Q&A: Libet’s Experiment, Types of Decisions, and Nihilism
Libet’s Experiment, Types of Decisions, and Nihilism
Question
Regarding what you wrote, that Libet’s experiments are not relevant to the question of free will because they did not test a real dilemma, but only pressing a button that has no significance for anything—according to this, do you think Libet’s subjects should have done nothing at all (basically, stopped cooperating with Libet…), since in their case their will was not free anyway but deterministic?
Answer
I didn’t understand this sophistry.
Discussion on Answer
From the determinist point of view, if he pressed, then he had to press. So what exactly is this question supposed to mean?
And you had to answer his question (because that’s why you set up the site).
You still haven’t demonstrated a single act of free choice.
It’s like talking about the existence of unicorns without bringing even one example of a unicorn in reality.
So on that I agree with you: there is free choice, in the conceptual world of the thinking person.
I think part of this pilpul is built on the premise that only a servant of God is truly free.
Decisor, I ate a cucumber today, and in my opinion I had free choice whether to eat it or not (and how wide to slice the pieces, and whether to peel strips from the skin). What’s wrong with that example?
Rabbi Michi,
It’s not only “from the determinist point of view,” but also from the libertarian point of view, because you admit that decisions of this kind are not free but deterministic (and that’s why you argue that Libet’s experiment is not relevant to the question of free will).
So do you agree that in decisions of this kind, a person is expected not to decide anything and not to do anything?
Like I said, I have no problem with your view. “There is free choice, in the conceptual world of the thinking person.”
But physically speaking, we live in a world with physical laws. And in that reality, what happens is dictated by the force of those laws. Even if you strongly believe that Santa Claus will come, he won’t come in reality. Unless you identify your worldview with reality—in other words, you’re delusional.
One of the People, I answered exactly that.
Decisor, then what kind of example are you expecting? You claim a priori that there is no free choice and everything is deterministic, but for some reason you present your claim as though the only issue is that no example has been given. There is an example—eating a cucumber—and each side describes it according to its own view. I see in it free, non-deterministic choice (physics didn’t cause me to decide to eat it), and you don’t.
Common sense says there are no unicorns, no Santa Claus, and no free choice.
All these concepts stem from feelings, desires, and passions—not from scientific experiments.
Nature shows the opposite of those feelings. And a person must c h o o s e whether he goes after reason or after emotion.
Fine, I just don’t understand why you present your claim as though no example was given. There is an example, and that’s what the dispute is about, and in your opinion common sense rules generally and sweeping that there is no free choice. Your subtle point—that a person does choose whether to follow reason or emotion, and whether you mean free choice in the non-deterministic sense—I didn’t understand.
The example you gave is an example of a cucumber and a mouth gnawing on it. These are examples from the physical world, which, as far as common sense can tell, operates not freely but according to clear laws.
You claim, based on emotion, that this is free choice. One of the reasons for that feeling is that you didn’t feel the reason why you chose to eat a cucumber. Emotion—that’s not proof. That’s how people once proved the existence of gods, demons, and spirits. They didn’t understand the cause of things. That’s how religions were born.
Rabbi Michi,
Is that how you conduct yourself in life? In every hesitation of this sort, do you abandon the will and let things happen by themselves?
You’re claiming, based on emotion, that this is not free choice, and you also have no proof. Nobody claimed to bring proof for free choice, only to say that there’s no proof to the contrary, and that the inner sense of plausibility supports the free existence of choice. And this has all been ground down like Gerber baby food.
No problem if what I’m claiming stems from emotion. The basis is scientific: there are laws of physics.
With you, the basis is emotional. Only because that thought makes you feel good. More precisely, only because denying that thought makes you feel bad. That’s why you believe in it.
I don’t have that blockage. I wouldn’t mind believing there is free choice—on the contrary. It would fit the feeling that there is no cause forcing me to decide things.
I need to be more precise. It’s not “to believe there is no free choice,” but rather “to think there is no free choice.” Because on the emotional level, which belongs to belief, every person is compelled to think he has free choice, for the reasons I described.
In my opinion, you didn’t describe me correctly. Unlike some wise and discerning people, for example, I think there isn’t the slightest tiny trace of any emotional/judgmental/experiential implication between determinism and choice, and in my opinion the whole yes-choice/no-choice question is blown out of all proportion and for some reason has become a respectable discussion instead of a specific question that is interesting only to a limited, curious degree. But the possibility is entirely coherent and not far-fetched at all. That’s all.
One of the People, when I don’t have an explicit decision while I’m thinking, I really do leave it to cook on its own.
Doesn’t it depend on the type of dilemma?
In a dilemma like pressing a button, is an explicit decision relevant?
It became an inflated discussion because it gives human beings the feeling that they are God, and that makes them feel good. In other words, pride, as usual, has puffed things up out of all proportion.
The question whether a person’s choices are free is a scientific question. And so far there is no scientific reason at all to think they are free. There is only an emotional or instinctual reason.
Rabbi Michi,
“Doesn’t it depend on the type of dilemma?
In a dilemma like pressing a button, is an explicit decision relevant?”
One of the People, what’s unclear? Pressing a button is not a decision. It’s picking, not choosing.
Is it possible to turn picking into choosing?
For example: in deliberating whether to press the button, I’ll stop, seriously weigh the sides—why to press and why not to press—and then I’ll make an informed decision. Would that count as choosing?
There are no sides here, so what exactly would you weigh? If there were meaningful sides, then of course it would be choosing.
All right, I think we’ve completely exhausted this.
Rabbi, there is such an experiment with that woman they brought you here,
https://rationalbelief.org.il/%D7%91%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%97%D7%A4%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D/
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%A7%D7%A8-%D7%94%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%91%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%AA
I know. I referred to that experiment not long ago, and I also discussed it in the last lecture I gave in the series on free choice.
Could I get a YouTube link to the lecture where you discussed Liad Mudrik’s experiment?
Lesson 11:
You argue (rightly) that a determinist has no real reason to decide to do anything, because even if he decides to lie in bed all day and stare at the ceiling, it turns out that he had to do that and had no other option.
And since you also agree that not all of our decisions are free, and some of them are deterministic, as in Libet’s example, do you think that in such cases we should simply do nothing? If someone asks me to press a button whenever I feel like it, would it be silly to decide when I feel like it and press?