Q&A: If One Acted, It Is Not Effective — Regarding an Act Done on the Sabbath
If One Acted, It Is Not Effective — Regarding an Act Done on the Sabbath
Question
It is explained in the Talmud in Sabbath 101a, both regarding carrying between boats and regarding carrying between domains for which an eruv had been made before the Sabbath, and then the partitions or the connection between the boats came apart and were reconnected on the Sabbath, that this is effective with respect to the eruv.
A. Why is this not considered in the category of an act done on the Sabbath, especially according to the view that it is forbidden even if done unintentionally? (For the Talmud here at the end does make a distinction regarding intentional violation.)
B. After all, an eruv is a halakhic matter and not a factual one, so ostensibly the rule of “if one acted, it is not effective” should apply here, no?
I would note that the Talmud states the rule: “Any partition made on the Sabbath, whether unintentionally or intentionally, is considered a partition,” which implies that in the final analysis there is a factual partition here even though it was made through a prohibition. But perhaps this rule really applies only to laws that depend on the factual existence of a partition, and not to laws of partition such as eruv?
Answer
A. Who says this is not an act done on the Sabbath? What is written is that it is effective with respect to the eruv.
B. An eruv is not a halakhic matter but a factual one. Once there is an actual partition, there is a law that it is effective for an eruv. But the existence of the partition is a fact, and therefore “if one acted, it is not effective” does not apply here. The same is true of a partition formed by a doorway-frame, or by the principle of “raise the edge and extend upward,” or a crossbeam, and the like, which are “halakhic” partitions: we are dealing with a reality that Jewish law recognizes as a partition. “If one acted, it is not effective” does not apply in laws of this kind, but only in the imposition of halakhic legal effect.
Once I was bothered by the question of someone who judged a case on the Sabbath (there is a rabbinic prohibition against this) — why is his judgment valid? And similarly regarding someone who betrothed a woman on the Sabbath. See the end of Tractate Beitzah, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger there (he discusses why the judges are not considered wicked people, but it does not trouble him that their judgment was rendered on the Sabbath from the standpoint of “if one acted, it is not effective”). Perhaps one could distinguish between monetary law, where the judgment only reveals the law, and fines, where it actually brings the law into being. This requires much further analysis, and this is not the place.
Discussion on Answer
Oren, it seems from the Rabbi’s words that this rule does not apply to rabbinic law; see the end of his remarks.
Rabbi, is an eruv of courtyards also a factual matter and not a halakhic one?
The opposite. My remarks show that it does apply.
Opinions are divided on this. I just now found an article by my friend Rabbi Meir Berkowitz. See there at the beginning of chapter 8 for sources and a discussion precisely of the Talmudic passage I mentioned:
:http://www.rambish.org.il/journals/a/avnei_mishpat/vol014/avm01404.pdf
And what about eruv? Why is that not a halakhic matter but a factual one?
An eruv of courtyards, of course.
I didn’t say that an eruv of courtyards is a factual matter. Here it באמת isn’t clear to me. I tend to think that here too it is a factual matter, because if the houses are mixed together with one another, that is a factual status. But there is room to argue here.
The Talmudic passage here deals with an eruv of courtyards, so perhaps one can prove from there that it is indeed a factual matter.
But it dealt with erecting the partitions, not with placing the eruv itself. That is a different question. Erecting the partitions is certainly a factual matter.
The implication of erecting the partitions is the eruv, and the eruv depends on the law, doesn’t it?
(I feel like I’m missing something in the Rabbi’s words, and I can’t quite put my finger on the point.)
The existence of the partition is a fact. But the partition by itself is not an eruv, since one must place an eruv of courtyards. Placing the eruv effects the eruv, and here there is some sort of legal effect. So here I wondered whether perhaps “if one acted, it is not effective” would apply (if one placed the eruv through a prohibition). As for the partition, that is a factual question whether there is a courtyard here that requires / allows an eruv, and here “if one acted, it is not effective” does not apply.
Definitely, but here the Talmud discusses that the partition made on the Sabbath is effective even for an eruv of courtyards.
I explained that.
Does the Rabbi mean that the factual existence of the partition creates the law of the eruv? That is, the law depends on the facts?
Sorry for the pestering, I just feel like I still haven’t gotten it.
Yes.
Much appreciated!
Does the rule of “if one acted, it is not effective” also apply to rabbinic decrees, such as the prohibition against judging a case and betrothing on the Sabbath? Or only to Torah-level prohibitions?