Q&A: Vows
Vows
Question
Hello and blessings!
The Mishneh LaMelekh (Kings 10:7) is unsure whether an oath had binding force even before the giving of the Torah, and tends to say that it did. What is the initial reason to think that it did not? If so, why did the Holy One, blessed be He, swear to us when that still had no significance from the standpoint of Torah law?
Answer
The laws of oaths were introduced at the giving of the Torah as part of Jewish law. That is why he is unsure whether they had force beforehand. What he answers is precisely this: that we do in fact find oaths before that time. And the Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De’ah sec. 306 (who cites this Mishneh LaMelekh), explained that the intent is not to the ordinary Torah laws of oaths, but that there are laws of oaths whose basis is logical reasoning (that a person must keep his oaths). Otherwise, how could our obligation to the Torah be based on an oath, when an oath itself is part of Torah law?!
\I have discussed this at length in several places regarding a written oath (which is the Avnei Nezer’s topic there) and the oath of minors. See, for example, my article on logical inferences.
The Holy One, blessed be He, is not proof of anything. He is not bound by the giving of the Torah, and His oaths are not within the framework of Jewish law.
Discussion on Answer
Definitely possible.
Is there also room to view a vow as something binding by logical reasoning, and therefore also as having force before the giving of the Torah?
[Granted, the Avnei Nezer argues that the logic behind an oath is because there is an obligation toward another party, which does not apply to vows.] But perhaps one could say that “what leaves your lips you shall keep,” and the need to be truthful (which also applies to vows), was indeed enough to obligate even before the giving of the Torah—or not?
Based on this, I thought to explain the views of some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who claim that there is a difference between a vow with association, where there is actual legal effect, and a vow without association, which is only an obligation (the famous responsum of the Rosh and the Mishneh LaMelekh in the laws of misuse of consecrated property). After all, how do we know that there are two tracks in the Torah itself? In the Torah itself there would seemingly be one track, and then either way: if it works without association, then it should also have actual legal effect; and if the Torah meant without association, then that too should have actual legal effect.
Rather, one can say that the Torah really did mean association, and there it introduced that there is also actual legal effect, but it did not cancel the layer that existed for the Noahides, which is obligation alone (and association is not needed, because one is not drawing holiness), and therefore that too works.