Q&A: A Problem
A Problem
Question
Hello Rabbi,
It’s well known as a joke that a person who fills out a lottery ticket shouldn’t cross the street, because statistically his chance of being hit in a traffic accident is higher than his chance of winning, and if he buys a lottery ticket on that basis then he should be worried about that too.
My question is: is it actually rational to buy a lottery ticket and to cross the street?
Answer
Obviously. It’s not really a very good joke, but as a claim about reality it is certainly nonsense. A person weighs alternatives against one another. Suppose the chance of winning the lottery is X (tiny), and the chance of being harmed while crossing the street is also X. But buying the ticket comes with a chance of winning a very large amount of money, and with the hope of winning. Therefore I am willing to pay in order to have a chance to win. By contrast, when crossing the street, the alternative is not to cross streets at all—to live inside my house without moving. That is definitely worth the small risk to my life. What is inconsistent about that? Concern about a small probability depends on what stands against it.
See the beginning of Column 197, which I only just wrote, and the references there.
Discussion on Answer
Yosiphon
Think of it this way: what Rabbi Michi answered you is very similar to David Hume’s argument, and I don’t remember its formal wording. But his decisive blow against miracles was—as Rabbi Michi elaborated in his book Truth and Unstable—that one must compare the testimony-claim against its alternative. Indeed, it is not likely that testimony about a miracle that occurred in front of thousands of people is simply made up—but what is more likely? That such an event, which breaks all our understanding of reality and has no parallel at all in everyday life, really happened? Or that someone simply invented it through some distortion in the processes by which the story was transmitted, or something of that sort? Of course, the invention is far more plausible. (It follows that one who chooses not to doubt the revelation at Mount Sinai is like someone who remains shut up in his house and doesn’t cross the street lest he be run over. But someone who chooses not to believe in it at all is not open to the opportunity to win the lottery of his life: the possibility that the word of God is indeed accessible to us in some way…)
If a person likes risk (he gambles on the lottery), how is that supposed to lead him to avoid risk (crossing the street)?