Q&A: They Did Not Rule Jewish Law in Accordance with Rabbi Meir
They Did Not Rule Jewish Law in Accordance with Rabbi Meir
Question
In today’s Daf Yomi, Eruvin 46b, several rules are brought regarding how Jewish law is decided—the precedence rules between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yosei—and the Talmud is uncertain what the law is when there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir; the Talmud leaves it unresolved.
Rabbi Michael Abraham has mentioned more than once the Talmud above on 13b, that the reason they did not rule like Rabbi Meir was because of his great stature, and they could not fully grasp his reasoning. If so, I do not understand why there is any room for uncertainty when the dispute is between him and Rabbi Shimon. After all, Rabbi Meir’s words are in any case beyond our understanding, aren’t they?
Answer
I asked there: if he was so great, why didn’t they always rule like him? If they didn’t understand, then apparently he is right even if they don’t understand. Therefore I argued that decisors do not rule according to the objective truth but according to what they understand. So there is no connection to the issue here.
However, the very existence of such rules seemingly contradicts what I said, since we see that they do not rule according to the truth and what they understand. But that is not so, because all these rules are intended only for someone who has no independent position in the passage under discussion.
Beyond that, already in Kovetz Shiurim on Bava Batra (if I remember correctly, siman 272) he addressed these rules and proved that they were established based on who is right, and are not merely procedural tie-breaking rules. His proof is based on the Talmud’s question here (the names are only examples): if the law follows Rabbi Shimon against Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Yosei against Rabbi Yehuda, then it should follow Rabbi Shimon against Rabbi Yehuda. That is, the Talmud assumes these rules should be transitive—that is, based on who is greater.
Discussion on Answer
I wrote that if you have a position of your own, then there is no need for rules. Rule according to your understanding. The rules are for someone who has no position. So if you understand Rabbi Shimon, that does not mean you agree with him.
The Maharik (Shoresh 165):
“In my humble opinion, it appears that throughout the Talmud, when it rules that in a dispute between so-and-so and so-and-so the Jewish law follows so-and-so, it is not because the masters of the Talmud fully penetrated every single dispute and determined that the law should be decided in accordance with the one they ruled like. For the sages of the Talmud could not put their heads between the rocky crags of the disputes of the Tannaim and Amoraim in every place and know, in detail, with whom the law lies in every case. Rather, they followed the majority pattern—for example, if they saw that one tanna was sharper than his colleague or had received more from his teachers, and likewise among the amoraim—and on that basis they relied to rule the law in accordance with him… And the sages of the Talmud had the authority to establish the laws as seemed right in their eyes… The laws were established only in matters that needed to be established, such as laws that were practiced in the days of the sages of the Talmud. But regarding the laws of leprosy-like afflictions and the like, which were not practiced from that time on, they did not establish Jewish law for them and did not speak of them at all by saying, ‘In a dispute between so-and-so and so-and-so, the law follows so-and-so.’”
From the question of Rabbi Matya ben Heresh’s students in Me’ilah 17, “Does Bar Yochai know this?”, it seems that Rabbi Shimon was not viewed as the sharpest. A great righteous man, and certainly an authoritative channel in transmitting the Oral Torah, but not the sharpest Torah scholar.
By the way, a literary analysis of that story, in line with the literary analyses of aggadic literature in our generation, points to the characteristic reversal in rabbinic stories: Rabbi Shimon is critical of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Yosei as someone who issues a halakhic ruling in the presence of his teacher, but in practice Rabbi Shimon quotes Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Yosei. In other words, Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Yosei is the teacher, and Rabbi Shimon the student.
In Tosafot on the words “If only,” there is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot whether Rabbi’s authority vis-à-vis Rabbi Yosei is formal (Rashi) or substantive, because he was sharper (Tosafot). According to Tosafot, it is clear that the law follows Rabbi against his colleagues because he was sharper, and apparently the law likewise follows Rabbi Akiva against his colleagues for the same reason.
This dichotomy is not so sharp. Even when they formally establish the law like someone, that is probably based on the fact that he is sharper or more expert in the field in question. On that basis, they establish a formal rule that the law follows him.
Still, when there is a clash between Rabbi Meir, whose reasoning they could not fully grasp, and Rabbi Shimon, whose view they do understand, autonomy requires ruling in accordance with what one understands—that is, like Rabbi Shimon. So why, then, is the issue left unresolved?
It seems to me you did not address this point.