Q&A: The Covenants for Observing the Commandments
The Covenants for Observing the Commandments
Question
What is the significance of making covenants with the Jewish people that they would keep the Torah? Suppose they had not made them—would they then not have been obligated? (And if indeed not, then how does that obligate us?)
And in general, what does obligation mean in this context? If God does not want it, and I see a problem in doing things that contradict His will, then even without the covenant it is forbidden. And to say that God's will is that someone who enters into a covenant should not eat pork, but that pork in itself is not absolutely forbidden, sounds strange to me, because that turns Him into someone with only one will—to uphold covenants. And if we say that the whole covenant is just about reward and punishment, then even about that one could ask: if He set a punishment for eating pork, what does obligation have to do with it? If you want to be punished, eat; if you don't want to be punished, don't eat.
I also don't really understand what the covenant justifies more than the forbidden act itself. What is the difference between the problematic nature of violating a covenant and violating the prohibition against eating pork, once I know that He regards it as something wrong…
Answer
There are quite a few questions here.
A. The covenant also obligates future generations, because the covenant was made with the people, not with the individuals who were present there. It is the same with state law. The law obligates the population even two hundred years later (unless it has been changed), even though they were not there. The entity that is obligated is the collective, not the collection of specific individuals, and therefore anyone who belongs to the collective is bound by it.
B. The Mishneh LaMelekh, in the laws of kings, asks: what is the point of the oath at Mount Sinai to uphold the Torah? (One is already sworn and standing bound—not that I know where there was even an oath there.) After all, the obligation to keep an oath is itself also part of the Torah. The answer is that the obligation to keep an oath exists even without the Torah. The Torah only adds a religious dimension to it (the prohibition of a negative commandment and a positive commandment). Therefore the covenant has force beyond the very understanding that it is wrong to act against His will, and even if I do not have such an understanding, once we have made a covenant it is not right to act that way.
C. Clearly there is something problematic about prohibitions even without the command, but without the command it is not a prohibition. There is no such law. I brought the example of a red traffic light. The punishment is not the point. At most it is an indication that there is an obligation. Someone who acts only out of considerations of reward and punishment—that is a completely different discussion, and for him the covenant is indeed less relevant.
Discussion on Answer
I agree, but in my opinion this does not answer the main difficulty.
The reason it is forbidden to violate the covenant even without the Torah is that it is not okay—call it not okay because God does not like people doing it, or not okay because it is simply not okay (it seems to me that according to your article "Without God, Is There Morality," you need the first side). Now once I know that God does not want us to eat pork, and that it is not okay to do things He does not like, then the thing is already problematic regardless of obligation.
And regarding A: do you think that when a people or a state accepts laws upon itself as a collective, the private individual who did not commit himself and was not present there is morally obligated? With state laws I understand it as a law that announces a punishment, but a moral problem created by other people's determination does not seem to me to exist.
Thanks.
I never manage to understand the analogy you make between state law and religious law.
It is true that formally there is something similar here (in both cases there is logic to preserving the framework), but on the essential level the difference is fundamental.
A state is a human-made framework, and without accepting the authority of its laws it would fall apart. Religion, by contrast, is based—or claims to be based—on eternal divine truth. Even if all believers turn their backs on it, the truth will remain valid forever (at least according to its own view).
From this enormous difference follow two additional differences that, in my opinion, completely undermine your analogy:
First, the authority of state laws is more severe, since obeying them is an existential condition (if there is no obedience, the state will fall apart, unlike religion);
Second, and in another sense, the authority of state laws is less severe, since they are not anchored in some "cosmic" truth like the one religion claims to represent. Therefore, in the case of religion, you cannot say that some group of people in history (for example, the Sages) has principled authority, formal or substantive, that binds the public—unless that group relies on the original religious truth, say the sacred scriptures. Of course, if that is what it does, then it is not correct to say that it is the source of authority; rather, the sacred scriptures are the source of authority.
There is another difference: "state" is written with an m, and "God" begins with an a. Why are these differences relevant to my claim?
TX, I do not understand your question.
You have convinced me.
You wrote regarding the law, "unless it has been changed." Is the fact that most Israelis do not observe the commandments (let us assume for the sake of discussion that this is the case) not some indication of such a change?