A. I wasn’t asking about the reasoning of how it is possible to distinguish between the two halves and say that each has a different status.

I was asking about a contradiction between the two rulings specifically. After a certain person ate the first half that did not separate (and therefore did not fulfill his obligation), is there any logic in obligating him to eat the second half? I didn’t find any reference to that in your words. What is the logic in requiring him to go back and eat from that same piece?

B. As for Shev Shema’teta: today I saw in Shev Shema’teta with the notes of Rabbi Ganievsky a similar question, about an impure piece that became mixed with other pieces, and half a piece separated, and afterward the two halves touched one another. Do we say that the half that separated became impure from the half that did not separate?

C. Regarding the question whether majority creates or reveals, does this question apply also to “follow the majority,” or only to a one-in-two mixture?
To the best of my knowledge, in a mixture of prohibition and permission, one in two, there is room to ask whether the rule of majority clarifies that this specific piece is permitted, or whether the majority merely removes the prohibition. And as is known, even in a mixture, majority cannot create a new status; at most it can remove statuses. Therefore a permitted piece does not become prohibited in a one-in-two mixture (with practical relevance where there is no olive-sized amount within the time to eat a half-loaf).
But with “follow the majority” I never heard of a doubt between these two possibilities.
So do you hold that regarding a single matzah that we come to judge on the basis of “follow the majority,” the majority of matzot that were baked for their own sake can “create” for it the status of having been made for its own sake?

Thank you very much!

A. I don’t see two rulings here. In the first case he did not fulfill his obligation because of doubt. In the second he fulfills his obligation with certainty. Therefore it is more reasonable that the half outside, which has a positive status, draws along with it the half in the mixture, which has no definite status (it is in doubt).

B. Regarding impurity, in my humble opinion there is no question. If it is in a private domain, then the doubt is certainly impure, and if in a public domain, then the doubt is certainly pure. It seems forced to me to say that fixed place is different and that the laws of doubt are applied even in matters of impurity.

C. Regarding the question whether majority creates or reveals, you are right. But one can discuss the half that remained in the mixture (not the one that separated). The fact that it is in a state of fixed place reveals that it was not for its own sake, or turns it into not-for-its-own-sake.
I’ll just note that according to Rashba, one-in-two dry mixed with dry, the rule of nullification is based on “follow the majority.” So it seems that according to his view there is no creation here but revelation. But as is known, his words are disputed.

Thank you.

A. I really didn’t understand. If the half outside draws the half inside after it, then he already fulfilled his obligation when he ate the half inside, and if so he should be exempt from eating the half outside. No?
That was the question: whether he must be required to eat the piece outside after eating the one inside (according to the Pri Chadash and those who agree with him, who do not hold that one half draws the other along).

B. I don’t have the book with me now, and I’ll check it, God willing.

C. I didn’t understand why one needs to say about the half inside that there is revelation or disclosure concerning it. After all, were it not for the law of “majority,” what would be before us is a “doubt.” Now that there is “majority” here, and opposite it there is “fixed place,” the law of fixed place removes the law of majority, and we return to the original situation that there is doubt here.

A. Maybe there is such a possibility, but I’m uncertain. And the reason is that perhaps this drawing-along happens only when the second half is eaten; otherwise there is no halakhic determination regarding it, and in any event it would not draw the other half after it. In other words: the question is what half I ate, not what the nature of this half is in itself.
C. Because the law of majority applies to the half outside, and regarding it there is no law of fixed place to cancel its determination. Fixed place cancels the determination of majority only regarding that piece which remained in the mixture, not regarding the piece outside that separated.

A. Meaning that only after the person eats the half outside does it become revealed that he had already fulfilled his obligation with the half inside.
Very interesting.
According to this, if the whole piece is as large as an olive-sized amount, then when he eats the olive-sized half outside, can he fulfill his obligation by combining it with the half-olive-size inside?

C. So the inquiry whether majority is revelation or disclosure applies only to the half outside (and also to the one inside, after he eats the half outside, according to your view)?

A. I was speaking mainly about the second case (combining them into an olive-sized amount). But yes, if the half inside is enough, there may perhaps also be room for this line of reasoning (though there is no need for it, since he fulfills his obligation with the outside half). More than that: it may be that only if he needs the outside half in order to fulfill his obligation will it draw after it the one that remained in the mixture, because if he does not fulfill the obligation with the outside half, then no status of “for its own sake” is fixed for it (since the question was never raised with respect to it).

C. On the contrary: the outside half is separated, and there, as you correctly wrote, it is obvious that the majority reveals and does not create. Only with respect to the half in the mixture is there room to discuss the laws of nullification by majority, and there one may ask whether this reveals or creates. True, there it is fixed and is not nullified, but still, if the laws of nullification by majority reveal rather than create, then even the state of doubt in fixed place is a doubt about what its true status is, and such a doubt can be resolved by the majority pertaining to the outside piece that separated. But if the laws of nullification create a new state, then the fixed-place status of the half in the mixture is not a doubt about what it is, but a newly-created doubtful state. And then it seems that the outside half cannot reveal anything about it, because its status was created by the mixture and is therefore different from that of the half that separated. In such a case there is no basis to connect the two halves.

With God’s help, 28 Shevat 5778

A good use for the doubtful matzah would be to place it as the middle matzah on the Seder plate, since the part that remains on the plate (and continues to be “fixed”) can serve for the olive-sized amount of “who brings forth [bread]” for which baking for its own sake is not required. And the part set aside for the afikoman would then count as “separated” (especially if it is hidden away), and for it we would follow the majority of matzot that were baked for their own sake!

With blessings,
S.Z. Levinger

And perhaps there is a way to repair a matzah that was not baked for its own sake: by cooking it and thereby removing its status as bread, and then baking it again for its own sake, so that its renewed transformation into bread is done “for its own sake.” This requires practical clarification, and may the Rock of Israel save us from errors and show us wonders from His Torah speedily in our days. Except that one may wonder, as its fitness comes through sharp pilpul, whether we should consider this “the taste of matzah,” which is the idea of simplicity 🙂

In the last paragraph, lines 3–4:
… one may wonder regarding a matzah whose fitness came about through sharp pilpul, whether it is considered…

But one should consider whether my suggestion that the doubtful matzah be the middle matzah, and the afikoman count more as “separated,” would seemingly involve a problem of “nullifying a prohibition ab initio.”

Still, one could say that simply setting it aside for the afikoman does not yet eliminate its fixed status, and only when the child grabs the afikoman and hides it does the matzah become “separated”; and the child hiding it certainly does not intend to nullify a prohibition. So it would seem, though in practice this requires clarification.

With blessings,
S.Z. Levinger

To the Rabbi S.Z.L.:
Whenever the doubt arose in the fixed place, it will not help afterward if it separates from there; it remains in its prohibited state. And not because of nullifying a prohibition ab initio, but because of the law of fixed place.
And I went back and considered your way of mixing piety into Jewish law, to see under which prohibition one might warn you, but I couldn’t come up with anything (see responsa Chatam Sofer, Orach Chaim 1, end of siman 51).

One may be lenient about mixing piety into Jewish law because it is a case of one type mixed with a different type. Although on the other hand, it is a case of nullifying a prohibition into something permitted ab initio. See the Chatam Sofer there, who nicely distinguished between sowing mixed species and plowing with an ox and a donkey together. Study it well.

I didn’t understand what leniency there is in mixing one type with a different type more than one type with the same type. On the contrary, with same-type mixtures, Torah law is satisfied by majority, whereas with different-type mixtures one needs sixty.

Unless our Rabbi follows the view of the responsa Ramatz (M.A. 8), that even according to Raavad, who holds that nullifying a prohibition ab initio is forbidden by Torah law, nullifying one type into a different type is prohibited only rabbinically (the reverse of the reasoning of Noda B’Yehuda and Chatam Sofer), and therefore he leaned toward leniency in mixing piety into Jewish law.
And perhaps in practice one should rule: leave Israel alone (and S.Z.L. too), for it is better that they be unwitting rather than deliberate sinners. After all, we rule (in Yoreh De’ah 99) that one who nullifies a prohibition—if done intentionally it is not nullified, if done unintentionally it is nullified.

And I did not come to issue a practical ruling until our Rabbi agrees with me, since this touches on the severe laws of mixed species.

With God’s help, 29 Shevat 5778

To Aharon—greetings,

I did not see anything in my remarks that had to do with piety. You raised a difficult question concerning a person who is alone and has only matzot among which one matzah baked not for its own sake became mixed in, and certainly his unfortunate situation requires a halakhic solution; finding a solution to his distress is our legal duty, not a matter of piety.

Seemingly, the solution is simpler than what I suggested, namely: he should eat an olive-sized amount from each of the matzot and intend to fulfill his obligation with those baked for the sake of the commandment, for since he ate from all the matzot, he certainly ate an olive-sized amount and more of matzah baked for its own sake. In this way he fulfills the Torah obligation of eating matzah. The problem would remain only if there are many matzot, such that he cannot eat an olive-sized amount from each one in order to remove the doubt.

Therefore I suggested two solutions:

Solution A:
That he should leave an olive-sized amount of matzah for the afikoman, which will become “separated” when it is snatched, and regarding it we will say: follow the majority.

To this you objected from what is stated in Rema, Yoreh De’ah 110:3, that separation after the doubt arose in fixed place does not change the law of fixed place.

However, one could say to this that since a matzah not baked for its own sake is permitted to be eaten, the doubt begins only when he reaches the stage of “motzi matzah,” when he wants to fulfill his obligation; and by that stage, the afikoman matzah has already separated from its fixed place.

Solution B:
That he should cook the matzot until their appearance as bread is removed and they lose the status of bread, and then bake them again for the sake of commandment-matzah—so that their new coming-into-being as bread is done for its own sake.

This solution sounds over-sharp (and that is why I jokingly noted that perhaps one does not fulfill the obligation of matzah with a “peppered” matzah :), but I think it is a real solution, since after cooking the matzah has lost its status as bread, and its second baking is already a new creation of bread, and that was done for its own sake.

May it be the will of the Lord our God that there never be such a case of an isolated and lonely Jew on the holy festival night!

With blessings,
S.Z. Levinger

S.Z.L.—the question is not a practical one, of course. It is meant in order to discuss the reasoning of fixed and separated. So we can imagine any possible scenario. True, if all the matzot are before him he can eat from all of them. And if not—he can also ask a neighbor.
For purposes of the discussion, the case here is that only the two halves are before him: one that separated by means of a non-Jew or a child who lacks legal acumen, and one that has the law of fixed place because it separated from its fixed place by means of a Jew. And the fixed place is the bakery.

Your claim that snatching the matzah for the afikoman is like separating before the doubt became known is, in my opinion, incorrect for two reasons. First, the Seder table is not the fixed place in our example (and I don’t know whether it can be called a fixed place at all). Second, because the doubt already exists before the matzah is snatched (just as you would not say that someone who has no appetite or is waiting half an hour after eating dairy, and manually separates a piece of meat from a mixture, is considered as one who separated before the doubt became known). And this is completely clear.
As for your solution of cooking the matzah and then baking it again: I am not expert in the laws of baking matzot. But it seems to me that once he cooked the matzah it can no longer become leavened. And therefore when he bakes it again, this no longer has the status of leavening, and anything that cannot become leavened cannot be used to fulfill the obligation of matzah. But as I said, I do not know the law in this, and I would be glad if you corrected me.

Solution B that I suggested seems not to help, because although the new baking is done for the sake of the commandment, the requirement is that the guarding from leavening be for the sake of commandment-matzah, and here after the first baking it can no longer become leavened.

What might support leniency is the reasoning of Oneg Yom Tov (siman 42) and Oznei Yehoshua (Orach Chaim siman 1), that one fulfills the commandment of eating matzah even with matzah that was not guarded. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef discusses their words in Chazon Ovadia, part 1, p. 888ff., and Rabbi Moshe Harari brings it in Mikra’ei Kodesh, Laws of the Seder Night, chapter 7, note 77. At any rate, in a mixture there may be room to combine this into a double doubt. This requires clarification.

Regarding “two contradictions in one piece,” see also the discussion of Rabbi Raphael Bitran regarding one who was stringent not to eat matzah on Passover except for the olive-sized amount on the Seder night—whether he may observe this stringency even with the leftover piece of matzah from which he fulfilled his obligation, since that would involve two contradictory positions in the same piece.

Rabbi Raphael Bitran was one of the sages of Constantinople and a colleague of Rabbi Shlomo Eliezer Alfandari. His discussion appears in his book Middot Tovot on the Mekhilta, edition of Yad Harav Nissim, Jerusalem 1988, pp. 352–354. It is also cited by Rabbi Moshe Harari in Mikra’ei Kodesh—Laws of the Seder Night, chapter 7, note 73, p. 314. To the best of my knowledge, the commentary on the Mekhilta with Middot Tovot is also in Otzar HaChochma.

With blessings,
S.Z. Levinger

S.Z.L., again, you are moving into other territories. The question was meant to examine the idea of fixed and separated, and instead of solving it you went looking for a lone opinion that one can fulfill the obligation even with matzah baked not for its own sake. As they say: nu, fine.
Second, the position of Oneg Yom Tov does not solve my question. What did I ask? Whether after eating the first half that did not separate, there is still an obligation to go back and eat the half that did separate. This question remains in force even according to Oneg Yom Tov!
For even Oneg Yom Tov agrees that there is an obligation to eat matzah baked for its own sake. He only argues that the requirement of “for its own sake” is a secondary law, such that one who ate matzah baked not for its own sake has fulfilled his obligation, but has nullified the commandment of guarding.
Therefore even according to his view one may ask whether the person must be required to go back and eat the half that separated in order to fulfill the commandment of guarding.
The question of Rabbi Raphael Bitran does not seem related to me, but I have not seen his arguments and reasoning. I would be glad if you would quote or upload a scan of his words, from the edition of the distinguished institute for which you are responsible.

Rabbi Bitran discusses this at length for about three pages (pp. 352–354), and in fact distinguishes between his discussion and the discussion regarding an animal of which part remained fixed and part separated. As I mentioned, his book is included in Otzar HaChochma, and anyone who wants may look there.

Regarding the animal of which part is fixed and part separated, he summarizes the discussion among the halakhic decisors:

“Indeed, we have found something similar—a single entity half of which is forbidden and half permitted, as happened in the time of the author of the Tur, of blessed memory: seven animals were slaughtered in the house, and two and a half were taken out to the meat market, and afterward a trefa defect was discovered in one of them. The four remaining in the house are certainly trefa, and the two in the market are certainly kosher. As for the divided animal, one part of which separated to the market, the decisors disagreed about it: some permit even the half that remained in the house, since the half that separated from it is permitted by law, so too what is in the house is permitted; while others forbid it entirely. But according to all of them, we do not say that one animal should have one half permitted and one half trefa. However, Pri Chadash, in the final appendix to siman 110, disagreed with them and concluded that each part remains in its own place: the half in the house is forbidden and the half that separated is permitted.”

It seems that according to most halakhic decisors one does not distinguish within the same piece—either all is forbidden or all is permitted—and your discussion is only according to the reasoning of the Pri Chadash. And regarding matzah there may perhaps be a triple doubt: (a) perhaps this matzah was baked for its own sake; (b) perhaps the law follows the view that what is fixed is drawn after what separated; (c) perhaps the law follows Oneg Yom Tov and Oznei Yehoshua, that one fulfills the obligation with matzah that was not guarded.

And since here we are speaking of a situation of great pressure, of a poor and lonely person who cannot get help from neighbors, and there are three doubts, I would suggest that he eat the matzah, since in any case it is permitted to eat—but he should not recite a blessing, because of the rule that in a case of doubt concerning blessings one is lenient. In practice, one should ask a sage.

We are still left to clarify regarding the poor fellow under discussion whether he has the other needs of the meal, and presumably he has no meat or wine either, and the matter requires thought—how can we help him celebrate the Festival of Matzot with joy! Perhaps we should organize a collection among the readers of the site 🙂

With blessings,
S.Z. Levinger

Incidentally, Rabbi Raphael Bitran was also sometimes called “Aharon.” Professor Benayahu suggests that his original name was “Aharon” and it was changed to “Raphael” because of illness. He notes that the sages of Constantinople continued to call him “Aharon” even after his death.

Regarding the reasoning of the Pri Chadash to distinguish between the part that separated and the fixed part:

I am not steeped in the subject, but at first glance it seems that the reasoning is that each piece is judged separately. That makes more sense to me when the discussion is a question of prohibition, where each piece is judged as to whether it is kosher or trefa. But with matzah, the matzah is certainly permitted. The question is not about the piece but about the person—whether he fulfilled the obligation of matzah or not. And in a discussion about the person, there is no distinction between one piece and another.

That is what seems to me from my “layman’s understanding,” and I leave it to the judgment of those who study the matter!

With blessings,
The above-mentioned S.Z.L.