any case it separated only from one of them. And in the reality of the separation there is no distinction between slaughtered kosher meat and carrion; therefore the whole idea of clarification and decision is nullified here. And since there is no clarification of reality regarding the very separation of the meat, there is likewise no clarification at all regarding the kashrut of the meat.”
Many thanks
No flaw at all. You are mistaken in your probability calculation.
Suppose there are 6 white stores and 4 black ones. And there are 9 kosher and 1 non-kosher. Suppose all the white ones are kosher, and among the black ones there are 3 kosher and 1 non-kosher. What is the probability that the meat came from a non-kosher store? The probability that it came from a white store is 0.6 and from a black one 0.4. This must be multiplied by the probability that, if it is a white store, it is kosher (1), and if it is a black store, it is kosher (0.75). The result is: 0.6*1 + 0.4*0.75 = exactly 0.9. The variable of color is irrelevant.
The flaw is not in the probabilistic calculation of the chance that the meat is kosher, but in calculating where the meat separated from irrespective of its kashrut.
If we assume that six of the stores are white and only two of the white ones are kosher, then if we use the characteristic of color before the characteristic of kashrut, we would conclude that the meat is non-kosher, because it is likely that it came from a white store and most white stores are non-kosher. If we conclude that it is kosher because there are also four black kosher stores, then it follows that it separated from a black store (since most kosher stores are black), even though black is the minority overall in terms of color.
It follows, then, that when we deal with determining the source of the meat on the basis of a present majority, we focus on the central characteristic of the question — kashrut. It is just that this now becomes very similar to a non-present majority, because an empirical examination of the stores can yield contradictory results, since the overall probability calculation would include countless variables based on observed characteristics, and we would not arrive at a decision.
I do not understand the insistence. It is indeed a flaw in the calculation, exactly as I explained. You are just repeating it in other words. We’ve exhausted this.
Thank you very much, Rabbi Michi.
Thank you very much for the references.
I looked at Sha’arei Yosher, Gate 3, and indeed he uses exactly this reasoning to explain Maimonides’ view that a non-present majority is preferable. And I saw the Rabbi’s illuminating comments in Column 79, where he analyzes the matter.
However, from the words of the Talmud: “A present majority, such as nine stores and the Sanhedrin — that is not what we are asking about; what we are asking about is a non-present majority, such as a minor boy and minor girl — from where do we know it?” it seems that a present majority is more obvious.
My argument is that if the examination of the majority is about where the piece of meat came from (and only afterward, once we know that, we decide whether it is kosher or non-kosher), then counting the number of stores that sell slaughtered meat versus non-kosher meat is not necessarily relevant, even though it sounds right. The number of stores painted white gives us the same sample — after all, there are additional variables and characteristics that distinguish between the stores, so why should we check only the kashrut characteristic? But with a non-present majority, even though it is not a majority established by local observation, the majority and the ruling need to stem from the same reason.
Therefore, it makes more sense to check how much kosher meat there is in the city and not how many stores sell kosher meat (and indeed, as the Rabbi noted, some maintain that if most of the meat in the city is not slaughtered kosher meat, then even if the number of stores selling slaughtered kosher meat is greater, one cannot rely on a present majority against a non-present majority).
More power to you!