Question

Hello, honored Rabbi. My name is Haim, and I am a Haredi kollel scholar from Rekhasim. I recently purchased your book 'God Plays Dice', and I was very happy to discover that there is also a rational approach to Judaism. After searching a great deal (and secretly) for someone who could give reasonable answers to questions that, in my eyes, are critical to my life as a Jew, I finally found your book, which simply puts the problems on the table as they are, without fear of being labeled a heretic—which I fear so much. More power to you. And to the question itself: in your above-mentioned book you concluded that the existence of the four forces and the other physical constants in a form that appears purposeful for the creation of the universe proves the existence of a metaphysical intelligence. In addition, you rejected Dawkins's argument about the multiverse theory as a claim that assumes more than is needed to understand the world in the theological view. A — seemingly, Dawkins's argument is based on assumptions rooted in empirical physics. True, parallel universes have not been observed, and apparently also cannot be empirically verified, but their existence is within the conditions known to science. Whereas the assumption of an independent entity possessing intelligence, to which attributes of will and the like are attributed (necessarily), is perhaps more intuitively appealing, but it assumes the existence of a new domain in science, none of whose aspects can be empirically examined. If so, why is there still a higher probability for the existence of God than to assume that time stretches infinitely backward together with the existence of parallel universes, but still within scientific laws?! B — another area. Regarding free choice, I saw a video explaining your position about the basis of free choice. There you explained that it is necessary to accept a deviation from the principle of causality in order to explain the expression of choice. In addition, you argued that the causal chain formed before a person's choice, which seems to compel him to choose this way and not another, is a parallel chain and not necessarily a cause—like David Hume's analogy of the two clocks. And all this despite the fact that, seemingly, the 'parallel' process always corresponds exactly to the person's choice. And here I have to ask: surely you would agree with me that the parallel process is completely causal and deterministic. If so, then the choice predicted from it is also, seemingly, necessary and without cause. Unless you argue that all the parallel processes of all humanity from the dawn of its creation just happened, by chance, to correspond exactly to the free choices that each and every person made. That is a somewhat hard assumption to swallow, is it not?! I would be very glad if you would contact me by telephone only (since as a Haredi person I am socially limited with various means of communication), at the number 0527634376. Many thanks, and more power to you.