Q&A: Ontological Understanding of the Proofs for the Existence of God
Ontological Understanding of the Proofs for the Existence of God
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Many times, in proofs for God, we begin from an intuitive observation in this world, and based on certain foundational assumptions we infer the unknown—God.
For example, in the cosmological proof, we assume that everything in our world requires a cause; if so, then the world as a whole also requires a cause. Therefore God exists—that is, a being that is its own cause.
And similarly with the physico-theological proof: every complex thing, which we could have imagined being this way and not otherwise, requires an intelligent cause. If so, then God exists, who assembled the world.
But I have a question: why assume that such a thing can exist—a being that is its own cause?! Doesn’t that seem to the Rabbi like an illogical idea?
B. If we were to assume that a heavenly voice informed us that this world was created without a planner or cause, but is eternal—would such a world be called its own cause? Or would it simply be a contingent reality without explanation?
C. In the physico-theological proof, does a being that is its own cause mean a being that we could not have thought might be constructed differently, and therefore is not contingent?
After all, if such a being could have been built differently, and it is very unique, etc., then it itself would require a planner.
Answer
A. If you had asked me casually, I would have said that indeed it sounds a bit implausible. But since there is a regress problem, that itself proves that there must be a being that is its own cause, or a necessary existent.
B. The question is whether creation ex nihilo is possible. I tend to think not, but that is of course a result of my experience. If I were to see clearly (through a heavenly voice) that my experience was wrong, I would retract my view. Then I would have to ask the heavenly announcer whether the world is its own cause, or a necessary existent, or whether it simply came into being. I don’t know how to answer such hypothetical questions. By the way, if it came into being at some stage, then it is probably not a necessary existent. See my debate with Copenhagen on this issue.
C. I didn’t understand remark C. Is there a question there?
Discussion on Answer
Since a reality in which our world has existed for an infinite amount of time is not something I understand, I cannot answer your question. The source that revealed this to you would also have to answer the question.
That being does not need to be structured in a particular way, since we are speaking about an intelligent being. You are assuming that this is some mechanism that generates the world mechanically, and then its structure dictates the world. But I am speaking about an intelligent being that decides what the world will look like, not one that produces it mechanically.
Thank you,
but why does the Rabbi assume that something which is not its own cause must have an emanator (if it is eternal)?
After all, the assumption that everything requires a cause is learned from pure reason and not empirically, but it is learned with respect to occurrences.
In the case of an eternal being, we do not have to assume an occurrence that emanated that thing.
Gilad, these are pointless word games. A composite thing requires a composer / emanator / rationale, unless its reason lies within its own essence. I have nothing to add.
A. Thank you.
B. I meant that you would know clearly that the world is eternal and was not created—and without an emanator.
Would such a world be called its own cause? Or just a universe without explanation?
I’m asking in order to understand your definitions of these terms.
C. This was a question meant to understand the concept of being its own cause with respect to the physico-theological proof.
The physico-theological argument is that every unique being, which we could have imagined looking different, requires a designer.
If so, then what stops the regress in the physico-theological proof is a non-contingent being, one that we could not have imagined being structured differently?
That sounds to me like a more “strange” being than what stops the regress in the cosmological proof. In the cosmological case it is its own cause. Here it is a being that cannot be structured differently. Consequently it is not unique (because the uniqueness of something is determined from a broad set of possible events that could have happened, but here it could not have been otherwise).