B. The fact that one can show that every complexity is a property with low probability does not mean that it is an "objective" property. It only means that we found a way to define reality coherently that will always give us a low probability for that property.
The practical implication is that we have no reason to assume that another intelligent entity would be impressed by complexity. Unless, of course, you define the intelligent entity as one that can distinguish between complexity and non-complexity. (Which is not far-fetched.)
And you still need to find the likelihood of such an intelligent entity causing this complex thing. If it has free will, then apparently there is an even greater difficulty, since one cannot assign it an internal probability.
Especially if this is a primordial entity, and you believe that it itself created the values, then the difficulty is even greater (it's all picking). On the other hand, you already found an independent side-proof from morality.

I didn't understand the claim. Entropy is a quantity in physics. Are you claiming that it too is only a product of our way of thinking?

I'm not sure there is a connection between entropy and complexity. But even if we define it that way, it is still only our way of thinking. True, this property allows us to examine cases coherently that are statistically unlikely. But that still does not mean another entity would care about that property.

Let everyone care about whatever they want. And if they want something else—let them take a pill. Who was talking here about what excites anyone? I think we've exhausted this.

The Rabbi used that word from the creature's side in column 144, p. 2. Here I borrowed it for the Creator. You can use the expression "way of thinking" instead of "to be impressed," as appears, for example, on p. 5 there.
But fine, I already know you don't want to get into this debate… and for some reason, in the book too, you didn't want to. (And that is a bit telling.)

I'm willing to get into any debate, and I don't recall any evasion in the book either. Except that I don't see a debate here. What I do see are things I explained very clearly, and there's no point continuing with them.

Whether there really is evasion here or not probably depends, to some extent, on the observer.
In any case, somehow, many, many people not only disagree on this issue, but simply do not understand your words up to now, including some whom I personally know who argued with you. And they are not suspected of poor reading comprehension.
By the way, the column itself also begins from certain assumptions that are simply not sufficient.

Although the Rabbi defined complexity as objective through the discussion of entropy, he also defined that this is not enough—because scientifically one can assume that entropy increases in one place in the universe and decreases somewhere else. Rather, this law is only a scientific formulation of the natural intuition that complexity does not arise on its own. Here the Rabbi added that, in terms of rarity, any event can be equally rare, and uniqueness is the criterion here. But uniqueness can be in the eye of the beholder. Therefore, the Rabbi said that ultimately the objective dimension of uniqueness is the correlation between the uniqueness in reality and our perception. That is, the fact that there is a precise match between our intellectual perception of uniqueness and the uniqueness we encounter in reality—that is the unique situation (not merely a rare one) among countless possible situations, and therefore it is unlikely that precisely that would occur randomly.
And my question is that this fit can also be explained from a naturalistic point of view—the entire world developed through an evolutionary process, and therefore there is a fit between the world that developed in a certain evolutionary way and the intellectual perception that developed in that same way, as part of that same world. So there is no reason there should not be such a fit between different parts of reality that developed together, without any higher factor.

I repeat that according to this, there is no point in introducing a quantity like entropy into physical calculations. It is built on our way of looking at things. And in general, if this is how you see our way of thinking, then it should not be trusted at all. That already takes us into the realms of skepticism.

So then I don't understand why in column 144 the Rabbi found it necessary to explain that the objectivity lies in the correlation between our thinking and the complexity of the world, instead of just relying on the definition of entropy.

As far as I remember, I was trying to explain why this is not just a random series of dice-roll outcomes (that is, how it differs from a series of sixes).

Right, but the Rabbi presents this as a difficulty with our very perception of uniqueness, which is defined according to measures of entropy. And to that the Rabbi answers: "The uniqueness is only in your eyes, but the correlation has objective significance" (The First Existent, 229). On this point I raised the difficulty above: perhaps the correlation too has no more objective significance than our entropy-based perception itself (that living creatures are something special), since it too is part of the same evolutionary system that created our minds, and therefore there is no reason such a correlation should not exist. Therefore, apparently, there is nothing in the correlation that teaches us about anything beyond it, other than that reality is coherent.

I'll answer with an example. My sister once worked as a counselor at a summer camp in Canada. On the Sabbath she went to the lake near the camp, and suddenly someone came over there. Later they spoke, and it turned out that he was from Jerusalem (she too was living in Jerusalem at the time). She was stunned by the coincidence. I told her that the chance of his being from Jerusalem is similar to the chance of his being from any other place. After all, he has to live somewhere, right?
But of course that is not a correct argument. She herself is from Jerusalem, so in her eyes Jerusalem is a special place. The probability that he came from Jerusalem should be compared to the probability that he came from the rest of the world. Jerusalem is special only because she lives in Jerusalem, but given that the person standing there is her, and she does indeed live in Jerusalem, this is an objective uniqueness. Her amazement that the man was a resident of Jerusalem was justified.

What?! I think all the understandings I had of your proof are wrong…
It does fit with a few lines in column 144, but it still doesn't fit many other places.
And what about the column you wrote about your car breaking down and someone from Yeruham happened to show up for a ride, and you said that wasn't special?

Oriel, do you have a reading of this? I'm really pretty much at a loss with the Rabbi's words.

I just now thought that maybe you define the concept of objective differently 🙂

I now understand that the discussion of subjective uniqueness was only regarding the series of sixes (where one cannot speak of entropy—since the macroscopic state of a series of sixes contains exactly one microscopic state, just like any other number), and the difficulty it posed for the physico-theological argument was not from the subjectivity in entropy (which certainly is not correct), but from the ability to prove something from statistics (statistics in reverse). Right?

I didn't understand.

I didn't exactly understand how the series of sixes poses a difficulty for the entropy argument, since with regard to it one really cannot define entropy, and therefore the uniqueness in the outcome is subjective (does a series of sixes have less entropy than any other series? After all, every particular series of numbers has only one state of numbers that will yield that macro-result). In my last response I tried to define the connection between them precisely, but if the Rabbi does not understand, then apparently I do not understand his words. I would appreciate it if the Rabbi could explain.

I lost you. I'll briefly explain what I mean.
Entropy is not defined at all for a microscopic state. Entropy is the number of microscopic states for a macroscopic state. Therefore it makes no sense to ask what the entropy is of a given series. Entropy is the number of series for a result defined globally. For example, when one rolls a die 1000 times and gets 1000 sixes, that is a macroscopic state. Its entropy is zero, because there is only one microscopic state like that. By contrast, any other series is one realization out of many of a macroscopic state with higher entropy. For example, one hundred 6s, two hundred and fifty 5s, and so on.
When you see a series of sixes, you understand that you got a unique string (low entropy), because it is the only realization of the macroscopic state of 1000 sixes. When you get a different string, it is not unique, even though its probability is identical to that of the sixes. The probability of the macroscopic state is essentially different. That is my definition of uniqueness as opposed to rarity.
Of course, if I am a creature for whom a certain series is special, then from my perspective it will have low entropy. And its appearance will be a phenomenon requiring explanation. Still, if you see a string of 1000 sixes, you will conclude with certainty that the die was "fixed." Why? Because from your perspective this is a special series. No other series would bring you to the same conclusion.
But life is a low-entropy phenomenon independently of our way of looking at it, since its entropy is low in physical calculations. The emergence of life requires a scientific explanation, and people are not willing to regard it as an ordinary phenomenon, just some random and meaningless thing. Therefore the claim that we see life as special because we are alive (evolution) is not relevant to the discussion.
But I'm ending here. I am worn out by these endless discussions.

If so, then why does the Canada case require an explanation? הרי that's not objective?
If so, then there are two possible ways for something to require an explanation: either objective uniqueness or subjective uniqueness, and according to your view both are valid. So why are you trying so hard to argue that the case here is objective?

In any case, the Rabbi could use his dualist assumption and his acquaintance with free choice to argue that certainly most worlds would not allow consciousness to be implemented in the physical world, so if so, clearly this state of affairs requires explanation. If almost all worlds except for a few isolated ones would not allow life, then this too assumes that entropy here is objective, but in a much more straightforward way.

I clarified this. Because with respect to life, if I were satisfied with subjective uniqueness, there would be room to argue that evolution explains that uniqueness and no further explanation is needed. Therefore I argued that here there is an objective dimension.