Q&A: Libet Experiments – Imposing the Veto
Libet Experiments – Imposing the Veto
Question
With God’s help,
Hello Rabbi,
In the previous discussion, the Rabbi mentioned that to the best of your knowledge, the newer Libet experiments still showed that there is no RP that occurs before the veto imposed by the subjects.
And moreover, you wrote that in your opinion there is, in principle, no way to detect an RP before a veto. You only mentioned there the magic phrase “this is not the place to elaborate.” So I thought it was important (and appropriate) to open a new question on this, so that you could write your position on why it is impossible to detect an RP prior to the veto.
Because to some extent, if the studies do not succeed in showing absolute determinism reigning in our brains at the neuron level (which apparently also will not happen, and certainly not in the near future), then with these points you have managed to argue that it will never be possible to establish a fully deterministic approach on the basis of brain research!
Answer
It is impossible for several reasons:
- Philosophically. In my view, the veto is the result of a free decision (= non-deterministic). Therefore, by definition, there should not be an RP before it that determines it.
- Scientifically. If there were an RP before it, one could impose a veto on that as well, and that veto too would need an RP, and so on ad infinitum.
- Scientifically. As far as I know, imposing the veto is an unfamiliar mechanism (whose very existence is disputed). Even those who claim it exists say so on the basis of the result (that there is an RP and yet the person does not act accordingly). They do not point to veto neurons. So in any case it does not seem possible to identify an RP responsible for the veto when the veto mechanism itself has not been identified and is not known.
- By definition. The veto is by definition a different kind of act than a mere neural computation. If it were part of the deterministic mechanism itself (that is, activated by an RP), then it could not be called a veto. It would simply be part of the computation performed in the brain, at the end of which there is an RP for the action. If one defines a veto as something beyond the RP, one means an action that is not part of the computation. From this it follows that the very definition of some act as a veto means that it is not a simple neural action. Note that this argument is not based on my philosophical view (as in section 1).
And indeed I argue that nowadays it does not seem to me that there will ever be a way to show determinism in brain research, at least not by Libet’s method. And this is so even if they make every possible refinement. I explained this at length in the book.
There, I elaborated.
Discussion on Answer
1. Obviously. That is why I wrote that this is a philosophical claim.
2. The veto is only an implementation of a decision. The feeling being described is that of a decision. How this is actually carried out is another question.
3. Correct.
4. This is not semantics. The libertarian claim is that there is a veto, and that it is not part of the computation. So you will not find an RP for it. Of course, one must also add here what was written in 3, that the veto is an assumption meant to explain the decision and not a scientific finding.
These are words I do not understand. It seems to me that you do not either. Be that as it may, if you accept such an absurd suggestion, then the entire discussion is void from the outset. Even without assuming a veto, one can always say that the RP indeed precedes the decision, but it is the result and not the cause.
1. 3. 4. Thanks
2. I didn’t understand the claim. Even if the veto is an implementation of a decision, how can one say that in practice this is carried out by imposing a long regression of vetoes on the initial vetoes that have RP? That does not sound reasonable at all.
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Regarding the idea I raised, it is not an absurd suggestion, because if so, how does the Rabbi accept that choice influences knowledge that preceded the choice in time? And if not, then how do you resolve the difficulty of choice and foreknowledge? And one who accepts that assumption—why should he not accept that the soul, which is a simple and abstract spiritual thing, can influence backward in time.
My claim is that there is not necessarily awareness of every stage in the computation in the brain. There is a feeling of decision. How is this actually carried out in the brain? That is another question. It can be a very complex process. And in general, many of our actions involve different regions of the brain simultaneously. Therefore there is no one-to-one correlation between a feeling and a brain action. And besides, this whole chain can happen simultaneously, with the veto, if it is imposed, being only the result of such a computational process. But all these are casuistic subtleties that are unnecessary. I have already explained my principled position.
I did not understand the claim. I do not accept that the Holy One, blessed be He, has prior knowledge of acts that depend on choice. Moreover, in my opinion, whoever thinks so is confused. And the Newcomb paradox proves it.
Thank you very much for the answer.
I didn’t really have much free time to respond until now.
1. I didn’t understand. After all, when we come to examine this very assumption—whether imposing the veto also has an RP preceding it—we have no reason to assume that assumption in advance…
2. I agree that if an RP occurs before the veto, then one could also impose a veto on it. But we do not have the feeling that we impose a veto on the veto. So in practice it does not sound reasonable to claim that. After all, the will reflects our judgment, and if we did not experience a feeling of a veto on the veto on the veto, why should we claim that we do this?
3. I agree. By the way, according to the studies, did the people experience the stirring of the urge to move the hand and then impose a veto on it, or did they not even feel that? Because your words imply that they were not aware of imposing the veto at all. So the whole reason we assume this is only because of the result—that there was an RP and nevertheless the person did not act accordingly.
4. As I understand it, what you wrote is entirely a semantic word game. But not at all a principled reason to object to the existence of the veto. As if, instead of veto, call it an “RP-canceling action.”
P.S.
A philosophical question occurred to me about the very existence of the RP. Why can’t one argue that the will, which is later in time, constituted a cause of the RP event that occurred earlier in time?
After all, nothing prevents us from claiming that the result precedes the cause. And as is well known, the soul is in the aspect of (though not literally) a part of God above.
Thank you very much, have a peaceful Sabbath