Q&A: Several Questions I Came Across
Several Questions I Came Across
Question
Hello Rabbi, I have several questions I came across and didn’t know how to answer all of them, and on some of them I’d prefer to hear another side of the issue:
- The argument of Occam’s razor: Occam’s razor claims that when we have two explanations accounting for the same phenomenon, we should prefer the simplest explanation. It is argued that God is a complex explanation, and that we should prefer the naturalistic explanation, on the grounds that it reaches the same explanatory quality regarding the world while relying on a less complex explanation.
Why is that not correct? And is it really preferable to assume God?
If all natural phenomena can be explained without God.
2.
The lack-of-motivation argument: If God is omnipotent, then He can fulfill all His desires, aspirations, and dreams without creating anything. Since there is a universe, and it is claimed that God created it, it follows that He has needs—so He is not omnipotent. If God exists as a perfect being, then He would not create the universe—a perfect being has no wants or needs. God created the universe, which means He has wants and needs—therefore He is not perfect.
3.
Spinoza’s argument of natural divinity: If God exists, He occupies all of space-time ("There is no place empty of Him"). Therefore, God has no personal sense of "I"; He has no self-awareness, because everything is part of Him, and He does not distinguish between "I" and "not-I." If God has no self-awareness, then there is no difference between Him and an unconscious universe governed by the laws of nature.
4
God-time relations: God is not "above time," because He acts and therefore is subject to change and causality, and therefore subject to time (and of course did not create it). God is not eternal, because He had a reason to create the universe, and the motivation for that reason did not exist until after an infinite period had passed. During an infinite period, God had no reason to create the universe, and at some point on the timeline, a reason to create the universe arose. It cannot be that for an infinite period God had no reason to create the universe and afterward did, because such a reason was among the possibilities available to God regarding the nature of His future actions.
5. Why is it not a deficiency if God does not know the future?
Thanks in advance. Maybe to some people it feels disrespectful to copy and paste, but I don’t think so, and if it is, then I apologize in advance.
Answer
I have no problem with copy-pasting as long as the relevant information is presented here clearly.
1. The razor is a criterion for choosing between two explanations that account for the phenomenon. But the naturalistic explanation does not explain the phenomena. After all, you could say that a theory with only an electric field is simpler than a theory that also contains a magnetic field. So why do we think there is a magnetic field? Because the theory without a magnetic field does not explain the phenomena. See the third and fourth notebooks on the site for why God is needed in order to explain the phenomena.
2. Here you mixed together two different questions: a. Why does He need to fulfill His wants through the world and can’t do so without it? b. Why does He have wants?
In the first, there is a logical mistake. For example, I am omnipotent and want to be the owner of a triangle, so I create a triangle. Does it make sense to ask why I create the triangle rather than become the owner of a triangle without creating a triangle? That is precisely how I fulfill my will. Even someone omnipotent cannot be the owner of a triangle without creating a triangle that he owns. That is a logical rule, and even the Holy One, blessed be He, is “subject” to logic. See an explanation of this here.
In the second question, it is a matter of definition. Say that He has wants and not needs. It was not that He lacked something, but rather that this is what He considers right and fitting.
3. Here too, the formulation is unsuccessful. The problem is not with a personal sense of self (what would a “feeling” of God even be? That is nonsense), but whether things exist at all. To that I would say that there is existence outside God. The contraction is literal. Although it is sometimes customary to say there is not, that is a mistake. We, for example, are not Him. The world is not Him. See the second notebook for a discussion of pantheism.
4. God is not subject to time, but our conception of Him is within a framework of temporal concepts. You also assume that time is infinite, but at least in current physics it is accepted that it is not. And in general, the concept of an actual infinity is conceptually problematic. On actual and potential infinity, see the second notebook.
You can always say that from the outset He had a will that when such-and-such a point in time arrived, the world would be created. That itself was His will from eternity, and nothing was renewed at that point in time (somewhat like Einstein’s letter to the family of his friend Besso after his death). This is certainly true in the deterministic view, and therefore it is at least consistent even if not correct. And if so, there is no problem raising this idea with them just for the sake of this discussion, even though I am not deterministic in my own outlook.
5. God knows the future, just not our actions insofar as they depend on free choice. To know in advance the result of a free choice is an oxymoron (it means the choice is not free. See Newcomb’s paradox, which I also discussed here previously). See again also the link in section 2.
Discussion on Answer
Also, if contraction of the Holy One, blessed be He, is possible, then why in cases asked here in other contexts, like “can the Holy One, blessed be He, turn Himself into a human being,” was the answer negative? (Isn’t contraction a contradiction of infinity? Why is it reasonable here but not there?)
There are several possible answers to this. For example, think of a two-dimensional shape that does not occupy three-dimensional space. That is how we are in relation to the Holy One, blessed be He. That is the explicit implication of the words of Nefesh HaChayim on the matter of contraction.
The problem with turning Himself into a human being is not because a human is finite, but because if someone shoots him he will die and cease to exist, whereas He is a necessary existent (one who necessarily exists). And if He would not die, then He would not be human (because a human being who is shot dies).
Very briefly, regarding the question about pantheism: if we are not part of the Holy One, blessed be He, even though He is not material, doesn’t that mean He is not infinite (because we occupy His “space”)? How does literal contraction fit with that?