Q&A: A Question Following the Debate on “Head-to-Head”
A Question Following the Debate on “Head-to-Head”
Question
With God’s help
Hello Rabbi, I just watched the debate, and there were a few things that remained unclear to me afterward. I’d be glad to hear your response to those questions.
1. First, you prefaced your remarks by claiming that the statement “There is a God” is not a scientific claim because it is not falsifiable.
But that isn’t precise, because there are phenomena in the world that could serve as evidence against the thesis that there is a God. The strongest of them are the difficulty of “divine hiddenness” and the evil that exists in the world. I don’t think the Popperian criterion requires the possibility of falsification only if the information reaches us after the scientific thesis is presented and not during it.
2. In the debate you agreed with Aviv that nothing is necessary, and it also seemed that you agreed with him that at some point we arrive at a brute fact.
Likewise, you agreed to narrow and revise the idea that complex things require an explanation, so that it applies only to things of the sort we know (and in this way you avoided the regress).
But I didn’t find any explanation of why not stop the chain of turtles at the laws of nature themselves or at the singularity point, rather than preferring an external cause—especially since it seemed you did not dispute his claim that even the very existence of the laws of nature is not exactly known to us.
3. Also, you didn’t explain why you think that the entity that serves as the stopping point must specifically have the property of a kind of “human-like” will, even though you mentioned it.
If so, why is it only an entity with will that counts for you as an “other kind of thing” that does not require a cause, while a universe-generator, as Aviv suggested, is not a good stopping point? (Or for that matter, just some unknown mechanism that produces a single universe like ours.)
If you had not had prior knowledge that free choice exists in reality, would you still have proposed the cause of an entity with will, or did you simply forget to mention that you are reasoning from the familiar: just as you have will and control matter, so too one may assume a more powerful factor with will that controls matter.
4. It was clear to him in the discussion that the linear timeline is an incorrect and naive point of view. It seemed that you agreed with him about that (you only claimed that there is no connection between a timeline and causality). You also said that you wrote books about this, but I am not familiar with them, so I wanted to ask what they are.
Thank you very much, and Sabbath peace.
Answer
1. There are various possible explanations for that. It is very far from being a refutation of God’s existence. Especially since we were not discussing whether He supervises and is involved in the world, so it is not relevant at all.
2. Laws require a lawgiver. There has to be a reason why they are as they are.
3. I explained this (a mechanical thing would also require an explanation). A universe-generator also requires an explanation (or it itself is God), especially since there is no indication whatsoever of the existence of additional universes.
4. In The Science of Freedom there is a chapter on causality. As for the timeline, that is just nonsensical rubbish. Even if there is dependence on time, an infinite number of causes does not necessarily take an infinite amount of time. It can be a convergent series. Beyond what I told him—that causality does not require time.
Discussion on Answer
A. Correct. Of course one could distinguish and say that Occam’s razor is a methodological principle and not a claim about reality. But in my opinion you are right.
B. Even without knowing watchmakers, anyone who encountered a watch would not think it created itself. Take an African who has never seen a watch in his life—I assume he too would conclude that there was a watchmaker here. See Appendix B to my book God Plays Dice.
B. But even the African knows human beings as makers of tools.
I hope to go over the appendix.
2.3
Let’s assume we are talking about a generator whose entire role is to create a single world—our universe.
Why would you prefer to place at the position of first cause some agent with will rather than something—an agent without will?
(Leave aside the semantics that, from your point of view, you would really call either the first or the second “God”).
I didn’t understand what is meant by a generator whose role is to create a single world. That is God. You prefer to call Him a generator? I have no problem with that.
The question why assume that He has will—because otherwise He Himself would be mechanical, and then again a reason would be required for why He is built that way and produces specifically universes like these.
That is exactly where the question lies: why does a mechanical thing, in your view, require a cause, but an entity with the property of will does not, in your view, require a cause? Why is it a better stopping point? Remember that we have no acquaintance with mechanical things being created (laws of conservation).
I think it is because you assume dualism and several accompanying metaphysical assumptions tied to it (for example, that the soul is simple).
But if you are a materialist, why not say the opposite: an entity with will should surprise you more in its existence and require more explanation for its existence.
It is worth returning to the starting point.
I do not assume anywhere in this argument that it has will. I only prove that there exists an entity that does not require a cause for its existence and that created everything. After the argument, I add from my own reasoning that a first cause should have will and discretion. A mechanical thing is unlikely to be a first cause and the cause of itself. A mechanical thing that creates a world is itself a kind of mechanism and therefore requires a cause. A first cause needs to be a being with will. But as stated, this is already a different discussion from the physico-theological one.
Beyond that, after we have reached the conclusion that such an entity exists, it reveals itself to us and tells us that it has will and that it wants us to do or not do various things. That too can complete the physico-theological picture and show that this entity has will.
“After the argument, I add from my own reasoning that a first cause should have will and discretion. A mechanical thing is unlikely to be a first cause and the cause of itself. A mechanical thing that creates a world is itself a kind of mechanism and therefore requires a cause. A first cause needs to be a being with will. But as stated, ****this is already a different discussion from the physico-theological one.****”
What do you call this discussion? Because I think it would be appropriate to open a separate focused question on it; I believe I won’t be the only commenter there.
You can open a discussion about anything. But that is not what the debate was about.
Hello Rabbi, I’m posting here two insights of mine from the discussion, and I’d be glad to read your opinion on the matter. I’m attaching them to an existing thread in light of your request not to open new ones unnecessarily.
A. A flaw in Aviv’s remarks:
Although he limits causality only to things that exist in reality (the physical reality, otherwise God too exists in reality), that does not prevent him from using Occam’s razor outside reality as well (regarding God’s existence without sufficient proofs). This despite the fact that both of these rules have the same status: they are neither logical nor observational, but rather derivatives of reason. Seemingly, once he was not convinced by your arguments, he should have remained a skeptic with no way out.
B. A misleading aspect of the watchmaker argument:
The watchmaker argument is misleading because in the case of the watch we are comparing the possibility that it came about by chance with the possibility that a person produced it (as Hume showed regarding miracles, everything has to be understood against the background of alternative theories). Since we are familiar with watches made by human beings and not with watches that formed by themselves, the theory of planned manufacture is preferable. In contrast, regarding complexity in the world, we do not know a “producer of complexities” from elsewhere; rather, we are proving its very existence on the basis of the complexity. I am not claiming that the complexity argument is wrong, only that the watchmaker argument does not illustrate it accurately.